The background of the cover is a blue-toned map with a grid of latitude and longitude lines. Overlaid on the map are various handwritten Latin phrases in a cursive script. Some legible fragments include "A. G. 1094", "particularis", "mittum, circa", "concur", "unde Prætor", and "Exhibens".

DRAGO ROKSANDIĆ
NATAŠA ŠTEFANEC
(EDS.)

**CONSTRUCTING
BORDER
SOCIETIES
ON THE
TRIPLEX
CONFINIUM**

**CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY BUDAPEST
HISTORY DEPARTMENT
WORKING PAPER SERIES 4**

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**INTERNATIONAL PROJECT CONFERENCE PAPERS 2
“PLAN AND PRACTICE. HOW TO CONSTRUCT A BORDER SOCIETY?
THE TRIPLEX CONFINIUM C. 1700–1750”
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PREFACE

Thanks to the financial support and readiness of the CEU History Department it was possible to publish research papers presented at the Second International Conference of the Triplex Confinium Research Project in the fourth volume of the History Department Working Paper Series. The conference itself, *Plan and Practice: How to Construct a Border Society? The Triplex Confinium (cca. 1700–1750)*, took place in Meerscheinschlößl in Graz on December 9–12, 1998, hosted by the Department for Southeast European Studies of the Graz University and financed mainly by the CEU. The organisation of the Conference was the accomplishment of Karl Kaser and Hannes Grandits.

This volume appears as the second one in the Triplex Confinium Series, after publishing the first volume (*Microhistory of the Triplex Confinium*. CEU Institute on Southeastern Europe. Budapest, 1998) comprising research papers presented at the First International Project Conference held in Budapest on March 21–22, 1997. Hopefully, this edition will be followed by the third one based on contributions to the Third International Triplex Confinium Conference “Eco-history of the Triplex Confinium (c. 1500–1800)” that was held in Zadar (Croatia) on May 3–7, 2000.

In the meantime, due to continuous project activities and in particular, due to the research work in Croatia, Hungary, Austria, Italy, Turkey and some other countries, some other project publications and activities have also been achieved. The scientific colloquia and the opening of the exhibition *Cartographic Sources for the History of the Triplex Confinium* held in Zagreb on October 29, 1999, resulted with an exhibition catalogue realized by Mirela Slukan. *Kartografski izvori za povijest Triplex Confiniuma – Cartographic Sources for the History of the Triplex Confinium – Kartographische Quellen zur Geschichte des Triplex Confinium*. Hrvatski državni arhiv & Zavod za hrvatsku povijest Odsjeka za povijest Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu. Zagreb, 1999, pp. 142 + 16 illustrations. The proceedings from the colloquia are waiting to be published in the ensuing number of *Radovi Zavoda za povijest Filozofskog fakulteta* (Vol. 31. Zagreb, 2000). The same exhibition was presented to the CEU academic community in April 2000.

An important source on Dalmatian Military Border was also published by Drago Roksandić & Olga Diklić (*Priručnik o vojnim krajinama u Dalmaciji* (Summario a materia di Craine). Ljetopis Srpskog kulturnog društva Prosvjeta. Zagreb, 1999, 11–41. Furthermore, Karl Kaser, Hannes Grandits and Siegfried Gruber realised a computer research and statistical elaboration of a land survey

Conscriptio terrenorum et hominum beeder graffschafften Licca und Corbavia – 1712 (the original manuscript contains circa 1200 pages) that will be published on CD-rom during year 2000.

We would like especially to thank Stefan Halikowski Smith from the CEU History Department, who revised all the texts included into this volume. In permanent consultations with the authors, he contributed substantially to our own efforts to present a volume that would be consistent and coherent both linguistically and in essence. We also owe Borivoj Dovniković-Bordo many thanks for his cover design.

We owe our deepest gratitude to the Rector of the Central European University Professor Yehuda Elkana and to the Head of the CEU History Department Professor László Kontler for making this publication possible, as well as for the support to the entire “Triplex Confinium Project.”

Zagreb, 6 November 2000

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TRIPLEX CONFINIUM IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

ABSTRACT

This essay is divided into three parts: an outline of the contours of comparative frontier history; a Eurasian type of frontier; and a specific comparison of the triplex confinium in southeast Europe with a similar three-sided frontier in the Caucasus. In the first section several important frontier types are defined. First, there is the relatively stable as opposed to the military frontier. Second, three different methodological models are noted: the single historical experience of a frontier, e.g. the American; the ideal type; and the empirical comparison of two similar frontier experiences. The second section deals with six variables of the Eurasian type of frontier. The third section give a detailed comparison from the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century of the Ottoman-Iranian-Russian frontier in the Caucasus and the relationship between the great power rivalry and the socio-economic life of the region. A conclusion seeks to weigh the similarities and differences between the two triple frontiers and points to the need for further research.

Living in an age of vanished empires the peoples of east central Europe have struggled throughout the twentieth century to draw and maintain the boundaries of new states. It has been a time reminiscent of the seventeenth century about which Lucien Febvre wrote: "Fear at all times, fear in all places," a time when it appeared that stable frontiers would somehow provide a greater sense of security from the chaos of war and revolution that threatened to break down all organized society. The task of delimiting the sovereignty of new states, in 1919, 1945 and 1989 has been immensely complicated by the histories, real and invented, of older boundary lines and the societies which evolved in the disputed lands between rival empires unconstrained in their expansion by pre-established ethno-linguistic or even religious lines. By the mid-fifteenth century, all along the adjacent edges of the Habsburg, Venetian, Ottoman, Polish-Lithuanian, Russian and Persian Empires there came into existence a series of frontier zones where it was increasingly difficult to make clear distinctions between the peoples and cultures under the control of the rival powers or outside their control in disputed territories. Compared to the states of western and northern Europe the process of drawing and redrawing frontiers in East Central Europe, despite similar problems in creating homogenous societies on opposite sides, was more problematic and long-lasting. The fact that at the end of the twentieth cen-

ture major territorial disputes continue to plague the successor states in South-eastern and Eastern Europe suggests that the history of imperial frontiers and their legacy has some bearing on contemporary politics.

Recent studies of the long disputed frontier between the Venetian, Habsburg and Ottoman Empires – the Triplex Confinium – has already shed much light on the great difficulties of drawing stable boundaries in the region even after several centuries. In such studies, however, the question arises whether this region exhibited a set of geographic and cultural conditions that were so particular for their time that they amount to a unique phenomenon in the history of frontiers. Such a question can only be approached, if not definitively answered by broadening its context, in short invoking comparative history. The use of comparative history in studying different frontier zones and frontier societies raises the persistent methodological problem of selecting the appropriate object of comparison.

COMPARATIVE FRONTIER HISTORY – A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

It is not always possible in comparative history to follow to the letter Marc Bloch's formula for the most productive outcome. Simultaneity in time and proximity in space of the two societies being compared are the necessary prerequisites for avoiding historical anachronisms and correcting for mutual influence. They have been found to provide the deepest insights when applied to an analysis of large scale social transformations such as feudalism.¹ In a comparative study of other kinds of phenomenon, these prerequisites may lose some of their essential quality. For example, in the study of frontier societies, it is necessary to address not only the question of social change but of imperial politics. It is here that history from below – the interaction of autonomous actors in the contested field located between well organized states – and history from above – the plans and policies of ruling elites – meet and often clash. In the case of a complex frontier where a multiplicity of cultures coexist and the imperial rivalry is more than two-sided, it is these elements that must be given equal prominence in the analysis with simultaneity and proximity even at the expense of the latter.

Recent studies of frontiers in history have dispelled the oversimplified image of linear boundaries separating distinctive cultures even though most of them have focused their attention on a two-sided interaction which characterize the societies of western Europe and the colonial world. In Sahlin's deservedly famous study of the Franco-Spanish boundary, national identity is perceived as the result of a complex interaction of ethnicity, topography and politics in frontier territory. It was a two way even dialectical process. The state sought to impose a clear-cut boundary in order to delimit its sovereign power and establish the rights and obligations of its citizens. The local inhabitants of the Pyrenees defined their own social and territorial boundaries repeatedly employing the au-

¹ Marc Bloch. "A Contribution Towards a Comparative History of European Societies." in Marc Bloch. *Land and Work in Medieval Europe*. New York-Evanston. 44–81.

thority of the center against the “other” but at the same time resisting the centralizing state by invoking its specific regional interests. In the end, they were able to preserve a their own unique sense of regional identity and sense of place while at the same time defining themselves as Frenchmen or Spaniards.²

Important as these insights are for an understanding of the zonal as opposed to the boundary concept of frontiers, the Franco-Spanish case study does not offer a sufficient number of comparable variable for our comparative purposes. It was fixed by international treaty, long-established, indeed one of the oldest well-defined political boundaries in Europe. Although the topography was suited to armed resistance by the local inhabitants to the authority of a central power, there was no tradition of continuous irregular warfare or social banditry in the region. It was a mixed ethno-linguistic but not a religious frontier. There was no competing third imperial power which would disrupt the long-standing political arrangements or serve as a resource for the local population in offering resistance to either of the hegemonic centers in Madrid and Paris.

In contrast to this type of relatively stable frontier, for all its internal dynamics and processes of change, there are the movable military frontiers of western European societies in contact with nomadic or semi-nomadic populations in colonial settings. These include the frontiers in North America, South Africa, Australia and North Africa.³ But while they display certain characteristics similar to those of the Triplex Confinium and while much is to be learned from borrowing several concepts developed by students of these frontiers, they are sufficiently different in a number of important features so as to disqualify them as objects of detailed comparison.

In building a model of comparative frontier societies in which Triplex Confinium has a legitimate place, it is important, I think, to avoid two kinds of approaches. The first is to take the historical experience of one frontier, all too often this has been the American frontier because of the powerful historiographical tradition that has developed around it, as the model that provides the structure of the analysis. To be sure recent interpretations of the American West have provided fresh methodological insights into the nature of frontier societies. But most of American frontier history has concentrated on its contribution to the formation of an American identity.⁴ The second is to take an abstract model, or ideal type, of what a complex frontier society might be like. The problem here is that complex frontiers, unlike social institutions like bureaucracies which lend themselves well to this method, are phenomena that have acquired multiple meanings as place, process and myth so that any attempt to define its ideal characteristics runs into a methodological morass. By contrast my approach is to build up a model on the basis of empirical investigation of several apparently similar historical examples in order to arrive at a rough hierarchy of similarities and differences that may help to place Triplex in a spectrum of complex frontiers, illuminating its unique and specific features.

² Peter Sahlins. *Boundaries. The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*. Berkeley, 1989.

³ M. Foucher. *Fronts et frontieres. Un tour du monde geopolitique*. Paris, 1991.

⁴ A recent survey of the vast literature on the American frontier is G.D. Nash. *Creating the West: Historical Interpretations, 1880–1990*. Alberquerque, 1991. An example of the shift in conceptualizing the frontier in terms of process instead of place is W. Cronon – G. Miles – J. Gittlin. *Under an Open Sky: Rethinking America's Western Past*. New York, 1992.

A EURASIAN MODEL

In search of general structural terms-geographic, power relationships, cultures and population movements – we may begin by examining the early modern history of the broad band of territory where contacts between nomadic or semi-nomadic and settled populations were undergoing a transformation that would lead to the political and military hegemony by large polyethnic empires engaged in a prolonged context for control over the intermediate space which separated their ethno-religio-linguistic core areas. In geographic terms these territories comprise a wide arc of varying depth stretching from the Baltic Sea through the eastern marches of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the western borderlands of Muscovy (after 1701 the Russian Empire), along the Pontic steppes into the Caucasian knot and rounding the southern shore of the Caspian into Inner Asia and the northern tier of the Chinese Empire. It is the meeting ground of multiple ecologies and cultures. Through this territory passed the great overland trade routes from East to West. The vast grasslands that extend from the highlands of Inner Asia to the Danubian lands and North German plain have provided the main avenue of large scale population migrations and nomadic empire building for two thousand years. With the relative decline in the military hegemony of the mounted horseman, the effect of ravaging plague and the shift in global trade routes these territories underwent a slow and uneven decline in resources and a loss of political hegemony over the settled populations on their peripheries.

As power relationships changed over the long period from the mid-fourteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, the nomadic peoples – Turks and Manchus – undertook their last great military campaigns to conquer the sedentary empires – Byzantine, Persian and Chinese; at the same time their expansion stunted the political growth of the medieval the South Slavic and Hungarian kingdoms and exposed the southern frontiers of Muscovy to constant and damaging raiding parties. They acquired dynastic status in Constantinople, Isfahan and Peking. The Hapsburg and Russian empires developed in part to check the further advance of the conquest states. By the end of the seventeenth century they were both engaged in a prolonged conflict with the Ottoman Turks in order to drive them back and to secure their own porous and unstable frontiers.

These complex processes produced a series of similar phenomena throughout the borderlands that separated the competing empires and were gradually absorbed by them. First, the competing empires – Habsburg, Ottoman, Polish-Lithuanian, Muscovite-Russian, Safavid and Qing, – were all polyethnic and multi-religious from a very early period in their existence. An inner fairly cohesive core – German, Turkic, Polish, Russian, Persian and Han – were surrounded by peoples of different ethno-linguistic and frequently religious composition so that the boundaries of the outer periphery of the empires cut through and divided similar social, religious and ethnic groups. As a result the peoples on the periphery had more in common with one another across the political boundary lines than with the peoples of the core areas. Their loyalties were often ambivalent and at no time more than during imperial warfare. And their reactions to the conquering power ranged from varied forms of accommodation – accultura-

tion, assimilation, cooperation to similarly varied forms of resistance from illegal trading, evasion of taxes, flight and banditry to open rebellion which and in the period beyond 1800 took the form of national liberation movements.

By virtue of their ecologies and cultural dispositions, the peoples of the borderlands were involved in large scale population movements long after this phenomenon had virtually disappeared from northern and western Europe. The meridional seasonal movement of transhumance characteristic of the grasslands and high lands was periodically supplemented by mass migrations of peoples moving from east to west under pressure of climatic factors or driven by new combinations of tribal confederacies under a charismatic leader. The repercussions extended deep into the eastern and southeastern part of what was coming to be known as Europe. The newly emerging empires of Eurasia, especially the Russian, Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman, engaged in various forms of deportation or resettlement and colonization as part of their imperial mission. These population shifts increased the ethno-religio-linguistic mix of peoples in the borderlands, created islands of isolated groups, and further blurred the cultural meaning of political frontiers.

In attempting to deal with the complex problems of maintaining security and administering the borderlands, the individual imperial governments undertook a wide range of policies. Planning alternated with improvisation. Much depended on the ambitions and talents of the local commanders and officials in addition to the changes in the personal styles of leadership at the imperial centers. Emphasis could shift, often rapidly, from policies of conciliation, cooptation of local elites and economic privileges to harsh discipline and punitive measures. The dynamic of the political interrelationships between center and periphery precludes easy generalization.

In the early modern period, complex Eurasian frontiers in exhibited a general set of ecological and cultural factors that may be summarized as: 1) military contest zones of rival multi-cultural empires edged by heterogenous frontiers surrounding more homogenous core areas; 2) meeting grounds of settled and semi-nomadic or nomadic populations and of mixed ethno-linguistic and religious groups; 3) varied forms of accommodation and cross border encounters by the indigenous people of military, economic and socio-cultural kinds; 4) a comparatively high level of population movement ranging from migration to deportation and resettlement. 5) ambiguous loyalties on the part of the peoples of the frontier zones; 6) inconsistent policies on the part of the central imperial administration oscillating between concessions and repression in order to maintain security and stability in the borderlands.

Combinations of these six elements have appeared periodically throughout the peripheries of the Eurasian borderlands which, to repeat have extended at times deep into east central and southeast Europe. But they register a high level of incidence for prolonged periods in five complex eco-cultural frontier regions: the Habsburg-Venetian-Ottoman (Triplex Confinium), the Habsburg-Hungarian-Ottoman (Transylvania), the Polish-Russian-Ottoman (Pontic Steppe), the Russian-Ottoman-Iranian (the Caucasian knot) and the Russian-Mongol-Han Chinese (Inner Asian). Returning to questions of methodology, it should be stated at this point that preliminary empirical study of these regions yielded the six

prominent characteristics listed above and not the reverse process. To be sure, not all of the five regions exhibited these characteristics to the same degree. Moreover, a more specific study of each characteristic in its regional setting reveals other differences that complicate the comparative task. But it is a normal outcome in comparative studies that as the focus shifts to the micro-analytical level the more dissimilarities appear between the objects of comparison. They must be acknowledged without, however, diminishing the importance of the middle range generalizations which have been established on the basis of some of the same data.

In the absence of comparable available documentary evidence and a rigorous comparative research effort, it is only possible to suggest a rough hierarchy of similarity among the five case studies. In my view the Caucasian knot and the Pontic steppe offer greater similarities to Triplex Confinium than Transylvania and Inner Asia. In the first four cases the confrontation between the Islamic and Christian powers was a unifying factor, although it must be kept in mind that rivalries within Islam, between Sunnis and Shi'ites and within Christianity, among Roman Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox often provided opportunities for cross-faith alliances and alignments. The strongest elements linking the western Balkans and the Caucasus is the ecology of mountains and seas.⁵ The mountains divided peoples, threw up obstacles to conquest and provided refuge for the defeated; the seas drew people together through trade but also provided a different arena of competition. This is not to deny the value of comparing the more dissimilar examples as a means of appreciating the importance of certain specific characteristics in a different context. But for the purposes of this essay, the comparison will be restricted to the Caucasian case.

A TRIPLEX CONFINIUM IN THE CAUCASUS

The independent states of the Transcaucasus which by the fifteenth century had been severely weakened by eight successive nomadic incursions of the Mongols and a serious outbreak of the plague, were, thereby rendered vulnerable to the imperial advances in the early sixteenth century by the Ottomans to the west and the Iranians to the east. The Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran were both Islamic "military patronage states", in the words of Marshall Hodgson, which, although nomadic in origins themselves, had acquired advanced administrative-bureaucratic ruling institutions, superior military technology especially in the use of artillery and a rich resource base with surplus food production and precious metals which they both plundered and taxed.⁶

⁵ For suggestive comparisons of similar Mediterranean mountain and seas scapes see John R. McNeill. *The Mountains of the Mediterranean World*. Cambridge, 1992.

⁶ Marshall G. S. Hodgson. *The Venture of Islam*. Chicago, 1974, III, 13, 18, 25–6; Halil Inalcik. *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age, 1300–1600*. London, 1973, 7–8, 21, 23, passim; Halil Inalcik. "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700." in *Archivum Ottomanicum*. Vol. 6 (1980); Roger Savory. *Iran under the Safavids*. Cambridge, 1980, 37–49, 77–83.

At the outset of their great contest which last two hundred years they were, however, unevenly matched. The Ottoman Empire had earlier than its rival mastered the use of firearms, siege warfare and disciplined infantry tactics. Moreover, the Ottomans had built a relatively more centralized state in which the nomadic spirit had been largely brought under control. On the other hand, the very loose organization of the Iranian state gave it a temporary moral advantage, particularly along the volatile frontier between the two empires.

As a result of the Mongol policy of incorporating nomadic and semi-nomadic Turkic tribes in their armies and empire, there was a widely diffused pattern of Turkic tribes scattered from the Central Asian oases to the old frontiers of Byzantium. While part of these tribes in eastern Anatolia had been incorporated into the Ottoman Empire, others like the Kizilbash (“redheads” because of their red turbans) Turcomen tribes remained true to their nomadic heritage and were only superficially Islamicized. They attracted those discontented elements in Ottoman society who resented constraints on their mobility imposed by the central power in Istanbul. It was an ironic reversal of the situation on the Hungarian military frontier where the Ottoman Empire provided a protective umbrella for all kinds of dissenting elements.⁷ In the late fifteenth century they rallied to the banner of Shah Ismail Safavid who took power in Iran and the Azeri speaking provinces on the south western shore of the Caspian (Azerbaijan). His exploits incited uprisings within the Ottoman Empire among the Kizilbashi who regarded Azerbaijan under his leadership as the ideal Turkic state where syncretic religious practices prevailed that blending pre-Islamic local beliefs with elements of shamanism from the steppes under the thin veneer of Islam; this was the old tradition which they venerated in opposition to the increasingly bureaucratized and centralized administration of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Ottoman sultan Selim I, condemned Ismail as a Shiite heretic, the beliefs of the Kizilbashi were still a far cry from the Twelver Sh’ia that much later became the religious line between Ottoman Turkey and Safavid Iran. In fact, Ismail “thought in Turkic as a Turk” illustrating once again the danger of attributing latter day religious or ethno-national allegiances to figures and movements of the early modern period.⁸

After half a century of warfare the Iranians and Ottomans overwhelmed the three indigenous Georgian kingdoms and in 1555 divided the region into spheres of influence. This did not bring an end to the resistance of the Georgian princes nor to the campaigning of the Turks. Rather it inaugurated the first active phase in the three sided rivalry among the Ottoman Empire, Safavid Iran and Muscovy. The Russian conquest of the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1555 created problems for the Ottoman Empire. It opened the way for Russian commerce with the Middle East and the penetration of the Caucasus. Control of Astrakhan also interrupted the overland trading caravans and the annual pilgrimages from Central Asia to the Ottoman territories. It was important for the Otto-

⁷ Carl Max Kortepeter. *Ottoman Imperialism During the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus*. London, 1973, 236–237.

⁸ Jean-Louis Bacque-Grammont. “L’apogée de l’empire ottoman: les événements (1512–1606)” in Robert Mantran (ed.). *Histoire de l’empire ottoman*. Paris, 1989, 142–43.

mans to keep contacts with their Sunni brethren among the Uzbeks on the Iranian northern flank and to maintain a direct commercial link with the Far East in the face of the virtual blockade by the Spanish and Portuguese of the sea born traffic through the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Moreover, Ivan IV's support of the English Muscovy Company in seeking an all alternative all water route to the silk trade of Iran foreshadowed a Muscovy-Iranian alliance that would have challenged the Ottomans on two fronts. His marriage to a Kabardian princess and establishment of a Cossack settlement and fort on the Terek River to support his father in law on in the east Caucasus threatened Ottoman supply routes across the steppe.⁹

Ottoman plans to dominate the Caucasus isthmus and the inland Black and Caspian seas revolved around an ambitious and abortive attempt to build a Volga-Don Canal and, in 1569 an equally abortive attempt to storm the fortress of Astrakhan. The Ottomans carried out a dual campaign to eliminate both the Russians and the Iranians from the Caucasus. They employed their Crimean Tatar and Nogai allies to defeat and expel the overextended Russians from Kabardia and six years later in 1578 launched a thirteen year war against Iran. Although by 1590 the Ottomans succeeded in driving the Iranians out of the Caucasus, they only gained a Pyrrhic victory. To be sure they demonstrated the superiority of their military technology and they constructed three great fortresses at Kars, Erivan and Tabriz, the latter deep in Iranian territory, that together with Astrakhan created a bent triangle of fortresses defining the outer limits of the contest zone.¹⁰ But their communication line were stretched over the wild terrain of the Caucasus mountains, exposed to guerilla warfare and raiding by local chieftains. No sooner had they achieved a foothold on the Caspian than they set about building a fleet. But they failed to stay on the western shore long enough to dominate the valuable trade in carpets and silks. The revival of Iranian power in the early seventeenth century owed much to the redoubtable Shah Abbas who reorganized the state on the Ottoman model, acquired Western military technology and drove the Ottomans out of the eastern Caucasus.

Continuous warfare had a devastating effect upon the region. Whole areas were depopulated, others were resettled mainly by the Iranians who deported large numbers of Armenians and Georgians who opposed them. The Caucasus was further fragmented political units into Christian kingdoms and Muslim khanates that gave external powers ample opportunities for further intervention. Throughout the wars the three expansionist empires had sought to form alliances with the mountain people; the Kabardians split permanently into pro-Muscovite and pro-Ottoman camps; the Iranians used the Kurds in order to resettle areas as far away as Khorasan. Embattled local Christian princes in the Transcaucasus also perceived in Muscovy a counterweight to the two Muslim powers, then more clearly defined as Sunni Ottomans and Shiite Iranians. A pattern began to emerge of the indigenous leaders appealing or allying themselves first with one then with another of the competing powers to maintain their own

⁹ Kortepeter, 1973, 28–9, 32, 45.

¹⁰ Christopher Duffy. *Siege Warfare: the Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494–1660*. London, 1979, 208–09.

autonomy. Religion was frequently but not always the rallying point. For example, when in the early sixteenth century Iranian power revived under Shah Abbas, the Georgian princes sought his aid in order to free themselves from Ottoman control when it became clear that the Russians, absorbed in their own long period of domestic strife (the Time of Troubles) were unable to render any substantial aid.

In the course of their long duel with the Ottoman, the Iranians sought to gain European support in order to force their rivals into campaigning simultaneously on two widely dispersed fronts, as indeed the Ottomans attempted to draw France into an anti-Habsburg alliance. The early Safavids sought an alliance with Venice aimed at obtaining much needed artillery against the superior firepower of the Ottomans; the later Safavids negotiated for an alliance with Charles V and Shah Abbas in 1599 approached Vienna.¹¹

The Iranian revival cost the indigenous peoples of the Caucasus dearly. Taking advantage of defections to their ranks of leading Georgian nobles they undertook to impose their own Muslim candidates on local thrones, launch a massive deportation of the Kakhetian people in eastern Georgia and replace them with Turkomen nomads. Despite the repartition of the Transcaucasus between the Ottoman and Iranian Empires in the 1620's resistance to both continued, punitive reprisals increase in ferocity and the entire economic structure of western Georgia collapsed. The Armenian population was also once again severely reduced. A large scale emigration launched the Armenian diaspora. Statistics are hard to come by. But what had been an Armenian majority in eastern Armenia in the mid-fourteenth century had shrunk by the early nineteenth century to about twenty per cent of the population of the area. Muslims constituted eighty per cent.¹² Once again the conquered Christian Georgians divided their allegiances. In the west much of the severely reduced population was Islamicized; in the east many of the local leaders entered Iranian service while a few placed their hopes on distant Muscovy and in extremis voluntarily emigrated to the north.

The competition among the three empires and the resistance of local princes entered a new phase following one of the periodic declines of Iranian power. As a competitor with the Ottoman Empire and Russia Iran suffered from the continuous presence of a very large nomadic Turkomen population. At times under inspired leadership such as Shah Abbas, they were a military asset, but their unpredictable and turbulent nature ill-fitted them to serve as disciplined citizens of a bureaucratic empire. Both the Ottomans and the Russians under the vigorous leadership of Peter I (the Great) took advantage of the Safavid decline. In 1722 Peter led the first large scale Russian invasion of the region, moving down the western shore of the Caspian, driving the Iranian forces in front of him. The Ottomans simultaneously renewed their advance from the west. One of the local Georgian kings, Vakhtang, who had reluctantly converted to Islam,

¹¹ Inalchik, 1973, 32-3, 38, 42.

¹² George A. Bournetunian. "The Ethnic Composition and the Socio-Economic Condition of Eastern Armenia in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century." in Ronald Grigor Suny. *Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change. Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia*. Revised edition. Ann Arbor, 1996, 77-8.

renounced the faith and sought to raise the Georgian and Armenian Christians against their Iranian overlord. The Russian army fought its way down the coastal plain but was unable to penetrate the mountains and rescue Vakhtang and his rebels from the advancing Ottomans. Vakhtang and a thousand of the Georgian elite fled to Russia and entered Russian service. As had happened so frequently in the previous two centuries, the victorious empires, in this case the Ottomans and Russians agreed to partition the Caucasus at the expense of Iran. The treaty of 1724 gave the Ottomans all the Georgian kingdoms and western Azerbaijan while leaving the Russians in control of the west and south coast of the Caspian. Once again, however, neither of the victorious sides could maintain its position. The Russians were plagued by the persistent problems of lengthy supply routes exposed to attacks by mountaineers and disease in the malaria infested lowlands which carried off 100,000 Russians between 1722 and 1735.¹³ To be sure, the main victims were, as usual, the indigenous peoples who were forced to throw in their lot with one or another of the competing powers and then, as a rule, be exploited or abandoned by them.

The periodic revival of Iran, this time under Shah Tahmasp and Nadir Shah, confronted the Russians with the alternative of a large scale campaign to maintain their position or withdrawal. By the treaty of 1732 the Russians renounced all their authority south of the Kura River and three years later their forces were back on the Terek. Throughout the thirties, forties and fifties of the eighteenth century the hapless Georgian principalities of Imeretia and Kartli vainly appealed for aid from Russia which rebuffed them for fear of a strong Ottoman reaction against them on the long unsettled southern frontier with the Crimean Tatars. Another half century would pass before the Russians were able to reenter the competition in force. In the meantime, a see-saw struggle between the Ottomans and Iranians continued until the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 enabled the Iranians' east Georgian royal clients to undertake a rebuilding of a Georgian state.

During the eighteenth century the return of the Russian in force to the region was marked by repeated disappointments and betrayals of the local population but it became clear to the rulers of Georgia that their best hope for revival lay to the north. The depredations of the Iranians continued to disrupt Georgian economic life, while trade with Astrakhan grew in importance. In the late seventies Catherine II (the Great), increasingly under the influence of the ambitious empire builder, Prince Potemkin, was drawn more and more into the Caucasus. His ambition was to create Georgian and Armenian states under Russian tutelage, but Russian protection of the Christian population was highly opportunistic and was never allowed to interfere with official policy.¹⁴

Potemkin proceeded against the Kabardians in the east more systematically than any of his predecessors. He sought to build up the Caucasian Line defenses to protect the Russian settlements against both Ottoman and mountaineer attacks. In addition to creating new forts he gave land grants to impoverished no-

¹³ Muriel Atkin. "Russian Expansion in the Caucasus to 1813." in Michael Rywkin. *Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917*. London - New York, 1988, 151.

¹⁴ Muriel Atkin. *Russia and Iran, 1780-1828*. Minneapolis, 1980, 24, 29-31.

bles and settled state peasants and retired soldiers in the forts and settlements around them. The Kabardians responded by pulling up stakes and fleeing to Ottoman territory or to the more remote mountain areas. But the pressure of large numbers of Russian troops and the absence of any external countervailing force obliged them to make peace. It was a characteristic frontier peace requiring the Kabardian chiefs to take an oath of loyalty pay tribute and provide livestock and food for Russian troops. The Kabardian princes were required to refrain from opposing the settlement of their countrymen on the Caucasian Line and the Russians used this clause to encourage migration to the Russian side in order to weaken unity and hostility of the Kabardian elite.¹⁵

It was only in the early 1780's that Catherine finally extended a protectorate over Georgia, founded the fortress of Vladikavkaz as the northern terminus of the Georgian Military highway which provided a strategic and commercial link between Russian territory and embattled Georgia. But even she discovered that under pressure from the Ottomans on the western shores of the Black Sea the Russians could not maintain their commitments to Georgia. The evacuation of their troops in 1787 and again in 1797 resulted in harsh punitive incursions by the Iranians. Finally, in 1801 Alexander I concluded without consulting the Georgian ruler that the country should be incorporated into the Russian Empire. This decision gave a fresh impetus to Russian efforts to advance their fortified line in the North Caucasus in order to secure a stable frontier against the mountaineer tribes. The history of the Caucasian Military Line grows out of the triple imperial competition for the Transcaucasus but develops along a different trajectory facilitating a more direct comparison with the military frontier of Triplex Confinium.

The three way competition of the Ottoman, Iranian and Russian empires for control over the Transcaucasus created one kind of frontier society composed of small kingdoms and khanates which more or less successfully sought to maintain some measure of local control over their societies. Like triplex confinium in the western Balkans the outcome had a great deal to do with the emergence of the small multi-cultural provinces and proto-states of the modern period. But the wars of conquest, large scale exchanges of territory and forced population movements in the Transcaucasus prevented the establishment of a stable military line dividing a frontier zone which permitted long term contact between the competing powers on the one hand and the indigenous population on the other.

A different though related frontier emerged north of the great Caucasus mountain chain where the Ottoman Russian competition, with the Iranians only indirectly involved, encountered the highly militarized cultures of the Terek Cossacks and the mountain peoples (Kabardians, Chechens and others). As a result of their interaction a specific set of socio-cultural and ethno-demographic structures evolved which survived the military conquest of the Russian Empire and continue to affect the life of the region at the end of the twentieth century.

In the sixteenth century the lands along the Terek and Kuban rivers (flowing from the mountains east and west respectively into the Caspian and Sea of

¹⁵ Atkin, 1988, 157-58.

Azov) had already been settled by free Cossacks, that is Slavic settlers from the north engaged in some agriculture, cattle raising, and fishing, occasionally engaged in Muscovite service but also raiding by land and sea against the local tribes, travelers, Ottoman and Iranian commercial and diplomatic missions. Their way of life and ecological niche resembled in many ways the Uskoks of the Triplex Confinium. They intermarried with women and even welcomed recruits from the indigenous populations so that the line between Cossack and native was blurred and in some cases effaced. Thomas Barrett has best defined them as “the stateless people who came into being in the interstices between states, in our case Muscovy/Russia, Iran and the Ottoman Empire. They were defined by what they were not – servitors or subjects.” Although they raided and plundered one another, they appeared to have more in common with one another than the imperial forces that sought to subdue them. The institution of *kunak/kuni-cestvo* on the side of the mountain people and various frontier intermediaries on the Cossack side performed similar services for one another such as mediators, bounty-hunters, traders and escorts. In the first half of the nineteenth century when the Russian government obliged the Cossacks to participate in regular campaigning against the mountaineers, desertion became a serious problem. The mountain leaders, particularly Shamil in the 1840s rewarded Cossack deserters, especially if they converted to Islam, with important posts in his military units. The Russian authorities learned the hard way to distrust both their Cossacks and auxiliary units recruited from mountaineers under their nominal suzerainty. The Cossacks shared with the mountain peoples a warrior culture which emphasized displays of horsemanship, shooting and a sense of honor maintained through finely designed weapons, extravagant dress, valuable horses and rituals of mourning.¹⁶

Both the Cossacks and mountain people resisted easy assimilation into the military and administrative system of the competing empires. Like other free agents in complex frontier zones they took casual oaths of loyalty and submission only to renounce them when a better opportunity arose. Moreover, it was difficult to coopt the elites of the mountain peoples because of the fragmented character of political authority among the clans.¹⁷ The nomadic culture survived in the seasonal movement of herds which ignored linear boundary lines and static administrative structures. (See map 1)¹⁸ As for the Cossacks, they not only raided and plundered Russian caravans and merchants, but participated in the major Cossack revolts of the seventeenth century. Up to 1720 they resisted formal subordination to Russian authority (the governor of Astrakhan) but long after that date their lands were a refuge for fugitives, the most famous of whom was Emelian Pugachev. They were only officially enrolled as Cossacks in 1824 when they had to assume service obligations and pay taxes.

¹⁶ Thomas M. Barrett. *At the Edge of Empire. The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 1700–1860*. Boulder, 1999, 19, 150.

¹⁷ Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejey. “Cooptation of Elites of Kabarda and Daghestan in the Sixteenth Century.” in Marie Bennigson Broxup (ed.). *The north Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World*. St. Martins – New York, 1992, 18–44.

¹⁸ Bournetunian, 1996, 76.

Map 1. Composition, location, and migration patterns of the khanate's nomads in the first quarter of the nineteenth century*



The Russian government was inconsistent on two levels in its policies toward strengthening and consolidating the Caucasian Military Line. First, it oscillated between promoting and discouraging settlement of peasants and dissident religious groups in the region.¹⁹ Second, it alternated between policies of tolerance and repression in its treatment of the customs and religious beliefs of the mountain people.²⁰ Russia's great advantage in securing and advancing its military frontier in the North Caucasus, as in the Ukrainian steppe to the northwest and the Kazakh steppe to the northeast was the settlement and protection of an agricultural population that engaged in a mixed economy and was able by the early nineteenth century to produce a surplus of grain. Before that the Cossacks were obliged to rely on trade with the mountain people who supplied them with agricultural products. The interdependence of the Cossacks and mountain people produce a stable frontier exchange economy that for several centuries kept the political situation in balance. It was only when in 1840's and 50's that a sufficient number of state peasants had been settled in the North Caucasus that

* Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.) *Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1996.

¹⁹ Nicholas Breyfogle. *Heretics and Colonizers: Religious Dissent and Russian Empire Building in Transcaucasia, 1830–1900*. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1998.

²⁰ Ia. Gordin (ed.). *Rossia v Kavkazskoi voine, vypusk 5 and 6*. Moscow, 1997.

the region was able to supply the forts and Cossack stations as well as the resident armed forces that within the next two decades finally subdued the mountaineers and brought to an end the Caucasian military Line.²¹

A PRELIMINARY COMPARISON

On the basis of this brief analysis it is possible to draw some more specific yet still tentative patterns of similarity and difference between the Caucasus and western Balkans triple frontier zones that could form the basis of more systematic comparison as a research agenda. 1) their eco-cultural history suggests that the distinctive avenues of approach of the three empires to the space of their encounter were highly distinctive but their interaction forced adjustments and accommodations to the local conditions as well as transforming the ways of life of the indigenous inhabitants. So the Slavic, mainly peasant, population of the forest and wooded steppe, belatedly arriving on the shores of the Caspian and Black sea; the Anatolian based Turkic population, in part still semi-nomadic but increasingly urbanized; and the mixed Persian-Turcomen population of Iran still strongly marked by the nomadic influence yet heir to an older urban culture profoundly shaped the historic experience of the Transcaucasian and North Caucasus people through conquest, predatory exploitation, resettlement, forced migration and ethnic mixing. At times the interaction produced creative solutions of intercultural exchange. But in the long run, as in *Triplex*, these processes long delayed thus immensely complicating local state-building history in the regions which could only take place after the defeat and/or expulsion of the imperial order. 2) in both cases the idea of a global clash of civilizations between the Christian and Muslim worlds can no longer be seen in absolute terms. Although there was great deal of coercive conversion on all sides, the military and religious conflicts between the branches and sects of Islam were as great in the centuries before the nineteenth as the Christian-Muslim clashes in the more highly publicized nineteenth century repression of Shamil's Murid movement by the Russian forces. Moreover, the development of trade on the Caspian between the Russians and Iranians was, like the Ottoman-Venetian trade, highly beneficial to both sides. 3) the repeated external invasions and wars had a devastating effect upon urban development and a rural economy capable of sustaining large concentrations of population. The depredations of the Mongol under Timur and the Iranians in the sixteenth century and the heavy drain of the slave trade upon the younger generations substantially reduced the population of Transcaucasus from its high levels of the thirteenth century until its recovery in the nineteenth century.²² 4) Along the Caucasian Military Line urban conglomerations before the nineteenth century were mainly confined to Cossack villages (*stanitsia*) often constructed around wooden forts. The great fortresses of Astrakhan, Kars, Erevan and Tabriz like those of the western Balkans (Karlovac, Bihać, Zadar)

²¹ Barrett, 1999, chapter 6, "Crossing Boundaries: The Trading Frontiers."

²² W. E. D. Allen. *A History of the Georgian People*. London, 1932, (Reissued, New York, 1972), 282-88.

stood outside the main contest zone, in a sense defining its parameters. So too, as in Triplex, the regular troops could maintain stability on the outer perimeters of the region but found it difficult to maintain a permanent presence in the border regions. In the Transcaucasus the large scale forced movements of population imposed by warfare not only weakened urban centers but also turned them into mosaics of ethno-linguistic groups that had several parallels in Triplex Confinium.²³ The overall impact of on the region of these two features of urban life needs further research and analysis. 5) In a related topic, also neglected in the literature, is the ecological impact of man made disasters, such as wars and invasions, particularly upon deforestation along the Caucasian Military Line and the damage, variously interpreted, to the ancient irrigation system of the Transcaucasus that reduced the cultivation of rice and wheat especially in what became under Russian rule Baku province.²⁴

The difficulties of organizing an international team of scholar to tackle the major issues that have been outlined in the agenda of Triplex Confinium are formidable enough without adding the burdens of a comparative study.²⁵ However, insights and experience gained from the development of one project can provide extremely valuable lessons for launching a second one; and the introduction, however preliminary and tentative, of the comparative dimension can also, one hopes, contribute to the planning and direction of the original enterprise.

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²³ This view is based on entries in the Brokgaus and Efron, Entsiklopeidicheskii slovar' for Baku, Derbent, Tiflis and Batum. For example, the population of Batum in the nineteenth century included the following elements: Russians, Turks, Georgians, Greeks, Gurians, Imeretians, Armenians, Lazy, Abkhazians, Persians and others.

²⁴ A pioneering study on these issues is Barrett, 1999, chapter 4, "The Ecology of Settlement."

²⁵ See Drago Rokсандić. "The Triplex Confinium, International Research Project: Objectives, Approaches and Methods." in Idem (ed.). *Microhistory of the Triplex Confinium*. Budapest, 1998, 7–21.

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**FRONTIER BLOOD-BROTHERHOOD
AND THE TRIPLEX CONFINIUM**

ABSTRACT

The institution of frontier “pobratimstvo” across religious and political lines on the three-way frontier between the Venetian Republic, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire raises a series of questions about the relations between state and church projects on the one hand, and popular values and behaviour on the other. Examining frontier “pobratimstvo” and its uses leads to a reassessment of the character of religious and cultural divisions on the frontier, elucidating both the existence of common interests and shared values among the border populations, and the persistence of frontier conflict and violence.

In 1660, Evliya Çelebi of Istanbul, Ottoman official and indefatigable traveller, was in the Dalmatian hinterland carrying information to the beglerbeg of Bosnia. He found himself caught up in a border skirmish with Venetian troops. His travel account describes the battle, the capture of the Christian forces and the subsequent decision to execute the captives – including notable border irregulars and renegades from Islam – in order to prevent them once again fighting against the Ottoman forces. Then he describes a curious incident. A border warrior or ghazi had tried to hide and protect one of the Christian irregulars. The two were discovered and dragged before the Pasha, but when the Pasha ordered that the Christian be executed, the ghazi cried out:

“Mercy, Great Vezir! I have sworn brotherhood with this captive on the battlefield, we have pledged each other our faith. If you kill him, he will go to paradise with my faith and that will be an injury to me, wretch that I am; and if I die, the faith of this captive with whom I have sworn brotherhood will stay with me, and we will both go to hell, so that again I am the loser.”

He had thrown himself on his prisoner and would not rise from him. When the valiant Pasha asked: “Hey, ghazis, what is the matter with this man?” the frontier ghazis answered: “When our heroes on this border fall into Christian captivity and then eat and drink at table, they swear brotherhood with the Christian and give an oath to him on their faith. The Christian pledges his faith to the

Muslim that he will redeem him from infidel captivity if need be, and the Muslim also [does the same] and says: 'If you fall captive to us, I will redeem you from the Turks'. And then they pledge each other their firm faith [ahd-ü eman], having said: 'Your faith is mine, and my faith is also yours'. 'Is it so?' 'It is.' Then they lick each other's blood. This is how a Muslim swears blood-brotherhood with a Christian. And so in this case this infidel is the blood-brother of this ghazi. He once redeemed this Muslim from captivity. Now, behold, this infidel who is in the hands of these men has become a captive. If [the ghazi] hides him and if he is saved, then he will have fulfilled his sworn word and faith. Then he could redeem his faith from him, and return [the Christian's] faith to him. But if this Christian is killed now, he will go to paradise, and this [Muslim] will go to hell with the faith of the infidel. Although this is written neither in the Muslim nor in the Christian [holy] books, this is nonetheless the custom on this border."

When they had explained all this to the Pasha, he said: "I release them both." And they both prostrated themselves and then disappeared. But we were all astonished at this conversation.¹

It was precisely because he was astonished that Evliya Çelebi – an outsider recording his impressions of border warfare on the Triplex Confinium – thought it worthwhile to recount the incident in detail, leaving us an account of the institution of *pobratimstvo* or blood-brotherhood as seen from the Ottoman side.

Çelebi's account provides a good starting point for a discussion of the institution of frontier *pobratimstvo* across religious and political lines on the three-way frontier between the Venetian Republic, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. The subject raises a series of questions about the relations between state and church projects on the one hand, and popular values and behaviour on the other. Clearly in this case there were tensions between the two, for not only did the tie of blood-brotherhood between Muslim ghazi and Christian irregular cut across a religious divide, it also ran counter to the state of war between Venice and the Ottomans in Dalmatia. But thinking about frontier *pobratimstvo* and its uses also leads us to reassess the character of religious and cultural divisions on the frontier.

Read one way, *pobratimstvo* shows us a border society characterized by cohesion and tolerance, where Christian and Muslim frontiersmen find ways to overcome religious and political divisions, recognizing their common interests and shared values. Read another way, however, the same institution (and sometimes even the same documents) can give us an insight into the persistence of frontier conflict and violence, since the shared values that bound frontier heroes together at the same time excluded the rest of the local population and made them into potential victims. The two perspectives on *pobratimstvo* are thrown into relief by the shift in emphasis between war and peace on the Triplex Confinium in the early eighteenth century, following the Karlowitz settlement of 1699 and the Ottoman acceptance of peace and a fixed frontier, when raiding came to be seen less as a semi-official way of war and more as a private means of subsistence. This was more a change in perspective than a turning point in the

¹ Çelebi, 1967, 147–148.

character of raiding, violence or blood-brotherhood. Changes in the balance of state power and new state projects on the frontier should not obscure the ways frontier socio-economic patterns persisted, and frontier ideals and values were preserved and reproduced in new circumstances. Even in the face of political change, men continued to live by raiding, made pacts with one another to reduce the danger they faced and explained their actions with the language of honor or of holy war.

The topic of frontier blood-brotherhood has obvious contemporary relevance given the tendency to interpret current conflicts in the region in terms of ancient and irreconcilable religious and ethnic enmities, and also given the hope of finding ways in which enmities have been (and can be) overcome. But the subject also raises some broader questions about how historians chose to deal with issues of conflict and cohesion in frontier society, and whether the study of the early modern frontier does hold lessons for the present. For historians, as well as for frontiersmen, the meaning of *pobratimstvo* is not inherent in the past. A good deal depends on context and intention.

The relationship that so surprised Çelebi was fairly common among the South Slavs (as well as among Vlachs, Albanians and Greeks). *Pobratimstvo* was one of a variety of forms of fictive kinship (others include co-parenthood or *kumstvo*, cemented by standing witness at a marriage, baptism, circumcision or first hair-cut).² References to blood-brotherhood in the region have been documented well before the seventeenth century and were found in this area into the twentieth century.³ The main features of the custom seem to have remained fairly consistent. In the largely military-pastoral society of the frontier, the family was the most important social and economic unit, protecting members' interests and competing for scarce resources in a hostile environment. *Pobratimstvo* was an extension of kinship ties born out of mutual assent, entailing reciprocal obligations (aid and protection), and incurring specific restrictions (creating an obstacle to marriage between blood-brothers' kin). Blood-brotherhood was a way of deliberately creating ties on the model of family obligations, increasing the allies available in an uncertain and hostile world only weakly regulated by the authority of the state.

A bond of blood-brotherhood was understood to implicate the honor of the two parties thus joined: betrayal or murder of a blood-brother could be treated

² Studies of *poratimstvo* and similar forms of fictive kinship among the South Slavs include: Hammel, 1968; Stojanović, 1977, 291–320; Palošija, 1975, 59–65; Kretzenbacher, 1979, 163–83 (this includes a useful bibliography).

³ Accounts of the custom in Dalmatia and the hinterland may be found in Fortis, 1774, 58–60; Lovrić, 1948, 86–88; Bogišić, 1874, 385–389; Gavazzi, 1955, 17–30; Zaninović, 1971, 713–24. Like many other aspects of popular culture, *pobratimstvo* as a frontier phenomenon is difficult to research in any systematic way, since incidents tend to be documented only when special circumstances draw the attention of the authorities or when observers are struck by the novelty of the custom, as in Çelebi's case. I have made use of scattered references from a long period and a large area of the frontier, though the greater part come from the Venetian hinterland in Dalmatia; the frontier epics (especially the early eighteenth-century collection known as the Erlangen manuscript, published by Geesemann, 1924); and, for comparative purposes, the accounts of nineteenth- and twentieth-century ethnographers cited above. This of course raises questions of whether such references are typical, and how far it is possible to generalise on such a basis.

as worse even than fratricide, because the blood-brother had been chosen, the bond had been created voluntarily and involved a pledge of honor. The ritual cementing the relationship emphasized its reciprocal character: this usually involved an exchange of blood (the symbol both of kinship and of honor) and a pledge of faith, as described by Çelebi, reinforced by the sharing of food and drink. Çelebi describes sworn brothers as also having exchanged their faiths in a quite literal way (“Your faith is mine, and my faith is also yours”). This belief is not recorded elsewhere. It is tempting to see this as a result of Çelebi's misunderstanding of the S.C. “vjera”, meaning both “creed” or “religion” and “oath” or “bond of honor”, and thus mistaking a reciprocal “pledge of faith” for an exchange of religions. In this case, the reference to the Christian going to paradise and the Muslim to hell would be Çelebi's own extrapolation. But it is not inconceivable that border fighters could have understood blood-brotherhood across religious boundaries as involving an exchange of faiths that needed to be redeemed for spiritual reasons as well as the imperatives of honor. Certainly any failure to uphold the pledge of faith was understood as culpable and punishable by the torments of hell.

The incident described by Çelebi was somewhat unusual, in that it involved a Muslim and a Christian. Blood-brotherhood was usually contracted between like and like: that is, between members of the same sex or the same religion (thus between man and man; woman and woman; Catholic and Catholic; and so on). But the relationship could cross the boundaries of sex (and so be contracted between a man and a woman) and could also cross the line drawn by a difference in faith (thus between Catholic and Orthodox, or even between Christian and Muslim, as in this case). Nineteenth and twentieth-century ethnographers have enumerated the reasons for contracting *pobratimstvo* across religious boundaries: to cement an alliance or friendship; out of necessity or in return for a favour (such as saving someone from misfortune, as in Çelebi's account); to restore social equilibrium or mark a reconciliation (to bring a feud or conflict to an end). Similar circumstances operated in our period: it is possible to find references to all these types of blood-brotherhood between Christian and Muslim on the frontier.

The ritual used to cement the relationship often had a religious character when it bound together Christians: it could be celebrated in or in front of church, with a priest officiating, and culminated with the participants sharing communion. There are examples of prayers and ceremonies used in Dalmatia and elsewhere in both Latin and Church Slavonic (and Greek versions dating to the tenth century).⁴ Çelebi's ghazis were wrong to say that the practise did not appear in the Christian holy books, at least. But ecclesiastical authorities were frequently dubious about lending the authority of the church to such practices, and the strictures of Catholic clerics provide one source on the custom – and suggest a variety of interpretations of its function on the frontier. The Orthodox authorities appear to have been generally tolerant of *pobratimstvo* among laypeople, but even so, they criticized the relationship on the grounds that it sin-

⁴ Zaninović, 714–16; Kretzenbacher, 169–72; Boswell, 1994.

gled out particular relationships as especially privileged, disregarding the injunction to love all men as brothers.⁵

John Boswell has suggested that ecclesiastical uneasiness about blood-brotherhood ceremonies – in both the Orthodox and Catholic churches – stemmed primarily from a concern over homosexuality within such relationships. He argues that the ritual consecrating such a union had initially been established by the church to solemnize a “passionate friendship” between individuals of the same sex, and was essentially a same-sex marriage. Boswell argues that an increasing revulsion against homosexuality in the West spelled the end of ecclesiastical tolerance for such unions, but believes that the practice survived longer in Orthodox territories “with its original meaning”; and he uses ethnographic material from Dalmatia, Montenegro and Albania to assert the institution's homoerotic aspect.⁶ Certainly the popular assumption was that the bond between blood-brothers was intense, stronger even than that between brothers of the same blood. One nineteenth-century epic characterizes the affection between Marko Kraljević and his blood-brother Miloš in passionately physical terms: “One kissed the other's white face / because of the tenderness between the two *probratims*. / The *pobratims* caressed each other so much, / their horses exchanged their manes, / and the heroes exchanged their moustaches and whiskers...”⁷ Should we read such a description of physical intimacy and emotional ties as evidence of an accepted homosexuality or as part of the conventions of friendship and blood-brotherhood?⁸ Since at least the eighteenth century commentators implied that blood-brotherhood might serve as a cloak for illicit sexual relations between men (and it is largely this evidence that Boswell draws upon).⁹ On the other hand, a text from the early eighteenth-century Erlangen collection of frontier songs indicates that any erotic attachments within the relationship were illicit. In this song, a girl takes a *bajduk* or bandit as a blood-brother to protect her on the way through a forest. She then proposes that he make love to her, but he refuses in horror, since she is his blood-sister. Wherever the girl passes, the green forest withers in shame; wherever the *bajduk* passes, the dry branches leaf out and the withered grass turns green, in a nice reversal of the way nature usually passes judgement on the evils of banditry.¹⁰ Here the song acknowledges that sexual attraction is possible within a heterosexual sworn friendship, but emphasizes that the kinship bond makes this incest. I have found no similarly explicit condemnation of same-sex eroticism, but

⁵ At least one seventeenth-century Serbian nomocanon condemned the institution on these grounds. See Levin, 1989, 149. See also Stojanović, 295.

⁶ Boswell, 265–78.

⁷ From S. Stojaković, “Pobratimstvo u srpskijem narodnijem pjesmama.” in *Crnogorka*. Vol. 8. Cetinje, 1885. Cited according to Stojanović, 309.

⁸ See Bray, 1990, 1–19, for a thought-provoking approach to these issues in another context.

⁹ Ivan Lovrić, in disputing Abbe Fortis's account of *pobratimstvo* in Dalmatia insinuated that Fortis, like other clerics, saw the relationship in this light. Lovrić, 1948, 87; see Wolff, 1998–99, 157–78, 21–22. Boswell cites in particular Durham, 1928, 158; P. Nücke, “Über Homosexualität in Albanien.” in *Jahrbuch für sexuelle Zwischenstufen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Homosexualität*. Vol. 10 (1908), 313–37; Tomašić, 1948. In these works a distinction is not drawn between the uses of the practice and its ideal type.

¹⁰ Geesemann, no. 150.

the incest taboo between siblings would presumably preclude this as well. This is not to say, of course, that individuals could not have used the relationship to cement or celebrate such a relationship, but both the suggestion that *pobratimstvo* served as a means of concealing homoerotic attachments and the presumption that *pobratimstvo* created consanguinity, and therefore an incest taboo, strongly suggest that *pobratimstvo* did not have the publicly acknowledged sexual dimension that Boswell wished to find.

It is true that in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Dalmatia, the Catholic authorities repeatedly forbade priests to officiate at blood-brotherhood rites. But what was at issue for the church here was not friendship between like and like, however passionate. The real concern was for relationships that bridged divisions. Thus, for example, in 1579 the Split and Zadar Archepiscopal Synod found it necessary to forbid priests either to officiate at ceremonies of blood-brotherhood “between men and women, between Catholics and Greek schismatics, and between Turks and Christians” because the resulting “familiarity presents an occasion for many sins”.¹¹ Similarly, in the 1620 code that Archbishop Sforza Ponzoni assembled for the use of priests in Poljica, clerics were forbidden to celebrate masses solemnizing *pobratimstvo* between men and women so they might “have to do freely with one another, without scandal” (article 54), nor were they permitted to affirm blood-brotherhood ties with infidels (“...s nevirnimi *pobratimstvo* nima činiti”) (article 114).¹² None of these prohibitions are specifically concerned with same-sex unions. On the contrary, the “many sins” that preoccupied the church grew out of blood-brotherhood relationships that broke down the barriers between difference – between men and women, Catholics and Orthodox, Christians and Muslims – and brought together people who ought, in the eyes of the church, to be kept apart.

This was not just a post-Tridentine desire to reform popular culture by stamping out superstitious or pagan customs in general, but was connected with a growing concern with enforcing confessional discipline. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Catholic hierarchs on the frontier with Islam were increasingly insistent on confessional differences and intolerant of syncretic practices that might blur religious distinctions. This impetus towards “confessionalization” was not only expressed through restrictions on *pobratimstvo*. (Similarly, in Bosnia between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Franciscans did their best to extirpate co-parenthood by hair-cutting – *šišano kumstvo* – as a device to affirm alliances that crossed the boundaries of faith and confession, eroded a distinct Catholic identity and eased the path to apostasy).¹³ Nor was it only a matter of relations between Catholics and Muslims (relations with the Orthodox were also more closely disciplined by the church, though here the hopes for attracting the Orthodox into union should also be taken into account). But the laity (and even the lower clergy) did not always respect the will of the ecclesiastical authorities. In spite of repeated prohibitions, Octaviani, Archbishop of

¹¹ Farlati, Vol. 5, 134.

¹² Mošin, 1952, 186, 192.

¹³ Džaja, 1984, 215. Compare Catholic opposition to Christian-Muslim *pobratimstvo* relations in the Albanian context. Stojanović, 296.

Zadar, in his visitation report of 1624, was led to condemn “the excessive and pernicious familiarity of the Christians with the Turks” in Dalmatia, and similar strictures often recurred.¹⁴ Evliya Çelebi’s account of border fighters contracting pacts of brotherhood would certainly have been seen as pernicious. Even if such pledges did not involve a literal “exchange of faiths”, they still cut across boundaries that the church was concerned to reinforce, challenged the newly emphasized confessional order, and broke down the concept of a separate Catholic identity.

The Venetian and Habsburg civil and military authorities were never so specific in prohibiting *pobratimstvo* as such. There was no principled opposition to the observance of a customary law with no official status. Indeed, the Venetian authorities were quick to use the institution when it could be adapted to their own political needs, as in a case in 1692 when the *Provveditore Generale* ended a damaging vendetta between two rival local commanders with what seems to have been a ceremony of blood-brotherhood, consecrated by a mass and a public pledge of mutual aid.¹⁵ Indeed, the capacity for friendship illustrated by the custom of *pobratimstvo* could even be advanced as evidence that the Dalmatians, correctly treated, could develop political loyalty to imperial Venice.¹⁶ Still, official military codes were explicit in forbidding fraternization and informal ties with the enemy, and *pobratimstvo* between their own subjects and those of a neighbouring state fell under this ban.¹⁷

Occasional cases of blood-brotherhood across the frontier are documented in official or semi-official reports, such as Çelebi’s travel notes. These give a sense of what it was that disturbed the state authorities about *pobratimstvo* ties. Usually what is involved is some sort of local accommodation that could keep frontier conflict to acceptable levels. This might take the form of an individual act of mercy towards a captive, in the recognition that one might someday share his fate (as in the custom Çelebi reports), but it could also have a collective function – setting a seal on negotiations over mutually acceptable level for ransoms, for example, carried out by the local leaders on either side of the frontier.¹⁸ The frontier authorities tended to view this sort of private arrangement with horror: it flouted the authority of the state, and challenged the assumption that religious and political confrontation defined the frontier. But this sort of opposition according to the definitions provided by the church and the state was not always in the interests of the frontiersmen themselves. For both sides a degree of accommodation with the other side was often necessary; not only for irregular raiders for whom “guarding the frontier is dreadful work, wiping off hands wet with

¹⁴ Farlati, Vol. 5, 159.

¹⁵ Desnica, 1950, Vol. 2, 281.

¹⁶ As Larry Wolff points out in his analysis of the political messages of eighteenth-century disquisitions on the population of Dalmatia. Wolff, 1998–99.

¹⁷ The eighteenth-century Military Frontier articles reprinted in Buczynski, 1998, Vol. 1, 347–51, are a good example, specifying punishment for those who are “in agreement with the enemy”, “who will not fight with the enemy” or who fail to punish such collaboration. See also article 1 the 1654 “Statute” of the Dalmatian Krajina, in Desnica, 1950, Vol. 1, 74–75; and a much earlier example from the Tkon Codex, in Štefanić, 1977, Vol. 2, 23.

¹⁸ See Bracewell, 1992, 182, for a detailed discussion of this case.

blood”,¹⁹ but also for local commanders whose own local interests were often at odds with the policies of their superiors directing war from far-off capitals. Thus in the course of the Candian War the Aga of Risan would write to the Captain of Venetian Perast, complaining about a clash between their troops, saying “you yourself know that this is not what we agreed, but rather to wash clean the bloody shirts, not stain them with more blood. For the more they are bloodied, the more painful it is to wash them.”²⁰ Quite so. In such circumstances, the ritual exchange of blood as *pobratims* could be a way to avoid shedding more blood. Frontier epics were sometimes explicit about this desire to put limits to the bloodshed of frontier existence through such ties: “Meet me where the coast curves and let us make peace and blood-brotherhood. Enough we have fought on our frontiers; heroes enough have died.”²¹

These and similar examples suggest that blood-brotherhood was an important institution of frontier coexistence. *Pobratimstvo* shows frontier life to be at least partly about finding ways of getting around the assumptions of unrelenting mutual hostility imposed by warring faiths and empires; of forming mutually advantageous alliances across such frontiers; of pursuing a minimal amount of peace and security; of escaping the destructive logic of perpetual warfare. This might be contrary to official policy, but it was not easy for the early modern state to enforce decisions taken centrally when communication was slow and local commanders were relatively autonomous. Other frontiers between faiths show similar patterns of coexistence and tolerance, operating together with a culture of religious war periodically rekindled by official campaigns – the *convivencia* of the late medieval frontier between Granada and Castile, for example.²² *Pobratimstvo* across the boundaries of faith might well be interpreted in terms of frontier pragmatism – a reminder that coexistence and warfare are not mutually exclusive.

But what is particularly striking about the institution of frontier blood-brotherhood between Muslim and Christian is that the frontiersmen did not seem to see it as simply a matter of pragmatism. The word itself, with its root in the word “brat”, “brother”, suggests there is more to it. *Pobratimstvo* converted the enemy not just into an ally, but into kin. Indeed, these ties were often described as more binding than those of actual kinship, incurring greater responsibilities. The idea that enemies could make one another into brothers is intriguing to historians, but the people of the frontier also seem to have been fascinated with the idea, judging by the number of frontier epics where the plot hinges on blood-brotherhood between Christian and Muslim. Thus, even in the earliest frontier songs we know, there are tales of heroes of warring faiths contracting blood-brotherhood in recognition of each other's heroism, in response to the other's plight, out of a desire for peace, to gain advantage, or simply from

¹⁹ Geeseman, nos. 69 & 88.

²⁰ Butorac, 1928, 127–128.

²¹ From an epic about the Pasha of Udbina, cited in Durham, 158.

²² For the Castilian-Granadan frontier, see the essays in Bartlett & MacKay, 1989; and MacKay, 1976, 15–33. Several essays in Power and Standen, 1999 address similar issues. Norman Housley weighs up the opposing forces of religious conflict and frontier pragmatism in a wide-ranging comparative article assessing local attitudes to holy war on religious frontiers. Housley, 1995, 104–19.

a desire to be the more magnanimous hero; tales about the “good friends” that heroes have in the opposite camp, and the accusations this leaves them open to; their refusal to betray one another – and also occasions when they did betray each other (with the moral being the enormity of such treachery – even when an infidel was the one betrayed). The subtext of all these tales is that the obligations of “blood”, honor and heroism should outweigh religious and political considerations.²³ How far these ideals actually determined the actions of the frontiersmen is open to question. The point I wish to stress is that the idea of ritual brotherhood across the divisions of faith gripped the popular imagination and, when set against the requirements of the church or of political loyalty, the competing obligations of blood-brotherhood provided the moral dilemmas that are the very stuff of many of the frontier epics.

The institution of blood-brotherhood summons up a vision of a common frontier society, rather than a world simply and implacably divided by a boundary between opposing faiths and warring empires. From this perspective, the frontier can be seen not just as a line of demarcation between civilizations, polities and identities, but also as a zone of shared interests and values. The men who contract ties of blood-brotherhood with one another are not driven solely by pragmatism – they operate in a common moral universe, recognize the same principles, accept the same standards of honor, heroism and manliness, and respect and admire one another in as much as they are able to embody these ideals. We can see this indications of mutual respect and admiration not just in frontier epics, but in the frontier correspondence between Christian and Muslim commanders. One apt example is a letter sent by Mustafa-bey, the Captain of Udbina to Petar Smiljanić, one of the Venetian local commanders in Ravni Kotari, at beginning of Candian War:

From Mustafa-aga, Captain of Udbina and Lika, to *harambaša* Petar Smiljanić: homage and warm and friendly greetings to our brother and friend. We wonder at your lordship, that no letter has come from you, you being our father's friend. Do you think us worth nothing in comparison to our father? We pray, if there is to be no settlement, as we wrote asking you to arrange with the *Provveditore Generale*, if you see that there will be no peace, we beg you, send us the news secretly, for the sake of our friendship. Our mother greets you and prays you for a Turkish slave-girl, and we will send you what is owed. We pray that you will greet your son *harambaša* Ilija [also a frontier commander] on our behalf. We have heard that he is a hero on the Frontier. God knows that we are pleased by that, for he is one of ours. We are sending a hawk's feather for him to wear before the heroes. And we ask him to send us a gun, which you know we need. On my faith, we will use it honorably. And we pray that *harambaša* Ilija send us a bottle of *rakija*, so that we may drink our fill. Keep merry! Amin.²⁴

Here the relationship is certainly a practical device meant to cope with a likely future hazard, like the relationship described by Çelebi, but it is also presented as more than that. The Muslim commander addresses the Christian as a “brother and friend” on the basis of his father's relationship with Smilja-

²³ For examples see Geesemann, 1924.

²⁴ In Kreševljaković, 1954, 21.

nić.²⁵ Mustafa-aga writes to Smiljanić claiming a right to treat him as an equal (Smiljanić is wrong to “think us worth nothing”), as an ally (one who will negotiate on his behalf with a Venetian General and who will keep information secret from the Venetians and the Ottoman authorities), and as a trade partner (trafficking in captives). The request for a Turkish slave-girl seems to underline the irrelevance of conventional religious loyalties (and subtly indicates Mustafa-aga's economic standing and ability to pay); the request for a gun does the same with respect to boundaries between opponents facing imminent war. It is their common status as heroes that over-rides these other differences. Mustafa-aga celebrates his correspondents' heroism and manliness, both as fellows (*barambaša* Ilija is a hero, and 'one of ours') and as worthy opponents, who will be treated 'honorably'. Mustafa-aga is also affirming his own self-perception in his appreciation of Petar and Ilija: he is a frontier hero to the extent that his opponents are also heroic. Moreover, bestowing an emblem of bravery (the hawk's feather) on Ilija emphasizes his own prior and superior claim to the same quality. The tone is one of comradeship, cemented by the exchange of tokens of bravery, arms and strong drink, as well as by the title of 'brother and friend'. These emblems of manliness are sent freely; like masculine honor itself, they cannot be bought and sold.

While not homoerotic, this relationship could well be described as homosocial, in that frontier notions of social worth are tied up with a specific notion of masculinity, and the emphasis on this common masculinity overrides other identities. The institution of *pobratimstvo* was not primarily about masculinity and, as we have seen, was not necessarily limited to men. However, when contracted between frontier warriors, it very often functioned as a means of recognizing each others' manliness and heroism – or as a means of competing over who was the more manly and heroic. There is a hint of this competitiveness in Mustafa-aga's letter to Petar Smiljanić. The same point is made even more explicitly in an early epic in which a frontier *bajduk* is captured by an Ottoman pasha, who shares wine with him and asks why he looks so gloomy. Is he sighing for his comrades, his mother, his true love, or for revenge against the Turks? No, the *bajduk* replies, he is sighing because he has failed to cut off the pasha's head. When his comrades ambush the pair, release the *bajduk* and seize the pasha, the *bajduk* refuses to cut off his head: “since we are blood-brothers, you are released”, and goes his way singing, satisfied his magnanimity makes him the better man.²⁶ Even when the tie is contracted between men and women, it is usually depicted as rising from the woman's need for the protection offered by a man (as in the song about the girl asking the *bajduk* to guide her through the forest, cited above) or involving a more or less illicit female attraction to masculine power (a case in point might be Ivan Lovrić's assessment of the “Turkish” girl who wished to become blood-sister with the *bajduk* Stanislav Sočivica:

²⁵ “Brother and friend” is used as a form of address in other examples of frontier correspondence (e.g. Husein-cehaja to Vojvoda Stanković, circa 1655, in Rački, 1879, 89). Does this refer to a blood-brother or is it merely formulaic? In either case, the presumption is that of mutual respect and shared values.

²⁶ Geesemann, no. 119. The *bajduk* chooses to view the sharing of wine as creating a tie of blood-brotherhood, the justification for his insolent magnanimity.

“thinking perhaps that since he was a hero in arms, he must also be a hero in love”).²⁷ In all these cases, *pobratimstvo* affirms a vision of potent masculinity rooted in honor and bravery – and as one of the cardinal social values on the frontier. (*Posestrimstvo* or blood-sisterhood may have been a formally symmetrical rite, linking two women as blood-sisters, but it does not appear to have been used in the same way to emphasize the blood-sisters' social role as women. The Italian Fortis dwelled on emotion and delicacy of sentiment when describing a rite of *posestrimstvo* between two girls, but the idea that such qualities were particularly appropriate to women and blood-sisters is not characteristic of South Slav sources.)²⁸

The contemporary appeal of examples of frontier friendship that cancel out religious and political differences is readily apparent, particularly when many commentators have been so quick to see the recent bloodshed in this same frontier region as the result of ancient, irreconcilable hatreds. Border blood-brotherhood can be used to make the point that even during wartime, people on this frontier could go to remarkable lengths to find ways to live together, to bridge the divisions of religion and politics, and to make brothers out of enemies. Even if the ideal of ritual brotherhood cemented by honor did not always translate into action, the people of the frontier gave evidence of its importance in their perceptions by debating its claims against the demands of other values in their songs and stories.

Such tales of blood-brotherhood also fit nicely into a particular interpretation of the relations between the state and society on the frontier. This presents division and conflict as primarily maintained and used by the state and the ecclesiastical authorities to legitimate elite projects and to preserve power; and on the other hand celebrates the capacity of the border population to recognize common values, dilemmas and fates in spite of their rulers' need to keep them apart. From this perspective, the centralizing state and the “confessionalized” church imposed divisions between faiths, between subjects of different states, between military and civilian populations, on a more tolerant and pluralist social reality, in which people used one another's churches and worshipped each others' holy men, drove their flocks up to pasture regardless of state frontiers, and sent each other hero's feathers to wear on the field of battle.²⁹ According to this perspective, *pobratimstvo* would be not just an institution of accommodation, but also a measure of resistance to the power of the state.

Such an interpretation is appealing, and it does help make sense of some of the complexities and contradictions of frontier society. But mutual respect and the preference for accommodation rather than war is only one aspect of frontier *pobratimstvo* – and gives only a partial picture of social relations on the Triplex Confinium.

²⁷ Lovrić, 204.

²⁸ Fortis, 58.

²⁹ Such interpretations have been particularly apparent in models of history that stressed common “Yugoslav” ties among the South Slavs. A good example is Bogdanov, 1957, 353–477; and recent Western works written in opposition to the “ancient ethnic hatred” model of Balkan history.

Though *pobratimstvo* shows that differences could be overcome in the pursuit of common interests, it also suggests that the divisions of frontier society – and especially its religious divisions – were not entirely imposed by outside authorities. Religious identities and religious rhetoric also provided a set of referents adopted and used for local purposes. Claims to defend a Christian *antemurale* against the infidel did legitimate both Habsburg and Venetian power on the frontier; imperial authorities did promote religious differences partly in order to control their populations; and vigilance against religious laxity, syncretism or conversion did bolster the authority of all the ecclesiastical hierarchies. But even so, blood-brotherhood between Muslims and Christians did not erase religious differences, and certainly did not prevent Christian or Muslim frontiersmen from using religious rhetoric to justify their raiding across the frontier. Ghazi attitudes – justifying raiding against the “abode of war” that lay beyond Ottoman lands – persisted on the Ottoman side of the frontier even after the Karlowitz settlement.³⁰ In turn, the Christian frontiersmen in Habsburg service stressed that they had taken an oath to their rulers to serve “faithfully and honorably, with gun and with sword, against the infidel Turk”,³¹ and both Venetian and Habsburg frontiersmen repeatedly argue that they should be permitted to smite the enemies of the faith, even in peacetime and against the strictures of the government. Whether or not the official elites so wished, the ideas of holy war retained their potency in the minds and in the deeds of their subjects. In spite of the fact that the Ottoman threat diminished continually after the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the state authorities strove to preserve peace on the borders, the population of Dalmatia remained convinced that killing “Turks” was not only justified, but also conferred honor and glory. This was one of the central points of Ivan Lovrić’s life of the *bajduk* Stanislav Sočivica, whose friendship with individual Muslims (including his Muslim blood-sister) did not modify in any way his hatred of “the Turk” as a category. Lovrić’s assessment was that frontier *bajdučija* rested on this popular hatred, since the population believed that “one can achieve almost total pardon by killing Turks, as though Turks were foul beasts”.³²

The point is that it was not just the state and the church, but also the frontier population that maintained and used religious differences for their own purposes. One could argue that they actively needed such divisions: not just because frontier oppositions were the reason for their existence and their way of life, but also more generally because an ideological framework was needed in order to explain and to legitimate suspicion, competition, and aggression between people who differed only slightly in all other respects.³³ However it was generated, the frontier between faiths on the frontier was real, and it had a profound effect on people’s attitudes and lives. The institution of *pobratimstvo* might make individual alliances possible, and might facilitate a recognition of your enemy’s heroism and even his essential humanity – but religious difference

³⁰ For this see especially Heywood, 1999, 228–250 and *Ibid*, 1994, 22–53.

³¹ Lopašić, 1899, 26.

³² Lovrić, 211.

³³ A point made more broadly about the religiously divided frontier “Vlach” communities in Roksandić, 1997, 79.

was still one of the fundamental organizing principles on the frontier. Such differences could be bridged, but they could not be ignored. Indeed, one of the salient points about frontier blood-brotherhood is that it was precisely the gulf between the frontier populations that made such an institution necessary. There is no need for bridges where there is no chasm to cross.

There are other stories about blood-brotherhood which are even more ambiguous, and cast a rather different light on the factors dividing and uniting frontier society. Here too blood-brotherhood blurs the boundaries between Christian and Muslim, but rather than suggesting tolerance and cohesion, it reveals other fundamental social conflicts. So far I have treated *pobratimstvo* between Christians and Muslims as a device for avoiding conflict, and more specifically the violence of war. But periods when the empires were concerned to keep peace on their borders and prohibited border raiding mean that other examples of blood-brotherhood between Christian and Muslim make an appearance in the records. As well as ensuring a minimum of peace and security on a war-torn frontier, blood-brotherhood could also facilitate disorder, plunder and conflict, allowing men of violence to demonstrate their heroism through the use of arms, even when the state proscribed this way of life. This was the case with *bajduks* or brigands – often the term is used to describe those who had started out as frontiersmen and continued living much the same way in peacetime, though in an altered political context. Such acts are more easily documented in peacetime, when unauthorized raiding was more likely to be documented – and was more likely to be stigmatized as brigandage. In reality, however, this was not all that different from the animal theft, ransom and extortion that characterized the constant “little war” of the frontier, and that shaded into the competitive and often violent economy of mountain pastoralism. The end of large-scale war threw such socio-economic patterns into relief, but it did not alter them rapidly or easily.

It was not unusual for frontier *bajduks* to have allies and protectors across the border. These were known as *jataks* (Tur. bed, refuge; the word has no adequate English equivalent), who sheltered them, supplied them with food, or passed them information. Such *jataks* were often Muslims. The *bajduk* epics recount numerous examples, often dwelling on the conflicts of loyalty that such a relationship caused, and official reports also document the phenomenon.³⁴ Thus we hear of prominent Muslim families in Bosnia and Herzegovina acting as *bajduk* protectors;³⁵ or of the Ottoman and Habsburg authorities cooperating in measures against the *bajduks* and their Muslim allies.³⁶ The relationship was often formalized through a tie of blood-brotherhood, as in the case of the Muslim blood-brother who aided and eventually was forced to betray the *bajduk* Stanislav Sočivica, a motif that occurs both in Lovrić's biography and in *bajduk* epics involving Sočivica.³⁷ The advantages of such a relationship for the *bajduks* is obvious, but what motivated their Muslim blood-brothers? A share in the plun-

³⁴ See Popović, 1930, vol. 1, 153–154; Nazečić, 1959, 189–90.

³⁵ Popović, Vol. 1, 154.

³⁶ Dabić, 1984, 132.

³⁷ Lovrić, 204; Stojanović, 308, fn. 35. For further examples of Muslim *jataks* see Popović, 1931, Vol. 2, 38.

der, certainly. Fear of *bajduk* reprisal, perhaps (though this must have been less compelling for the beys and agas who aided the *bajduks*). Some commentators have suggested a common cause against the Ottoman state, grounded in a sense of shared ethnic origin.³⁸ Perhaps it was this sentiment that led Mustafa-aga to call Ilija Smiljanić “one of ours”. Yet on the basis of the preceding discussion, I would suggest that the *bajduk* and the *jatak* recognized in each other not so much a common ethnicity, but rather a common code of behaviour and shared values which set them apart – as men and as heroes – from their victims. This shared code could cut across other divisions, binding together Christian and Muslim and legitimating their acts of plunder and violence in their own eyes. Just as the same socio-economic patterns persisted regardless of the state of war and peace, so too *bajduks* and their *jataks* reproduced the pattern of alliances between Christian and Muslim frontiersmen.

Looking at the workings of blood-brotherhood in this context raises some questions about “shared culture” as a cohesive force on the frontier – and suggests that we should not idealise either *pobratimstvo*, or the concepts of honor and heroism it affirmed. True, blood-brotherhood could link Christian and Muslim on the basis of shared ideals, cutting across the divisions of church and state, but this did not necessarily lead to social stability and a diminution of conflict. *Hajduks* and frontiersmen may have recognized each other as heroes and as men, but in doing so they could deny or ignore other equally valid claims on their loyalties. Brotherhood between Christian and Muslim heroes, and between *bajduks* and *jataks*, meant that these men could strive for glory through the use of arms regardless of the state of war or peace, and could flout with impunity the forces of state law (whether Ottoman, Venetian or Habsburg). Even more to the point, every bond contracted between heroes implied an exclusion from this fellowship of brothers. Inclusion and cohesiveness creates in turn exclusion and new boundaries. Frontiersmen and *bajduks* demonstrated their heroism at the expense of the border population, both Christian and Muslim, who bore the brunt of their raids. Something of this echoed in Çelebi's account when he cited fears that if the Christian captives were not executed they would survive to fight against Ottoman subjects again: “Among the captives there are many evil-doers whose hands are stained with the blood of our black livers. [...] they will return to our frontier to desolate and destroy our land”.³⁹ By protecting his Christian blood-brother from execution the ghazi was endangering the lives of his fellows in the future. Similarly, Mustafa-aga's promise to use *harambaša* Ilija's gun honorably begs the question: against whom? Against Ilija's Christian compatriots, those not protected by the bonds of blood-brotherhood with the enemy. Though underpinned by the same values and ideals as the first set of tales about *pobratimstvo*, stories of frontier brigandage fit much less comfortably into a celebration of the tolerance and cohesiveness of border society. *Pobratimstvo* between frontier heroes may have ignored divisions between Muslim and Christian, or between Venetian, Habsburg and Ottoman subjects, but it divided fron-

³⁸ Mijatović, 1969, 225.

³⁹ Çelebi, 147.

tier society into the strong and the weak, predators and victims, and glorified this division as one between heroic men and those who were less than men.

The frontier epics contain some pungent assessments of the price others were forced to pay to maintain this sort of brotherhood. In a song exploring conflicts between the demands of political or religious loyalties and the ties of brotherhood between frontier heroes, the “Ban” of Venetian Zadar insults the heroes by pointing out that such an alliance allows them to betray both “Turks” and Christians equally: “the [Christian] whore and the [Muslim] brigand met; they sell Turks to Christians, and Christians to the Turkish lands.”⁴⁰ (This was more or less what Mustafa-aga proposed to Smiljanić, though he proposed to buy a Turkish slave.) Popular culture may have recognized that a shared code of honor was a possible basis for recognizing one's enemy's manliness; but at the same time it could also acknowledge the costs. Still, popular reactions to *bajduk* raiding were ambiguous, since observers regularly reported that the frontier population approved of and aided the *bajduks* to the extent that they embodied heroism and manliness, regardless of whom they attacked and the effects of their raids. Thus, for example, Grgur Stratiko of Zadar, writing in 1785 for the Venetian authorities on Dalmatia's social and economic problems, noted that “among the people, a particular view of this sort of miscreant has struck root; someone who gives such brilliant evidence of his strength, his daring and his fearlessness is considered a man of renown”.⁴¹ Such an attitude, encouraged by a social and economic system that rewarded aggressive competition for scarce resources and reinforced by a model of masculine honor based on physical prowess, was difficult to extirpate, even after the warfare that had given it official legitimacy had waned. The capacity for violence, dignified as heroism, retained its popular uses and its glamour long after the authorities found it desirable to proscribe it.

This assessment of the factors of conflict and cohesion on the frontier, seen through blood-brotherhood between Muslim and Christian, gives us a more complex (if perhaps less emotionally appealing) picture of state and society on the frontier. It suggests that frontier society was influenced by two different sets of referents. On the one hand religious and political divisions separated the people of the frontier; on the other hand common cultural values (honor, heroism, manliness) drew them together. Both sets of ideals mattered, shaping the ways people thought, setting their aspirations, guiding their actions. People could be pulled in different ways. The workings of ties of blood-brotherhood across the frontiers of religion demonstrate the ways that two sets of values or ideologies could be in tension with one another, or could result in contradictions. But we should recognize that the people of the frontier were not just prisoners of their environment. They made their own choices, manipulating the rules or exploiting expectations about how they should behave – in their own interests and to their own advantage. The exact mix of conflict and coexistence, the balance between hostility and accommodation depended on the needs and possibilities of

⁴⁰ Geeseman, 81–82.

⁴¹ G. Stratiko. *Sistema regolativo della provincia veneta di Dalmazia* (1785). Cited in Grgić, 1958, 248.

the moment. Much the same thing could be said about the ways we, as historians, chose to tell our own stories about the frontier, balancing between a desire to celebrate the human capacity to make connections across difference and an awareness that every community of brothers is maintained at the price of excluding others.

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**DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATION AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE IN VENETIAN DALMATIA:
OFFICIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE MORLACCHI FROM THE
PEACE OF PASSAROWITZ TO THE GRIMANI REFORM**

ABSTRACT

This article considers the Morlacchi of Venetian Dalmatia, living along the Triplex Confinium, and analyzes the perspective of the Venetian administration in Dalmatia. By the extensions of the Venetian border, at the expense of Ottoman Bosnia, with the treaties of Carlowitz and Passarowitz, there were more Morlacchi subjects of Venice in the early eighteenth century than ever before. The dispatches and relations of the "Provveditori Generali" reveal the particular political, religious, social, and economic issues raised by consideration of the Morlacchi, and the special importance of their migrations across the triple border. The article focuses on the mid-century concerns surrounding Marco Foscarini's speech in the "Maggior Consiglio" in 1747, the consequent Venetian investigative mission in Dalmatia, and the Grimani agricultural reform of 1755. The article analyzes the changing administrative emphasis from "discipline" to "civilization," and discusses how the official discourse of provincial government pointed toward the philosophical priorities of enlightened anthropological interest in the Morlacchi.

Voltaire, in his *Essai sur les Moeurs*, in 1754, made customs into the fundamental principle of his universal history, and when he considered the subject of "savages," he casually cited as examples: "the Morlaque, the Icelander, the Lapp, the Hottentot."¹ Twenty years later, in 1774, Alberto Fortis published his *Viaggio in Dalmazia*, with a section on the "Customs of the Morlacchi," and presented the subject to his readers thus: "You will have heard talk of the Morlacchi as a race of ferocious men, unreasonable, without humanity." Fortis was arguing against an idea of the Morlacchi as irrational and inhumane, and referring back to "talk of the Morlacchi" from earlier in the century. Indeed he declared himself the champion of the Morlacchi, and wrote, "I believe that I owe to the nation, by

¹ Voltaire. René Pomeau (ed.). *Essai sur les moeurs*. Vol. I; Vol. II. Garnier Frères. Paris, 1963, 3, 25; 811.

whom I was so well received and humanely treated, a most ample Apologia, writing about that which I personally saw of their inclinations and customs."²

Thus he seemed to recognize the Morlacchi as a distinct nation, based on the perceived community of customs. This perception derived from an earlier administrative perspective on the Morlacchi, who constituted an important subject in the discussions of the Venetian administration in Dalmatia from the beginning of the eighteenth century. Administrative observations concerning Venetian Dalmatia during the earlier part of the century were fundamental for the emergence of enlightened anthropology, focused on the Morlacchi, during the later part of the century.

The pastoral people of the mountainous inland territory of Venetian Dalmatia, along the Triplex Confinium, were called Morlacchi by the coastal Dalmatians and by the Venetians, but Fortis knew that these Morlacchi sometimes referred to themselves as Vlachs. He also knew that they spoke a Slavic language, which linked them to other Slavic peoples across Europe. In the early twentieth century the Serbian ethnographer, Jovan Cvijić, mentioned the Morlacchi in a footnote, and identified them as Slavicized Vlachs: "the Slavicized Vlachs or Morlachs, "who constituted "the most primitive population, moreover very rare."³ Foreign tourists at the beginning of the twentieth century recorded their impressions of the Morlacchi in the marketplace of Zadar, viewing them as a rare and remarkable attraction. Alice Moqué described the Morlacchi as "strange, uncouth-looking people from the mountains," and was impressed by their "barbaric gorgeousness." Maude Holbach thought they spoke "the strangest tongue that ever assailed my ears," and seemed "more like North American Indians than any European race." Frances Hutchinson admired "the barbaric costumes of the Morlacchi," and regretted that "civilization is about to encroach upon picturesqueness."⁴ Fortis, in the eighteenth century, made the Morlacchi famous throughout Europe, but, by the twentieth century, in spite of their picturesque appeal, they were on the way to ethnographic oblivion.

In the records of the Venetian administration, and later in the literature of the Venetian Enlightenment, the Morlacchi nation appeared not so much as a division, but rather as an aspect of the Dalmatian nation, conceived as anthropologically alien to Italy and emphatically backwards in customs and economy. A Dalmatian who was perceived as primitive could be called a Morlacco. The character of the Morlacchi, even for Fortis, was still the less "civilized" aspect of Dalmatia, which made the province appear as part of "Eastern Europe," according to the values of the Enlightenment. In this regard, the Morlacchi are crucial for understanding what Drago Rokсандić, in his agenda for research on the Triplex Confinium, has called "the history of the triple-frontier area as a history of

² Alberto Fortis. *Viaggio in Dalmazia*. Presso Alvise Milocco. Venice, 1774. Republished by Jovan Vukovic & Peter Rehder (eds.). Verlag Otto Sagner & Izdavacko Preduzece "Veselin Masleša". Munich – Sarajevo, 1974, I, 43–44.

³ Jovan Cvijić. *La Péninsule Balkanique: Géographie Humaine*. Librairie Armand Colin. Paris, 1918, 363n.

⁴ Alice Lee Moqué. *Delightful Dalmatia*. Funk & Wagnalls. New York, 1914, 58–60; Maude Holbach. *Dalmatia: The Land Where East Meets West*. John Lane, The Bodley Head. London, 1908, 31; Frances Kinsley Hutchinson. *Motoring in the Balkans: Along the Highways of Dalmatia, Montenegro, the Herzegovina, and Bosnia*. Hodder & Stoughton. London, 1910, 68–69.

“barbarism” as perceived in the Venetian, Habsburg, and Ottoman traditions.”⁵ Furthermore, just as Karl Kaser and Hannes Grandits have suggested that Habsburg ethnography was organized around the polar principles of the “Gegensatzpaar Kroate-Wallache,” so Venetian administrative views were founded upon the related pair of designations Dalmatian-Morlacco.⁶ These complementary terms acquired meaning in contrasting opposition to one another.

In 1747, Marco Foscarini, in a speech before *Maggior Consiglio* in Venice, addressed the subject of administrative abuses in Dalmatia, and invoked the name of the Morlacchi when he pointed to the economic misery of the province. It was the “unhappy Morlacco” (*infelice Morlacco*), who might well starve to death without the assistance of the Venetian Republic. These were the “villagers of Dalmatia, a people crafty from need and ferocious by nature.” The Dalmatians were characterized as Morlacchi when they were seen as unhappy and ferocious, victims of poverty and perpetrators of violence: in short, an administrative problem. Foscarini in 1747 learned about the Dalmatian economic crisis from the reports of the *Provveditori Generali*, the governors in Zadar: “That the unhappy Morlacco was often subject to such scarcities the *Provveditori Generali* themselves bear witness, they who several times moved by compassion for that mendicant but loyal people have interceded with the Senate for liberal loans of fodder, so they would not die of hunger.”⁷

In the official reports of the *Provveditori Generali* the Morlacchi first appeared as a problem of disciplinary administration, and then, later in the eighteenth century, as a problem of imperial civilization. The changing emphasis from discipline to civilization reflected the different priorities of administration and anthropology, with their convergent interests in the Morlacchi. The *Provveditori Generali*, during the first half of the eighteenth century, wondered whether the Morlacchi could be disciplined, and, later in the century, whether the Morlacchi should be civilized.

* * *

The expansion of Venetian Dalmatia into the *nuovo acquisto* and *nuovissimo acquisto*, which followed upon the peace of Carlowitz in 1699 and the peace of Passarowitz in 1718, gave the province its deepest inland territorial extent and its largest subject Morlacchi population. This inaugurated a new level of Venetian official concern about the administration of the Morlacchi. In the 1730s Zorzi Grimani, as *Provveditore Generale*, formulated the new problem of governing the Morlacchi in peacetime. He distinguished them from the coastal

⁵ Drago Roksandić. “The Triplex Confinium International Research Project: Objectives, Approaches and Methods.” in Drago Roksandić (ed.). *Microhistory of the Triplex Confinium*. Institute on Southeastern Europe. Central European University. Budapest, 1998, 16.

⁶ Hannes Grandits & Karl Kaser. “Familie und Gesellschaft in der Habsburgischen Militärgrenze: Lika und Krbava zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts.” in Drago Roksandić. (ed.). *Microhistory of the Triplex Confinium*. Institute on Southeastern Europe, Central European University. Budapest, 1998, 35.

⁷ Marco Foscarini. “Degl’inquisitori da spedirsi nella Dalmazia (Orazione detta nel Maggior Consiglio il giorno 17 dicembre 1747).” in Emilio Morpurgo (ed.). *Marco Foscarini e Venezia nel secolo XVIII*. Successori Le Monnier. Firenze, 1880, 220–21.

Dalmatians, who had “devotion and loyalty already rooted in them,” after centuries of Venetian rule.

The Morlacco too, who is not of very ancient subjection, shows himself of optimal heart toward his prince. He is by nature ferocious, but not indomitable. He is accustomed to being treated without excess. Too much gentleness makes him impertinent, and extraordinary rigor renders him fierce and harsh. He does not love working the land; he is inclined rather to pillage, and succeeds best at arms.⁸

Thus Grimani emphasized that the Morlacchi were new subjects of Venice in the eighteenth century; loyalty was not “rooted” in centuries of habituated subjection. He offered a formula for governing them – not too gentle, not too rigorous – aimed at taming and training them to docile loyalty, to match the coastal Dalmatians. The Morlacchi could be seen as Dalmatians in the making, or the Dalmatians could be seen as fully dominated and domesticated Morlacchi.

Giacomo Boldù, *Provveditore Generale* in the 1740s, evaluated the economic potential of the province according to the character of its people.

Agriculture and the arts are the principal if not the only sources of commerce, which certainly can not flourish where human labor and industry languish. Here is the invincible defect of these peoples of Dalmatia... Agriculture in this province, if it is not totally absent, is at least languid and unattended... Obstinate is the aversion of even the coastal subjects to every other application except that of the flocks, and the labor of arms, which are then devoted by most of them to pillage, blood, and other human disorders... Also lazy by nature, especially the Morlacco... and incapable of discipline ...⁹

In this view, the Morlacchi were just like other Dalmatians, but “especially” so. The Morlacco thus presented the most marked features of the general Dalmatian character. While “even the coastal subjects” demonstrated that character, it was “especially the Morlacco” who represented the extreme manifestation. The invincible defect of the Dalmatian character was economic inaptitude, perceived as laziness, disorder, and indiscipline. Boldù summed up the Morlacchi accordingly: “rough and lazy people, of a different rite, equally slothful in religion, but all by nature ferocious and vindictive, more or less avid for blood and prey, troublesome to their neighbors across the border and to their own compatriots.”¹⁰ When Fortis offered his Apologia in 1774 for the ferocious Morlacchi, he was responding to a prejudicial opinion already articulated within the Venetian administration by the middle of the century.

Boldù did concede that the Morlacchi showed an aptitude for arms. In the 1740s, the decade of the War of the Austrian Succession, troops were summoned from Dalmatia to Italy to defend Venetian neutrality, and this also meant that Morlacchi were mobilized, armed, and assembled at Zadar to embark for Italy. At that time the young Carlo Gozzi was serving in Dalmatia under Girolamo Quirini, *Provveditore Generale*, and Gozzi remembered the mobilization of the Morlacchi in his *Memorie Inutili*: “I was present at the review of this species of

⁸ Zorzi Grimani. Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASV). Collegio: Relazioni, filza 69, marzo 1732.

⁹ Giacomo Boldù. ASV. Collegio: Relazioni, filza 69, 30 agosto 1748.

¹⁰ Ibid.

anthropophagi, which took place at the harbor of the city of Zara before the *Provveditore Generale*." Gozzi watched them doing "strange dances" as they boarded the ships. According to Gozzi, they caused nothing but trouble in Italy because they could not heed "the commands of discipline or subordination."¹¹ Boldù, later in the decade, commented thus on the Morlacchi militia, the Craina, in Dalmatia: "without military discipline, likely to abandon their posts to go home, called there by the spirit of family, and likely besides to collude with criminals rather than arrest them."¹² Military discipline was just one aspect of the more general disciplinary ideal invoked by the Venetians in the eighteenth as the administrative standard by which to evaluate the Morlacchi.

The administrative problem of the Morlacchi was further addressed in reflections on their perceived propensity for violence, which flouted the forms of law and requirements of public order. Boldù found that his efforts to govern them by the routines of legal administration was frustrated by "the ferocious character of the nation, the multiplicity and gravity of the crimes that occur, and the serious disorders that derive from the strength of a barbarous custom." That custom was the vendetta of the South Slavs, the private family revenge by which the Morlacchi took the law into their own hands, and Boldù in a special supplement to his general relation to the Senate provided an account of the vendetta which constituted an early contribution to Venice's anthropological study of the Slavs of Dalmatia. Boldù described the "barbarous custom" of the vendetta as an obstacle to disciplinary administration.

The Morlacchi, by their own instinct, easily determine to commit homicide, so a brief dispute and a few words precipitate the resolution to attack for every trifling cause or suspicion. Considerable is the number of subjects who perish in the province in such a manner from year to year, but the harm to the population from this loss would not be so serious if it were not aggravated by the vendettas that are immediately undertaken by the relatives of the victim. As soon as they receive the news of the misfortune of the killing, they all rise up tumultuously, and, with arms in hand, coming to the house of the killer, they carry off the effects and animals they find there, and with indomitable furor lay waste to all that they can not easily carry, often even setting fire to the house, the granaries, the stables and whatever is found in the possession of the unhappy family... It sometimes happens that some families that have been subjected to such misfortune have closed up their own homes and abandoned entirely the Venetian state. However vigorous are the orders and dispositions of the penitentiary office and the public agents of the province, it has never been possible to eradicate in the nation this barbarous custom of reprisals.¹³

The Morlacchi character was repeatedly designated as "ferocious," and Morlacchi customs were, correspondingly, conceived as "barbarous."

However, the empirical account of customs indicated the potential intersection of traditional administrative imperatives and nascent anthropological concerns.

¹¹ Carlo Gozzi. Domenico Bulferetti (ed.). "Memorie Inutili." Volume I. in Gustavo Balsamo-Crivelli (ed.). *Collezione di Classici Italiani*. Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese. Turin, 1928, 66–67.

¹² Giacomo Boldù. ASV. Collegio: Relazioni, filza 69, 30 agosto 1748.

¹³ *Ibid.*

In observing that vendettas sometimes drove the Morlacchi to abandon the Venetian state, to emigrate from Venetian Dalmatia, Boldù addressed a fundamental issue of social and political discipline. Foscarini, in his speech of 1747, attributed such emigration to conditions of extreme poverty: "Unfortunately it is certain, Serenissimo Mazor Consegio, that an infinite number of families which, having shaken off the yoke of the Turks with arms in hand, and were brought beneath the placid and temperate Dominion of the Republic, for some time since have abandoned the new establishments and houses, to return as tattered beggars under the Ottoman tyranny."¹⁴ Such migrations, crossing the borders of Venice and the Ottoman empire, and the Habsburg empire as well, did occur in the eighteenth century as impoverished pastoral people responded to economic conditions drawing them in one direction or another. Thus the emigration of the Morlacchi was perceived in Venice as an important administrative problem in the context of the *Triplex Confinium*.

* * *

Foscarini in 1747 appealed to the senators of the *Maggior Consiglio* to send a commission of "inquisitors" across the Adriatic to investigate administrative abuse and corruption in Dalmatia. The inquisitors' report was submitted in 1751, at the end of a three-year investigation of the province. They addressed not only corruption in the Venetian administration, but also "the corruption of customs which we have found prevailing among these populations," and especially the customs of the Morlacchi:

Considerable and ruinous we have discovered among the Morlacchi the custom of solemnizing annually their saints' name days, the celebration of the anniversaries of their deceased, as well as the daily deaths, the solemnity of weddings, the celebrations of wedding masses, the confirmation of their peacemakings, all occasions on which, for the course of several consecutive days and nights, they were profuse with excessive intemperance and squander in costly debauches with a copious number of guests, in such a manner as finally to convert their solemn days of consecration not only into profane use but into an outlet for vice, with revelry and indecent bacchanals right in the face of the church.

With such ruinous formalities houses were destroyed in excessive behavior, and fomented by prodigality and intemperance, their native ferocity sparked brawls and awakened dormant quarrels; nor did the arrangements ever finish ordinarily without scandalous enormities and without the shedding of blood.¹⁵

These criticisms of the Morlacchi matched the campaigns of reform against popular culture which had been promoted by the reformed churches and the early modern state throughout Europe since the sixteenth century. The Morlacchi, only recently redeemed from the Ottoman Empire, received such attention belatedly in the eighteenth century, in the name of enlightened administration.

In the report of the inquisitors the Morlacchi appeared as a Rabelaisian race, characterized not only by ferocity, but intemperance, prodigality, debauchery,

¹⁴ Foscarini, 231–32.

¹⁵ Sindici Inquisitori in Dalmazia (Giovanni Loredan, Nicolo Erizzo, Sebastian Molin). ASV. Collegio: Relazioni, filza 70, 2 ottobre 1751.

and the blasphemous perversion of religious observance. Their “ruinous” appetites for food and drink fit their natural inclination to violence, and even suggested, by implication, some sort of bacchanalian sexuality. The issue of discipline was here conceived as a problem of self-discipline. Sent to investigate administrative abuses, the inquisitors found fault with the character and customs of the inhabitants themselves. The report revealed the anthropological aspect of administration, urging reform not just of the government, but also of the customs of Morlacchi.

The inquisitors did not altogether ignore the reality of oppression in provincial government. They noted “greed and malice” in some officials, and found that abusive official fees could cause “extreme misery and desperation” in the subject population.

In fact copious complaints of subjects have been directed mostly against the unheard-of oppressions that they experienced from the avarice of the chancelleries concerning criminal costs, complaints deploring the fatal effects that derive from their arbitrary and intolerable exactions ... By the excess of the costs of a trial the poor Morlacchi (*poveri Morlacchi*) are destroyed since to obtain the payments ... even their arms, agricultural instruments, and the ploughing animals themselves are illegally violated; so that desperate at seeing themselves denuded of everything, either they join with criminals or they are forced to give up being Venetian subjects.¹⁶

Concern for the *poveri Morlacchi* was keyed to the imperial preoccupation with emigration. The poverty of the population and the proximity of the triple border combined to create unstable demographic circumstances.

One possible solution to such instability was to favor agriculture over pastoralism, and the inquisitors declared themselves committed “to impose salutary rules toward an equitable and charitable distribution of lands, for upon this, we frankly can not keep from repeating, depends uniquely the true redemption of these provinces, the true well-being of the peoples, and the interest of the principate.”¹⁷ This insistence on the urgency of land reform in 1751 would lead to the law of 1755 by which Francesco Grimani, *Provveditore Generale*, enacted the indicated reform.

The inquisitors were alarmed by the uncertainty of property rights which derived from the new and newest acquisitions of territory in Dalmatia after the treaties of Carlowitz and Passarowitz. “Such lands of new conquest were discovered by us in a general disorder, confusion, and chaos,” they declared, “most of them occupied, invaded, possessed without title, against every right and reason, and by arbitrary violence.” The conquered territories were claimed by Venice as the property of the state, but the Morlacchi, who lived there, treated the land as if it belonged to them.

This serious affair having proceeded without system, and without appropriate rules, the Morlacchi, guided by their improper abuses, according to custom, presumed to sell the lands of *Vostra Serenità*, to mortgage them, to assign them, to donate them, to give them as dowries, to divide them, to bequeath them, and

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

to make of them whatever most prodigal and arbitrary disposition, as if they were of their own right and free dominion. Accustomed to invade, not only reciprocally among themselves the seeded land, the vineyards, the pastures, the plants, to expel whomever they think unable to resist their violence; but also to cut into and occupy the communal lands destined for the pasture of plow cattle, and to usurp the meadows reserved for the hay of the Public Cavalry. From such serious and violent causes are derived the mournful effects of brawls and homicides and innumerable criminal cases.¹⁸

The inquisitors perceived a chaos of unclarified property arrangements. It seemed that only if the Morlacchi conceded the property rights of the state, could the state then impose an equitable distribution of land on behalf of the inhabitants. By this reasoning the distribution of land would vindicate the state's right to impose order, while submitting the Morlacchi to the ultimate discipline of property.

The violence and irregularity of their national character was to be countered by the imposition of discipline on social and economic structures. "We believed it essential above all to give a methodical form to the village, where houses are dispersed and widely distant one from another," noted the inquisitors. Patterns of settlement and habitation along the Triplex Confinium were to be modified in conjunction with the reformed distribution of land, so that economic and administrative order could be pursued simultaneously. "It was our precaution," warned the inquisitors, "to concede to the Morlacchi the investiture of confirmation or addition of lands only in those villages where they were planted with their families, so they might not escape from the observation of their leaders and from their contributory obligations." Observation and obligation were invoked as basic principles of administration, and the redistribution of land was conceived as a strategic measure toward the countering of customs and character, toward the transformation of the Morlacchi into disciplined subjects. "We have thought to propose," reported the inquisitors, "as most sufficient, just, and proportionate to the sustenance of the Morlacco, were he to wish to employ himself at his labors, and the required work, two fields per person, and these in perpetuity in the masculine line."¹⁹ The formula of two fields for each Morlacco, unalienable and indivisible, was to be the basic principle of the Grimani reform in 1755.

When Francesco Grimani left Dalmatia in 1756, a year after the promulgation of the land law that carried his name, he wrote to his successor as *Proveditore Generale*, Alvise Contarini.

Entering into civil affairs, of which the emergent character may merit being explained before the illumination of Your Excellency, I present first of all the agrarian matter.

Upon my coming to the province I found it in circumstances so murky and perverse that I was overcome, considering the tenuousness of my talents...

With a topographical plan of every village on the desk I reviewed the villagers, family by family, and in this way came to know the truth of things.

Satisfying thus their honest conveniences, even to the point of bringing them to call themselves spontaneously content, I fixed by my own hand the detail of the assignments. With this guide, the consignments of two fields per per-

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

son were executed on the spot... Thus the cadaster was formed, that is, the Register in two large volumes, each of which corresponds to the topographical plans.²⁰

Grimani presented agrarian affairs as a crisis, which he overcame through the rational procedure of enlightened administration. He celebrated the triumphant management of the Morlacchi, whose coordinates were now precisely marked on the topographical maps and definitively inscribed in the volumes of the cadaster.

Grimani also celebrated the triumph of administrative discipline over character and customs:

I will not stop here to say anything new in describing the character of these subjects. Speaking about the Morlacco, all the observations of my predecessors combine to characterize him as ferocious, intemperate, inertial, and devoted to theft. Yet it is a most well-known principle that population is the substance of the principate, and that the most healthy policy teaches to procure the increase in number, I have studied every expedient to eliminate any necessity for the Morlacchi to take refuge in foreign states. And I reflected that for every family that the prince loses here, he loses the seed of able soldiers...²¹

Grimani refused to contribute to the already well-established discourse on character, reciting the various attributes from ferocity to criminality as if they were tired and irrelevant *clichés*. The Morlacchi, whatever their character, were the actual inhabitants of Dalmatia; the state had no alternative but to value them, to seek to preserve them, and to render them more content there than elsewhere, that is, in the Ottoman or Habsburg empires. Such were the administrative imperatives of government along the Triplex Confinium. Grimani urged Contarini to govern the Morlacchi “with maxims of tolerance and gentleness,” toward the ultimate aim of “keeping them in discipline and moderation.”²² Disciplined subjects, after all, were an important resource of the state.

Pietro Michiel, completing his three-year term as *Provveditore Generale* in 1765, wrote about “unusual and fatal combinations of plague, famine, and rivalrous military aggravations in neighboring Bosnia that kept me occupied almost through the entire triennium.” His criticisms of the Morlacchi were harsh: “The true character of the Morlacco is intemperate to excess, lazy, inclined to theft and vendetta, restless, and violent.” The issue of discipline seemed particularly pressing on account of the plague in Bosnia, which represented an epidemiological menace to Dalmatia: “The danger of infection always hangs over the province when neighboring Bosnia has been struck.” The quarantine, however, was especially difficult to maintain on account of the “undisciplined Morlacchi,” *indisciplinati Morlacchi*.²³ With this epithet Michiel consolidated the disciplinary discourse that had developed during the first half of the eighteenth century in the observations of the Venetian administration in Dalmatia.

²⁰ Francesco Grimani. “Informazione del *Provveditore Generale* Grimani al Suo Successore Alvise Contarini.” ASV. Collegio: Relazioni, filza 69, 10 ottobre 1756.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Pietro Michiel. ASV. Collegio: Relazioni, filza 70, 25 dicembre 1765.

Fortis's anthropological explorations, from the first time he crossed the Adriatic in 1770, took place in the philosophical context of the Enlightenment, conditioned by Voltaire's emphasis on customs and Rousseau's interest in savages. *The Viaggio in Dalmazia*, however, was also a voyage undertaken in the political context of Venice's Adriatic empire and the international context of the Triplex Confinium. The problematic subject of the Morlacchi was already well developed within the discursive channels of the Venetian administration when Fortis redirected the discourse to put it before the public of Venice, reformulated according to the values of enlightened anthropology. Indeed, it would be possible to argue, with reference to Fortis, that modern anthropology began in the territories of the Triplex Confinium. In the earlier part of the eighteenth century the *Provveditori Generali* reported to the Senate on the character and customs of the Morlacchi, considered as a problem of disciplinary administration. In the later eighteenth century this problem would be philosophically and anthropologically reframed as an issue of civilization.

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**CRIME ON THE BORDER:
VENICE AND THE MORLACCHI
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY**

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the representation of the Morlach population offered by Venetian documents in the first half of the eighteenth century, especially in the 1740s and 1750s. It deals above all with the attention Venice directed toward crimes committed by the Morlacchi, on the explanations provided for their misdeeds and on the measures that were adopted (or suggested) to turn them into “good” subjects and faithful soldiers. In investigating this topic archival sources (mainly located in the Venice Archives) have proved to be particularly useful, together with several other eighteenth century documents kept in private and public libraries. In addition to various reports made by the “Provveditori Generali” and “Sindici Inquisitori”, I have consulted and compared the accounts provided by the fiscal lawyer Antonio Giusti and by the Franciscan monk Vuco Raulych, which analyse the Morlacchi's behaviour from different cultural and “national” points of view.¹

It was only after the treaty of Carlovitz (1699) and the extension of the Venetian territory up to the “Nani line”² that the Morlacchi, until then just one of the peoples which formed the mercenary armies fighting in the East, became subjects of the Republic and started posing problems because of their peculiar lifestyle and different religion.

The new subjects were a semi-nomadic population inhabiting the mountains and valleys in the Dalmatian inland, mainly devoted to sheep breeding. In general, Venetians regarded them as ready to accept the rule of those who could offer the best living conditions and opportunities. That is why the Republic tried

¹ F. V. Raulich. *Le Traversie della Dalmazia, memoria dedicata al senatore Querini dal monaco francescano Raulych nel 1748*. Venezia. Biblioteca Querini Stampalia. Cl. IV, Cod. CCCLXXXI (the Venetian senator Paolo Querini was brother of the new Provveditore Generale in Dalmatia); A. Giusti. *Progetti e ricordi dal Signor Antonio Giusti rassegnati agli Ecc.mi Signori Sindici Inquisitori in Dalmazia*, s.d. (1750). ASV (Venice State Archives). Collegio V (*Secreta*), *Relazioni*, b. 70.

² On the extension of Venetian dominion in Dalmatia see G. Praga. *Storia di Dalmazia*. Cedam. Padova, 1954, 188–195; R. Cessi. *La Repubblica di Venezia e il problema adriatico*. Cedam. Padova, 1943, 292–336; *Prospetto cronologico della storia della Dalmazia con riguardo alle provincie slave contermini*. Spiridione Artale libraio. Zara, 1878, 252–285.

to find a way to bind the Morlacchi to itself, detaching them from both the Ottoman Empire and the Austrians.

Generally speaking, Venetians offered a two-fold image (with a common core) of the Morlacchi, which accords with the vision "civilized" Europe had of the "other" in the eighteenth century, particularly of peoples with a backward economy and a "natural" life style. The common core was formed by the following traits: the Morlacchi were strong, tough, hearty, healthy, simple, wild, superstitious and fond of weapons. In addition, they were described by some writers as barbarian, fierce, violent, vindictive, cruel, lazy and devoted to robbery, a people needing a firm hand to be subdued, and by others as individuals possessing enviable virtues, unspoiled, naturally free, living by old and innocent customs, hospitable, sincere, honest, reliable, warm and brave.³ The prevailing image of the Morlacchi, it deserves to be noted, was the one consisting of the common traits plus the positive qualities we have just mentioned. This did not occur by chance: the Morlacchi, in fact, were constructed as a population which could be perfected by (Venetian) civilization and whose gifts could prove useful to the needs of the Dominion.

The necessity of coping with crime in the region was one of the greatest concerns for the Venetians: the problem was to find measures which, though extending to the newly acquired territories the laws and principles of the Republic, would establish a social climate enabling Venice to exploit the defensive potential of such populations against the Ottoman Empire's aggressions as effectively as possible.

As Giusti states in his report regarding the Morlacchi sent to the *Sindici Inquisitori*, after Carlovitz some Venetian aristocrats (Giovanni Grimani for example) deemed that, in order to make such populations useful in peace as at war, it was necessary to keep a firm, but paternal, attitude towards them to prevent their boldness from degenerating into crime.⁴ These people's loyalty had to be sought by catering to their self-interest rather than relying on their virtues: therefore, it was necessary to find a way to bind the interests of the Morlacchi to those of the Republic.

Others faced the question with a more tolerant and understanding spirit. In his report of 1702,⁵ Alvise Mocenigo had affirmed that the Morlacchi were proud but docile, that they were unruly but could obey discipline and that, even though used to the ferocious freedom of war, they knew obedience, as had been demonstrated on several occasions.⁶ These words partly anticipated the image of


³ On this subject see L. Wolff. "The enlightened anthropology of friendship in Venetian Dalmatia: Primitive ferocity and ritual fraternity among the Morlacchi." in *Eighteenth-Century Studies*. Vol. 32/2. Winter 1998-99, 157-178; L. Wolff. "Venice and the Slavs of Dalmatia: The drama of the Adriatic Empire in the Venetian Enlightenment." in *Slavic Review*. Vol. 56/3. Fall 1997, 428-455; V. Gulin. "Morlacchism between Enlightenment and Romanticism (identification and self-identification of the European other)." in *Narodna umjetnost*. Vol. 34/1. Zagreb, 1997, 77-100.

⁴ See Giusti, 1750, c. 16.

⁵ ASV, *Collegio V (Secreta), Relazioni*, b. 68.

⁶ See Praga, 1954, 185-192; E. Eickhoff. *Venezia, Vienna e i Turchi. Bufera nel Sud-Est europeo, 1645-1700*. Rusconi. Milano, 1991, 448-456. In this regard, particularly interesting are many of the documents collected in B. Desnica (ed.). *Historia Uscoccorum Cotarensium (1646-1746)*. Belgrade, 1950.

Dalmazia. Rappresentazione del litorale dell'isola di Pago a quelle di Curzola e Meleda e l'entroterra delimitato dal tracciato confinario con l'Austria e Ottomani. Autore n.i., 1752. Senato Militar, filza 36, dis. 1. N. 1.



the Morlacchi that would be fully constructed later in the century, and that clearly emerged in the well-known report by Abbot Alberto Fortis.⁷

Those who regard the Morlacchi as a people whose customs are to be understood and respected, like Father Raulych, also try to explain their unlawful behaviour ascribing it to difficult life conditions and to the widespread corruption of nobles, judges and the clergy.⁸

The “Venetian” Morlach is usually represented as a better person than the Austrian Morlach, the latter being portrayed as highly aggressive and greedy. The shepherds living in the Lika region shared with the Venetian Morlacchi the name, the general disposition and the bold temperament, but they were held to be wilder, since they did not engage in any trade with important towns, and they showed arrogance due to their connection with the Habsburg Empire.

A further distinction was sometimes drawn between the Morlacchi who observed the Greek cult and those who followed the Latin Church. The Greek Morlacchi were said to be less amenable and they were badly guided by ignorant priests, while the Latin Morlacchi were taken care of by the order of Franciscans, which had always promoted faith, truth and the respect of Christian principles.⁹

What has been said so far demonstrates that the image of the more “tameable” Morlach is fashioned, not surprisingly, according to the Venetian perspective. Such a perspective was based upon two factors: geo-political location and religion, with the Republic of Venice opposed to the Austrian territory and supportive of catholicism instead of Greek orthodoxy. Nevertheless, as far as religion was concerned, it needs to be recalled that since the beginning of the century the *Provveditori* had made a significant effort to ensure respect for the Greek cult. In 1702 Alvise Mocenigo had contacted the major representatives of the Greek cult assuring them that their creed enjoyed the protection of the Republic, even though from time to time some bishops and *calogeri* coming from the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires crossed the border and preached “in a suspicious way.”¹⁰

* * *

As mentioned above, in most official documents the Morlacchi are described as people who often did not abide by the law and sometimes perpetrated brutal crimes.

Thefts, committed to the detriment of other Morlach families, were very frequent: the Morlacchi often stole sheep, horses, cattle and seeds. The most seri-

⁷ See A. Fortis. *Viaggio in Dalmazia*. Alvise Milocco. Venezia, 1774. On Fortis and his works see. F. Venturi. *Settecento riformatore, L'Età dei lumi*. Vol. 2: *La Repubblica di Venezia (1761–1797)*. Einaudi. Torino, 1990, 71–84.

⁸ Raulych, 1748, *passim*. The importance of respecting long-established habits and traditions had been fully grasped by Alvise Mocenigo III, who left a good memory of him by always defending local customs and wearing hair, moustache and cap according to the Slav fashion, see *ibid*, c. 26r.

⁹ Report by Provveditore Generale Marin Zane, 1705, ASV, *Collegio V (Secreta), Relazioni*, b. 68.

¹⁰ ASV, *Collegio V (Secreta), Relazioni*, b. 68, c. 17r. As regards religion, particularly interesting is Pietro Gradenigo's memoir, held in the Biblioteca Querini Stampalia in Venice: *Promemoria d'informazione di quanto à seguito dal principio del secolo corrente in rapporto della Chiesa di rito Greco serviano nella Provincia di Dalmazia et Albania all'anno 1767*, Cod. DLV.

ous problem, anyway, was constituted by the fact that every theft was followed by the uncontrollable reaction of the victim who, using all possible means (often illegal), tried to obtain justice. The victim of a theft left his job and wasted a lot of time looking for the offender. He was willing to pay informants a sum of money (often higher than the value of the stolen goods) to have them find the wrongdoer (it happened, sometimes, that the informant was the very same thief, or one of the thieves accusing the others so as to avoid conviction). Using bribery, it was possible to find witnesses ready to declare no matter what in front of a judge: 'justice', therefore, was obtained through corruption and deceit. At times, the victim of a theft went, together with friends and relatives, to the alleged culprit's house to sack it and recoup his losses. In such actions of plunder people unrelated to the murder often also participated, motivated purely by the prospect of a sacking.¹¹

The Morlacchi adopted a typical counterstrategy in order to avoid falling victim of retaliation or suffering the consequences of the application of justice: some of the young people, unwilling to work, left their homes and supported themselves by robberies. The parents of the wrongdoers reported to the *Cancelleria* that their children had "emancipated" themselves, so becoming the only ones to be responsible for their actions. This was done, of course, to prevent the victims of theft from claiming retribution for their losses from the parents' possessions. In reality, the young men kept in close contact with their family, which often helped to hide the loot and hosted them when they were pursued.¹²

Also, some Morlacchi regularly attacked Turk merchant caravans heading through Sinj to the quarantine stations in Split. Such deeds, committed under Venetian jurisdiction, provoked a strong reaction from the Turks and therefore could not be tolerated.¹³

Murders were frequent among the Morlacchi.¹⁴ When a murder was carried out – no matter if caused by self-defense, by a row or by accident – the relatives of the victim took revenge on the relatives of the murderer, sacking their houses, taking away all they could and burning the rest, sometimes even killing the children left behind by the fleeing parents. Family feuds continued until the survivors, pursued and in dire poverty, were forced to desert the country and to live in exile in the bordering regions devoting themselves to crime.¹⁵

The reports by the *Provveditori* mention the great celebrations and the expensive banquets that took place during Patron Saint Day. On such occasions the Morlacchi got drunk, let their ill-feelings towards each other surface and started fights which resulted in bloodshed. Such things also happened on All Souls' Day and after a funeral. Wedding celebrations lasted from three to eight days without interruption and, more often than not, degenerated into violence.

¹¹ Giusti, 1750, c. 17.

¹² Ibid, c. 17r.

¹³ Ibid, c. 63. On the commercial relationship between Venice and the Turks see Praga, 1954, 181–182.

¹⁴ Giusti speaks about 400 murders just in the district of Zara in three years, from 1746 to 1749. See Giusti, 1750, c. 19.

¹⁵ Ibid, cc. 19–19r.

Even during local festivals, the expression of piety, the Morlacchi performed profane and indecent acts giving vent to all their vices.¹⁶

To keep the Morlacchi within Venetian Dalmatia was not easy. A great number of people incessantly crossed the border with the Ottoman Empire and, in order to escape hunger in the cold winter after a scarce crop in the Venetian territories, often stopped throughout the season in Ottoman regions, paying a fee (lower than the one imposed on the inhabitants of the Empire) for their stay.¹⁷ They left part of their family behind to take care of the fields and the stock and went away to look for a job. Giusti speaks about one-hundred and fifty families living in this sort of “double subjection”. He also mentions the fact that some people considered these Morlacchi informers of the Turks and that others viewed them as traitors who, on coming back to the Republic's Dominion, scattered infections on purpose.¹⁸

Giusti's words reveal that the Venice Republic did not hold itself at all responsible for such an exodus. According to the fiscal lawyer, it would be better for the Morlacchi to attend to their goods more carefully instead of idling about. In fact, by adopting such behaviour, they would soon consume their reserves of food and suffer from starvation. Consequently, they spent a lot of money buying goods from merchants¹⁹ or migrating to Ottoman territories, that is to say to the country they previously fled because of despotism and mistreatment.²⁰

* * *

Some *Provveditori* mainly attribute the Morlacchi's conduct to their barbarian nature, depicting them as men unused to respecting any kind of rule, accustomed to get personal revenge without restraint, naturally lazy and fond of robberies, innately driven to steal everything they desire. Others relate thefts – which were considered to be acts from which much more serious crimes often originated – principally to the state of poverty in which the Morlacchi found themselves: these commentators attempt to explain, and therefore somehow to justify, such behaviour by connecting it to environmental, economic and social causes.

Above all, living was made difficult in some areas by the morphological character of the region. In the summer, the climate was arid and very windy, and the soil was barren. The region around Imoski was the most fertile, followed by the areas around Sinj and Knin.²¹ Even where breeding was possible conditions were extreme and the income obtained from such activity proved insufficient. Furthermore, the Morlacchi were not good at land cultivation and the few of them that turned to this activity mainly grew the basic products of their diet, such as greens, onions and garlic.²² Merchants took advantage of this condition

¹⁶ ASV, *Collegio V (Secreta), Relazioni*, bb. 68–69.

¹⁷ Giusti, 1750, c. 64r.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, cc. 65–65r.


¹⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 34.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, c. 64r.

²¹ *Ibid.*, c. 34.

²² Report by Provveditore Giacomo Baldù, 30 August 1748, ASV, *Collegio V (Secreta), Relazioni*, b. 69, f. 12, cc. 29–30r.

Dalmazia. Mappa con il territorio del Triplice Confine tra Dugo Poglic - Knin e Mogro Poglic - Campagna di Grahovo ed el canale della Morlaca. Autore n. i., sec. XVIII. *Provveditori alla Camera dei confini*, b. 257, dis. 6. N. 1.



of indigence by providing the Morlacchi with products which would entail a long journey to town to get (like wine and fruit) and paid a low price for the goods offered by them. The young, less suspicious than their parents, stole the reserves of grain for the winter, wool and cheese to exchange them for cheap and unnecessary things. Instead of finding their way to the coastal markets, the goods produced by the Morlacchi were therefore dispersed, so that what remained for them was only the bare minimum, sometimes not even that.²³

The poor condition of the Morlacchi, and therefore their behaviour, was also determined by the working of institutions and by the social and power structure in the region. The Franciscan monk Raulych admits that the Morlacchi committed robberies, but he justified them with two reasons: because they were a naturally belligerent people and because they were driven by necessity, since their possessions were taken away by those who oppressed them, above all nobles, foreigners and *colonnelli* (governors of the *krajinas* elected by the Venetian Senate).²⁴ Once again, therefore, the Morlacchi were attributed a double status, which left room for improvement and potentially kept them within the domain of Venetian law.

Raulych maintains that most of the nobles in Dalmatia had disappeared and that the few still remaining had lost their honour and position. Many foreigners, starting from a low social standing, had become rich, obtained a title by marrying into the old families and appropriated their goods. Such people had no scruples, behaved in a despotic way and aimed at taking possession of the whole country. They were idle, cruel, afraid of military life and would never be willing to fight the Turks.²⁵ On the contrary, the Morlacchi had a noble nature and did not need foreigners to corrupt their customs and oppress them.²⁶ They were always ready to defend the borders from the Turks whereas the new nobles left the land at the first sign of danger, moving to the coastal towns and sometimes even abandoning the region.²⁷ Father Raulych, who clearly voices the point of view of an “insider”, though faithful to the Republic, saw foreigners as a threat to the Morlacchi’s customs and life.²⁸ He mentions Greeks, people from the province of Bergamo and others who had grown rich through illegal trade and money lending, and had bought or usurped lands forcing the legitimate subjects

²³ Giusti, 1750, c. 22.

²⁴ On the nature of the *colonnelli*’s power, see the report by Provveditore Generale Paulo Baldù, presented to the Senate on 15 March 1793, ASV, *Inquisitori ai Rolli*, b. 24, cc 8r–9r. On Dalmatian *krajinas* in the first half of the XVIII century see A. Sfrecola. *Le craine di Dalmazia. La “frontiera militare” di Venezia nel primo Settecento e le riforme del fedelmaresciallo Von Schulenburg. Ai confini degli imperi: nuove linee, nuove frontiere*. Edited by Enrico Fasana. Cedam. Padova, 1998.

²⁵ See Raulych, 1748, cc. 4r–5.

²⁶ *Ibid*, c. 5r.

²⁷ *Ibid*, cc. 23r–24; cc. 43r–44.

²⁸ Father Raulych’s patriotic spirit is also to be found in the writings by Giovanni Lovrich, native of Sinj and medical student in Padua. See *Osservazioni di Giovanni Lovrich sopra diversi pezzi del Viaggio in Dalmazia del signor abate Alberto Fortis, coll’aggiunta della vita di Soçivizza a sua eccellenza Maffio Albrizzi gravissimo senatore veneto*. Francesco Sansoni. Venezia, 1776. On the debate concerning the character of Dalmatian population in the second half of the 18th century see Venturi, 1990, 347–370.

to escape to the Ottoman Empire.²⁹ In this case, it is worth noting, the Morlacchi's breach of loyalty to Venice becomes fully justifiable.

Both in Giusti's report and in Raulych's account tax collectors are charged with greed and accused of taking advantage of the new subjects of the Republic.³⁰ The fact that the Morlach needed to be urged to pay his tributes was not denied, this being an attitude connected to his state of poverty. The Republic had agreed to the use of authority to induce obedience from its new subjects but had not contemplated abuses of power on the part of the collectors such as, for instance, taking food for themselves, their attendants and their horses. At the beginning, such a practice was used to punish those who violated the law but, later, it became a habit and almost a right.

Tax collectors were also charged with taking advantage of the Morlacchi's ignorance and with demanding of them more than was due. Raulych also states that tax collectors insulted the people, sent soldiers to sack their houses and kill their stock if they did not pay the tributes or asked for a delay. In addition, they counted animals at the beginning of the winter and in the summer requested payment also for those which had died in the meanwhile.³¹

According to Raulych, one of the main causes of the Morlacchi's poverty was the behaviour of the *colonnelli*. The *colonnelli* settled in the places where they performed their duty, built houses, got lands and deprived the subjects of their flocks and herds. The Morlacchi were forced to cultivate their land, to collect wood for them, to look after their animals, to act as servants in their houses and to perform several other duties on request.³² The *colonnelli* were therefore to be considered rebels, because they took for themselves what was meant to be used for the Venetian strongholds, which they kept unarmed. When the subjects resorted to the *Prefetto* to expose their grievances, the *colonnelli* abstained from committing abuses for a while only to resume their old behaviour later, when a new judge took charge, and caused the ruin of the men who had turned to the law. As a consequence, the Morlacchi did not dare ask for justice again.³³ Behind the explicit preoccupation for the welfare of the Republic, Raulych's irritation at the abuses committed against the inhabitants of his own country is evident.

Raulych also claims that the Morlacchi were in part responsible for their own evils, making a remark that once again unveils his "patriotism": he laments their lack of unity and the fact that they just suffered the oppression of the rich. First of all, even the *sardari* and *bavambassé* did not complain about the *colonnelli's* behaviour in order not to arouse their hate. Secondly, since the subjects did not know Italian, their accusations may backfire. Sometimes they were courageous enough to react, but they gave up in front of the offers of their op-

²⁹ Raulych, 1748, cc. 41–41r.

³⁰ Ibid, cc. 50–50r; Giusti, 1750, cc. 25–25r. Also Provveditore Pietro Vendramin, in 1729, complained about this situation: "Fatal in all respects to 'the Economy' as proved by many cases, has been the unfaithfulness of the *Amministratori dei Pubblici Capitali*." Report by P. Vendramin, 1729, ASV, *Collegio V (Secreta), Relazioni*, b. 69.

³¹ Raulych, 1748, cc. 50–50r.

³² Ibid, cc. 9r–10.

³³ Ibid, cc. 11r–12.

pressors, trusting such dishonest individuals and not thinking about the consequences of their actions. Actually, occasionally the Morlacchi joined forces and submitted a complaint to the *Prefetto*. Yet, when the defendants come to know about the complaint, they immediately ran to their accusers and convinced them to withdraw the charges with gifts and all kinds of promises. The Morlacchi accepted and later, in front of the judge, they denied what the lawyer supporting their accusations said. The defendants were acquitted and could therefore resume their criminal activity, which got even more intense than it was before since, due to their behaviour, the subjects were no longer believed or helped when they complained.³⁴

In any case, the Morlach was not motivated to respect the laws and resort to justice since he faced a corrupt judicial system pivoting on bribery and personal connections. Since legal expenses were high and the Morlacchi often proved unable to meet them, weapons, work tools and animals were taken away from them.³⁵ This left the population in poverty and forced it to abandon the Venetian territory and to embrace criminality.³⁶ Raulych notes that the *Cancellerie* in Dalmatia were full of weapons confiscated from subjects. Even oxen were expropriated in order for the *Ministri* to be paid, despite the Republic's prohibition, and without oxen the subjects could not cultivate the land. A great number were compelled to flee to Turkey, as happened to many Morlacchi of Imotski: though their escape was represented as voluntary and disloyal, in reality it was caused by the oppression of the very people who accused them in front of the *Prefetto*. Finally, lawyers, in order to increase their earnings, prolonged trials and were as scrupulous in examining the theft of a sheep as they were in the case of a murder.³⁷

The Morlacchi did not only have “internal” enemies. Actually, as was noted by Giusti, they were further impoverished by the fact that Austrian sheep and cattle spent the winter in the farther hinterland of Zadar. This was due to an agreement reached at the end of the seventeenth century: in exchange for the pasture lands granted to Austrians in the winter, the Morlach shepherds of the *Serenissima* Republic could move into the mountains of Lika in the summer. No problem had arisen until about 1730, when Austrian shepherds started to cross the river Zrmanja and to lodge near Zadar, causing disorders. The Lika shepherds entered Venetian territory to release their inclination to robberies, strongly repressed by the Habsburg monarchy. They brought with them not only sheep but cattle and horses that destroyed vineyards and sown ground. They also did not content themselves to let the animals graze but destroy public woods.³⁸

Religion, which in Raulych's opinion could be the only restraint to a licentious and corrupt life, did not have a decisive effect on the life of the Morlacchi.

³⁴ Ibid, cc. 33r–36r.

³⁵ ASV, *Senato, Provveditori da Terra e da Mar, Dalmazia, Sindici Inquisitori, Dispacci*, b. 590, n. 22.

³⁶ Ibid, b. 590, nn. 22; 43.

³⁷ Giusti, 1750, c. 17r.

³⁸ Ibid, cc. 26–27.

According to the Franciscan monk, in Dalmatia there were more priests than peasants, and half of the crops were used to sustain those who became clergymen only to avoid work. He accuses priests of being amoral, haughty, lascivious, quarrelsome and points a finger at the great number of monasteries: one for each town would be enough, while it would be more useful to convert the buildings into institutions for the shelter of orphans and prostitutes.³⁹

In his report Giusti affirms that Greek priests were extremely ignorant and just inspired aversion to the Latin cult. Furthermore, both Catholic and Orthodox priests were indulgent towards thefts.⁴⁰ They are accused of sharing the loot and believing that robbery was not against the evangelical law.⁴¹

Lastly, for the Morlacchi it was extremely difficult to pay the tributes that the Republic asked of them. According to both Giusti and Raulych, the life conditions of such populations would not be affected so negatively if tithes and *erbatico* were distributed more equally.⁴²

* * *

As has been seen, the cause of the problems in the *nuovo* and *nuovissimo acquisto* was acknowledged to be not univocal, and it was assigned (in different degree) to both Morlach behaviour and Venetian faults. The suggestions advanced to solve such problems, therefore, took both factors into account.

The solutions proposed to limit the number of crimes committed by the Morlacchi were conditioned by military and economic interests. Even though for a few very serious crimes the *Provveditori* deemed it appropriate to resort to exemplary punishment, on the whole a soft approach prevailed, which tended to look for compromise and relied on the Morlacchi's *capi* (chiefs) to check the excesses of their people. Such an attitude was clearly considered to be the most appropriate to keep those populations, which played a crucial role in the defence of the Dominion, tied to the Republic. The only drastic measures suggested by the *Sindici Inquisitori* were meant to punish plunder and the killings committed as a consequence of a murder: in these cases the *Sindici* thought it suitable to inflict capital punishment. At the same time, substantial rewards were given to those who wanted to collaborate, in order to isolate the criminals.⁴³ Furthermore, the men who had been sentenced by default were given the opportunity, in exchange for freedom, to be sent to serve the army in the East: this was done with the intention of making the criminals come out and expelling them from Venetian territory.⁴⁴

In order to reduce the number of thefts and the bloodshed often following them, Giusti suggested to exile the most incorrigible families, while others proposed exemplary punishments, such as public thrashing or the "use of the

³⁹ Raulych, 1748, cc. 55–57r.

⁴⁰ Giusti, 1750, c. 16r.

⁴¹ Ibid, cc. 28r–29.

⁴² Ibid, c. 22r and Raulych. 1748, cc. 50–52.

⁴³ *Relazione dei Sindici Inquisitori ritornati dalla Dalmazia*, 2 October 1751, ASV, *Collegio V (Secreta)*, *Relazioni*, b. 70.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

rope."⁴⁵ Since theft appeared to be the cause of all problems, it needed to be corrected but, Giusti affirms, rules that prevent crime were better than those which punished it. It was necessary, above all, to supervise the subjects' life and to check crime using local militias, whose members could be paid through tax exemption and an amount of money contributed by the inhabitants of the villages. Furthermore, nocturnal patrols should be established in the villages to prevent robberies and to protect the houses of a murderer's relatives from retaliation.⁴⁶

In Giusti's opinion, an apparently efficient system to avoid the consequences of thefts had been conceived in the past, but it had never been applied. According to it, the value of the theft should be reimbursed by all the inhabitants of the village where the crime had taken place, but the community received a refund if the thief was discovered. In this way the victim would not waste time looking for the offender and would not squander his money to pay for *denunzianti*, lawyers and witnesses, while the burden on the community was light. Besides, every family was stimulated to stay alert.⁴⁷

As stated above, Venice tried to find solutions that were not limited to the punishment of the offenders but also aimed at prevention. First of all, a reformation of the customs of the clergy was deemed necessary. Churches that had been abandoned or were at the mercy of licentious priests should become places of cult and decency again, and clergymen become models of humility and honesty.⁴⁸ In addition, it was advisable that priests belonged to the Morlach population, that the rites were celebrated in Slav and that the Orthodox cult was maintained since it was practised by the majority of the population.⁴⁹

According to Raulych, letting the Morlacchi keep their customs and language was the only way to make them faithful subjects.⁵⁰ As it appeared evident, Raulych legitimates his suggestions as the best proposals to serve the interest of the Republic but he is also concerned to preserve the cultural identity of the Dalmatian population.

In order to limit the number of occasions on which the Morlach could lose control, usually by drinking too much wine, some celebrations were forbidden and the number of participants in weddings and funerals were restricted. The *capi* were required to ensure the observance of such rules, and transgressors were punished.⁵¹ To check the consumption of wine, the many *botteghe* (inns or taverns) scattered across the region were closed in 1751 as well as the *bettole* and *bettolini* that had multiplied in the towns from about 1720. In such places the Morlacchi idled about and got drunk, many rows started and smuggled goods were hidden.⁵²

⁴⁵ Giusti, 1750, c. 29.

⁴⁶ Ibid, cc. 29r–30r.

⁴⁷ Ibid, cc. 31–31r.

⁴⁸ Ibid, c. 28r.

⁴⁹ Raulych, 1748, c. 56r.

⁵⁰ Ibid, c. 26r.

⁵¹ ASV, *Relazione dei Sindici Inquisitori ritornati dalla Dalmazia*, 1751.

⁵² Ibid; ASV, *Senato; Provveditori da Terra e da Mar, Dalmazia, Sindici Inquisitori, Dispacci*, b. 590, n.10. In this regard, Antonio Giusti suggested that some vineyard land be turned into olive groves and arable land, see Giusti, 1750, c. 50r.

To tackle the problem of corruption in the judicial system, Venice had to watch over the actions of the people in charge of carrying out the law in these territories. Besides, the *Cancellerie* had to reduce the costs and the number of witnesses.⁵³

It is worth noting that the Republic tolerated the resort by its subjects to alternative judicial practices. First of all, there existed a form of arbitration whose rules had been established mainly by priests: in a short time and with little expense a sentence was reached, even though it was not always respected. When suspicions fell on a regular offender he could appeal to the so-called “oath”, that is to say he could be acquitted if a number of people swore that he was innocent. A more frequent alternative practice was the “compromise”, which occurred when the two sides met and reached an agreement in front of a judge.⁵⁴

It was also necessary to prevent powerful men from taking advantage of the Morlacchi's ignorance. In this case Venice had to commit itself to stronger direct control since it was not possible to rely on local justice or on the behaviour of the subjects. Since 1702 Alvise Mocenigo had claimed that, in order to counter the abuses committed by *colonnelli*, *governatori*, *sardari* and *capi* it was opportune to regularly change the people in charge.⁵⁵

For a better control of the population, Raulych affirms, it was necessary to abolish the *capi* and to entrust the *sardari* with the responsibility of supervising the subjects, as used to be the case. The *sardari* were regarded with greater respect by the Morlacchi and had performed heroic acts in the past, though they had lost their valour after being subjected to “all sort of scum”.⁵⁶ According to Giusti, instead, the number of *capi* needed to be increased, since four of them were too few to oversee thousands of irascible people scattered across a territory 200 hundred miles long.⁵⁷ Giusti suggested that the *sardari* had to visit the villages every two months and the *capi* every six to inspect the work of the *capitani*. After their visits they were supposed to send a detailed report to Venice.⁵⁸ Furthermore, in his opinion, it was advisable for the Republic to assign land to *capi* and *sardari* and to increase their salary in order to improve the efficiency of their controls.

Since the very beginning of the eighteenth century the crimes committed by the Morlacchi had been directly connected to their nomadism and it had been

⁵³ ASV, *Senato, Provveditori da Terra e da Mar, Dalmazia, Sindici Inquisitori, Dispacci*, b. 590, nn. 22; 43.

⁵⁴ Giusti, 1750, cc. 17r–18r.

⁵⁵ Report by Provveditore Generale Alvise Mocenigo, 1702, ASV, *Collegio V (Secreta), Relazioni*, b. 68.

⁵⁶ Raulych, 1748, cc. 12r–13r. Father Raulych dwells upon the corruption within the army and remarks that those who know Italian were favoured as far as promotion was concerned. Therefore, the Morlacchi could never hold important positions, though they were very good warriors, and appointments which were not made on account of merit, of course, damaged the interests of the Republic, see *ibid*, cc. 68r–69.

⁵⁷ It is worth reminding that it was Provveditore Lorenzo Donati who, in 1684, nominated four *capi* as heads of the Morlacchi, notably Counts Jankovic, Possedaria, Bortolazzi and the *Sardaro* Smiglianich.

⁵⁸ Giusti, 1750, cc. 24r–25.

thought that the solution to such a problem consisted in linking them to the land.

Following Carlovitz, the Republic tried to settle the Morlacchi and to transform their economy from pastoral into agricultural. The Morlacchi lived in lonely hovels because, so they said, they needed to be closer to the land they cultivated and to the pastures. In reality, according to *Provveditore* Marin Zane (1705),⁵⁹ they did so because they wanted to live free, without restrictions. Such freedom, in Zane's opinion, was the main reason for their depravity and allowed criminals to evade justice. To compel them to live in villages, Venice ordered the burning of the Morlacchi's shelters dispersed across the country. After the Peace of Passarowitz, in the areas around Knin, Sinj and Imoski, each inhabitant received two *campi* (two-thirds of a hectare). The distribution of land to the Morlacchi was regulated definitively in 1757 with the Grimani law, which assigned three hundred *campi* to nobles, two hundred to town citizens and two to each Morlach. After the promulgation of the law Girolamo Bajamonti maintained that, rather than assigning only two *campi* to the Morlacchi, who were deprived of all other source of income, and extensive land to families which were already rich and powerful, it would have been better to give the rich a monthly payment and to apportion all the fields among the inhabitants of Morlacchia.⁶⁰ By doing so, Venice would not have incurred any loss since the tithes collected from those lands, opportunely cultivated, would have increased.

* * *

As has been seen, in its approach to crime, the Republic was not willing to have recourse to drastic methods except for serious security reasons (it is worth reminding that Giusti speaks of four hundred murders in three years if only for the hinterland of Zadar).⁶¹ This attitude was due to several factors. Despite their poverty, the Morlacchi potentially represented a good source of income for the Republic, a source destined to become more profitable in the future, once they would be completely settled.⁶² But, above all, it was the role played by the Morlach in protecting Dalmatia from the Ottoman enemy that was considered fundamental. By granting fields, though of small extent, to capable, strong and courageous warriors, Venice aimed at increasing their attachment for the land and, with this, the impulse to defend it. The religious tolerance shown towards the Morlacchi's cults pursued the same objective: to guarantee a peaceful rela-

⁵⁹ Report by Provveditore Generale Marin Zane, 1705, ASV, *Collegio V (Secreta), Relazioni*, b. 68.

⁶⁰ See G. Bajamonti. "Sopra i veri mezzi di promuovere l'agricoltura in Dalmazia." Memoir presented to the Spalato Academy, 30 January 1791; on the Grimani's law see F. Luzzatto. "Una vecchia legge agraria nella Dalmazia Veneta." in *Rivista Dalmatica*. Vol. X. 1929, 51-59; F. Luzzatto. "La legge agraria Grimani nella critica degli scrittori dalmati." in *Archivio Storico per la Dalmazia*. IV. Vol. VII. Fasc. 42. 1929, 1-9; F. Luzzatto. "La legge Grimani nel giudizio di Vincenzo Dandolo e di Melchiorre Gioia." in *Archivio Storico per la Dalmazia*. IV. Vol. VIII. Fasc. 43. 1929, 1-9.

⁶¹ Giusti, 1750, c. 19.

⁶² In this respect it is significant that the *Sindici Inquisitori* in December 1748 sent a dispatch to the Senate, emphasizing the need to help the Morlacchi to cultivate the land, directly supplying them with the seeds they could not buy for lack of money, see ASV, *Senato, Provveditori da Terra e da Mar, Dalmazia, Sindici Inquisitori, Dispacci*, b. 590, n. 8.

tionship with a population whose attitude could prove very beneficial to Venice in an incessantly contested border area. In 1758, Francesco Grimani counted 51,268 inhabitants in Dalmatia and Albania supporting orthodoxy, a quarter of whom were men able to fight.⁶³ Almost all of these people lived along the frontiers separating the Republic of Venice from the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. That is why, when Grimani came to know of the intention to expel from Dalmatia all subjects following the “Servian cult,” or at least to exile the *calogeri*, he expressed his strong disapproval. Besides provoking riots, he asserted, such a decision would have important political, economic and military consequences.⁶⁴

Venetian policy concerning the Morlacchi resembles the one adopted by the Austrians towards the Orthodox populations living on the Military Border in Croatia, which enjoyed privileges in exchange for faithfulness and militarization. As Drago Roksandić notes, though during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries the Habsburg Monarchy demonstrated its commitment to Catholicism on the Military Border in Croatia, where Catholicism was long threatened by Islam, a policy of religious tolerance toward Orthodoxy seemed the most pragmatic for state or dynastic interests despite the Habsburgs' long-standing commitment to church unification. The number of Orthodox believers (primarily from the Peć Patriarchate), and their share in the population, was so great on the Military Border that no other policy was viable. It had not been possible to settle the *Krajina* region, which was the borderland with the Ottoman Empire, only with Catholics. From a strategic point of view, it would have been unwise to “push” the Orthodox believers back into becoming Ottoman subjects.⁶⁵

Both Venice and the Hasburg Empire had to protect themselves from the Turks: consequently, to deal with border people in a *do ut des* way was considered of the utmost importance.

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⁶³ *Informazione sopra le Chiese greche di Dalmazia del Provv Gen. Francesco Grimani*, 5 July 1758. Venezia, Biblioteca Querini Stampalia, Cod. DLV, c. 213.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, c. 222r.

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**EXPOSING EXISTING FALLACIES REGARDING
THE CAPTAINCIES IN THE BOSNIAN FRONTIER AREA
BETWEEN THE 16th–18th CENTURIES**

ABSTRACT

In the present study a new look is offered on the development and the significance of the frontier “militia” in Bosnia. Both in the old as well as in the recent writings about the same topic, the phenomenon of the “militia” under the command of the “captains” has been dealt with quite ahistorically. The older authors cherished the idea of the one and the same thing from the 16th till the early 19th century, while the younger have neglected pre- and post- 18th century periods. Similarly, this has left the (wrong) impression of a division among historians, opposing the “enlightened” internationalists to “narrow-minded” locals. Here, the effort has been made to demonstrate that the reality was much more complex than either “the struggle for national independence” or a wise and well-balanced cooperation between the Porte and the militia.

According to what is still the only monograph on the subject, written by H. Kreševljaković in 1954, the role of Ottoman officers in the eyalet of Bosnia who were known as “kapudan” as well as the functioning of districts under their command (kapudanlık, “kapetanija”) was essentially the same from the second quarter of the sixteenth century until the second quarter of the nineteenth century when the institution was abolished.¹ Kreševljaković thought that it was something completely unknown in terms of Ottoman military organization and created after the already existing Croatian-Hungarian and Hapsburg model of frontier fortresses or defence units and their commanders, also called “captains” and “captaincies”. In 1960 Hazim Šabanović² amended that statement by adding a remark about the early captains from the mid-sixteenth century, stressing the high level of their wealth and influence as well as their special connection with waterways and naval affairs. However, he also believed that this institution remained *essentially* the same throughout history. Later, some articles and publi-

¹ Hamdija Kreševljaković. *Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Sarajevo, 1980².

² Hazim Šabanović. “Vojno uređenje Bosne od 1463. do kraja XVI stoljeća.” in *Godišnjak društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine XI*. Sarajevo, 1960, 173–224.

cations presented new data on the early *kapudans*, but our information for the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries has remained confined to what was said by these two authors a very long time ago.³

Now if we compare the data on the *kapudans* over three centuries only for the Western Balkan area, substantial differences soon appear. And if we consider data from other sources,⁴ a new page in the history of the Ottoman north-western *serbat* opens. Let us try to establish new vistas.

The first known *kapudanlık* was founded in Gradiška around 1535 on the middle Sava river. But it seems that what we know about its functioning differs greatly from the picture I have just described. The *kapudan* might have been the head of the *azaps* and directly responsible for military activities connected with the river and navigation, but we cannot prove it yet.⁵ He certainly had much more to do with other things. His duties did include a kind of administering a large territory, taking care of resettlement, and he surely was the highest commanding person over a large area, with members of other military units in the fortresses subordinated to him. The first trace of a *kapudan* in Gradiška can be dated to around 1540 when a certain Mahmud bey sent a letter in Latin to the then Croatian *ban*. In it, he promises to prevent incursions of *martoloses* from the fortress of Stupčanica, and goes on to ask the ban to liberate a person called Turhan Yazıcı (held in captivity by Count Zrinski/Zrinyi), and finally he introduces himself as a “*Croatiè et portu Zawy dominus*”.⁶ He was mentioned again in 1560 just after his death, when he was credited with revivifying 39 deserted villages on both banks of the Sava in order to add to his *ze'amet* 26296 *akçe* which could then total 50,000.⁷ Therefore we can also assume that a captain of Gradiška which came with 5000 men to repair the westernmost Ottoman stronghold in the region (Čazma, only 50 km away from Zagreb) in 1558 was the same person.⁸ It is debatable whether he could also have been (in 1537?) the master

³ Behija Zlatar. “O Malkočima.” in *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju*. Vol. XXVI/1976. Sarajevo 1978, 105–114.

⁴ I did not have opportunity to carry out a systematic inquiry in the field of central Ottoman military institutions. But I hope that, aiming at detecting the important contrast between central, regional and local circumstances, I was not wrong if I first consulted the article “*azeb*” in Pakalin's dictionary. That article is based mainly on the “*azap kanunu*”, a part of the well-known general Süleymanic kanunname, which I could use in the edition of Hamid Hadžibegić. Hamid Hadžibegić. (ed.). “*Kanun-nama sultana Sulejmana*.” in *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja u Sarajevu*. Nova serija IV–V. Sarajevo, 1950, 366–368. The *kapudans* did originally have their natural setting among the *azaps*, therefore I thought that it would be reasonable to start there. My second step was to consider what Evliya čelebi says when he mentions the *kapudans* in some major ports on the Danube (İzmail, İsakça, Belgrade and Buda. Finally I have checked some information scattered around in glossaries of a number of monographs written by Ottoman scholars. Taken together, these references point toward a general impression that could be accepted as a working framework in researching the nature of the *kapudans* and *kapudanlıks*.

⁵ Šabanović insists on the idea of a quite a mechanical passage from captains and captaincies exclusively concerned with rivers to those on dry land with different duties. Šabanović, 1960, 219–223.

⁶ Ernst Petritsch. *Regesten der osmanischen Dokumente im österreichischen Staatsarchiv 1*. Wien, 1991, 40.

⁷ Ešref Kovačević. *Muhimme defteri*. Sarajevo. 1985, 64 (Mühimme 215-IV/6, 21–28.10.967). But Šabanović thinks that the text speaks only of the right bank (o. c. p. 221).

⁸ Emilij Laszowski. *Monumenta Habsburgica*. Vol. III. 457.

of the border region in Dalmatia called “*vilayet-i Hırvat*”, because one Mahmud bey was in charge there in the thirties of that century. Or could it be that a huge portion of land on the border (subordinated to Bosnia but under a special regime) from the Dalmatian hinterland up until Gradiška and even farther to the north was at least for a short while assigned to this person?⁹

After Mahmud bey left the scene, we see that the *sancakbeyi* of Bosnia, the famous Malkoç bey, asked this post to be given to his son Cafer bey with a similar mandate. This Cafer bey was said to be able to effectuate what Mahmud bey failed to do, and he was also offering to carry out further colonization on his *basses* in Novasel (Novosel, in north-western Bosnia). Yet he perished shortly thereafter in a skirmish near Čazma the same year he became *kapudan*. Then Malkoç bey managed to install another of his sons Hüseyin bey who was in turn followed by his brother Ali bey in 1565. This Ali bey was a *sancakbeyi* in Esztergom/Ostrogon and probably in Požega (1569).¹⁰ It is also important to note that at the same time Malkoç bey was requesting the *kapudan's* office for Cafer bey, he also submitted a request in favor of a certain Pervane ağa, proposing that that man be confirmed as the ağa of the *azaps*, “because the fortress, being jeopardized by the enemy fleet, must have *azaps* and a *kapudan*”.¹¹ Obviously we have to distinguish between the “greater” *kapudans* (let us call them “*archkapudans*”), who were *beys* and *zaims* holding an office almost as high as that of a *sancakbeyi*, and the “lesser” ones, that probably could be often imagined as small and local-level replicas of the top naval officers on the Danube.

The next example is the *kapudanlık* in Osijek/Ösek where in 1564 the sources mention a certain Gazi (Arnavut?) Mehmet bey who was a *kapudan*, a *zaim* and an *emin* entrusted with an *emanet* consisting of a very valuable group of state revenues for the *sanjaks* of Sirem, Pojega, Začasna, Bosna and Klis together.¹² Later he became a *sancakbeyi* of Požega and a progenitor of a whole dynasty of *serbat beys*.¹³ He was followed in the *kapudan's* office by another *zaim*, but that person did not “inherit” his *eminlik*.¹⁴ Here it also seems that occupying the post of a *kapudan* was only one and not necessarily the most important duty for the *serhat ümera*.

We can even doubt whether we are dealing with what we are accustomed to call *kapudans*, or if it is rather a different post but with the same name – the more so if we remember that in Gradiška there was an “*archkapudan*” above the commander of the flotilla. This suspicion may be reinforced after we examine our third case, which is the post of *kapudan* in Bihać/Bihke, created after

⁹ See below, footnote 14.

¹⁰ There is a possibility that he is identical with the Grand Vizier Yavuz Ali paşa (d. in 1604).

¹¹ Kovačević, 1985, 62 (Mühimme 215-IV/V, 21.10.967).

¹² BOA, Maliye 2775 (125, 127).

¹³ He was even said to have been installed as a kind of governor in Obrovac in Dalmatia in or shortly after 1527. See Hazim Šabanović. *Evlja Čelebi. Putopis*. Sarajevo, 1979, 163. He quotes Katib Čelebi, Fezleke, I, 176, 195; Sicill-i Osmani IV, 514 (but here there is no mention of his post in Obrovac); Muvakkıt (Muvekit), Tarih-i diyar-i Bosna I, 199 and Safvet-beg Bašagić. *Znameniti Hrvati Bošnjaci i Hercegovci u Turskoj carevini*. Zagreb, 1934, 50. Perhaps Mahmud bey was his successor, but the vilayet-i Hırvat was abolished in 1537.

¹⁴ Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Wien, MXT 485, fol. 6.

the Ottoman conquest in 1592. There the river Una could hardly be accredited with any importance for military activities on water. Consequently, there was not a “kapudan-i nehr-i Una” like those for the Sava and Drava. The *kapudan* in Bihać, like his forerunners, was again the highest commanding person in a larger area. Evliya çelebi witnesses how large the sum of ransom money was for one *kapudan* of Bihać who was to be brought out of captivity.¹⁵ His formal title and rank was not that imposing: he was only the a-ğa of one *cemaat* of the *azaps*.¹⁶ On the one hand, the *kapudans* of Bihać belonged to the **new type** (only a-ğ as, not *ümera* descendants, not serving a waterway of primary importance) but on the other hand they conformed to previous *kapudans* inasmuch as one of them, Mustajbeg/Mustafa bey, son of İdris a-ğa Velagić/Velija-ğaoğlu soon become a *sancakbeyi* (in Krka/Lika) and a hero of local sagas and epic poetry.¹⁷ Therefore it seems, from inference rather than records, that the title of *kapudan* was used, at least in the case of some *serbat ümera* in the sixteenth century, more as a designation for *the governor's military-administrative deputy* in the “hottest” part of the border region, rather than a title for the commander of one unit of the main castle's garrison, preferably of the *azaps* – more specifically of those who served in the river fleet. True, other officers were entrusted with the same or similar duties in the same or similar areas: a *voyvoda*, a *serasker*, a *subaşı*, even a *mir-i liva* when he happened to depend on another governor.¹⁸ Yet it seems that the “greater” *kapudan* perhaps like the “dependent” *mir-i liva* was often a son or a relative of the governor, not just a person from his retinue. Or a very distinguished bey was given a post generating as much power and money as that of a *sancakbeyi* (Gazi Memi bey). This fact can help us understand why they appear here and there without continuity. The somewhat ambiguous title *kapudan* was flexible enough to be applied in such cases. After all, the *kapudan* was originally an *azap* officer, but that must be interpreted in a very broad sense.¹⁹ Other peasant volunteers and irregulars under his command like *martoloses*, *gönüllüs* and others were all used for the same purposes as the *azaps* and finally the *kapudan's* duty in places like Gradiška included naval business too.²⁰ I would not dare to exclude completely possible influences of the Hapsburg frontier title *capitaneus* and *Hauptmann* as an additional motive, perhaps even unconsciously, but that could play only a secondary role.²¹ Therefore, I suppose that those “greater” *kapudans* were indeed a local invention, but not just a copy of the Hapsburg institution.

¹⁵ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatnamesi V*, Istanbul 1315, 508, 527–529.

¹⁶ Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Wien, MXT 627. fol. 121. There is no reason to believe that other *kapudans* ever enjoyed higher titles.

¹⁷ Kreševljaković, 1980, 103–104.

¹⁸ The case of Arslan bey, son of Yahyapaşaoğlu Mehmet bey and *mir-i liva* of Požega, in the early phase of Ottoman rule was quite a similar one.

¹⁹ Pakalın says that his post was lower than that of the *ağa* of *azaps*. M. Z. Pakalın, *Türk tarih terimleri ve deyimleri*, Istanbul 1983 (*azap*).

²⁰ Milan Vasić. *Martolosi u jugoslovenskim zemljama pod turskom vladavinom*. Sarajevo, 1967, 68. One *kapudan* of Pest belonged to the *martoloses*, and already in 1548. this officer was a bey. Šabanović, 1960, 219 (both Vasić and Šabanović do not quote their sources).

²¹ Mahmud bey, being the “master” of Croatia and a *kapudan* writes to the Croatian ban (vice-roy) and captain of Bihać Kegljević as to his equal.

Yet in the following century the picture was very different: by then the *kapudan* in Bihać was the sole representative of the older system, while the “lesser” *kapudans* (those in charge with river affairs) were still there. And, what is more important, “*kapudans*” were emerging in many other places where previously there were no such officers. In this they acted as commanders of the garrison’s mobile part (*azap, faris, martolos*) and displayed a tendency toward diminishing the role of the *dizdar*, either through the manifestation of equal power or even by growing over his head. Evliya made the remark that “in this region they call the *dizdar kapudan*”.²² If we confront his statement with military records it becomes obvious that he was not wrong, but only a bit imprecise. In one case recorded in 1643 it seems that the *kapudan* was holding the post of the *dizdar*, and was therefore called *dizdar*. The sources also show that the *kapudan* was often the highest ranking officer, more important than the *dizdar*.²³ It could even happen that more than one *kapudan* be found in one fortress.²⁴ In such cases the title seems to be used in a peculiar way, and its origin might not be traced back simply and directly to the river or sea *kapudans*, much less to a few *ümera* from earlier times. Probably a thin and sinuous connection with those groups did exist, but for deeper roots we have to look elsewhere.

This new phenomenon did not appear before ca. 1580. Why is this so? We may speculate as to the reasons for such changes. I think that it would not be easy to find a direct proof for the hypothesis I am going to submit, but I believe that there are at least enough important hints to make such speculation reasonable. The raids that belong to the earlier period were predominantly executed by *akıncıs* and Vlachs who, although serving only occasionally as a militia, called themselves *martolos* just like the much less numerous but regular *kale martoloslari*.²⁵ These Vlach *martoloses* were not fortress troops. So the *kapudan*, where there was one at that early time, was indeed the leader of attacks on enemy territory, but he was at the same time truly connected with the *azaps*, and his power was confined to them and, more specifically, to the navy, be it on rivers or on the sea (Gradiška but also Obrovac and Gabela where situated on

²² Seyahatnamesi V, p. 510.

²³ MXT 627, fol. 164, Sirač/Sirçe in Western Slavonia. This place with a garrison of 269 had a *dizdar* who was the *ağa* of the *mustabfizes* (only 19 of them), then a large *azap* group was transferred there from the nearby Cernik/Černik. Their *ağa* who, judging from other cases in the *defter*, could be expected to be called *kapudan*, became now a *dizdar* too. He obviously disposed of more power and influence than the first *dizdar*. The whole garrison in Tržac (145 persons) was subordinated to the *kapudan* of Bihać (Idem, fol. 151–153). For Velika in the same region (garrison of 421) it is clearly stated that the fortress has a “*kapudan-i kale*” (Idem, fol. 170).

²⁴ Tadija Smičiklas. *Dvjestogodišnjica oslobodjenja Slavonije*. Zagreb, 1891, 253. (Hofkammerarchiv in Vienna, the Hapsburg survey for Slavonia from 1702; the case of Pakrac).

²⁵ Vasić, 1967, 85–88. The *proveditore* Foscarini says that thousands of Vlachs in Ottoman service in Dalmatia were paid (1572). See Ivan Grgić. “Opis Kliškog sandžaka s ove strane Velebita i Dinare iz godine 1572.” in *Zadarska revija* 4. Zadar, 1956. That fits well in with what we read about the *azaps* and their service having its roots in the last instance in the *avarız*. In 1596 (Sisak) Hasan paša had in his army many thousand Vlachs: very probably this engagement was a kind of mass *martolos* service. The whole of what today is Western Bosnia was occasionally called “Martolosia” or “monti dei Martelossi”. See Radoslav Lopašić. *Bibać i Bibačka krajina*. Zagreb, 1890, 305; Karlo Horvat (ed.). *Monumenta historiam uscocchorum illustrantia. Pars altera (1602–1620)*. Zagreb, 1913, 225.

river estuaries from where there was access to the sea). This “lesser” *kapudan* had a range of action that was quite restricted in comparison with that of the “greater” *kapudans* as well as with that of the eighteenth century *kapudans*. There were not many of them before ca. 1580, probably just half a dozen. Some decades later the whole *serbat* was set thickly with *kapudans*, their competence greater than ever before. Obviously new navigable rivers did not start to flow. But after 1578/1579 the Hapsburg defence system began to solidify. Intensive raiding continued only along the middle section of the border (in the Una-Kupa region), but on other sections it declined. Moreover, in the southern area, from Lika up to Neretva, the Ottoman *serbat* experienced hard blows and disturbances because of the irresistible pressures from the Hapsburg *uskok* raids from Senj. Then the war between 1593–1606 made things even worse. So the Ottomans eventually gave up intensive peacetime raiding and chose the hedgehog defence strategy. There were more garrisons with many more soldiers in the area from the River Drava to southern Dalmatia in 1643 than in 1586 or earlier. The numbers of *azaps* and *farises* especially were much higher (100% or more). There is no indication that many of them were displaced to the westernmost border from the deeper Bosnian hinterland or from remote parts of Ottoman Europe. Now the only possible explanation could be that a good deal of Vlach militiamen (called *martolos*), no longer useful in their original function, were accepted to serve in fortresses as *azaps* or *farises* who in such cases were regulars paid in cash (almost all of those Vlachs eventually became Muslims).

In the seventeenth century, the resident portion of the border garrisons was somewhat increased too, but the majority Vlach *martoloses* probably could not be easily turned either into the *mustabfiz* (with their specific characteristics and their janissary connections), or into the *topçus* (which were not many), nor even into the *martolos* regulars in fortresses whose number was growing slower or stagnating. We can suppose that after they were enrolled as *azaps* and *farises*, new ranks emerged inside the two groups. Most units in important strongholds received a *çavuş* and a *kılavuz* in their commanding staff. That was something new. These ranks also existed among the regular *martoloses*, but it would be difficult to explain the new development as an intentional step towards uniformisation of the troops while neglecting the strong influx from outside. The title *kapudan* for many *ağas* of inland fortresses was also a new thing. Let me stress the fact that *martoloses* as Vlach militiamen had their *martolosbaşıs*, responsible for territories of the size of a *kaza* and called *capi* in Venetian reports.²⁶ Moreover, the Vlachs were in daily touch with Hapsburg frontier soldiers, especially the *uskoks* who were fighting under the command of the captain of Senj as well of subcaptains and captains in lesser nearby forts.²⁷ The sources confirm the fact that *uskok* leaders – who in many cases must have been

²⁶ Vasić, 1967, 65.

²⁷ Catherine Wendy Bracewell. *The Uskoks of Senj*. Zagreb, 1977, 48, 60, 107, 120, 133–134, 137 (Cornell University Press 1992). The case of Senj offers a valuable comparative material. The similarities of structures and trends on both sides are striking enough to confirm the presence of a common ground, the more so if we recall the same or almost the same ethnic, social and cultural patterns inside the local population. Of course this does not disavow the other main factor in the formation of *kapudanlıks* which is “purely” Ottoman.

former heads of *martolos* militias – were bringing their recruiting people from the Ottoman territory in their role of *vojvodas* and/or captains.²⁸ So the title was probably used already in Ottoman service among Vlach irregulars. Members of both groups of the same or similar south Slavic stock frequently moved from one side of the border to the other to serve different masters and they shared the same or similar socio-cultural patterns of living. It is quite easy to imagine that many distinguished *ağas* of Vlach origin appropriated the title *kapudan* by taking their own tradition as a model. Perhaps they were aware of the equation *kapetan* – *kapudan*. In any case this novelty was not opposed by higher Ottoman authorities. This could also support further speculation about the functional relatedness and changeability of titles among *akıncıs*, *azaps* and *martoloses*. In this respect very suggestive are the speculations of Nedim Filipović (1983), although in a different context (islamization); perhaps also the dates he ascribes are too early.²⁹

The use of different names for units might depend on tradition, religion, whether one was paid or not, etc. While speaking of a leader of one hundred militiamen of whatever name in the Croatian – Bosnian border area one could exactly translate the latin *capitaneus* with *yüzbaşı* or *sermie*. One could also be perfectly justified in using *vojvoda* instead.³⁰

The new *kapudans* soon merged into a new class of local élite, less distinguished than the few sixteenth century *kapudans* coming from among the “big” *ümera*, but strong enough to become privileged. The function was now hereditary in the hands of something like petty dynasties. It seems that in the mid – seventeenth century we meet even some late offspring of the famous early *kapudan* families (descendants of Malkoç bey as well as of Gazi Arnavut Memi bey), all of them serving as “new” or “lesser” *kapudans* in Northern Dalmatia.³¹ When the Ottomans started to transform the military, administrative and taxation system in the much smaller Bosnian *eyalet* after ca. 1700, they acknowledged the local power of the *kapudans*, but then they gave them still more authority over territories that were for the first time in history clearly delimited, binding them simultaneously more to state interests. The land was covered in its entirety with *kapudanlıks*. As a consequence, defence in the eighteenth century wars became much more effective.

Recently, the idea of the inheritability of functions and salaries among members of the Bosnian provincial army (fortress garrisons) has been rejected with

²⁸ *Historija naroda Jugoslavije II*. Zagreb, 1959, 409 (Fedor Močanin).

²⁹ Simp. VI. TT 742.

³⁰ Vladimir Mažuranić. *Prinosi za brvatski pravno – povjestni rječnik*. Zagreb, 1975², 486. Significantly a larger *akıncı* unit consisted of a hundred men. This unit's incursions into enemy land was called *baramilik*, while the *martoloses* had their *baramibaşıs*. However, in the 17th c each *ağa* in a *serbat* stronghold had under his command approximately the same number of men, usually much less than 100. Yet since only one of them, if there was any, was a *kapudan*, we conclude that in war and raids he must have been commanding over 100 men and more.

³¹ The famous Halil bey of Vrana (1st half of the 17th c) was probably a descendant of Gazi Memi bey, while a *kapudan* mentioned in 1647 (Alipaşazade Selim) might have been offspring of Malkoç bey. Archivio di stato, Venezia, Documenti turchi, busta 13, 1509. Seid Traljić. *Vrana i njezini gospodari u doba turske vladavine*. Povijest Vrane. Zadar, 1971, 357–358.

no convincing proofs.³² Turning back to the older historiography (Kreševljaković and others), we can see that they were basically right, but their ideas had roots more in popular tradition than in modern academic approaches and an analysis of sources. Of course, inheritability did not mean perpetual tenures reserved for a progeny of a particular officer in precisely this or that *kale* and/or *palanka*. Yet most capable members of families of frontier soldiers had the right to be appointed for service in the area their *ocak* was living. First, the *ocaklık timars* developed in the early seventeenth century and then the same principle was applied in the case of cash *ocaklıks* for “militiamen”.³³ This was indeed a happy compromise, but neither the state nor the *kapudans* were able to hold on to it on the eve of the Tanzimat. A recent study by Michael R. Hickok (see footnote 32) tries to make us believe that the governors acted by a way of consensus and “shared visions” with the “people” (that is, the *kapudans* and their troops).

Referring to the example of Bosnia, the obvious purpose of the author's research has been to confirm the thesis that eighteenth-century Ottoman provincial government was intelligent, well-balanced and responsible. Much effort has been invested in the attempt to discard the allegedly parochial obscurantism of “Yugoslav” (in fact Bosnian) nationalist – and Marxist – historiography dealing with the same subject. I certainly agree that there was – and still is – much anti-Ottoman ideological prejudice in the writings of many “local” scholars who denigrate the effects of the Ottoman administration to justify nineteenth and twentieth century developments. A critique of their shortcomings must be welcomed, especially when really new vistas are opened up.

However, what if such a critique tends to the other extreme, that it would have us believe that eighteenth-century Bosnia was ruled by the Ottomans through “consensus” or a “shared vision” between the “people of Bosnia” and the Porte? Both attitudes suffocate the more modest aim of simply enabling us to understand the conditions of the time. “The Ottoman governors perceived a need to provide protection against peasant unrest, bandits, and violent betrayal by officials. These needs transcended the interests of any single class, confessional community, or ethnicity.” (p. 115) Who is to blame for the fateful disruption of this idyllic state of affairs? Hickok thinks it was the Porte with the transformations in its financial policy (cf. “Transformations in Militia Funding”, pp. 98–113) and which undermined the role of the governor as an intermediary between the center and the “locals”.

Grave methodological errors have led Hickok to such opinions. First, the absence of any information about the earlier history of Bosnian *kapudanlıks* (17th century) as well as of later developments that culminated in the rebellion of 1831 have left the section 1737–1798 (the period of the author's research) suspended in the air, lacking both a “where from” and a “where to”. Secondly, the reduction of the idea of what constituted Bosnian military potential to garrison troops alone (hardly a half of the total, even in the critical year 1737) has led

³² Michael Robert Hickok. *Ottoman Military Administration in eighteenth-century Bosnia. The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage*. Vol. 13. Brill. Leiden–New York–Köln, 1997, xxiii + 190.

³³ Nedim Filipović. “Islamizacija vlahu u Bosni i Hercegovini u XV i XVI vijeku, Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine.” in *Radovi LXXIII*. Sarajevo, 1983, 139–148.

to the erroneous concept of "militia", as if being "locals" was enough to fit this definition. Finally, these "militiamen" (in fact their commanders) have been mistakenly declared to represent the whole "Bosnian people" (for the equivalence of concepts such as "militia" and "people" cf. p. 175, twice). The final outcome suggests a picture of the Ottoman military administration as embodied in three wise, energetic and impartial viziers, almost as a bold, if premature prefiguration of the efforts of the European Union's High Commissioner for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It seems that wherever the chance for a revisionist view has presented itself in the course of his investigation, Hickok either abstains from drawing the necessary conclusion, or else contradicts his main convictions. When he mentions the "disturbances" during the period ca. 1740–1752 the reader gets the impression that in his opinion the disturbance-makers were nothing but "naughty young men" (*yaramazlar* etc. p 116–117). Subsequently he says that some "militia" officers perceived the true reason for the "disturbances", i.e., excessive taxation – but he does not follow that hint (p 124–127). In another instance he denies those events the character of peasant uprisings, especially one directed against the state (p. 134) and then (p. 115) says that the governors perceived the need to provide protection (obviously for the "people") from "peasant unrest". So either the majority of the Bosnians had to be defended against themselves – providing financial support for the governor, though the *taksit* tax was vigorously opposed by literally all taxpayers – or the majority of the population were not peasants. The concept of "people" in Hickok's view obviously does not include Muslim peasants, taxpayers such as townfolk (almost entirely organized in bands of "local Janissaries"), *sipahis* and Christians. They are all driven back into the shadows as occasional trouble-makers of marginal importance. Yet it was precisely the townfolk and the many peasants who were furnishing the bulk of the true militia in the eighteenth century. Hekimoglu Ali Pasha was intelligent enough to realize that with only some 20.000 troops from the garrisons (Hickok believes that that was all his strength, pp. 22,26) he could not achieve much against the Austrians, despite all his strategic ingenuity and bravery. So, as other sources tell us, he mobilized at least an additional 20.000, creating a *militia* force consisting of non-garrison members, Christians included; the body of his army at Banja Luka was composed of such people (Adem Handžić, *Studije o Bosni*, Istanbul 1994, pp. 273,280). If ever in the eighteenth century the Bosnian people had its militia, it was these men – non-professionals, serving when needed, irregularly-paid or unpaid. Quoting Voltaire, who praises peoples who defend themselves by creating militias (p. 1), Hickok forgets the essential prerequisite for such bodies, that there be a degree of self-government, if not democracy and independence. His obstinate clinging to the idea of a consensus between the governing and the governed has also led to the conclusion that "an explanation for the social disruptions (...) lies somewhere beyond the one-dimensional claims of class warfare, emergent nationalism, religious strife, or even Ottoman decline" (p 175).

This might be true only on the level of the relations between the Porte and the provincial army in the fortresses, the latter being only *a* fraction of the "people". But then the disorders would not transcend the limits of an "internal af-

fair”, arising here and there inside a complex of “partnership” ties. They would really be beyond “class warfare”. Hickok’s interpretation is obviously and deliberately focused on nothing but quarrels about financing the “militia” which started with the introduction of the *malikane* system. But these did not outgrow the limits of protest, threat and verbal dispute. The “militia” found ways to cope with the new situation and things continued to go on peacefully enough for the following two decades or so.

“(…) The causes of civil disorder rarely rest solely with the state. Ottoman governmental needs, Bosnian expectations, and out-and-out individual avarice mixed together an amalgam of motives” (p 176, Conclusions). This sounds very plausible. Yet again, if applied to large-scale armed conflicts, it would mean that, for example, in the years 1740–1752, “Bosnian expectations”, being partially responsible for all the disasters, undermined the “balance” by not wanting to do the impossible (pay the devastating *taksit* thrice a year); still worse, the share of “guilt” on the side of “Bosnian expectations” in ca. 1830 would consist in not wanting the old order to be annihilated. Here we do have a case of class warfare (Bosnian notables vs. the Porte) and a kind of a pre-modern “national” conflict (emancipation from central control) with the religious factor also in play (general passivity of Christians). Eighteenth-century Bosnian society was not multi-ethnic (Hickok thinks it was, see pp. 112–113) as it is today. It was rather bi-ethnic (Bosnians, Muslim and Catholic, who later adopted different identities, viz. the modern-day Bosnians and Croats, and Orthodox Vlachs who later adopted Serbian identity). The Bosnian Muslim elite found a common interest among themselves as well as with underprivileged Muslims to vigorously oppose the centre, fighting for the preservation of the old system and demanding an almost vassal status for the land. That is very much beyond the *chaffer* about who should procure funding for the garrisons, and how. The only difference between the mid-eighteenth century uprising and the rebellion of 1831 was that the pro-governmental forces had become weaker and the conflict sharper. Perhaps Abdurrahim Pasha in 1827 or Ömer pasha Latas in 1850, with all the executions they ordered, were nastier people than the “Doctor’s son” (Hekimoglu Ali Pasha), or the “Cuckoo bird” (Koprülüzade El-hac Ahmed Pasha Kukavica) – Hickok’s “just and wise” pashas – but they were doing the same thing: imposing the will of the Porte.

I do not think that the ruin of Ottoman power and the rise of independent Balkan states was a “good” thing; even less do I consider the developments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as strife for the people’s liberation from the “Ottoman yoke”. But I equally think that by substituting “shared visions” for “oppression” we gain nothing. We just roll back the “nationalistic” garment, looking to the past for clues that might confirm recent trends. In addition, the naive projection of the all-transcending “search for social tranquillity and corporate order” (p. xxii) in the case of the Ottoman Empire posits either a democratic state – which it was not – or links such ideals with autocracy and militarism. The latter is logical: then the author’s much cherished pashas have to share company not only with the officials of one Louis XIV, but also with other inventors of a “transhistorical” corporate order: Benito Mussolini for instance

with his *corporazioni* and successful measures against the local *yaramazlar* in Sicily.

There was a division in Bosnian society in the eighteenth century. The rebels, a motley bunch of thousands of peasants, townsmen, Janissaries and others attacked the *kapudans* precisely because they were the protracted hand of the central power collecting the much-hated *taksit*. The general idea was that all had to join their ranks, building up a real militia which could finance itself and provide for internal security, instead of paying for the governor's retinue and other needs. By crushing the rebellion, the Porte prevented a strong "initiative from below", which offered its own "vision to be shared", simply because the central authorities did not trust such a move. Reliance on garrisons (a "partner" created from above) and strong government control had been effective for centuries. The system was working especially well after financing by cash *ocaklıks* was introduced from ca. 1630.

Hickok has tried hard to convince the reader that these *ocaklıks* cannot be compared with the "hereditary" ones invented by the imagination of "Yugoslav" nationalists. The proof would consist in the fact that the governor and the Porte exercised control in administering the *ocaklıks*. Another proof would be the absence of mention of (hereditary) *ocaklık timars* outside Eastern Anatolia and the development of the concept of the cash *ocaklık* by "Turkish and American scholars" (*argumentum ad verecundiam*, pp. 43, 47, 48). What is more, local scholars are said to have confounded cash *ocaklıks* with "hereditary" *ocaklık timars*, their chimerical creation, thus strengthening two fallacies: that of the almost independent status of Bosnia and the Marxist myth of land-holding that formed "the basis of concentrated wealth". As Hickok writes, linking "militia" commanders and the wealthy *ayans* (...) "provided a solid framework for a Marxist rendering of the social transformations in the nineteenth century" (p 45).

Hickok finally argues that market-oriented agricultural production "(...) did not exist in the province of Bosnia (...)" and that the wealthiest were "members of religious/judicial or scribal professions" and not landholders (p 46). He probably thinks that "Yugoslav Marxists" wanted to construct a picture of preparations for a revolutionary overthrow of Ottoman rule in Bosnia by the national bourgeoisie. Otherwise his insistence on the absence of such a force cannot be explained.

Quotations and the use of literature are not the author's strongest weapons. In the last-cited example, he quotes from Bruce McGowan and Yuzo Nagata's studies. Earlier, he blamed Nedim Filipović for inventing the hereditary land holdings and the feudal lords who were outside the Porte's control (p 43–45). Avdo Sućeska is criticized because he "went so far" that he linked the "militia" commanders and the wealthy elite to "control over the means of production" (p 45), and so on. Let us check what these writers say. McGowan (*Economic Life in Ottoman Europe*, 1981, 170–172) does not mention Bosnia. Nagata (*Materials on the Bosnian Notables*, 1979) gives examples of seven (!) persons from the second half of the eighteenth century, all of them living near Sarajevo and not all around Bosnia, and only *one* being a member of the *ulema*. Filipović (*Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju* 36; wrongly quoted in the footnote on p. 43 and in the bibliography as XXX and XXXV and as if it were in English) says explicitly that

Bosnian holders of *ocaklık timars* were, unlike the heads of Eastern Anatolian tribes, dependent upon the state. Sućeska simply offers examples from the sources for the actual merging of functions. Despite all that nobody has ever argued that these elements puttogether were leading toward a kind of national and social revolution. Such statements can be found only in very recent years when some have returned to a level of thinking inferior to that of the Marxists (Ahmed Aličić in his study of the Gradašćević uprising, 1996).

As for the *ocaklık timars*, these existed in Bosnia throughout the seventeenth century and until the end of the *timar* system. The term itself does appear in the *Ruznamçe defterleri* (for example, Ruznamçe 505, Bosnia, nahiye Zvečan/Izvečan; nahiye Novi, sancak Kxrka, etc.). There we see the motive for their formation (“serhat ocakları bozulmamak üzere”), the decision according to which they were formed (a hatt-ı hümayun, shortly before A.H. 1017), how the inheritance was regulated and limited (from father to son, or when there were no sons to brothers or to anyone from among the *akraba* (relatives) living in the same *ocak*, provided the man was capable of service). Occasionally the terms *serhat timarx* or *ocak timarx*²⁴ occur with the same meaning. The term itself does not belong to the categories of bureaucratic jargon, but came into the *defters* from colloquial use; therefore, the existence of these kind of grants in Bosnia was not accepted. Hickok presents Filipović’s views as if arguing *ex nibilo*, stating that *ocaklık timars* were introduced “somewhere in the sixteenth century” when he quotes Filipović, who puts forward the same view (pointing to the time after the battle of Sisak in 1593 with Ahmed I as the probable author of the imperial order). Filipović’s intuition is the more amazing, since he very probably did not consult the Ruznamçe, but was deriving the essence of his conclusions from a single document belonging to the Oriental Collection of the Academy of Sciences in Zagreb.

The cases of transfer of cash *ocaklık* destined to support garrisons studied and presented by the author in order to invalidate the “misconceptions” of “local scholars” agree in general with principles governing the assignment of *ocaklık timars*. Because the *ocaklık timars* appeared three decades earlier than the cash *ocaklıks*, the latter were broadly modeled on the former. Before substantial territorial losses and depopulation at the end of the seventeenth century, their funds were drawn mainly from local sources (various *mukataas* in Bosnia), not from the center. There is a good example from 1702, speaking of a cash *ocaklık* as if it were a particular place yielding crops (BOA, MMD 10310 Stara Ostrovica).

I think it is very significant that most *sipabis* did not revolt between 1740–1753, because they basically belonged to the same sub-class as the garrison “militia”. As for the “concentrated wealth” of which Hickok writes, it did not only exist, but it really originated from the possession of land. Of course modest grants, frozen forever like the *timars*, could not serve that purpose. Nor did anybody disposing of that wealth have the idea of starting a social and national revolution. But the enormous quantity of *çiftlik*s in the hands of the urban upper class, as well as of the *kapudans*, was a strong weapon in a revolt aiming at autonomy, at first only by the urban-based elite, and then in 1831 by all. The *çiftlik* economy in Bosnia was not and could not be oriented toward international ex-

port but it was strong enough to constitute the foundations of power of the provincial elite. The *kapudans* often had both a family *zeamet* and held office within the *ayanlık* institution (*ayanlık* signifying more than simply the *ayans* themselves). This is how different sections and layers of the *askeri* class and urban elite were linked together.

The process of homogenization was gradual. In the mid-eighteenth century only rarely did “militia” members join the rebels because they were generally not much burdened by taxation; on the contrary, some *kapudans* were tax-farmers. Then in 1827, part of the garrison troops joined the persecuted “local Janissaries” and finally in 1831 all except those from Herzegovina joined in. Again, the key factor was not the method of funding, but a political one: first executions, and then the feeling of being abandoned when the Ottomans handed over six *nabiyes* in Serbia to Miloš Obrenović (“now the Muslim land is sold to the enemy there, tomorrow it will be us”). In both cases the fears of the *kapudans* were enhanced by a vague premonition of the imminent and total upheaval of the traditional order through the ongoing reforms, although nothing “big” had yet happened.

If Hickok has read the writings of the “Yugoslav” historians he is quoting, then he did so quite superficially, or he has misunderstood them, or both. That is why they appear almost like primitives producing gross misconceptions. He offers an incorrect translation of famous popular verses commenting on the situation after Mehmet Pasha Kukavica crushed the Bosnian rebellion (pp. 118, 130). The correct rendering – in prose – might run:

“During the mandate of Mehmet Pasha, nobody knew who was a local Janissary leader (*beşe*, in Bosnian *baša*). They jammed (out of fear) their headgear (*sarık*, in Bosnian *saruk* + accusative suffix) into their coffins (...)”.

Because Hickok is trying to say that there was anarchy and public funds were plundered before the pasha came, his translation sounds quite surrealistic:

“Until Kukavica was pasha, nobody knew who was the *head*. All the *hands* jammed into the (*state's* – a later comment) coffins (...)”.

There are also examples of dubious and plainly wrong readings of Ottoman texts. The word *veledeş* is explained as a term for a member of the “landed nobility” (pp. 16, 67). Does such a meaning exist? Normally it means “his son” and in payroll lists it indicates relatives. After a Mehmed comes his son (*veledeş*), an Ahmed, and so on. Hickok thinks that the word *alaybeyi* means the same (“land owners”, p 119), although he quotes in translation the chronicler Ömer Efendi who clearly says that they were officers. The fact that they might have had the most important role in the mobilization of probably half of the local forces and that they belonged to the *sipahi* class does not suit the author's idea regarding the insignificance of the *sipahis*. The “ada mutesarıfı” (p 69) is probably an “eda mutesarıfı”, one who has merits, not the owner of an “island” in a place where there are no islands (Novi Pazar).

The transcription of place-names supposedly follows eighteenth-century Ottoman usage, but the way they appear shows the author's dependence on twentieth-century catalogue compilers who did not take the trouble to guess at the Ottoman form of a South Slavic place name. Thus Livno (older form Hlivno) in

Ottoman can be only Ihlivne, never Ehlune. Viduška has become Veroška, Prolog (in the best case Pirolog), Berovlog etc.

The most striking example is Pećigrad (peć(ina) = cave) in NW Bosnia, just across the Croatian border. The Ottomans called it Török Mihal Pekleri after the last Christian commander, Török Mihaly. Hickok has taken over the modern scribe's misspelling, "Türk Mihal Beyleri" without noticing how nonsensical this is historically (p 70). Then he created a "Fort Türk" out of it, ignoring the historical and geographical context (Pećigrad under the captaincy of Tuzla). Perhaps the meaningless words "Türk hizmeti" could be read "terk-i hizmet". The remainder of the translation of the document he comments on on p. 70 is equally suspicious. There is also a statement that Tırhala is in Thrace (p 138), and so on.

In conclusion, this book fails to deliver what its title promises. "Local scholarship" in Bosnia is responsible at one level for the mostly undeserved charges of incompetence levelled at it by Hickok: few individuals have had outside contacts, attended international meetings and published (enough) in Western languages or Turkish. The present book could signal the end of quiet self-containment in the historiography of Bosnia and has at least the merit of starting a debate that is much needed.

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**HABSBURG MILITARY CONSCRIPTION AND
CHANGING REALITIES OF THE TRIPLEX CONFINIUM
(16th–18th Centuries)**

ABSTRACT


The authors examine and statistically elaborate Habsburg Military conscriptions of the paid and unpaid army from 1573 until 1735, analysing the quantity, organisation and development of military structures on the Habsburg side of the Triplex Confinium. The authors are especially interested in how the tactics and strategies of the Imperial powers, which clashed on the Triplex Confinium, particularly those of the Habsburgs, reflect the number of paid and unpaid military formations on the Triplex Confinium. How did those tactics and strategies influence the spatial and quantitative distribution and the quality of armaments of the military along the borderline? Who were the soldiers, with respect to their ethnic background, who were actually engaged in military operations on all three sides of the border? Consequently, the authors also compare source data collected on the Habsburg side to the Ottoman and Venetian circumstances of the time known from printed sources and literature.

INTRODUCTION

The Triplex Confinium – the Triple Border – was not just a mere frontier line. It was a zone of incessant conflict between the Habsburg Empire, the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire conducted on the territory of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia from the fifteenth until the eighteenth century.

Expanding their power the Ottomans challenged both the Venetian Republic and the Habsburg Monarchy, yet, both of the latter, in spite of the fact that they should have been natural allies, following the logic of Christian solidarity, quarrelled among themselves too. After the last major Ottoman offensive in this region, in the 1520s and 1530s, the limits of influence of the three imperial powers were largely set down but the official delimitation was not made until the Karlovac Peace Treaty in 1699. However, the Triplex Confinium remained a

Map 1: Sections of the Croatian-Slavonian-Hungarian Military Border Opposing the Ottoman Empire in the Second Half of the 16th Century. Made by Nataša Štefanec after Pamleny, Ervin (ed.). *A History of Hungary*. Budapest, 1973, 125.



Map 2: Fortresses in the Karlovac Generalate According to the Habsburg Military Conscription From 1573. Made by Nataša Štefanec.



rather unstable, unsettled zone, characterised by constant skirmishes and small war. Furthermore, the Triplex Confinium was just one of the regions where these imperial powers clashed so that every one of them, following their current interests, attached different importance to this battlefield and acted here accordingly; from the 1570s until 1670s mainly trying to maintain the balance of power.¹

The Habsburg side or the entire Croatian-Slavonian-Hungarian Border was divided into six sections (See Map 1). Every section was further divided into captaincies with their headquarters and system of castles and fortified places. A similar system of captaincies organised into sanjaks existed on the Ottoman side. As one can appreciate from Map 2, the Habsburg part of the Triplex Confinium was the section adjacent to the Adriatic Sea, called the Karlovac Generalate.² Opposite it were the sanjaks of Bosna and Klis. On the Venetian side, territory was divided into cities and islands with their accompanying lands, each having its own defence system which did not correspond to the Ottoman and Habsburg military systems.

Because of the constant modification of military structures on all sides of the Triplex Confinium and the changing importance of this part of the border in the eyes of the three imperial powers, every attempt to clarify events and processes on one side should be perceived and undertaken comparatively. Additionally, besides particular imperial aspirations, one should take into consideration the interests, aspirations and possibilities of the administrative and political structures in the Kingdom of Slavonia, Croatia and Dalmatia, as well as those of the domestic population and refugees who, either passed through the Border territory, or remained there in military services, often changing sides. Those latter aspects were also among the crucial ones in the war.

AIMS AND FOCUSES

The aim of the work is to investigate the functioning of the Habsburg side of the Triplex Confinium, including how its military structure related to the indigenous population. Moreover, the paper aims at comparing the functioning of the Habsburg side of the Triplex to the Ottoman and Venetian side, whenever possible. The research was primarily based on unpublished conscription of paid and

¹ Only after Lepanto (1571) did the Ottomans start to be seriously challenged, which culminated in 1699.

² Until c. 1579 this section was called the Croatian Border and was divided into the Croatian Border (Hrvatska krajina) and the Maritime Border (Primorska krajina, *Mör Gränze*), but from around 1579 on, the name Karlovac Generalate came ever more often into use. It consisted of four Captaincies: Captaincies of Bihać, Senj, Ogulin and Otočac. From the second half of the 17th century the system was restructured. Karlovac Generalate was divided into three Head Captaincies: Karlovac, Žumberak & Slunj and Senj and five Captaincies: Turanj, Barilović, Tounj, Ogulin and Otočac. The Hungarian Border in general was divided into six sections: a) the Croatian Border/Karlovac Generalate; b) the Slavonian Border; c) the Hungarian Border from the Drava river to Lake Balaton; d) the Hungarian Border from Lake Balaton to the Danube; e) the Border of the Mining Towns; f) the Upper Hungarian Border.

unpaid military forces in the Karlovac Generalate, dating from 1573 to 1732.³ Published sources were also used, especially in uncovering the Venetian and Ottoman situations.

The paper attempted to tackle five problems. First, to investigate who were the people that were actually involved into the war, primarily from the Habsburg side of the Triplex Confinium, but also from the Venetian and Ottoman sides. Namely, in what way the Inner-Austrian Estates participated in the defence and what forces they had at their disposal in their confrontation with the Ottomans and the Venetian Republic, since they prevailingly financed the border and appointed the majority of the officers on the border from 1578.⁴ The second aim was to investigate to what extent military conscriptions as official documents of the Inner-Austrian War Council reflect the real, concrete structures of power on the border, comparing the given data with known examples from the Ottoman and Venetian sides. The third intention was to observe how deeply geo-strategic changes on the Triplex over these 160 years affected the organisation of military forces and, fourth, what it meant to take over the financing of the military on this section of the border. As a fifth, the essay uses the conscription of paid and unpaid armed force on the Habsburg and Ottoman sides – if only a partial representation of the size and status of forces at their disposal – as a means of approaching the density and spatial distribution of forces in Karlovac Generalate and in bordering sanjaks.

1/

In the year 1577, against less than 2000 enlisted paid soldiers (mercenaries) on the Croatian Border, there stood more than 3500 Ottomans. The modest number of mercenaries paid by the Inner-Austrian Estates on the Croatian side of the Border remained the same over the next 160 years. Besides, in 1577, there was much more cavalry on the Ottoman side of the Border (more than 1530 horses, as against 158 on the Croatian side). According to these figures, the

³ List of military conscriptions that were transcribed, statistically elaborated and used in this paper:

1. Vienna. Kriegsarchiv (further KA). Alte Feldakten (further AFA). 1573-11-1;
2. KA, AFA, 1577-8-2 (partially published in Radoslav Lopašić. *Spomenici Hrvatske krajine (Acta confinii Croatici)*. 1409–1610. Vol 1. Zagreb, 1884.);
3. The conscription of the Ottoman military from 1577 published in Lopašić, 1884, 44–48;
4. The conscription from the year 1657 published in Franz Vaniček. *Spezialgeschichte der Militärgrenze*. Vol. 1. Wien, 1875;
5. Vienna, KA, Hofkriegsrath, Expedit, 1710-VI-2199; 1721-I-457.
- 6, 7, 8, 9. Hrvatski državni arhiv. Karlovačka General Komanda. Uvezani spisi. Vol. 1–2. Conscriptions from 1701, 1725, 1730 and 1732.

In the text which follows I will refer to them only by the year of issue, not mentioning them in footnotes.

⁴ In 1578, it was decided that the Inner-Austrian Estates (ruled by Archduke Karl, Ferdinand, etc. presiding in Graz) would take over the financing of the Croatian and Slavonian Border. The Croatian Border (later Karlovac Generalate) was financed by the Carniolan and Carinthian Estates and the Slavonian Border by the Styrian Estates. The authority over the Hungarian Border ultimately rested to Archduke Ernst, presiding in Vienna.

reorganisation on the Habsburg side of the Border seemed imperative. Nevertheless, even after the great plans announced with the Brücker Libel in 1578, neither the number of soldiers nor the structure of the military forces substantially changed. The announced increase in the number of mercenaries to around 3700 people,⁵ (this meant nearly twice as many paid soldiers) was never accomplished, not even until 1730s, when the number of effective paid soldiers fluctuated around 1500 men. On the basis of this data, we can ask to what extent military conscriptions reflect the real power relations on the border. In other words, were the paid military forces on the Habsburg side of the Triplex Confinium sufficient for the defence of the border and, consequently, who and in what status actually led the war on the Habsburg side of the border?

There are several different sources and notions providing answers to this question.

A/ From the sixteenth century onwards, the main discussion in every session of the Croatian-Slavonian Diet was conducted over two issues. First, over the redistribution of already scarce tax revenues for the payment of military forces in the counties of the Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom and over the possibilities of provisioning military garrisons in the fortresses of the Kingdom, including help to those maintained by contributions from the Inner-Austrian Estates.⁶ Since the majority of participants in the sessions of the Croatian Diet belonged to the lesser nobility, we could conclude that this stratum also participated in the war in at least three ways.⁷ They ensured partial financial support to the Austrian and non-Austrian fortress garrisons, they guaranteed equipment for the prescribed number of soldiers from their estates, and, thirdly, they partially participated in the military actions themselves with their own troops. Besides, the lesser nobility that fled or was expelled from conquered territories was often either in-

⁵ From the conscription made in August 1577 it can be seen that almost every fortress needed more soldiers, especially the better equipped German soldiers known as *teutsche knechte*, but also the *baramia* (infantry), *bussars* (cavalry) and *arcibusiers* (personal guard). The amount of required supplements was exactly stipulated for every fortress. For example:

“Hauptmanschaft Wibizsch, an jezo

<i>buserische Pfärdt</i>	58
<i>Teutsche Knecht</i>	100
<i>Haramia</i>	126
<i>Zubesterckben mit bussarn</i>	50
<i>Arcubusier</i>	100
<i>Teutschen Knechten</i>	50
<i>Sockboll an jezo baramia</i>	12
<i>Zubestergkben mit</i>	18, etc.”

KA, AFA, 1577-8-2.

Nevertheless, from the conscription made in 1657 it can be seen that the numbers remained the same as in 1577.

⁶ Ferdo Šišić. *Hrvatski saborski spisi. (Acta comitialia regni...)*. Vol. III–IV. Zagreb, 1916–1917. and Ivan Erceg. *Šišićeve bilješke za povijest Hrvatskih sabora u XVI stoljeću (Notes made by Šišić for the history of Croatian Diets in the 16th century)*. Zagreb, 1954.

⁷ A large number of Croatian and Slavonian nobility was impoverished and economically ruined and magnates such as Zrinski, Frankopan, Erdödy, eventually Bathany sent their deputies, but almost never participated in the sessions of the Croatian Diet by themselves. See Erceg, for every session of the Croatian diet after the 1550s.

cluded in the military forces of Croatian and Slavonian magnates as officers or was recruited into fortress garrisons maintained by the Inner-Austrian Estates.

B/ In the sixteenth century, the lower strata of society, as serfs, peasants and burgers were often summoned with the call for insurrection when a major Ottoman offensive threatened. The entire territory of Croatia was included in these calls.⁸

C/ A significant number of paid horsemen in the service of the Croatian-Slavonian nobility that appear in the conscription from 1573 were not mentioned at all in any later conscription.⁹ Thus, one more significant part of the frontier military forces escapes our direct insight after 1573. However, it is clear from numerous archival sources that at least those powerful magnates like the Zrinski and Frankopan families preserved important numbers of their own soldiers on the border until 1671. Some of those forces should have been maintained by the Inner-Austrian Estates, although such salaries were rarely disbursed.¹⁰

D/ Furthermore, the Croatian-Slavonian Diet, the king himself and the War Council in Graz were included in fierce disputes incited by the complaints of Croatian noblemen against the settlement of Uskoks, Vlachs, fugitives, immigrants etc., on the territory of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia.¹¹ They would cross over from the Ottoman side of the border to the noblemen's estates, often invited by the Inner-Austrian War Council, even the King himself, who wanted to ensure the army that would not have to be paid at all. From the end of the sixteenth century, these processes became especially dramatic and noblemen could rarely dispute the King's decision. As a result the role of the unpaid frontiersmen, recruited among all kinds of immigrants on the border,

⁸ Adamček, Josip – Kampuš, Ivan. *Popisi i obračuni poreza u Hrvatskoj u XV. i XVI. stoljeću (Tax conscriptions and tax accounts in Croatia in the 15th and 16th century)*. Zagreb, 1976, 1–XIX.

⁹ "Volgen die 467 Pfaradt an der Crabattischen Granizen

<i>Auff herrn Grafen von Serin 75 Pfaradt Monattlichen</i>	358 f
<i>Auff des junngen Grafen von Tersaz 38</i>	
<i>und des alten Grafen 10 Pfaradt Monatlich</i>	225 f
<i>Auff des Grafen von Blagey 75 Pfaradt Monattlich</i>	358 f
<i>Auff des Crainerischen Kriegs Raths 75 Pfaradt Monattlich</i>	358 f
<i>Auf des von Weichsberg 80 Schutzen Pfaradt Monattlich</i>	474 f
<i>Aufs Tadiolouitsch 38 Pfaradt Monattlich</i>	185 f
<i>Aufs Grezi 38 Pfaradt, der auch samst</i>	
<i>Des Quartier und Waachtmaister Ambt versicher Monattlich</i>	205 f
<i>Auf Hautzman Däna 38 Pfaradt Monattlich</i>	185 f
<i>Auf dise 467 Pfaradt Monattlich</i>	2348 f

KA, AFA, 1573-11-1.

¹⁰ During the 17th century Zrinski still had personal troops. In the beginning of 1647 Petar Zrinski was delegated the position of captain of the Uskoks from Žumberak under one condition. He should collect 6 platoons of soldiers every three months and incorporate them into the Emperor's army. In 1746 Nikola joined the Emperor's army in the Thirty Years War with 300 of his own soldiers for which he was supposed to be paid. *Posljednji Zrinski i Frankopani (The last Zrinski and Frankopans)*. *Zbornik radova*. Zagreb, 1908, 1–4.

¹¹ Lopašić, 1884, 154, 293, 296, 308, 310, 313, etc.

started to increase. In return for their military service they obtained a parcel of land, mostly noblemen's land.¹²

E/ Moreover, in the Captaincy of Senj, from the sixteenth century there were many (usually well over a thousand) fugitives, mostly Uskoks, ready to enrol in Habsburg military service whenever the official authorities would express a need for them. According to conscription records from 1573 and 1577, the garrison in Senj, which was the main stronghold of the Maritime Border, consisted of around 200 paid Uskoks that were included in the regularly financed Habsburg military force. Other Uskoks, in some periods up to 2000 of them, dwelled in Senj or its surrounding waiting to be invited to participate in actions and raids both on Venetian and Ottoman territories. Most of them (around 90%) had fled from the Ottoman territory.¹³ They were not paid by the Habsburgs and lived out of war booty, participating in numerous skirmishes along the Border, known as "small war" or *mali rat*.¹⁴ Consequently, both of these groups of Uskoks were, despite the fact that they served the Habsburgs, known as bandits and pirates on the Venetian side. Nevertheless, even Venetian officials recognised their indisputable military prowess and bravery and often engaged them in their own service.¹⁵ When describing the potential of Split, one of the largest Venetian cities in Dalmatia, to defend itself, Giustiniani claims: "*There exists one mediocre company containing 38 Italian infantry-men and another one with 25 Uskoks, who are exquisite people and capable of accomplishing everything, but, they are surely bandits, born for theft. Once discharged, they do not know how to live so that they go to Senj and become murderers, which incessantly so importune Your Excellency* (the Doge of Venice – S. L. and N. Š.)."¹⁶

But, as far as robbery and raids are concerned, the Uskoks of Senj were not an isolated phenomenon on the Military Border.¹⁷ Almost the whole society of

¹² See Karl Kaser. *Freier Bauer und Soldat. Die Militarisierung der agrarischen Gesellschaft in der kroatisch-slavonischen Militärgrenze (1535.–1881.)*. Graz, 1986.

¹³ Catherine Wendy Bracewell. *Senjski uskoci: piratstvo, razbojništvo i sveti rat na Jadranu u šesnaestom stoljeću (The Uskoks of Senj. Piracy, Banditry and Holy War in the Sixteenth-century Adriatic)*. Zagreb, 1997, 60.

¹⁴ At the end of the 16th century they were almost starving, being too numerous, and unable to live only out of plunder. They were further endangered by the Long War (1593–1606) so that the constant increase in the number of Uskoks gradually ceased. Bracewell, 61–63.

¹⁵ In the 16th and in the beginning of the 17th century, Uskoks were perceived in many ways. For Habsburgs in whose military service they served, they incarnated the *Antemurale Christianitatis*. Venetian considered them pirates, outlaws and bandits. For the local population they were embodiment of courage and bravery. Despite the fact that in many cases Uskok raids endangered them too, they remained the embodiment of hope that Ottomans could be successfully fought against. Primarily because of the latter they considered themselves as heroes embodying at the same time a strong sense of honour. Also see Bracewell.

The Croatian nobility had an ambivalent attitude towards them. They fought and complained against the Uskoks to the War Council in Graz or to the King himself. But often they sheltered them and even participated in the plunder of Venetian ships. Like, for example, the Zrinski family that possessed a southern part of the Croatian coast with its own harbours and who competed fiercely with Venetian merchants. KA, Croatica, 1579, February, 13; 1578, June, 56; 1579, May, 39; Croatica, 1582, June, 49; 1582, September, 5.

¹⁶ Antun Giustiniani. "Izvrještaj o Dalmaciji Antuna Giustiniana godine 1575 (The report on Dalmatia written by Antun Giustiniani in 1575)." in Vicko Solitro. *Povijesni dokumenti o Istri i Dalmaciji (Historical documents on Istria and Dalmatia)*. Split, 1989, 103.

¹⁷ Moreover, Uskoks, as one part of the Croatian military society, were just one of the variants of free military frontier communities that stretched along the frontier between Islam and Christen-

the border was in some way involved in the “small war.” This was a means of survival enforced by the harsh living conditions on the very border.¹⁸ Uskoks became a social phenomenon, but they were just one part of a unique kind of society; a border society or militarised society firmly attached to long-lasting border zones, those almost incessant warfare zones between great imperial powers in the early modern period. Uskoks were the most celebrated protagonists because of their number and organisation. Furthermore, the far-reaching consequences of their actions gave them special importance. They plundered vessels (especially Venetian) along the coasts of the Adriatic Sea up until the island of Krk to the north and to Slano (Dubrovnik) to the south.¹⁹ They regularly made incursions into the Ottoman hinterland. Living on the littoral but penetrating the hinterland they were present on every side of the Triplex Confinium, whether that be the sea, on the plain or in the mountains. They in a way embodied the complex geographical and ideological archetype of the Triplex Confinium, which made them special and worth remembering.²⁰

Hence, even before the Habsburg and Inner-Austrian Estates started to actively participate in the anti-Ottoman defence of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, the late-medieval Croatian society mobilised in numerous ways all its human potentials, often the lower strata, too. On the other hand, even among mercenaries that appeared in the Inner-Austrian military conscriptions, there was a majority of indigenous soldiers, too. This especially comes to the surface in General Rabatta's list of *Teütsche Fändl* and *Musquetirer* from 1709, where one can observe a prevailing number of indigenous surnames among the troops that exist on the border from the sixteenth century as *Teutsche Knechte* and who should be of German origin.²¹ Most of those “Ger-

dom up to Crimea and Caucasus. They were similar to the Barbary corsairs of Algiers and Tunis that fought under the Ottoman flag etc. These communities were mainly in military service and had an ideological basis for their actions that was in most cases the preservation of a religious identity which could justify robbery as holy war, and present the Uskoks as the *Antemurale Christianitatis*. Bracewell, 14. For more on the ideological justification of the Uskoks activities see Bracewell.

¹⁸ See more in Drago Roksanđić. “Kordunska 'Slunjska ploča' – Prostor na granicama, migracije bez kraja (The 'Slunj plain' of Kordun – a border region, endless migrations).” in Milan Mesić. *Vanjske migracije i društveni razvitak (Exterior migrations and social development)*. Zagreb, 1991, 64.

¹⁹ *Pomorska enciklopedija*. Vol. 7. Zagreb, 1961, 698.

²⁰ After 1617 (Peace Treaty of Madrid), the Uskoks had to leave Senj, partially because they were not so important to the Habsburgs any more.

From the middle of the 17th century conflicts among frontiersmen on Habsburg side (Uskoks included) began to take place. Newcomers were continuously causing conflicts because of the lack of arable land. To possess a piece of land became important as soon as this region ceased to be at the very frontier line, and the same land was neglected for years since frontiersmen, usually cattle-breeder, were not used to cultivate it. Finally, as a consequence of new living conditions, the ideological basis of Uskok activities had to change accordingly. More on Senj community at the end of 17th and the beginning of the 18th century see Drago Roksanđić. “Bune u Senju i Primorskoj krajini (Riots in Senj and the Maritime border).” in *Radovi Instituta za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu*. Vol. 15. 1982, Zagreb, 33–106, here 51.

²¹ In example, in 1709 under *Teütsche Fändl* there are 14 soldiers, 8 with Slavic names and 2 with Italian surnames (Petter Vukasšouitsch, Jure Tomlenouitsch, Lucas Vrananin, Petter Vuhšitsch, Illia Vusšitsch, Juriza and Lorenz Locatelli, etc.). Stipendiati in the Carlstätter Generalate on December 15, 1709. Fragment of the Report Written by Count Joseph Rabatta, Commander-in-Chief of the Karlovac Generalate. Vienna, KA, Hofkriegsrath, Expedit, 1710-VI-2199; 1721-I-457.

mans" included in the defence of the Karlovac Generalate (less than 200 in over 160 years) assimilated during the centuries or were substituted by Croats.

2/

One can notice that there existed a whole spectrum of military formations in the war beside the paid soldiers stationed in fortresses. Similar conditions also prevailed on the Venetian side, in Dalmatia.

In the sixteenth century, mercenaries paid by the Venetian Republic were just a symbolic force. They were stationed in the larger cities of Venetian Dalmatia. Sometimes these cities, like Zadar and Split, were only a mile-and-a-half far away from Ottoman garrisons. Mercenary troops consisted of *stradioti*, cavalry of Greek origin, as well as Croatian cavalry, Uskoks (whether from Poljice or Senj) and infantry. The largest garrisons were stationed in Zadar (over 800 men), Šibenik (over 150 men) and Split (over 60 men). In addition to 37 *stradioti*, the Trogir community kept in pay large numbers of Uskoks from Poljice. Yet, these Uskoks rarely dwelled on Venetian territory, preferring to live in "*Turkish lands*," according to Giustiniani.²² In general, mercenaries were rarely paid on time and, as on the Habsburg side, were often remunerated in kind. Throughout the sixteenth century, Venetian possessions in Dalmatia were reduced to cities, retaining only in rare cases a tiny belt of hinterland that was to ensure the cultivation of comestibles for their inhabitants. These possessions were ever more pushed towards the sea, exposing themselves to pirates of all kinds and moreover being obliged to participate in military formations of the Venetians.

The majority of the military forces of the Republic consisted of volunteers recruited in Dalmatia itself (so-called *černide*). Consisting of indigenous people, they existed already from the beginning of the sixteenth century, but their systematic organisation and training began around the 1550s.²³ The adult male population, usually between the ages of 20 to 50 years, was obliged to join the *černide*.²⁴ Refugees from the Ottoman territory often joined these troops, too. In 1565, from around 7200 inhabitants in Zadar and surroundings (Giustiniani's report from 1575 mentions numbers very close to Šime Peričić) more than 2000 were armed and ready to fight against the Ottomans. In 1580, in Šibenik, there were more than 1300 soldiers organised in the *černide*. Hence, they were a sig-

²² According to the report of the Venetian dispatcher A. Giustiniani, from 1575 the mercenaries were stationed in Budva, Kotor, Korčula, Hvar, Brač, Omiš, Split, Trogir, Šibenik, Zadar, Nin, Novigrad, Pag, Rab, Krk, Cres and Osor. Sometimes these cities were only a mile and a half distant from Ottoman garrisons, like in Zadar. Solitro, 87–135.

²³ Šime Peričić. "Vojna krajina u Dalmaciji (The Military border in Dalmatia)." in Vasa Čubrilović (ed.). *Vojne krajine u jugoslavenskim zemljama u novom veku do karlovačkog mira 1699 (Military borders in Yugoslav countries in the early modern period until the Carlovitz Peace Treaty in 1699)*. Papers from the conference on Military Borders in Yugoslavian countries held on April 24–25 1986. Beograd, 1989, 169–215.

²⁴ The lists of soldiers were made for every city or island as was the case in the Venetian Terraferma. Nevertheless, although the character of the service was obligatory and unpaid, it was emphasised all the time that participation in the *černide* was voluntary. Venetian authorities counted on the patriotic feelings of Dalmatians in joining those formations. Peričić, 184–185.

nificant force when compared to the mercenaries, especially when from the first quarter of the seventeenth century their military skills and organisation as a product of training became more than satisfactory.²⁵ They existed until the eighteenth century. Later on, from the year 1699, when Venice acquired new lands in the hinterland, populated mostly by Morlachs, Morlachs began to constitute the majority of the Venetian army. The size of the Venetian *černide* and mercenaries manifest a conspicuous structural compatibility when compared to the Habsburg paid and unpaid military.

On the Ottoman side the situation differed in organisational terms. All soldiers (*neferi*) were appointed by the sultan's written order, the so-called *berat*. The position of a soldier was hereditary or could be transferred during a period of armistice or peace from father to son or to the closest relative. The one who wanted to enter the army had to submit a request to officials.²⁶ Although soldiers were supposed to be paid monthly, salaries often came late. The military were regularly paid for one-year period in return, from the money levied by taxation. If salaries were late, soldiers often leased them. A hereditary and financially contractual character of Ottoman army service in fortified captaincies came as a consequence of their invading status until 1683, according to Hamdija Kreševljaković.

Furthermore, although on the Ottoman side indigenous people were also the most numerous part of the army, the character of the "small war" should be perceived slightly different. On the Venetian and Habsburg sides it was an existential need that imposed the necessity of plundering and raiding. On the Ottoman side, a "small war" was one of the well known military techniques that ensured a "cleansing" of a territory, the expulsion of domestic population and an easier occupation of the area concerned.²⁷ The collection of war booty was not the only purpose of such warfare. This aspect of the "small war" only became a necessity for the Habsburg side from the second half of the seventeenth century, along with the beginning of their military advances into Ottoman held territories.

We can therefore conclude that the basic military force on all three sides of the border, whether paid or unpaid, were indigenous people or refugees from different areas of the border hinterland. Mercenaries, that is, conscripted and paid military forces constituted a significantly lesser part of military formations on both Venetian and Habsburg sides of the *Triplex Confinium*. It means that we can only partially grasp the concrete number and conditions of the military on the border for a certain period. The data extracted out of conscription records, therefore, must be compared to other documents too.

²⁵ Peričić, 179.

²⁶ Regarding the organisation of the Ottoman army, see Hamdija Kreševljaković. *Kapetanije u Bosni i Hercegovini (Captaincies in Bosnia and Herzegovina)*. Sarajevo, 1980, 22, 32–36.

²⁷ This feature of the Ottoman warfare is in detail explained in Caroline Finkel. *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593–1606*. Wien, 1988. Furthermore, she states that the Ottoman state ensured supplies for the military expeditions along the way so that they did not have to pillage Ottoman-held territories (unlike the European mercenaries who destroyed the area they passed through; authors' note), and when the military reached the borderline then it willingly approved plundering across the border. Ottomans even attempted to engage Tartars along the borderlines of the Empire that could serve as plundering units. But, at the same time, they had to restrain these Tartars from attacking the Ottoman subjects. Finkel, 1988, 97–109.

3/

But, conscription can clearly illustrate another issue. The Habsburg policy on this part of the Border was characterised by the stagnation of the number and equipment of the paid military, despite the centuries of geo-strategic changes on the Border.

As it was said, the border was until the 1670s defended by all social strata of the Kingdom, including the aristocracy, the lesser nobility, and people of different legal status included in skirmishes and attending the often summoned insurrections. Moreover, Ottoman incursions were in the sixteenth century deeper and fiercer, reaching as far as Carniola and Styria, too. Until the seventeenth century the Croatian lesser nobility had little economic power, which made it impossible for them to finance or equip soldiers whom they were obliged to sustain proportionally to the quantity of land (*sessio*) they possessed. The Croatian Diet, severely afflicted with a lack of money and human potential, lost a lot of its authority, too. Therefore, the responsibility for organising and financing defence was gradually transferred to the Inner-Austrian Estates, while military forces included mainly newly settled population.

The question of **unpaid frontiersmen** enters the discussion along with the more numerous settlements of Vlachs at the end of the sixteenth century on the estates of the Zrinski and Frankopan families in Croatia and Slavonia. The financial capability of the Inner-Austrian Estates was not sufficient for the up-keep and recruitment of new mercenaries so that the system began to promote unpaid military forces compensated by land tenure. Although this process was not consequently carried out, as it was in the case of the Varaždin Generalate, the Inner-Austrian Estates managed to settle a significant numbers of Vlachs in the Karlovac Generalate, too. Conscriptions records from 1725 and 1732, which number the unpaid military, confirm that unpaid frontiersmen were a much more significant part of the military on the Croatian side of the Border, even three times more numerous than the paid military. The number of unpaid horseman alone was close to the total number of paid military. Out of 7000 unpaid soldiers there were 2500 horsemen. After the liberation of Lika and Krbava at the end of the seventeenth century the defence system completely excluded paid military forces, and began to be based exclusively on unpaid forces, frontiersmen that carried out military duties in exchange for land. Karl Kaser calls them peasant soldiers (*Freier Bauer und Soldat*).

For the Croatian side of the *Triplex Confinium* this meant that, in contrast to the sixteenth century when the entire territory of Croatia was included in the anti-Ottoman defence, a special belt was created – Military Croatia. Civil Croatia, which from now on lay deeper in the hinterland, was more or less left in peace. This was not so much because of the strength of the defence-belt but, due to the fact that after the Long War (1593–1606), the focus of fighting transferred to the north, towards Graz and Vienna, passing over the Pannonian plain.

Hence, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, after the end of the Long War and after Senj was “pacified” by the provisions of the peace treaty of Madrid (1617), the border towards the Ottoman Empire stabilised and Ottoman interests were directed to northeast. Besides, after the fall of Pounje around

1558 and Bihać in 1592, the main role in the defence of the Inner-Austrian lands and Croatia appertained to Karlovac (built in 1579) that, as a well fortified stronghold, dissuaded Ottomans from any serious invasion in this direction. Moreover, although the border against the Ottomans was by no means a stabile border, even Slunj, the most exposed fortress on the Croatian border, remained unconquered, both due to the natural configuration of the terrain and the defending role of Karlovac.²⁸

For the territory of Military Croatia what resulted was the entrenchment of the “small war” and border skirmishes, while actions on a larger scale were absent. Interests and forces willing to shift the border were lacking on all three sides of the Triplex for a long period. Besides, unpaid frontiersmen turned the “small war” and particularly plundering into the very basis of their existence, especially due to the irregular and mostly insufficient incomes from their land. The war was led by traditional means in a traditional way. The use of any kind of more developed military techniques failed to take place. These processes benefited the Habsburgs and their expenditure policy on the border. As a result, any better weaponry from the sixteenth century was too expensive and, in fact, considered not necessary, which leads us to the next point.

4/

Not only were the unpaid frontiersmen badly armed. The same tendency can be perceived in the military forces paid by the Inner-Austrian Estates. From the 1570s and for the next 160 years, the larger part of the paid military consisted of Croatian infantry, *baramije*. The number of hussars and better-equipped infantry, *Teutsche Knechte*, was negligible and they were stationed only in some headquarters of the captaincies. Furthermore, they were fully equipped only during the time of large-scale war operations, which meant that armours, heavy armament and better weaponry were stockpiled in armouries, like Graz, over the seventeenth century. When this equipment was finally needed in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, it was already old-fashioned.²⁹ Furthermore, as far as Croatia and Slavonia are concerned, from the sixteenth century armour

²⁸ Regarding the tactical importance and role of the Slunj fortress and Slunj plain during Ottoman attacks from the 15th until the 17th century, see the refined analysis of Roksandić, 1991, 63–66.

²⁹ The development of weaponry, armoury and military clothing in western Europe underwent significant changes already in the 16th century, becoming more destructive, lighter and more uniformed. Furthermore, military tactics and strategies followed this development as explained in detail in Jeremy Black. *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society 1550–1800*. Houndmills–Basingstoke–Hampshire–London, 1991, 20–34; Geoffrey Parker. *The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*. Cambridge, 1992 (1988), 6–81. Moreover, European armies started to rapidly increase in size. Parker, 1992, 45–46. Almost none of these changes reached the Triplex Confinium. Features like Renaissance fortresses and great field battles which prevailed in early modern western and central European warfare were not present in the Triplex Confinium area, both due to the configuration of the terrain and to the absence of great military formations in this region of “small actions” inclining to maintain a status quo. See also Jeremy Black. *European Warfare 1660–1815*. London, 1994; Jeremy Black. *War and the World. Military Power and the Fate of Continents*. New Haven–London, 1998; Michael Duffy (ed.). *The Military Revolution and the State, 1500–1800*. Exeter, 1980; Bernhard R. Kroener. – Ralf Pröve (ed.). *Krieg und Frieden. Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit*. Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich, 1996.

was just sporadically used, usually just those parts that did not hinder an infantryman's mobility.³⁰ Taking this into consideration, the Habsburg army could hardly make any more significant offensive break-throughs than re-conquering the Lika and Krbava and some additional territories at the end of the seventeenth century. The number of the heavy artillery was insignificant during the whole period (10–30 pieces of artillery on the Habsburg side).³¹ From the perspective of military technique, improvements almost completely lacked. The Inner-Austrian Estates were not interested in any more considerable financial involvement on the Military Border.

But, it was not just the case on the Habsburg side. The introduction of military innovations was a slow process on the Ottoman side, too, but this should be further investigated. All in all, it was a rather static state of affairs in military terms, shadowed by the military events on the Pannonian plain and directed towards the “small war.”

5/

On the basis of a systematic investigation of the number of paid and unpaid frontiersmen in the Karlovac Generalate, one can obtain quite a precise insight into the density and distribution of forces along its rim. (See tables attached to the text.) The first change in affairs was a result of the fall of the Bihać captaincy in 1592. At the time, while it still existed the most numerous forces were stationed in Bihać, including cavalry.³² Bihać was followed by Senj as the second most exposed captaincy facing the Ottomans. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the fall of Bihac and the entrenchment of the border area followed by the building of the Karlovac fortress, the majority of paid military was concentrated around Karlovac in the border area closer to the interior of Croatia. In numbers it meant that out of 2000 paid soldiers more than 1100 of them were transferred and stationed in captaincies further away from the borderline. This process led to the condensation of the paid military in the relative security of Karlovac and the entrenchment of the unpaid frontiersmen (over 7000 of them) on the very borderline of the Military Border, mostly around Ogulin, Otočac and Senj (see tables of unpaid military). There were much smaller units of the unpaid military in the area close to Karlovac.

According to these figures, the number of unpaid frontiersmen, including cavalry, increased rapidly, providing better opposition to Ottoman forces. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the population inhabiting the border area was therefore entrusted the main defence role, independently as to whether it was indigenous troops (in the sources known as Kranjci, Hungarians, Croats) or newcomers from the Ottoman or Venetian area (Vlachs, Uskoks, Bunjevci, etc.) This additionally supports the hypothesis that the paid military had a more organisational and symbolic role on the border.

³⁰ Desanka Nikolić. *Odevanje graničara Vojne krajine u XVII i XIX veku (Clothing of Military border frontiersmen in the 17th and 18th centuries)*. Beograd, 1978, 28–33.

³¹ Data taken from military conscriptions numbered in the first footnote.

³² KA, AFA, 1573-11-1; 1577-8-2.

CONCLUSION

In sum, on the basis of the conscription records of the paid and unpaid military forces on the border in the period from the last third of the sixteenth century until the 1730s, we can conclude that:

1/ In spite of the significant role of the Inner-Austrian Estates in the financing of the border, the paid military constituted a lesser part of the military forces on the Habsburg side of the *Triplex Confinium* from the sixteenth until the eighteenth century. The share of the paid military forces was equally minor on Venetian and Habsburg sides of the *Triplex Confinium*. Only on the Ottoman side of the *Triplex Confinium* did there exist a completely organised and financed military where every soldier had to be approved by the Sultan itself. The majority of the active military on all three sides consisted of indigenous population and fugitives. This meant that on every side of the *Triplex Confinium* the population of the same or similar ethnic background was involved in centuries-long military operations. But, these aspects of border life remain to be explored.³³

After the Croatian nobility prevalingly suffered economic ruination from the 1560s, the Inner-Austrian Estates completely took over the military organisation, especially along with the establishment of sharper borders between Provincial (or Civil) and Military Croatia. On the Venetian side the organisation of indigenous population into a voluntary troop corps, the *černide*, was transferred from the Venetian *terraferma*. The *černide* as unpaid military, as well as Morlachs later in the seventeenth century, constituted the strongest and most sizeable pillar of the Venetian defence against the Ottomans.

2/ Moreover, one has to emphasise that the number of paid military on the Habsburg side remained relatively constant during the period under consideration. The number of unpaid frontiersmen increased with the exclusion of a greater part of Croatian territory from the immediate border zone distinguishing Civil from Military Croatia.

3/ The stagnation in the number of paid military along with the occurrence of more severe fighting towards northern borders rendered military innovations on the Triple Border almost unnecessary. After the Long War this area became the region of a "small war," remarkable for the plundering and absence of any tactically and strategically more significant actions.

4/ The majority of the paid military forces was before the fall of the Captaincy of Bihać stationed in the most exposed fortresses (Bihać and Senj). With the fall of the Captaincy of Bihać its military forces that were the largest in the area were transferred to the inner part of the Border, close to Karlovac. The very borderline was almost exclusively inhabited by unpaid military, especially the areas of Lika and Krbava as well as Senj, Otočac and Ogulin.

³³ See Miroslav Bertoša. *Jedna zemlja, jedan rat. Istra 1615/1618 (One country, one war. Istria 1615–1618)*. Pula, 1986. For the case-study of Istria in the Uskok War, Bertoša argues that wars led on the territory of the Military Border (or wider early-modern Croatian Kingdom) were actually civil wars, since populations of a similar ethnic background participated in war against each other, divided by artificial imperial frontier lines, imposed from above. See also Miroslav Bertoša. *Zlikovci i prognanici. Socijalno razbojništvo u Istri u XVII. i XVIII. stoljeću (Villains and refugees. Social banditry in Istria in 17th and 18th centuries)*. Pula, 1989.

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CONSCRIPTION DATA

TABLES

The Conscription Records of the Paid Military on the Croatian Military Border in 1573

	Infantry (Croatian)	Infantry (German)	Cavalry	Post horses
Zrin	125			
Gvozdansko	80			
Vranograč	40			
Gradec	12			
Novigrad n.U.	8			
Mutnica	11			
Hrastovica-Captaincy (H)	100	20		
Blinja (H)	32			
Vinodol (H)	15			
Bojna (H)	20			
Gora (H)	10			
Ajtić (H)	14			
Mašin (H)	8			
Gradec (H)	20			
Greda (H)	10			
Bihać-Captaincy (B)	170	80	58	
Ripač (B)	62			
Sokol (B)	12			
Izačić (B)	20			
Brekovica & Toplička kula (B)	21			
Ostrožac (B)	39			
Tržac (B)	20			
Drežnik (B)	20			
Stijena (B)	12			
Cazin (B)	40			
Krstinja (B)	10			
Donja Kladuša (B)	10			
Gornja Kladuša (B)	10			

Bužim (B)	24			
Podzvizd (B)	10			
Peć (B)	16			
Hresno (B)	10			
Cetin (B)	10			
Šturlić (B)	8			
Blagaj (B)	10			
Ogulin-Captaincy (O)	20			
Modruš (O)	12			
Dabar (O)	30			
Jesenica (O)	30			
Plaški (O)	12			
Sveti Juraj (O)	10			
Tounj (O)	12			
Slunj-fortezza (O)	10			
Slunj (O)	10			
Kremen (O)	10			
Kastel (O)	6			
Senj-Captaincy (S)	220			
Senj-fortezza (S)	24			
Otočas (S)	60			
Brinje (S)	40			
Brlog (S)	6			
Ledenice (S)	10			
Trsat (S)	4			
Rijeka (S)	10			
Count Zrinski			75	
Count Frankopan Tržački Snr			10	
Count Frakopan Tržački Jnr			38	
Count Blagajski			75	
Carniolan War Council			75	
Weichsslberg			80	
Tadiolović			38	
Grezi			38	
Commander in Chief Däna			38	
Ljubljana	8			
Črnomelj				4
Žužemberk				2
Scattered in woods and hills	510			
Totals	1893	100	525	6
Total			2524	

**Conscription of the Paid Military on the
Croatian Military Border in 1577**

	Infantry (Croatian)	Infantry (German)	Cavalry
Hrastovica captaincy (H)	100	20	
Vinodol (H)	15		
Blinja (H)	32		
Bihać captaincy (B)	126	100	58
Sokol (B)	12		
Ripač (B)	62		
Brekovica (B)	15		
Ostrožac (B)	40		
Toplička kula (B)	6		
Izačić (B)	20		
Blagaj (B)	40		
Krstinja (B)	10		
Hresno (B)	50		50
Vrnograč (B)	40		
Donja Kladuša (B)	10		
Cetin (B)	10		
Perna (B)	50		
Gornja Kladuša (B)	10		
Peći (B)	16		
Sveti Juraj (B)	10		
Šturlić (B)	8		
Gvozdansko (B)	60		
Pedalj (B)	100		
Zrin (B)	120		
Srednji Gradac (B)	12		
Mutnica (B)	15		
Gora (B)	10		
Ajtić (B)	14		
Mašin (B)	8		
Greda (B)	20		
Bojna (B)	20		
Ogulin captaincy (O)	20		
Modruš (O)	12		
Plaški (O)	12		
Svetica (O)	10		
Sveti Juraj (O)	10		
Tounj (O)	27		
Ključ (O)	12		
Jesenica (O)	35		
Drežnik (O)	20		
Tržac (O)	20		
Slunj (O)	20		
Hojsić (O)	20		

Senj captaincy (S)	200	40	
Brinje (S)	40		
Brlog (S)	6		
Prozor i Bag (S)	60		
Otočac (S)	60		
Dabar (S)	35		
Rijeka (S)	10		
Trsat (S)			
Ledenice (S)	10		
Ljubljana	8		
Totals	1688	160	108
Total		1956	

**Ottoman forces opposite to the
Croatian Military Border in 1577**

	Infantry	Cavalry	Martolosen
Udbina	500	300	
Krupa	400	300	
Kostajnica	200	400	50
Novigrad	200	200	
Ostrvica	150	60	
Bužim	130	50	
Cazin	130	50	
Bunić	100	100	
Boričevac	100	70	
Kamengrad			
Belaj			
Totals	1910	1530	50
Total		3490	

**Conscription of the Paid Military on the
Croatian Military Border in 1657**

	Command	Deutsche Knechte	Infantry	Cavalry	Artillery
Karlovac-OH*	5	254		204	13
Turanj-H**		10	124		
Barilović-H			84		
Žumberak & Slunj-OH			200		
Tounj-H			81		
Oštarija-voivodschaft			21		
Kamensko-voivodschaft			28		
Ogulin-H			221		
Otočac-H			236		
Senj-OH		71	228		8
Totals	5	335	1223	204	21
Total			1783+5		

* Oberhauptmannschaft

** Hauptmannschaft

**Conscription of the Paid Military on the
Croatian Military Border in 1701**

	Command	Infantry	Deutsche Knechte	Cavalry (arquebusiers & hussars)	Artillery
Karlovac-OH	5		252	204	13
Križanić-Turanj-H		62	10		
Vražić		49			
Radošić		13			
Barilović-H-incl. Skrad		84			
Žumberak & Slunj-OH		24			
Slunj		93			
Velemerić & Janjač		87			
Tounj-H					
Tounj		81			
Oštarije		21			
Kamensko		28			
Ogulin-H					
Ogulin		67			
Modruš		51			
Otok		24			
Ponor		7			
Novi Kaštel (Dobrinić)		30			
Gojak		38			
Debica & Delnice		4			
Otočac-H					
Otočac		129			
Otočac-fortezza		22			
Prozor		20			
Brinje		65			
Senj-OH					
Senj (+ waldwachter)		129	111		8
Senj-fortezza			16		
Ledenice		17			
Rijeka		18			
Trsat		4			
Totals	5	1167	389	204	21
Total			1786		

**Conscription of the Paid Military on the
Croatian Military Border in 1709**

	Deutsche Knechte	Infantry (haramia, uskoks)	Cavalry (arquebusiers & hussars)	Artillery (Cannons)
Karlovac-RH	208		200	13
Križanić Turanj-H		59		
Vražić		60		

Barilović-H	10	43		
Skrad		34		
Žumberak & Slunj-RH				
Slunj	9	78		
Janjač		66		
Velemerić		37		
Tounj-H	8	50		
Orljak		19		
Oštarije		19		
Kamensko		25		
Ogulin-H	13	40		
Gomirje		48		
Otok		22		
Ponor		7		
Novi Kaštel		29		
Gojak		37		
Debica & Delnice		2		
Otočac-H		112		
Otočac-fortezza		17		
Prozor		19		
Brinje		62		
Senj (+ waldwachter)-OH	100	111		9
Senj-fortezza	15			
Rijeka		18		
Trsat		12		
Ledenice		15		
Totals	363	1041	200	21
Total		1625		

Conscription of the Unpaid Military on the Croatian Military Border in 1725

	Infantry	Cavalry
Karlovac-OH		
Tržić	73	80
Bilaj	49	35
Dubravice	36	27
Erdelj	50	14
Ponikve	44	13
Križanić Turanj-H		
stright Vojnić	87	34
Krstinja	44	32
Tušilović	43	3
Barilović-H		
Budački	178	88
Skrad	72	51
Perjasica	137	52
Klokoč	45	

Slunj-OH		
Blagaj	44	27
Sveti Nikola	16	18
Kremen	9	6
Velemerić	17	
Lađevac	55	12
Žumberak-OH		
12 Voyvodschaften	423	
Tounj-H	138	
Ogulin-H		
Ogulin	161	25
Moravice	24	44
Gomirje	12	2
Vrbovsko	10	3
Drežnica	25	9
Plaški	118	37
Otok	22	5
Oštarije	138	13
Modruš	31	9
Jesenica	32	10
Gornja Mrežnica	38	
Otočac-H		
Sinac	78	8
Lešće	86	23
Prozor, Dobrave (?), Spilnić	102	19
Švica, Polica, Kompolje	101	20
Vilići	157	78
Brog	99	48
Vrhovine	95	43
Senj-OH		
Brinje	128	78
Stajnica i Jezerane	25	23
Lučane	55	38
Dabar	33	19
Vlaški Kosinj	49	59
Gornji Kosinj	39	22
Donji Kosinj	28	17
Ledenice	42	21
Sveti Juraj	28	32
Jablanac	61	6
Krmpote	68	
Lika & Krbava-OH		
Udbina-H	161	170
Perušić-H	73	137
Bunić-H	116	171
Lovinac-H	124	122
Ribnik-H	41	39
Novi & Divoselo-H	77	72

Bilaj & Ostrovica-H	44	31
Gračac-H	93	90
Medak-H	35	76
Mogorić & Vrebac-H	68	77
Podlapac, Mekinjar & Jošane-H	94	173
Zrmanja & Popina-H	52	87
Pazarište-porkulabia	147	47
Komić-porkulabia	21	21
Široka Kula-porkulabia	37	41
Knežija, Smiljan & Podgorje-pork.	106	61
Totals	4734	2618
Total		7352

**Conscription of the Paid Military on the
Croatian Military Border in 1730**

	Infantry Croatian	Infantry German	Cavalry Croatian	Cavalry German	Artillery
Karlovac-RH		196	74	78	12
Križanić Turanj-HC	58	10			
Vražić	47				
Radojšić	12				
Barilović-HC	69				
Skrad-incl. in Barilović					
Žumberak & Slunj-RH	80	8			
Velemerić	37				
Janjač	42				
Tounj-HC	65	8			
Orljak-incl. In Tounj					
Kamensko	25				
Oštarija	18				
Ogulin-HC	36	13			1
Gomirje	47				
Otok	22				
Ponor	7				
Novi Kaštel	29				
Gojak	34				
Debica	4				
Otočac-HC	127				2
Brinje	56				1
Prozor	19				
Senj-RH	116	84			8
Rijeka & Trsat		20			
Ledenice	14				
Totals	964	339	74	78	24
Total			1479		

**Conscription of the Unpaid Military on the
Croatian Military Border in 1732**

	Number of soldiers
Tržić	686
Križanić Turanj	431
Barilović	715
Žumberak & Slunj	766
Tounj	185
Ogulin	1185
Otočac	1162
Senj	1568
Total	6698

**Comprehensive list of the Paid Military on the
Croatian Military Border in 1657, 1701, 1709 and 1730**

	1657	1701	1709	1730
Karlovac-OH	471	474	421	370
Križanić Turanj-H	134	134	129	117
Barilović-H	84	84	77	69
Žumberak & Slunj-OH	200	204	190	167
Tounj-H	130	130	121	116
Ogulin-H	221	221	198	193
Otočac-H	236	236	210	205
Senj-RC	307	303	280	242
Total	1783	1786	1625	1479

**Comprehensive list of the Paid Infantry and Cavalry
on the Croatian Military Border in 1573 and 1577**

	1573 - Infantry	1577 - Infantry	1573 - Cavalry	1577 - Cavalry
Hrastovica captaincy	249	167		
Bihać captaincy	614	964	58	158
Ogulin captaincy	142	198		
Senj captaincy	374	461		
Noble Corps			467	
Scattered, mostly Uskoks	510			
Totals	1889	1790	525	158

**Comprehensive list of the Unpaid Military on the
Croatian Military Border in 1725 and 1732**

	1725	1732
Karlovac (1725) or Tržić (1732)	421	686
Križanić Turanj	243	431
Barilović	623	715
Žumberak & Slunj	627	766
Tounj	138	185
Ogulin	768	1185
Otočac	957	1162
Senj	871	1568
Lika & Krbava	2704	
Total	7352	6698

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**THE “TRIPLEX CONFINIUM”
IN HABSBURG-VENETIAN RELATIONS AT
THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY**

ABSTRACT

On the basis of extensive archival research in Graz, the author attempts to present the new border realities as reflected in relations between the Imperial powers and the regions of both Lika and Krbava and the northern Adriatic. Particular attention is given to the interdependencies of several processes and activities constituting the new realities on the border, like the salt trade (including smuggling, etc.), misunderstandings regarding the borderlines, suspicions regarding the intentions of the “other”, etc. All these turned to be problems which determined the complex nature of the “Triplex Confinium” even before it was constituted in legal terms.

1. INTRODUCTION: THE WAR OF VIENNA (1683–1699)

In the last quarter of the seventeenth century there was a significant clash in central and southeastern Europe. A large Ottoman army (c. 250,000 people) under the command of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa protruded into Central Europe and in July 1683 started the siege of Vienna. In September, after two month of fierce fighting, due to the resistance of the city and the Polish intervention, the Ottoman attack was terminated. In the decisive battle with the German-Polish army under the command of Charles of Lorraine and the Polish King Jan Sobieski III (1674–1696) on Kahlenberg near Vienna (September 12), the Ottoman army experienced a disastrous defeat. In 1684 under the patronage of Pope Innocence XI (1676–1689) the anti-Ottoman coalition – the Holy League – was founded. The founding members were the Habsburg Monarchy, Poland and Venice. In 1686 Russia joined in. The united Christian army started a widespread offensive which incited popular uprisings against Ottoman rule in Dalmatia, Lika and Slavonia. This was the beginning of the Vienna War (1683–1699). The Christian-Ottoman war was long and bitter. Ever more fragile, Ottoman armies unsuccessfully strove to prevent Christian attacks, losing battle after battle. Finally, the assaults of the Christian coalition supported by uprisings in Croatia and other

countries under Ottoman rule (Serbia, Macedonia) forced them to withdraw from Central Europe.¹

The military offensive in the Habsburg-Venetian-Ottoman border area started already in 1683 with the first uprisings against the Ottoman army in Lika. The leader of the rebels in Lika was the priest Marko Mesić (c. 1640–1713), and from 1684 *knezovi* Jerko Rukavina and Dujam Kovačević. Rebels and maritime frontiersmen managed to liberate the territory northeast of Karlobag and the hinterland of the Gacka river-valley. Uprising against the Ottomans in Dalmatia started in 1684 under the leadership of *serdar* Stojan Janković and *vojvoda* Ilija Smiljanić. Rebels managed to liberate the whole of Dalmatia, except the fortified towns of Sinj and Knin. After the Holy League was created, the Venetian Republic entered the war by annexing acquired territory in Dalmatia. In 1685, with the help of rebels, General of Karlovac Johann Joseph von Herberstein (1669–1689) occupied several Ottoman fortifications in Lika and Krbava (Bunić, Grebenar, and Korenica). At the same time, rebels in Dalmatia led by Stojan Janković defeated the Ottoman army near Sinj and entered Herzegovina. In 1686 Venetian General Cornaro and Stojan Janković conquered Sinj, and on September 11, 1688, the Venetian army took Knin. In 1689, General Herberstein and the Croatian Ban, Count Nikola Erdödy (1680–1693), conquered Ribnik, Bilaj, Budak, Perušić and Široka Kula and later on Udbina, supported by Marko Mesić and other *vojvodas* (Knežević, Došen, Kovačević). Krka-Lika Sanjac, the Ottoman military-administrative unit for the territory of Lika and northern Dalmatia, ceased to exist. With the fall of Udbina, in July 1689, the liberation of Lika and Krbava was finished. But, since the French King Louis XIV (1643–1715) suddenly attacked Habsburg possessions on the Rhine in September of the same year, the Emperor's army in Lika and Bosnia was instructed to halt the offensive and entrench a defensive line.²

2. HABSBURG-VENETIAN RELATIONS IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

The Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic were allies in the War for Vienna. Nevertheless, their foreign policy strategy at the end of the seventeenth century often significantly differed, and was by no means in harmony.

Relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic in the early modern period were conditioned and determined by historical circumstances, the *Zeitgeist* and the nature of international relations in Europe. But, at the same time they were partially independent of the prevailing social-historical surroundings and the European *ancien régime* dictum ruled by the Trinity: absolutism, mercantilism, and in the eighteenth century, enlightenment. From the Westfalian Peace Treaty in 1648, after a long period of religious schism and ferocious confrontations, foreign policy was during absolutism marked by force and

¹ Goldstein, 1996, 1683–1684.

² Ibid, 1684–1689. See Grandits – Kaser, 1998, 29–30; IPH, 1990, 166–171; Kruhek, 1997, 68–69.



the acquisition of power. Hence, the fundamental characteristics of the development of foreign policy in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the expansion of powers, defence from other powers and interaction and communication between the powers. The means used to achieve them were refined diplomacy and barbarous wars.³ The paradigm of that model was embodied in French policy under Louis XIV.

The Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic played an active part in international interactions and communications. Although their positions towards each other could fluctuate over the period, one side could achieve and preserve its individuality mostly in response to the other. In other words, both of them framed their policies interacting mainly with each other, but respecting general European “rule of the game.”

The Habsburg Monarchy was primarily a continental, Central European country, born out of the Holy Roman Empire, and Venice was a maritime, Mediterranean country (*Stato da Mar*), embracing Italo-roman-Byzantine heritage. The first was an early absolutist monarchy of early modern origin, and the second one an aristocratic republic originating in the Middle Ages. Both of them were in the early modern period individual social-historical phenomena with their own historical background, power structures, identities, state apparatus, values, longings and interests. Every cultural *milieu* possesses its own world view, its own attitude towards itself and others, naturally, in coexistence with common cultural pre-suppositions that it also accepts.⁴

The Holy League was a union out of necessity. As soon as the Ottoman danger began to recede, old animosities between its members reappeared. The main opponents were precisely the Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic. Officials of both countries were from the beginning of the War for Vienna split between the higher cause of fighting the Ottomans and their own selfish interests and motives. At the same time, their attitude towards the “holy war” was not identical. The war was imposed on the Habsburg Monarchy, but the Venetian Republic entered it guided by utilitarian, individualistic motives.

From the early modern point of view of state policy as a policy of interest,⁵ power and force, the focus is on the conquering and/or strengthening the power and authority, especially regarding foreign policy. During the War for Vienna, both the Habsburg and the Venetian side exhibited the will and aspiration to dominate and to increase their power. Towards the end of the seventeenth century the Habsburg Monarchy was obviously in expansion embodying a special *elan vital* throughout the early modern period. The War of Vienna was an existential question for her. At the same time, the Venetian Republic was facing a gradual decay of its power, despite the will to survive as a great power in Europe. Its expansion belonged to the Middle Ages.⁶

Amidst the Habsburg-Venetian encounters in the early modern period was the Adriatic Sea. The Adriatic Aquatorium was from the Middle Ages under the

³ PS, 1990, 531. See McKay – Hill – Buckler, 1987, 508–524.

⁴ Filipović, 1989, 224.

⁵ See Hirschman, s. a.

⁶ See the scheme for the history of Venice in Norwich, 1989.

uncontested dominance of the Venetian Republic, often being called the "Venetian Bay" (*Golfo di Venezia*). A fight for hegemony in the Adriatic became in the early modern period, and especially in the seventeenth century, the key political and diplomatic problem burdening relations between Habsburgs and Venetians.⁷ While the Habsburg Monarchy tried to gain at least part of the influence and power in the Adriatic, the Venetian Republic strived to maintain its absolute *dominium per mare*. The "Adriatic Question" was thus opened. The main aim was the control over the Otranto sea channel. Still, the Adriatic Sea was not the only place where Habsburgs and Venetians confronted each other in the early modern period. One of them was also the "Triplex Confinium."

3. THE TERM, HISTORIOGRAPHY, SOURCES, APPROACH

The notion of "Triplex Confinium" in this paper has a double meaning.⁸ In its narrower sense it is a point Medvedak or Medveda Glavica, the peak of *Debelo brdo* or *Veliko brdo* (Fat hill or Big hill), northwest from Knin, namely between Knin and the source of the Zrmanja river. It is a point where three frontier lines between the Habsburg Monarchy, the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire met, from the Karlowitz Peace Treaty in 1699. In a broader sense, it is the area of Habsburg-Venetian-Ottoman interaction and conflict, stretching between Zadar, Senj, Knin and Bihać and embracing the surrounding territorial units: the Maritime Border, Lika and Krbava, western Bosnia (or Turkish Croatia) and northern Dalmatia. The project of investigating this border could, in the future, become a role-model for the investigation of similar complex border areas in Europe, even more so because the complex and manifold history of this area has not been the object of systematic research yet.

As far as author knows, there is no synthesis produced that comprehensively deals with Habsburg-Venetian-Ottoman relations, along with the history of the people living on the "Triplex Confinium" in the early modern period from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. True, there are some new studies that elaborate and approach methodologically certain aspects of the "Triplex Confinium" problematique.⁹ Sources on the "Triplex Confinium" in the archives of Vienna, Venice, Bologna, Istanbul, Graz, Zagreb and Zadar and elsewhere are abundant, but are still not thoroughly researched or more extensively published.

During the summer of 1997, with the support of a Mogersdorf stipend, the author spent a month in Graz (Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv), where he systematically collected archival documents on the Maritime Border and Lika and Krbava in context of Habsburg-Venetian relations from 1689 (liberation of Lika and Krbava) until 1699 (the Karlowitz Peace Treaty). Among the collected sources, reports were predominant, but there were also other documents of different background, mostly from the collection of the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber (*Hof Kammer*) in Graz which during the time governed Lika and

⁷ Roksandić, 1998, 11.

⁸ Ibid, 9–10.

⁹ I.e. Bracewell, 1997; Faber, 1995; Kaser, 1997; Kruhek, 1995, etc.

Krbava. Sources turned out to be very abundant, and the language used was German and Italian (Gothic and Latin script).¹⁰ This paper, concentrating on Habsburg-Venetian relations in the 1690s, contains yet unpublished results of the archival research, presented in chronological order.

4. HABSBURG MONARCHY, VENETIAN REPUBLIC AND “TRIPLEX CONFINIUM” (1689–1699)

The Venetian occupation of Knin in 1688 and the Habsburg occupation of Lika and Krbava in 1689 drastically changed the military and political *status quo ante bellum* on the “Triplex confinium”, furthermore enhancing the complexity of situation. The Venetian Republic took control over liberated parts of Dalmatia, and the Habsburg Monarchy, namely the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber, took over administrative control of Lika and Krbava. The war with the Ottoman Empire was not finished yet, so that the main fortresses were enhanced with additional garrisons. Old structures of power collapsed, and the new were not yet reinforced. The economic infrastructure was devastated, especially in Lika and Krbava. Moreover, the everyday life of people in local communities in liberated areas was little socially developed, laden with poverty, uncertainty, exigency, etc. On the other hand it was a life highly based on personal interaction within relatively stable and regular patterns of traditional culture. After liberation, the local population, mainly Muslims, in principle withdrew towards Ottoman-held Bosnia. As a consequence of these migrations, but also due to a natural depopulation, the total number of people in liberated areas was rather low. Therefore, the social development of the “Triplex Confinium”, especially of Lika and Krbava, was in the next two decades after liberation based on the intense re-population of the area from outside. The central question was how to organise the administration and life in newly acquired lands, above all in Lika and Krbava. Military authorities required a complete monopoly over this border area, since it was still a war zone. The Croatian Diet, on the other hand, demanded to adjoin Lika and Krbava to the Kingdom of Croatia Slavonia and Dalmatia, based on the natural and historical rights of the same Kingdom. Centralised administrative bodies in Graz, especially the Court Chamber, were also interested in governing them. Moreover, along with the entrenchment of its authority in Dalmatia, the Venetian Republic aspired to spread its power to maritime parts of Lika region with the intention of joining them to its newly acquired Dalmatian possessions.

According to sources, at this time the Habsburg authorities prohibited the import of foreign salt to Lika and Krbava and other Habsburg newly acquired lands. The sanction should also be applied to Venetian salt, although it was *de*

¹⁰ I would like to thank Ms Snježana Husić from Zagreb for the translation of sources originally written in Italian. I would also like to express my gratitude to all members of the Research Project TRIPLEX CONFINIUM, and especially to Prof. Dr. Drago Roksandić, both for very useful ideas and fruitful co-operation while working on this paper. Many thanks also to the archivists in *Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv* in Graz for their willingness to help me during my research.

facto allowed to import Venetian salt to Trst, Rijeka, Senj and Bakar until then. In spring 1690, Leopold I (1658–1705), Roman emperor, Hungarian-Croatian king, etc. demanded from the Court Chamber in Graz to be furnished with documents and reports elaborating the possibilities of providing Lika and Krbava and other newly acquired lands with royal salt from Rijeka and Trst. As a consequence, in May 1690, the Court War Council (*Hofkriegsrath*) ordered the General in Karlovac, Count Josip Rabatta to issue a decree that would prevent the purchasing of any other salt but royal salt in Lika and Krbava and all other newly acquired lands. He was also ordered to examine how this decree could be enacted without excluding the provisioning of the mentioned areas with Habsburg salt from Rijeka and Trst. Rabatta reported “daß zu Fiume kheine Saline vorhanden”, but “habe vnd mieste daß Kay[serliche] Salz von Thriest (...) nacher Fiume, vnd Zeng geliefert vnd vberbracht werden.”¹¹ So, this salt should be transported somehow to Rijeka and Senj, and that was a very serious problem.

Rabatta analysed two options with regards to transportation. One of them was to convey salt from Trieste by ship “vber den venetianischen Golfo bey Istria.” However, Rabbata thought that, in all likelihood, Venetians would not allow that. The second option was to convey salt by land over the Habsburg territory towards Rijeka and Senj. Since this was still a time of very basic transportation infrastructure, Rabatta was of the opinion that high and impregnable mountains would make the transportation of needed quantities of salt by land impossible, extremely arduous and a rather impractical and pointless enterprise. Moreover, costs for the transportation of salt (from Trieste to Rijeka and Senj over the mountains) would increase its final price, and this would additionally burden the frontiersmen (*krajišnici*). According to him, it would be wise to take into account the custom of the Maritime and Croatian frontiersmen from the Karlovac Generalate to exchange wheat for salt, all the circumstances of their provisioning with needed salt in Rijeka or momentarily in Bakar and Bakarac “zu nicht Gering abtrag der kay[serlichen] Cammer”, the situation in Senj and Karlobag, possibilities of i.e. “die benöthigte Provision es seye hernah von Triest[er] Barletisch[en] oder Venedigischen Salz erhandlen,” etc. Nevertheless, Rabatta did not *a priori* contradict the intentions of his superiors to deliver salt from Trieste to Lika and Krbava and other newly acquired lands. He just thought that the prospects of such an enterprise should be examined in Trieste first.¹²

In the meantime “zu gewinung der Zeit,” the town of Trieste required a report and related documents on the salt issue from the Court Chamber in Graz. In July 1690, after being minutely introduced to the entire issue of provisioning Lika and Krbava and other newly acquired land with Habsburg salt from Trieste, Emperor Leopold, mediated by the Court Chamber, asked the community of Triest for an opinion “waß etwo für mitl hierinfahls zuuersehung derselben mit Salz zutreffen sein möchte”, because “derentwegen (...) die notturff allernechstens Erwarttet wierdt”, so that “dan darmit kheine Zeit zuuerabsaumb[en] ist”.¹³ Source does not mention smuggling of salt by word, although it was well

¹¹ Stmk. LA, HK 1690-VII-51.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.



known that such activities existed. (There exist testimonies about the smuggling of Venetian salt in Lika and Krbava, especially over the island of Pag which had its own salt-factory, and was adjacent to Lika and the slopes of the Velebit mountain range, and was subordinate to the Venetian Republic). Salt was strategically a very significant product, it caused grave conflicts, and the legal and illegal salt trade was a profitable business where the mercantilist economy prevailed.

Already in 1690, the Venetian Republic required the Habsburg Monarchy to warn seamen and merchants not to sail in the Adriatic without paying taxes to the Republic (“...senza pagar li Daty alla stessa Rep[ubbli]ca”). But, according to sources, the Peace Treaty of Furlanija (1618) registered the possibility of a compromise on free navigation in the Adriatic (“Trattato per la libera Navigazione di q[ues]to Mare Adriatico, riservato da farsi nella pace di Friuli l' anno 1618.”). As a consequence, during the audience of the Venetian ambassador at the Vienna Court in 1692, the Habsburg secret advisor and court chancellor asked for “dieser auch seiner Republic darüber zuzuschreiben, vnd dero befehch Ein-zuhollen sich erbotten, vnd weillen sich Vileicht schikken könnte, daß gemelter Tractat daraussen zu Wienn, od[er] aber zu Venedig in ganz gebracht werden möchte”.¹⁴ While negotiations were led in Vienna, the Secret Council (*Geheimrath*) and Court Chamber (*Hofkanzlei*) in Graz did not possess any documents on the matter. In October 1692, in order to re-examine the compromise on free-sailing rights with Venice, Emperor Leopold issued a decree, demanding the Court Chamber in Graz to trace, find, classify and present necessary military documents and other materials to the Secret Council that would scrutinise them and extract needed information.¹⁵

Anyway, despite the obvious desire of the Habsburg side to actualise the alleged compromise from 1618, the Venetian Republic consistently strove to preserve the *status quo* in the Adriatic. The Habsburg Monarchy was at the time expanding on land, but it was still obvious who had dominion over the Sea. The compromise was abolished because Venice resisted all the Habsburg attempts to strengthen their positions at sea. It lasted until the beginning of the eighteenth century when Venice's supremacy in the Adriatic basin was shattered. In 1717 Emperor Charles VI (1711–1740) momentarily proclaimed the freedom of navigation in the Adriatic Sea by issuing protection to all ships heading towards the harbours of the Monarchy, which was followed by a new maritime orientation of the Habsburg Monarchy.¹⁶ By this time, a centuries-old Venetian dominion in the Adriatic Sea was terminated.

Venetians often openly attacked Habsburg subjects in the Adriatic and abducted or held their ships. At the beginning of the 1690s, victims were predominantly their trading rivals, especially those from Senj and Rijeka. When Venetians detained some vessels from Rijeka and Senj in spring 1694, the Court Chamber in Graz demanded a report on the incident from Baron Rudolf von Edling. Since Venetians released the detained vessels in the meantime, Edling, now in Venice, informed the Habsburg authorities with conspicuous pleasure that he predicted

¹⁴ Stmk. LA, HK 1692-X-23.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ See Faber, 1995, 47–49.

that Venetians would return those vessels while he was still on his way to Venice. But, exactly at that moment, in May 1694 Venetians *de novo* detained one ship from Senj. Moreover, according to sources, they swiftly released the warning that they would capture all Habsburg vessels as ordered by the Venetian general *provveditore* in Dalmatia.¹⁷

Both Baron Edling and the Court Chamber in Graz alerted Emperor Leopold of the existence of such hostile actions and intentions via their letters. They asked him to furnish them with legal advice and to undertake appropriate steps, while pointing out that the return of the Senj vessel was absolutely necessary so as to prevent Senj's vendetta. It was all the more necessary since the impoverished and robbed “Kaÿ[serliche] Vasallen”, i.e. people of Senj, “bey erscheinender so hochere Vnbilligkeit, vnd auf seitere d[er] Venetianer denegirten Justiz”, threatened to avenge Venetian misdeeds by themselves. In response to the reports of Baron Edling, the Court Chamber, the Secret Council and the Court War Council, the Emperor ordered the Secret Council and the Court War Council to contact the Habsburg Ambassador in Venice, Count Franz von Thurn and engage him as a mediator in the case of the recent Venetian attacks. They asked him to put in a complaint, directly to the Venetian Senate in the Emperor's name, demanding the return of the abducted ship along with satisfactory compensation. Next to this, Emperor Leopold promised that he would undertake adequate steps against the Venetian Ambassador at the Habsburg court in Vienna.¹⁸

At the same time, by the endeavours of the Croatian Diet a new county (*županija*) for the liberated region of Lika and Krbava was founded as well as the fortification of Zvonigrad in the Zrmanja river-valley. Since 1691 Lika and Krbava were placed under the spiritual and ecclesiastic guardianship of the clergy from the Senj and Modruš or Krbava diocese. Moreover, in the same year, a county governor (*veliki župan*) and a county vice-governor (*podžupan*) of Lika and Krbava were appointed – Petar Richiardi from Dubrovnik, and Pavao Ritter Vitezović from Senj, a distinguished writer, polyhistor and politician. It seemed that the liberated regions were to be integrated into the Croatian territory in the long term. However, Lika and Krbava were not returned to the jurisdiction of the Croatian Diet and Ban, because the owner of newly acquired areas was the Court Chamber in Graz. Together with military commanders, the Court Chamber held all the power in Lika and Krbava. They obstructed the connection of the liberated regions both to the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia and to the Hungarian Kingdom. In the year 1692 Lika and Krbava, as well as the port of Karlobag, were sold to the Austrian count Adolf Sinzendorf (or Zinzendorf) for 80,000 guilders. A special (double) county was founded, but there were various lines of resistance from “below” and “above” to this civilian project. It did not endure long – in 1694 the Court Chamber took over the management in Lika, Krbava and Karlobag.¹⁹ North Dalmatia was still under the Venetian rule, while

¹⁷ Stmk. LA, HK 1694-V-34.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Grandits – Kaser, 1998, 38; IPH, 1990; Goldstein, 1996, 1691–1695; Kruhek, 1997, 69–74.

western Bosnia (or Turkish Croatia) and regions beyond the Plješivica mountain range were still under Ottoman sovereignty.

There was nothing new in the old "Triplex Confinium". However, at the end of 1695 and at the beginning of 1696, an interesting (triple) conflict took place. According to the report by Johann Franz Hyacinten (or Giovanni Francesco Giacinto) Peri, which was submitted to the Court Chamber in Graz, in December 1695, fifteen days before Christmas, some one thousand Venetian subjects from Dalmatia burst into the Ottoman region near Bihać. The leader was a Zaviša Janković, accompanied by *harambaša* Stjepan Čorković, a Habsburg subject who lived in Vrhovine in the Maritime Border (*Primorska krajina*). They passed through the Venetian region in northern Dalmatia, and through the Ottoman region in the Una river-valley, and they reached Bihać (on the other side of the river Una) near the village of Pounje, "aliter Poguhie in lingua sciava, che in Italiano altro non vol dire, che loco presso la Una" ("... in Slavic language, which in Italian means nothing else but a place at Una").²⁰

The mentioned document stated that no one recognized them as Christians. It is possible that they were disguised, although at that time there was no significant difference in the manner of clothing and behaviour among locals on the "Triplex Confinium", that is among Habsburg, Ottoman and Venetian subjects. By the way, in the many wars that the Habsburg Monarchy led in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, the Croatian frontiersmen (*krajišnici*) often scared their enemies with their "Turkish" appearance. Because they were not spotted, they easily approached the mentioned place (Pounje). They found "Turks" dancing and in gaiety, and they robbed the village. They plundered some 60 persons of both sexes, and took away many animals, big and small. Although it happened near Bihać, the Ottoman military crew was afraid to leave the city ramparts, as noted by the source. The robbers left the village after they plundered it. By retreating to the Venetian region, they passed next to Mazin near Gračac in Habsburg Lika. A military crew from Otočac in the Maritime Border was positioned in Gračac at that time, and at the road between Gračac and Mazin another crew of soldiers from Lika was located. However, the intruders passed that road, whether intentionally or not, but they were not stopped.²¹

The revenge for the Christian offence was the Ottoman raid from Boričevac in the Lapac region into Krbava in January 1696, and they ravaged the area up to Pišać village near Podlapac. They were stopped there by Habsburg military forces. According to the document, a minor skirmish occurred, which ended up with two people killed on the Habsburg side, and one on the Ottoman side. Since other crews heard shots and volley, they sounded an alarm in Lika, so the aggressors had to escape to Bosnia.²² Undoubtedly, these excesses did not benefit the harmony on the triple-frontier area, nor the improvement of the Habsburg-Ottoman-Venetian relationship. However, such events were not uncommon in the border region at that time.

²⁰ Stmk. LA, HK 1696-II-5.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

Simultaneous to its territorial extension over Dalmatia, the Venetian Republic usurped the southern slopes of the Velebit mountain range, a region that stretched over some forty Italian miles between river Zrmanja and Karlobag, which was a unique territorial unit with Lika, Krbava and Karlobag. Previously, it was an area within the Maritime Border, that is within the Senj Chief Captaincy (*Senjska Nadkapetanija, Oberhauptmanschaft Zengg*), governed by the General of Karlovac, Count Herberstein, as an integral part of the military border (before Herberstein's death in 1689). It was a territory which indisputably belonged to Emperor Leopold and to the Habsburg Monarchy, as well as to the Court Chamber in Graz. Therefore, in the eyes of the Habsburg rulers, Venetian penetration in that territory was treated as usurpation and occupation, even as an act of enmity.²³

The Court War Council in Graz, repeatedly ordered double commands to the Border Captain in Senj Baron Edling and to the military authorities in the Maritime Border. They were supposed to restore Habsburg rule in the occupied places in Podgorje (on the slopes of Velebit). For some reason, which the document does not mention, they did not succeed.²⁴

In July 1696 Emperor Leopold ordered the newly appointed Habsburg ambassador in Venice to demand urgently that the Venetians return the occupied places in Podgorje, especially Dračevac. Because of that "durch den Jezigen Venedigischen legations Secretarium zum öftern die Instanz daselbsten bey Ihre republic gemacht worden", but there was no use. The only result was "daß mehrgemelte Republic entlichen nur eine Andtworth darüber abgeben hete, sondern betragt sich ipso facto der possession". The occupied places in Podgorje were held by arms and were not returned, nor "dero banachtbahrt Vnterthanen mit allerhand repressalien so Villfeltig und ohne scheuch betranget werden sollen". The diplomatic wrangle was aimed from the Venetian side to gain more time so as to fasten their rule over the occupied area and, therefore, to prevent the return of the area to the Habsburg Monarchy by "ex praescriptione temporis."²⁵ Since it was obvious that the diplomatic struggle did not bring significant results, the Habsburg government had to think about some other methods and means to achieve their goal.

In a report given to the Court Chamber in Graz in autumn 1696 the Chamber Officer Count Antonio Coronini argued that it was necessary to take into possession the occupied area by all means. Otherwise, he thought, it would be impossible to inhabit the upper part of Lika in the winter period since its inhabitants, livestock owners and cattle-breeders, usually left the area at this time of the year because of the lack of pasture. However, the problem could have been solved if the occupied places were returned, and many "Catholische Morläckhen" from Lika moved in there. In that case, Coronini thought, they would be on the frontier with the Venetians and the Ottomans at Masin! ("et farano il Confinio é i Veneti et Turchi dalla parte di Masin"). Count Coronini did not clarify how would it be possible for the new immigrants in Podgorje and Pozrmanje

²³ Stmk. LA, HK 1696-XII-2.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

to be on the frontier with the Ottomans and the Venetians at Mazin hinterland. Furthermore, the area depopulated by Morlacchi could be inhabited by other subjects, proposed Coronini, who would pay taxes to the Court Chamber.²⁶

Coronini pleaded that there was no time to delay the return of the occupied areas. He proposed that the Court War Council had to order the immediate return of the places in question via the commander of Karlovac Generalate and backed by the military might of the Senj Chief Captaincy and Otočac Captaincy on the Maritime Border. Since similar orders had been already given sometime in the past, it would not be a problem to give another one. The occupied territory had to be returned by arms. The Venetian subjects and other inhabitants of that areas who acknowledged Venetian rule were to be expelled by force, while their houses, made of wood, were to be demolished. In that way, the inhabitants of the region would be expelled without many riots, thought Coronini, and the Court Chamber would restore the whole area of Lika and Krbava to the Habsburgs. He also proposed that the military captains in Lika had to populate the area with "Catholischen Morlakhen" and to keep the area under Habsburg sovereignty at any cost.²⁷

The Court Chamber accepted the proposition by Count Coronini in December 1696 and they forwarded it to Emperor Leopold. He was supposed to make a final decision on the problem of occupied Podgorje. The source noted that the territory the Venetian occupied was taken over with no resistance on the Habsburg side. Moreover, military leaders on the Habsburg side and Habsburg captains did not withstand the occupation, although they should act that way.²⁸

Implacable oppositions and conflict of interests on both continental and maritime sides between the Habsburgs and the Venetians escalated in the 1690s. The sources recorded riots, robberies, open hostilities and attacks as well as other forms of violent activities on the part of the Venetians, especially at the seaside. The victims of these conflicts were Habsburg subjects, but also crews of ships of different countries heading for Habsburg ports. For example, the Venetians attacked one Spanish ship, loaded with wine, in the waters near Trieste in autumn 1696. The Venetians also attacked the county of Gorica, which was a part of the Inner-Austrian hereditary lands. Waiting for the Habsburg response, the Venetians started to fortify themselves and to prepare the defence of Podgorje which they had occupied. According to Habsburg sources, at the end of 1696 the Venetians had one fortification (not completely built) and some 150 people ready to act upon the eventual Habsburg attack.²⁹

The emperor Leopold was informed about the problems with Venetians from different sides: from the reports of Count Coronini, of the Court Chamber and of the city government representations of Trieste, as well as of the president of the Court Chamber, Count Franz Adam von Dietrichstein and his secretary Johann Christoph von Abele. The emperor decided that it can not be expected from the Venetians to give back the territory. Therefore, at the beginning of Jan-

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

uary 1697 he made decision "das so Vill die per Mare, dem fre en Commercio, vnnnd navigation, auch aufgerichten fridens puncten zu gehen" etc., in order to prevent or to repulse the Venetian attacks at the sea. Concerning Dračevac and other occupied places in Podgorje the emperor decided to return the area by the action of the Karlovac Generalate, supported by commander in Otočac and other Border captains, together with a considerable number of inhabitants from Lika and Krbava. The emperor had in mind a peaceful return of the area and avoidance of provoked direct conflict with the Venetian Republic.³⁰

For the realization of the plan, the emperor anticipated several steps and the General of the Karlovac Generalate, Count Franz Karl von Auersperg, was assigned to carry out the plan. Firstly, all the Vlachs and Morlacchi who have been living in the area occupied by the Venetians, or have been moved in the area recently, "de novo in Vnsere Pflicht vnd homagium nembe, daß ist, von Ihnen sambentlich daß Juramentum fidelitatis Subjectionis et obedientia abfordere." After they took an oath, the people from Dračevac and other places in Podgorje who firmly recognized the Venetian rule had to be removed in the districts given to the officers of the Court Chamber and far away from the eventual Venetian help. Those displaced people and their families had to be provided with basic conditions for life and supplied with food provisions.³¹ Although the document does not specify the place of the removal, having in mind the proposition of the Count Coronini, it can be presumed that the emperor has thought of some place in Lika and Krbava.

If someone stood against the plan or tried to resist, he was to be expelled, the leaders put in jail, and their houses destroyed. It was a method supposed to cleanse the regions of Lika, Krbava and Podgorje of Venetian followers who had to be driven out of the region. A newly acquired area had to be populated by significant numbers of new inhabitants loyal to the Habsburgs, who would be in turn be provided with salary, food provisions and munitions according to their needs. It was a task given to the officers of the Court Chamber together with the Inner-Austrian Estates of Carinthia and Carniola. After the Monarchy returned the occupied regions, the Karlovac General should take care of the area and hold the Venetians far from the frontier and from the Habsburg territory. Although the task assigned to the Karlovac General Auersperg was not an easy one, the emperor had confidence in him because of his experience, proficiency and sense of duty.³²

From the Habsburg standpoint, Emperor Leopold's decision (and an order) from January 1697 to return occupied places in Podgorje was not a bad idea. Although there were some conceptual differences, the plan was similar to the propositions of Count Coronini and the Court Chamber. The emperor presented some of his vision, but he also took into consideration some of the solutions proposed by Coronini and the Court Chamber. Was it possible to realize the plan? I did not come across any documents which would confirm or dispute the plan's realization. However, the fact is that the Habsburg Monarchy did not

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

take into possession the occupied part of Podgorje, although the Habsburg-Venetian conflicts over the frontier area of Lika and Dalmatia lasted for several years, even after the Peace Treaty of Srijemski Karlovci in 1699. Only a century after, with the fall of the *Serenissima* in 1797 (Peace Treaty of Campoformi), were the Venetian possessions in the eastern Adriatic, including the southern parts of Podgorje, transferred to the Habsburg Monarchy.

In the meantime, the Venetians continuously attacked the littoral. The victims of those attacks were mostly Habsburg subjects, especially those from Rijeka. In December 1696 the Captain of Rijeka, Baron Ottavio von Terzi, reported that “daß höchst deroselben Gethroye Östereihische Vassalen sonderlich die Fiumaner von ser Republic zu Venedig mehrmahlen betragt, vnnd in Ihrer gerechtsambe der freyn Mör=fahrt turbirt werden”.³³ The Habsburg Monarchy did not intend to abandon their idea of free navigation in the Adriatic, and the Venetian Republic would not accept it.

At the end of 1696 the Venetians detained two Habsburg ships in Zadar, belonging to a certain Tomašić and Serchas, who transported vine from Pescara in southern Italy to Rijeka. They were forced to pay taxes to the Venetian general. Tomašić paid 637 *lire* in cash in the name of the real shipowner, a certain Nikola Morotti. Serchas, who was the owner of the other ship, was taken aground accompanied by Venetian soldiers and was beaten. He had to pay 6 *cekins* (sequin, ducat, goldpiece) to the Venetian general (who previously asked for 12 *cekins*) and was released.³⁴ In summer 1697 a Venetian battleship stopped the ship “Saint Leopold” (San Leopoldo) “auf dem Golfo” for inspection. The ship was loaded with salt and had sailed from Barletta in southern Italy to Rijeka. The Habsburg authorities evaluated the inspection as a hostile act.³⁵ At the end of 1698 the Venetian “Capo d' Istria” confiscated a trading ship of Pietro de Denaro which was heading to Trieste loaded “mit Barletischen Salz”³⁶ Since southern Italy (the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies) was under Spanish sovereignty, ruled by Karl II, a king from the Spanish line of Habsburgs who died in 1700, the Venetian attacks on the ships from southern Italian ports which were headed to the Monarchy's ports were far from accidental.

Although such conflicts at sea were significant for the Habsburg-Venetian relationship as a whole, they were of no considerable importance for the situation on the triple-frontier area. However, at the same time, one Venetian attack on the “Triplex Confinium” area was very significant. In May 1698 the Court Chamber commission announced its arrival in Bakar. Antonio Pancini, the imperial steward and controller in Karlobag, was ordered to go to Bakar to be at its disposal. He travelled from Karlobag to Bakar by sea in the company of two priests. One of the priests was Poppe Mesić, and the other was a Capuchin, Father Marin, an apostolic missionary at the Court Chamber in Lika and Krbava. They were all accompanied by a sailor, a *Bunjevac* Matija Mažuran, a Habsburg subject from Karlobag. Since Father Marin intended to visit the bishop of Krk for

³³ Stmk. LA, Gut 1696-XII-8.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Stmk. LA, HK 1697-VI-1.

³⁶ Stmk. LA, HK 1698-XII-34.

consecrated water, as stated in the document, they decided to stop by in the city of Krk. (The island of Krk was then under the sovereignty of the Venetian Republic). When they approached the island, the Venetian mayor of Krk (“Podesta in Veglia”) ordered that one *fusta*, a small galley, had to help the landing of the ship. After the landing, the mayor captured Mažuran and the rest were forced to return.³⁷

Mažuran was well-known and appreciated in Lika and in Karlobag. Therefore, as soon as locals heard of his arrest, a riot started spontaneously: they were embittered because “dißer Massurana Von grosser parentella seÿe”. The rebels, the Morlacchi as Pancini called them, threatened people with death, especially those who were on the ship when Mažuran was arrested. Since their lives and personal security were jeopardized, Pancini, Poppe Mesić and Father Marin had to find shelter and protection. Pancini went to Rijeka. Mesić went to Lika after the Mažuran had been arrested, but he had to move on because Mažuran's cousins (family) threatened him, as stated by Pancini. Pancini also faced similar threats by the rebels. He decided to inform the Court Chamber and to ask to prolong his stay in Rijeka and Bakar as long as the riot continued. He also stated that all of his duties in Karlobag, such as paying taxes, was confided to the fort captain, that is to the town mayor (*kaštelan, porkulab*, “sig[no]re Purgravio”), and all the other duties were managed. In the meantime, Mažuran was set free, he returned to Karlobag and the riot ceased.³⁸

On the basis of Pancini's report, the Court Chamber informed Emperor Leopold about these events. On the basis of these events and the following aggressive and violent actions, “ex parte Venedig”, in June of 1698 he took certain diplomatic steps: he decided to expose the case to the Venetian ambassador at the Court in Vienna. Leopold ordered the Secret Council to implement the command “Vnsern zu Venedig Subsistierenden Legations Secretario, das er ein gleichmassiges be dem Senat zu Venedig thuen solle”.³⁹

By the Habsburg-Ottoman Karlowitz Peace Treaty on January 26, 1699 (February 7, 1700 Venetian-Ottoman Karlowitz Peace Treaty), the Ottoman Empire was permanently expelled from Hungary and the majority of Croatian lands (Slavonia, Lika, Krbava and Dalmatia). However, in spite of peace treaties, the conflicts between Habsburgs and Venetians continued, especially around Starigrad, Dračevac, Zvonigrad and other locations in southern Podgorje and along the river Zrmanja. The peace died out, but boundaries were not established. The Venetian Republic took over all mentioned places, intending to include them in their own new possessions (*Acquisto nuovo*) in Dalmatia. Meanwhile, a new conflict occurred in the region, due to Austrian efforts to incorporate mentioned areas, such as northern Zrmanja, into Austrian possession.

In the springtime of 1699, new ideas for the Austrian re-conquering of occupied places in Podgorje and Pozrmanje (the area around Zrmanja river), especially Dračevac and Zvonigrad, reappeared. According to Austrian information, Dračevac had a fortress in ruins, defended by between 30 and 40 Venetians. The

³⁷ Stmk. LA, HK 1698-VI-1.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

Austrian authorities stated it would not be a problem to seize and capture Dračevac, especially since the local inhabitants, Morlachs, were not so fond of Venetian rule and were still economically dependant on the hinterland of Lika (“...habitanti, che pure Senza La Lika uiuer non puono”). The fortress of Zvonigrad, close to the source of Zrmanja, was considered the most important in the whole area (“der importantiste orth dieser gegent”), which dominated the natural lines of communication between Dinara and Velebit, that connected Lika and Krbava with Dalmatia. Due to such a geographical location and geo-strategic importance, Zvonigrad was described in contemporary archival sources as the “key” or the “entrance” to Dalmatia (“Schlüssel in Dalmatien”, “la chiave della Dalmatia”, “La porta tra La Lika, e tra La Dalmatia”). According to Austrian sources, the fort was defended by a band of Venetians led by an Italian commander and 60 Morlach mercenaries in Venetian military service.⁴⁰

At the beginning of June 1699, a huge Austrian army ordered to seize Zvonigrad gathered in southern Lika close to the fort of Gračac, that was according to sources located near two routes: one leading towards Dračevac, and the other towards Zvonigrad. The army was constituted of more than 400 maritime frontiersmen and around 1000 armed men from Lika and Krbava with supplementary forces. In total, around 1500 soldiers was engaged for that campaign on Zvonigrad, mainly infantrymen.⁴¹

According to the source, the mentioned Austrian army was commanded by the Governor of the Court Chamber maritime possessions in Bakar, Count Ludovik (Ludwig) Coronini, higher captain of Slunj and Žumberak, Baron Johann Wilhelm von Kušlan, Count Antonio Coronini and other military leaders. They moved from Gračac to the village of Popina. Then they turned to the banks of the river Zrmanja and seized Zvonigrad on June 9, 1699. The small number of Venetian defenders did not surrender but tried to resist the attack, but were soon beaten. When the Austrian army entered the fortress, the leader of the crew, “with a banner in one hand and a pistol in the other” (“con il stendardo in una mano, e con una pistola nell' altra”), admitted the loss of Zvonigrad. While the soldiers were trying to repair the damages on the fortifications, Count Ludovik Coronini was writing a report on the occupation of Zvonigrad and sent it to the authorities by captain Antun Marković.⁴²

The next day, on June 10, 1699, a Venetian captain (*serdar*) with 50 horses and other representatives of Venetian rule met outside Zvonigrad. They complained against the occupation of the fortress in a time of peace and of the threat of military attack. That was the reason why Austrian forces spent the whole next day, June 11, encamped around Zvonigrad. The Austrian military leaders did not notice any perceptible movements of the Venetian army, so they decided to withdraw towards Gračac on June 12. Moreover, they were lacking livestock, food and flour, and the army started to abandon their duties: recruited Morlachs, “who do not obey or believe” (“che non hanno, ne obediensa, ne fede”), were leaving the army daily. From around 1500 men, who were sent to

⁴⁰ Stmk. LA, HK 1699-VI-60.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

Zvonigrad at the beginning, not more than five hundred remained – as is cited in one source. In the castle itself, a hundred armed men prevailed, mainly from Lika and Krbava. According to the source, none of the *stipendiati* (mercenaries) on the border wanted to stay and defend Zvonigrad. Frontiersmen, mainly local soldiers and peasants, were tied to their own home and land which had to be farmed and defended. An efficient means for deploying frontiersmen for long periods of time in areas distant from their domicile did not yet exist. Thus, a small salary of four florins per month for bread and food (“quatro fiorini al mese, et il pane”) was apportioned to the defenders. The command over the fortress was delegated to Count Antonio Coronini.⁴³

After the departure of the rest of Austrian forces, on June 13, 1699, around 1500 Venetian men with horses and infantrymen from Dalmatia appeared under Zvonigrad. They pitched tents in the area and took control over the course of the Zrmanja near the castle. Since the defenders lacked water, a few men left the fortress and went for water supplies down to the river. On the way they clashed with Venetians who opened fire. According to sources, the Venetians lost two men and one horse, and one Austrian was wounded. Just around midnight the crew managed to get close to the water, hidden by the dark and protected from the gunfire. A little later a small amount of flour and other supplies were smuggled into the fortress. On the next day, on June 14, Venetians surrounded the whole hill on which the castle was perched. At that moment, three Venetian captains (*serdars*) asked to be received in audience by Count Antonio Coronini, the commander of the Castle. They repeated the accusations of Austrian conquest and asked for a surrender, which was resolutely rejected by Count Coronini. The same day, Coronini sent a letter from the besieged fortress to Count Ludovik Coronini in Gračac, informing him of the real situation and, naturally, asking him for help.⁴⁴

Having received news of the Venetian siege of Zvonigrad, Count Ludovik Coronini sent a report with several appendixes from Gračac to the Emperor on June 15, 1699. By his messenger, Saverije Massimo Zanutti, the Count informed the emperor, the Court Chamber and the Habsburg border commission of the situation. Moreover, he stressed the importance of Austrian maritime borders, which were, in his opinion, dangerously exposed. In Coronini's words, if the Venetians decided to attack, they could easily accomplish their aims with the help of their naval forces. Aiming to help the occupied Zvonigrad and its defenders, he himself tried to recruit men in Lika, but he managed to assemble only 200 men. “If we got only five hundred German soldiers (*Deutsche Knechte*), we could hope to chase the Venetians tonight and terminate the siege, as powerful as it was. But, with these men nothing can be done” – stated Coronini.⁴⁵ He specially asked the Court Chamber for adequate supplies, since he at that moment, by his words, had not the money, ammunition or equipment. “Grain and flour from Bakar are hardly deliverable by sea, even if I had a license to bring it here,

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid: “...et se havessimo havuto in punto solo cinquecento Dragoni Alemani, ancor' in questa note s'havessimo fidati, di scacciar li Veneti, da tal'assedio, blocata che sia, ma non questa gente non si puol far cos' alcuna”.

and it is nearly impossible to transport it by land since the route is long and one can not hire horses, even if one has enough money, for moving such a small amount of grain and the equipment we have” – reported Coronini.⁴⁶ Anyway, he asked for the defence of Zvonigrad by any price due to its enormous importance.

During the Venetian siege of Zvonigrad, the inhabitants of Lika were alarmed, but the collected forces and supplies were insufficient. Only fifty people went to the Zrmanja valley and encamped close to the ruins of the ancient tower of counts Keglević, evidently aiming to close the entryway to Zvonigrad from Knin. Around 300 men with horses and infantrymen, mainly from Lika, were assembled a little later. Almost nobody came from the Maritime Border. According to the source, the only exception was the captain of Otočac, Strassoldo. But even he came only with a large retinue, not the army.⁴⁷

The Court Chamber in Graz gave the order to the Governor of Bakar, Pietro de Denaro, on June 22, 1699, to send supplies to Karlobag. The emperor's “Salzversilbenern zu Triest”, Francisco Marenzi and Gieremi Francolla, were told to collect and send 5,000 guilders (or florins) immediately to the treasurer and inspector in Bakar, Carlo Ferdinand von Dapp, who in July of the same year certified receipt of that amount.⁴⁸

Since, in the meantime, he was appointed chief commissioner of the Court Commission for places in Lika and Krbava as well as in Podgorje and Pozrmanje, which were captured by the Venetians, Baron Kušlan, at the end of June 1699, asked for financial support, or specific monetary additions (“liffergelt”). He asked for at least, 600 florins, indeed “in der wahrheit respectu anderer Herrn Commissarien, was Ihnen gegeben wirdt”. As reasons for the request he offered his great expenses and costs, and even his own horse (which, in his words, one could not buy for such an amount) that had suffered on the bad roads, etc. The Court Chamber pointed out that every border officer needed to require his personal financial maintenance both from import and export taxes, or in trade, in the area which he commanded instead of requiring it from centralized court sources and reserves. In other words, they wanted to prevent a precedent. Anyway, in this particular case they decided to make an exception, and they allowed the requested amount to Baron Kušlan, due to his obedient service and the requirements in the Imperial Commission, but not as a special addition to his salary, rather as a sort of compensation. Since Emperor Leopold in July 1699 agreed with the opinion of the Court Chamber, 600 florins (or guilders) were approved for Kušlan. But since “Hofffening ambt” in Rijeka and Bakar did not have any sources, allegedly, the Court Chamber “reminded” the Secret Council of its duty of paying the appropriate amount.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Ibid: “...et quel Formento, et Farina, ch'è in Buccari, hora sarà difficile, ancorche havessi l'authorità, di trasportarla per mare et per Terra n'è quasi impossibile, poiche la strada è lungissima, et Cavalli non si posson' havere, ne meno col danaro per portar il nostro pocho vitto, et bagaglio”.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Stmk. LA, HK 1699-VI-53.

Es an example, Baron Kušlan did not omit the occasion of stressing in his application the importance of returning the places from both sides of Zrmanja, possessed by the Venetians. It could be done peacefully or, in the case of refusal, "manu forti, et militari".⁵⁰ Anyway, by the final delimitation of the borders in the year 1700, places in southern Podgorje and the Zrmanja valley (except Zvonigrad) became Venetian possessions. The genesis of the mutual Austrian-Venetian-Ottoman triple border was developed in a way which, with all benefits and shortcomings, and causes and results of such a decision, greatly influenced the destiny of the area and the future of its inhabitants: the "Triplex Confinium" was institutionalized.

CONCLUSION: "TRIPLEX CONFINIUM" (THE PLAN AND THE PRACTICE)

At the end of the seventeenth century, in spite of the co-operation in the War for Vienna, there were, in certain phases of that war, more confrontations in the relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic than in the relations with the opposite side – the Ottomans. This was the time of "institutionalization of war and peace" in the European context,⁵¹ or the policy of power as the legitimate and ubiquitous method and instrument in serving the interests and goals of foreign affairs, whose course was mainly based on the interests of great European powers. Certain aspects of the history of the "Triplex Confinium" in Austrian-Venetian relations at the end of the seventeenth century leads to the hypothesis that the victim of the confrontation, which was caused by irreconcilable contrasts, aspirations, and the clash of opposite mercantilist interests of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic in the early modern times was, in a way, the very "Triplex Confinium."

By the collision of many, mainly non-beneficial natural, geographical and historical circumstances – and primarily due to the limited natural resources, constant conflicts among huge imperial systems, the peripheral sociological-geographical and geopolitical situation and the border uncertainty in the area – the early modern period produced a number of negative features in the socio-economic reality of the area. However, the Habsburg Monarchy and Venice at the end of the seventeenth and at the beginning of the eighteenth century were not interested neither in investing in the Triplex Confinium, nor in developing it. It was at that time interesting only as the instrument of political power, that could bring a strategic security and potential financial benefit. Generally, neither the Habsburg Monarchy nor the Venetian Republic had, after the War of Vienna, any intention of improving social conditions on the "Triplex Confinium." In other words, they were not concerned for the welfare of their subordinates but primarily for the territory. Local inhabitants in bordering areas were in reality important factors in the power structures on the border, but, in the contemporary conceptions and structures of Austrian and Venetian interests, they fell into sec-

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Dülmen, 1990, 375–379.

ond place. In other words, the people were only the instruments for certain overriding goals, and the main goal was territory. For instance, Lika and Krbava were only included in the Habsburg military bordering system in 1712, after other models of administration had not shown any success, and their implementation was useless and unsuccessful. Therefore, one could rather talk about deconstructing than constructing a border society in the new possessions of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic at the end of the seventeenth and at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

According to sources, in order to balance opposing geo-strategic interests, both the Habsburg Monarchy and Venetian Republic primarily endeavoured to establish the most direct control over the area and to restrict any possible changes that would eventually question the *status quo* that was gained. The result of such a policy was a blockade of communications on the "Triplex Confinium" (e.g. in the case of Zvonigrad) and its further socio-economic destruction. In such circumstances the area simply could not, even if there were efforts, function in a way common to the developed parts of Europe, mainly those of the Mediterranean world.

Since the Habsburg Monarchy and Venetian Republic, due to their mutually opposite particular interests, fought each other mainly for the territory and not for the subordinates, one can observe the existence of oppositions between the intentions and plans of the structures of power "from above" to those creating and moving from "below". It can be described as a contradiction between idea and reality on the "Triplex Confinium" at the end of the seventeenth and at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The plan and the reality, however, are intrinsically connected: each practice includes a certain plan, and *vice-versa*. One just has to have in mind that in such a situation there was neither much coincidence nor liberty in actions. The causality connected all these appearances in various shapes of interaction, but the relation between reasons and results, plan and practice, was not simple, one-sided, simply directed or standardized.

This was especially recognizable from the point of view of mutual distrust and partially by mutual excommunication between the structures of power and local inhabitants on the "Triplex Confinium" around 1700, which can be raised as basic problems of their (co)existence in the whole area.

From one side, due to its archaic nature and lack of attraction at that time, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Venetian Republic had not expected a single thing from this area, and have trusted its inhabitants even less. From another side, highlanders on the "Triplex Confinium," enlightened by bad experiences and bearing historical heritage, felt a lack of trust in the new structures of power in "liberated" areas. Following their own inertia and autarchy, they did not expect anything from the authorities, and they believed even less in radical changes on the border. The change of subordinacy was, especially in the first decades after the Peace of Karlowitz 1699, often the only real change in the lives of those people, both in the modest urban nucleuses and in the predominate rural areas. Such an "equilibrium" between plan and practice, which dispossessed one side of the requirements for development and of even feeling the need for it, enabled the other side to live according to "old habits." This balance was at the beginning even useful to both sides fighting a common enemy (Ottomans), but in

the long-term, it was counter-productive. The external positive impulses failed to appear for a while, while the same area did not find enough motives, and even less the possibility for progress.

And finally, one could conclude that the only thing that could "be developed" in such a clash of contradictions on the "Triplex Confinium", in the historical evolution towards the present day, was the total lack of development, and the results of it are present even today. In this sense, the "Triplex Confinium" system was, and still is, an extreme burden for the area in which it was imposed by the network of circumstances.

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**GOOD LUCK FOR PIONEERS AND BAD LUCK FOR
LATECOMERS: DIFFERENT SETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN
RESETTLING LIKA AROUND 1700**

ABSTRACT

This article investigates possible reasons for different settlement patterns in the resettling process of the region of Lika and Krbava after reconquering it. After 1683 reconquering and resettling of this region occurred in an irregular and unplanned manner. The census of 1712 provides us with information about the situation some time after the intense settling period. Ethnic/religious affiliation played a role in this process and the size of the households was also decisive for Vlachs. The later the people came into this region the smaller were their landholdings. Those people who came last were not able to obtain any land of their own.

1. RECONQUERING AND RESETTLING LIKA AND KRBAVA

1.1 RECONQUERING

The area of the Croatian counties Lika and Krbava was conquered by Ottoman troops in 1527 and during the following one and a half centuries most of the inhabitants were Muslims and Vlachs. The centres of their presence were strong fortresses constructed for defence in the case of attacks of the Habsburg Empire or the Republic of Venice. In 1683, a large Ottoman army laid siege on Vienna for a second time. The outcome was disastrous for the Ottoman Empire: its army was defeated and the Habsburg Empire began a counter-attack which led Habsburg troops deep into the Balkans. These troops were assisted by irregular units. The priest Marko Mesić led such voluntaries which united with Vlach rebels and attacked and plundered Ottoman fortresses in Dalmatia. Jerko Rukavina and Dujan Kovačević led Bunjevci of the Habsburg border regions into the Lika region and conquered parts of it in 1684. The following year other voluntary units also attacked the region and regular Habsburg troops conquered several Ottoman fortresses. In 1689, the last Ottoman fortresses in the Lika re-

gion gave up and their inhabitants left for Bosnia. During these battles, most of the inhabitants left the Lika region: most of the Muslim population fled to the remaining Ottoman territories and most of the Vlach population also left their homes. They went partly to Habsburg territories and partly to Venetian territories.

1.2 RESETTLING THE REGION OF LIKA

The resettling of this region occurred in parallel to the reconquering of it. The financial administration of the Habsburg Court (Hofkammerverwaltung) was officially responsible for distributing the land among the immigrating settlers. These settlers were not willing to become ordinary subjects and pay taxes to the court and a feudal lord. So it was finally decided to incorporate this region into the Military Border system. In 1712, a census was conducted in order to know how many people were living in this region and how many of them were able to bear arms and defend the border. Between 1696 to 1701, most of the fertile land was acquired by new settlers. In 1712, land was already scarce and newcomers found no free land for themselves. In addition, quarrels began over the borders of some villages. Several possibilities existed for acquiring land in the Lika region: the first was to buy land. Muslims who had converted to Christianity and stayed in their homes came under pressure during the phase of massive immigration around 1700. This pressure caused many of them to leave during these years and they tried to sell their property to newcomers. The other possibility for newcomers was to buy land from people who had already settled. In most cases they were able to obtain only small landholdings in this way. Several of these transactions are recorded in the census. In the course of the census, the commission reported whether or not each household had an official confirmation of having legally acquired its property (the so-called "Konfirmationsbrief"). Only a minority of the households had acquired their land in such a legal way. The majority of them simply took their desired portion of land without asking the official authorities. The voluntary fighters against the Ottoman Empire had the moral right of taking land according to their wishes. But the majority of the settlers did not participate in driving the Ottomans out of this territory. They arrived after the end of the battles and acted somewhat like the "glorious heroes" of the war. The imperial authorities did not dare to confiscate the illegally acquired land and the commission for the census simply recorded if the households held statements of confirmation. There were attempts to reorganise the villages according to the concepts of the administration. Dispersed settlements should get a centre by moving the houses to a central place. But these attempts were mostly fruitless. The administration also tried to provide new settlers with land, but the fertile land had already been distributed among the settled. In spite of these attempts, many latecomers waited for years without getting land of their own.¹

¹ Kaser, 1997, 250–252.

2. THE SOURCES USED

The summaries of the census of 1712 in the Lika and Krbava region were the main sources for this analysis.² This is in contrast to the conference in Budapest, where the data of the census itself was used.³ A comparison of both sources reveals their respective strengths and weaknesses. The census covers 30 villages with 2,178 households and 22,133 persons. Every household is described by the name of the household head, the first name of the male members considered to be fit for military service, their relationship to the household head, their age, the number of minor males, the number of females, and their landholdings. The landholdings are mostly described by their location and partly by their usage. The area of each landholding is given and also the overall amount of landholdings. Due to 85 households which are described incompletely, the number of households for analysis decreases to 2,093.

The summaries provide the following information for each household: name of the household head, number of landholdings, area of landholdings, number of males fit for military service, number of other members of the household, number of all members of the household. The summaries contain 2,523 households for 35 villages. This sum includes 38 households with no members, i.e. these households are mostly additional landholdings of households already described in this village or in a different village. A further category of households which has to be dealt with separately is the category of households where the household head held a position in the military or church administration. The priests and military leaders or officers got additional landholdings in return for their service. In analysing landholdings, this group has to be dealt with separately because of these additional landholdings in the same village and also because this category comprises the owners of most of the landholdings which belong to owners residing outside the respective village. Their overall number is 120 households. The third group of households which has to be analysed separately is the group of landless households. Their number is, according to the summaries, 363 households. The remaining number of households for most of the analyses is therefore 2,013 households. The overall number of households in the summaries is about 400 higher than the number of households in the detailed census. The cause for this is that the detailed census for 5 villages does not exist any longer while the summaries exist for these villages. Using the summaries enables us to analyse all the villages, whereas only using the detailed census limits the number of villages for analysis to 30 villages. The weakness of the summaries is the missing detailed information about other members of the household and the missing information about the usage of their land.

² They can be found in the Regional Archives of Styria (Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv in Graz, Miszellenbestand der Innerösterreichischen Hofkammer, 1712-X-268), in the Croatian Archives (Arhiv Hrvatske in Zagreb, Spisi Like i Krbave, kut. 4), and in the Austrian State Archives (Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, IÖHKR/Croatia, 1713-V-35). For information about this census, see Kaser, 1997, 236 and for information about the validity of the data, see Gruber, 1998.

³ The papers are published in Roksandić, 1998.

2.1 MEASURING THE LANDHOLDINGS

The area covered by landholdings is measured in *Strikb*, i.e. a cord or rope, which was originally a linear measure and not a square measure. The length of one *Strikb* was defined in the census as being equal to 40 Italian or Venetian *ells*. This *Strikb* was known as a “big Krbava *Strikb*”, whereas a “small Krbava *Strikb*” was only equal to 20 Venetian *ells*. This small *Strikb* was only used in the reporting of parts of Ostrovica. In computing the overall sums, they made no distinction between these two different sorts of *Strikb*. The problem of converting the reported areas into m² is further complicated by the fact that there were long (685.77 mm) and short (639.59 mm) Venetian *ells* at that time.⁴ Converting a *Strikb* from a linear measure into a square measure was done in the following way: it was defined that an area of ten *Strikb* length⁵ and one *Strikb* width equalled the area which could be ploughed with four or eight pairs of oxen within one day. The area of such a “day's work” in this census was therefore 7,524.49 m² (based on long *ells*) or 6,545.21 m² (based on short *ells*). This area is slightly larger than the *Niederösterreichische Joch* (Lower Austrian yoke) with 5,754.64 m², which became the standard unit of measurement throughout the Habsburg Empire in 1785 and 1786,⁶ and is about twice the area of the *dan oranja* (3,237 m²) which was used in Serbia for measuring fields.⁷

This measurement of area by the work that can be done within one day was very widespread throughout Europe, although it was never the original meaning of the names of such units of measurement. All these names were derived from the act of measuring or marking of landholdings, and later people who were unfamiliar with these terms misinterpreted them as being terms meaning “the work of one day” or such like.⁸

In the census, the landholdings are reported in *Strikb* and not in “day's work”, i.e. in a linear measurement and not in a square measurement. But it is no problem to also use these *Strikb* as a square measurement for practical purposes, since the width of one “day's work” was also one *Strikb*. You can therefore use an area of 752.45 m² or 654.52 m² (one tenth of one “day's work”) as a conversion ratio for one *Strikb*. This means that one hectare consists of 7.65 or 8.79 *Strikb*. The sum of all the reported landholdings is 315,406 *Strikb* (20,644/23,732 ha) or, according to different summaries, 319,654.75 or 323,285.875 *Strikb* (max. 24,326 ha). These landholdings included only fields and meadows since forests and pastures were common land. We shall compare these figures with later ones in order to get information about their validity. In 1835, Franz Julius Fras published a topography of the “Karlstädter Militärgrenze” which presents the following figures for the “Liccaner Regiment”: 104 villages, 6,309 houses, 62,279 inhabitants, 69,870 *Joch* fields, 24,538 *Joch* meadows, 301

⁴ Herkov, 1971, 103.

⁵ Twice in the census you can find a definition of this area with a length of nine *Strikb*, but there are several examples in which a conversion ratio of 1:10 was used (e. g. 490 *Strikb* – 49 days' work, 50 *Strikb* – 5 days) and once the writer uses 10 *Strikb* as a unit of measurement.

⁶ Ulbrich, 1967, 185f.

⁷ Sundhaussen, 1989, 237.

⁸ Pfeiffer, 1986, 22–40.

Joch gardens, and 8 *Joch* vineyards.⁹ This amounts to 94,717 *Joch* (54,506.25 ha) which can be compared the above range from 20,644 to 24,316 ha. The increase in the area of landholdings is somehow comparable to the increase in the population living there. Therefore we can conclude that the census's data regarding the landholdings in 1712 can be treated as reliable. This is true despite the fact that the area of the "Liccaner Regiment" was not the same as the area of the census in 1712: some parts of the region belonged to the "Ottochaner Regiment" in 1835.

3. WHAT DETERMINED HOUSEHOLDS' SIZE OF LANDHOLDINGS?

3.1 ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

The mean area of landholdings of the 2,013 "normal" households, i.e. priests, officers, and landless households excluded, was 137.8 *Strikb* (15.7 or 18.0 ha).¹⁰ The different ethnic or religious groups differed in this respect. The largest landholdings were the possessions of the Muslims who converted to Christianity after the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops. The mean area of landholdings of these New Christians (*Neochristiani*, 31 households) was 241.0 *Strikb*, i.e. almost twice the overall average. The second largest landholdings were in the hand of the Vlachs. The mean area of their landholdings was 150.7 *Strikb* (1,477 households). The Catholic settlers had, on the average, much smaller landholdings. The Bunjevci had a mean area of 101.9 *Strikb* (191 households) and the other Catholics had, on the average, only 88.5 *Strikb* (304 households). The average landholdings of the New Christians were about three times that of the Catholics and the average landholdings of the Vlachs were about two times that of the Catholics. The reasons behind these differences seem to be the following: The former Muslims had a better starting position since they were already there when the other settlers came. Maybe they were also able to increase their landholdings during the time of the flight or emigration of their former fellow-believers. The reason for the larger landholdings of Vlachs and Bunjevci may be their stronger tendency to engage in animal husbandry in contrast to the stronger tendency of the Catholic Croats to engage in agriculture. A further reason may be the much higher average size of households of Vlachs and Bunjevci compared with the Croats.

The standard deviation¹¹ for the different ethnic/religious groups correlates with the means: the former Muslims have the highest with 136.7 *Strikb*, the Vlachs have 118.0, the Bunjevci 94.7, and the Catholic Croats 71.4 *Strikb*.


⁹ Fras, 1835, 149–219.

¹⁰ In the future, only *Strikb* will be used in this article, and with the conversion ratios mentioned above you can convert *Strikb* into ha.

¹¹ The standard deviation measures the differences between the different values of the households. A high standard deviation means that there is a wide range of possible values (very large and very small landholdings) among this group.

Chart 1 shows the median (the central value, i.e. half of the values are below it and half of the values above it), the interquartile range (the range of the central 50 % of all values), and the range of the values (with the exception of extreme cases) for each group.

Chart 1: Landholdings in *Strikb* by ethnic/religious groups



3.2 NUMBER OF MALES ELIGIBLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE

The correlation between the number of males eligible for military service and the area of landholdings is positive and significant. The coefficient is 0.48 while the coefficient for other members of the household is 0.52 and the coefficient for all members of the household is 0.55. The correlation between the number of men fit for military service and the area of landholdings is strongest for Vlachs with 0.50 and weakest for Catholic Croats with 0.26.

3.3 THE SIZE OF THE HOUSEHOLDS

As mentioned above, this correlation is slightly stronger than the correlation analysed before. The differences between the different ethnic/religious groups are similar: the correlation is again strongest for the Vlachs with 0.56 and weakest for Croats with 0.34. These coefficients suggest that the number of males and the overall size of the household played a much more important role for the area of landholdings for Vlachs than for Croats. It suggests that Croats tended to assign a similar area of landholdings to each household with only little consideration for the size of the household. The trouble in this analysis is that we are

comparing the actual size of households in 1712 with the area of landholdings granted or taken years before – maybe 10 or 15 years before. Since there is a positive correlation with household size, it is rather clear that larger households in 1712 were already larger at the time of settlement in the villages of Lika. Another explanation would be that larger families in 1712 were larger because they were able to obtain larger landholdings 10 or 15 years before. The third explanation would be that larger families were able to obtain additional land during the last decade. But until now we have only had evidence of selling land to new settlers and of attempts of the Habsburg administration to obtain land for new settlers at the expense of already settled households.

3.4 INTERVENTIONS OF HABSBURG AUTHORITIES

Interventions of Habsburg authorities may have split the villages into two groups. The interesting result is that the ten villages¹² which received such interventions had larger landholdings than villages without such an intervention (170.2 as against 126.7 *Strikb*). In addition, the standard deviation was also higher (126.8 as compared to 107.6 *Strikb*). Interventions in the form of dividing the village into *squadre* and then into *petine* did not result in a more equal distribution of land among the settlers. The areas of *squadre* and *petine* were relatively consistent throughout the same village. The *petina* was then divided among several households and in this division the differences arose: One *petina* could be owned by only one household or by up to ten households. Two villages were organised as closed villages: Kaludjerovac and Mušaluk. Both were small villages inhabited by Catholics. The mean area of landholdings in Kaludjerovac was 52.7 *Strikb* and thus one of the lowest in Lika and Krbava. In Mušaluk, the mean area of landholdings was twice that of Kaludjerovac: 110.7 *Strikb*. This number was still below the average of all villages. The land was rather equally distributed among the inhabitants of these two villages: the standard deviation for Kaludjerovac was 20.7 and for Mušaluk it was 37.6 *Strikb*.

3.5 THE DATE OF VILLAGE SETTLEMENT

A deciding factor for the differences in settlement patterns may be the different dates when the villages were settled after the reconquest. The villages can be broken down into three categories:

1) Villages where there was some sort of continuity in settlement: in these villages former Muslims remained and were then baptised or Vlachs remained there. 9 villages¹³ and 426 households belong to this group.

2) Villages which already existed in 1696: 7 villages¹⁴ and 480 households belong to this group.

¹² Korenica, Bunić, Visuć, Pećane, Jošane, Ploča, Mekinjar, Široka Kula, Mušaluk, Kaludjerovac. Kaser, 1997, 253.

¹³ Bunić, Bilaj, Ostrovica, Perušić, Novi, Ribnik, Počitelj, Široka Kula, Budak. Pavičić, 1962, 197–228.

¹⁴ Korenica, Ploča, Raduč, Medak, Pazarište, Vrebac, Mušaluk. Ibid.

3) Villages which were settled between 1696 and 1701: 18 villages¹⁵ and 1,054 households belong to this group.


4) Villages with unknown date of establishment: 1 village with 53 households belongs to this group (Mutilić). This village is not included in the analysis.

The first category contains all the New Christians and half of all Catholics. Vlachs and Bunjevci are underrepresented in this group. Their mean area of landholdings was 157.5 *Strikh* with a standard deviation of 133.5 *Strikh*.

The second category is made up of half of the Bunjevci and only very few Catholics. The Vlachs are represented slightly higher than in the whole population. The mean area of landholdings in the second group was 186.9 *Strikh* with a standard deviation of 132.3 *Strikh*.

The third and largest category was made up of mainly Vlachs with smaller shares of Bunjevci and Catholics. Their mean area of landholdings was much smaller: they had, on the average, only 108.9 *Strikh* with a standard deviation of 86.2 *Strikh*.

Chart 2: Landholdings in *Strikh* by date of settlement



The villages established or re-established after 1696 were obviously more densely populated than villages that had been founded earlier. This is in con-

¹⁵ Podlapac, Pećane, Jošane, Pisač, Mekinjar, Udbina, Visuć, Srednja Gora, Komić, Bruvno, Mazin, Popina, Zvonigrad, Gračac, Lovinac, Kaludjerovac, Divoselo, Mogorić. Ibid.

trast to the fact that they were populated mainly by Vlachs who enjoyed larger landholdings on the whole. The differences between the households were also smaller in the villages that were settled later.

If we compare the different ethnic or religious groups within these three groups of villages, we shall see the following: the Catholics always had smaller landholdings than the Vlachs. The mean areas was 105.7 as compared to 176.7 *Strikb* in the first category, 110.7 as compared to 218.9 *Strikb* in the second category, and 60.9 as compared to 115.0 *Strikb* in the third category. It is astonishing that the Bunjevci had the smallest landholdings in the second category of villages. They had only 71.7 *Strikb* on average and thus only one-third of that of the Vlachs. In both of the other categories they had larger landholdings than the average.

3.6 DIFFERENT VILLAGES

The mean area of landholdings differed vastly among the 35 villages of the census. By far the smallest landholdings were reported in Podlapac. On the average, the households in Podlapac owned only 34.8 *Strikb*, whereas the average in Vrebac, the village with the largest landholdings, was 287.8 *Strikb*, or about nine times the area of a household in Podlapac. The three villages with the smallest landholdings (Podlapac, Kaludjerovac, and Bilaj) were inhabited by Catholics, whereas the seven villages with the largest landholdings (Vrebac, Medak, Ploča, Počitelj, Jošane, Široka Kula, and Korenica) were inhabited by Vlachs. In general, the inequality within the village was higher when the average area of landholdings was also high. The three villages with the smallest standard deviation were Podlapac (23.4) and Kaludjerovac (20.7), the two villages with the smallest landholdings, and Udbina (19.9, no. 8 in the ranking of the smallest mean landholdings). The villages with the largest standard deviation were Medak (158.8), Pećane (157.5), and Bunić (157.3). All three of them were among the 11 villages with the largest landholdings.

Table 1: Landholdings in *Strikb* by villages

village	No. of households	Mean landholdings	Median landholdings	Standard deviation	Ethnic/relig. group
Vrebac	40	287.8	286.0	80.4	Vlachs
Medak	106	242.6	212.5	158.8	Vlachs
Ploča	41	231.4	188.0	133.4	Vlachs
Počitelj	39	218.0	200.0	108.2	Vlachs
Jošane	41	212.0	181.0	125.7	Vlachs
Široka Kula	54	207.6	187.5	145.3	Vlachs
Korenica	117	201.2	191.0	118.3	Vlachs
Perušić	85	192.9	148.0	147.5	Mixed
Bunić	92	181.7	113.5	157.3	Vlachs
Raduč	67	163.3	137.0	108.3	Vlachs
Pećane	12	161.3	124.0	157.5	Vlachs
Pisač	46	149.6	153.0	81.2	Vlachs
Bruvno	52	148.4	121.3	120.5	Vlachs

Mazin	36	131.8	118.8	89.2	Vlachs
Mekinjar	57	115.4	85.0	58.2	Vlachs
Gračac	152	114.0	96.5	70.9	Vlachs
Mušaluk	18	110.7	100.0	37.6	Catholics
Mutilić	53	109.3	93.0	71.2	Mostly Vlachs
Zvonigrad	91	108.9	64.0	107.4	Vlachs
Budak	30	105.8	96.0	54.1	Catholics
Mogorić	64	104.5	87.0	71.3	Vlachs
Visuč	54	104.4	96.0	49.2	Vlachs
Lovinac	118	103.7	75.0	94.2	Mostly Bunjevci
dclparRibnik	27	103.4	66.0	97.1	Catholics
Komić	25	101.7	102.0	41.7	Vlachs
Srednja Gora	30	98.5	96.0	36.9	Vlachs
Popina	88	98.0	60.5	93.5	Vlachs
Udbina	62	94.1	95.0	19.9	Mostly Catholics
Novi	58	89.2	80.0	64.6	Mostly Catholics
Ostrovica	30	84.4	64.5	79.5	Vlachs
Pazarište	91	71.7	57.0	42.5	Bunjevci
Divoselo	50	67.4	60.0	45.0	Vlachs
Bilaj	11	54.0	37.0	62.3	Catholics
Kaludjerovac	26	52.7	60.0	20.7	Catholics
Podlapac	50	34.8	26.0	23.4	Catholics

Chart 3: Landholdings in *Strikb* in Udbina




Chart 3 shows the rather equal distribution of landholdings amongst the households of Udbina. The two largest landholdings in Udbina were owned by military leaders, as were several of the other larger landholdings. So there was really almost an equal share of landholding amongst the “ordinary” households.

Chart 4: Landholdings in *Strikh* in Medak




Chart 4 shows the distribution of landholdings in Medak, the village with the highest standard deviation in landholdings. One can see a distribution of landholdings from the largest to the smallest. The largest landholding in Medak was that of the Orthodox priest. There were three military leaders, too, but they did not possess the largest landholdings. It is interesting to note that there is a continuous decline in the area of landholdings and no sharp drop, with the exception of the largest landholdings.

All the above analyses were carried out to the exclusion of military or church leaders and landless households (they are only included in charts 3 and 4 for illustrative purposes), which will be treated separately.

4. EXCEPTIONAL GROUPS

4.1 OFFICERS AND PRIESTS

Officers and priests held land on average amounting to 307.2 *Strikh*. This is more than twice the average of "ordinary" people. Every officer was supposed to receive land exempt from taxation which was meant to serve as a reward for their military service. This land was fixed according to the following stipulations: a captain should get 15 *Joch* (131.9 or 114.7 *Strikh*), a *porkulab* 12 *Joch* (105.5 or 91.8 *Strikh*), a *knez* 10 *Joch* (87.9 or 76.5 *Strikh*), and a standard-bearer 8 *Joch* (70.3 or 61.2 *Strikh*). Most of the officers never did receive property or land to such measurements. However, since the land was exempt from taxation and since the officers enjoyed larger possessions than the average citizen, this did not create any trouble.¹⁶

The summaries report 30 priests, i.e. almost one priest for each village. Orthodox priests sometimes got additional land as *Pfaffengrundstück*, i.e. the equivalent of the officers' land allocation, whereas Catholic priests normally did not get such additional land. The exception was Jurai Smolich, the priest in the village of Pazarište, which was inhabited by Bunjevci.

Catholics were over-represented among the officers and priests (23.3 %, in comparison to their share of 14.6 % of all the households). In villages with a mixed population, most of the military leaders were Catholics: in Mutilić, with a predominantly Vlach population, there was a Catholic priest, a Catholic *porkulab*, a Catholic *knez*, and a Vlach *knez*. In Novi and Udbina, a Vlach minority existed but the military leaders were only Catholics. Medak was a Vlach village with only one Catholic family: that of the captain. In Lovinac, with a majority of Bunjevci and a minority of Vlachs the captain, the *porkulab*, the *knez*, and the priest were all Bunjevci. In Perušić, where all groups were present, the captain was a Catholic and the *porkulab*, the *knez*, and the standard-bearer were New Christians. Vlach officers existed only in Vlach villages without any Catholics.

The landholdings of the Catholic priests and military leaders were smaller than those of the other ethnic/religious groups. The mean area of landholdings of Catholics was 212.3 *Strikh* compared to 269.3 *Strikh* of the Bunjevci and 321 *Strikh* of Vlachs and New Christians. The tendency of "ordinary" households was thus also preserved among the leading households of the Lika region. The landholdings of officers were also connected with the average landholdings of the villages where they were living: the larger the average landholdings in the respective village, the larger the landholdings of its military leaders. Their landholdings were always more than the average of the village where they were residing. The only exceptions were Gergo Luketich, standard-bearer in Budak, with 69 *Strikh* and Marco Savatovich, standard-bearer in Ostrovica, with 65 *Strikh*.

¹⁶ Kaser, 1997, 271.

4.2 LANDLESS HOUSEHOLDS

14.4 % or 363 of all households were at the time of the census still without land of their own. All ethnic/religious groups are under-represented in the category of landless households with the exception of the Bunjevci. The reason for this is that most of the households with unknown ethnic/religious affiliation fall into the group of landless households. The landless households were very unequally distributed among the villages. In some villages, up to one-third of the households was still landless. On the other hand, there were also villages without landless households.

Table 2: Landless households by villages

village	No. of households	Landless households	% landless	Ethnic/relig. group
Bilaj	15	3	20.0	Catholics
Bruvno	62	7	11.3	Vlachs
Budak	34	0	0	Catholics
Bunić	120	23	19.2	Vlachs
Divoselo	58	4	6.9	Vlachs
Gračac	194	38	19.6	Vlachs
Jošane	49	6	12.2	Vlachs
Kaludjerovac	30	4	13.3	Catholics
Komić	38	8	21.1	Vlachs
Korenica	142	23	16.2	Vlachs
Lovinac	149	27	18.1	Mostly Bunjevci
Mazin	46	6	13.0	Vlachs
Medak	112	0	0	Vlachs
Mekinjar	59	0	0	Vlachs
Mogorić	67	0	0	Vlachs
Mušaluk	27	9	33.3	Catholics
Mutilić	57	0	0	Mostly Vlachs
Novi	72	10	13.9	Mostly Catholics
Ostrovica	36	2	5.6	Vlachs
Pazarište	119	24	20.2	Bunjevci
Pećane	14	1	7.1	Vlachs
Perušić	145	56	38.6	Mixed
Pisač	49	0	0	Vlachs
Ploča	50	4	8.0	Vlachs
Počitelj	41	0	0	Vlachs
Podlapac	52	0	0	Catholics
Popina	129	36	27.9	Vlachs
Raduč	96	0	0	Vlachs
Ribnik	35	4	11.4	Catholics
Široka Kula	62	3	4.8	Vlachs
Srednja Gora	37	4	10.8	Vlachs
mult1Udbina	70	0	0	Mostly Catholics
Visuč	62	4	6.5	Vlachs
Vrebac	63	20	31.7	Vlachs
Zvonigrad	132	37	28.0	Vlachs
Total	2523	363	14.4	

The summaries report the length of time for which families were already living without land in the Lika region and applies to 71 households (most of the landless households of the villages Bilaj, Bunić, Korenica, Lovinac, Pećane, and Ploča). Half of these households had already been living ten or more years there. Four households had already been 17 years in the region, i.e. they arrived in the Lika region in the year 1695, during a time of intense settlement there. The question arises as to why these households were not able to obtain land of their own while other households were able to. The next question is why these households did not move to other villages of the region. For some of these households the census reports the way they earned their living: they worked for households with enough land. There is no difference between landless and landowning households concerning living in villages which had always been populated, which were populated earlier, or which were populated later. The overall percentage is also the same concerning living in villages where the administration intervened or where it did not intervene. In the village of Lovinac, there were 26 landless households, 16 of them for at least ten years. This village was populated in 1698, 14 years before the census was made. But seven households reported that they had already been living 15 to 17 years there, i.e. before the village was populated. It seems that the information about the amount of time these landless households had already been lived in the Lika region is not completely reliable. Nevertheless, a reported 17 years of inhabitancy indicates that they had already been there for a long time.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Several factors which may have determined landholdings have been investigated for this paper. They can be summarised in the following way:

Catholic Croats had, on the average, smaller landholdings than the other ethnic/religious groups in the Lika region.

Larger households had larger landholdings, especially Vlach households.

Organising a village in the form of *squadre* and *petine* did not necessarily result in a more equal distribution of landholdings among its households.

Officers and priests possessed, on the average, landholdings of more than twice the size of "ordinary households".

The date of a village's settlement was influential on the amount of land settlers could obtain. Settlers in earlier established villages had larger landholdings than settlers in later established villages. Those people who came latest were forced to live without land of their own.

One remaining question has not been dealt with: the question of the different usage of land and the quality of land. The usage of the different plots was reported only for the villages of Mekinjar and Bruvno. This information is also available for parts of some additional villages, but for most of the villages there is no such information. Therefore, such information has not been included in this paper. Kaser¹⁷ notes some examples of the use of land within the villages of the

¹⁷ Kaser, 1997, 273–276.

Lika region. No information is available for the quality of the land, but one would assume that the people coming earlier would take land of better quality and that latecomers had to be content with the land that was still available. Research in this respect will be based on cadastral sources of later times and will hopefully also be able to link this data with data of the census of 1712.

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LIKA AND KRBAVA UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INNER AUSTRIAN COURT CHAMBER

ABSTRACT

Historical research up to now has cast various lights on the administration of the Inner Austrian Court Chamber in Lika and Krbava. It is claimed that this administration was executed without particular interests of the people in charge into the newly annexed territories and without their more significant administrative efforts. These statements are now to be called in question, based on a detailed investigation of the archive material concerning the administration in Lika, kept in the "Steiermärkischen Landesarchiv." The following questions are taken into consideration. Which concepts were pursued by the Chamber to obtain information about Lika and who was responsible to supply new concepts to administrate the region? Which difficulties did the officials of the Chamber encounter in practice and how did they resolve them? What was the kind of the relationship of the Chamber towards other interest groups in Lika (Military administration, Catholic Church, local population)?

The history of Lika and Krbava, "Lika" for short, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has repeatedly been described before.¹ Historical research regarding the first years of Austrian administration draws a homogeneous picture, which I would like to present as follows.

Lika was reconquered by Habsburg troops in the years of 1685 to 1689, after having been part of the Ottoman Empire for about a century and a half. The authorities of the military frontier, the Court Chambers in Graz and Vienna, and the local population then engaged in a discussion about how to administer the regained possessions². The sale of parts of Lika to private individuals turned out

¹ Recent publications on the subject include: Hannes Grandits – Karl Kaser. "Familie und Gesellschaft in der habsburgischen Militärgrenze: Lika und Krbava zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts" in Drago Roksandić (ed.). *Microhistory of the Triplex Confinium*. Budapest, 1998, 27–68; Karl Kaser. *Freier Bauer und Soldat. Die Militarisierung der agrarischen Gesellschaft an der kroatisch-slawonischen Militärgrenze (1535–1881)*. Wien, 1997. Chapter 5, Die Lika, 227–277.

² See also Hermann Ignaz Bidermann. *Geschichte der österreichischen Gesamt-Staats-Idee 1526–1804. I. Abt. 1526–1705; II. Abt. 1705–1740*. Innsbruck, 1867; 1889. Here Abt. II. 120.

to be rather unsuccessful. Therefore, the largest part of the country was finally put under the administrative control of the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber in 1695. According to the view commonly held in the publications so far available, this authority hoped to financially exploit the new acquisition as fast as possible and without great administrative efforts, and therefore installed its own administrators. These officials proved to be incompetent and faced fierce resistance from the population. Two of them, Anton Count Coronini and Jakob von Ramschüssel, were even murdered by the local people, and a third one, Andreas Baron Oberburg, was chased away. In the end, this united opposition against the unreasonable administration of the Court Chamber forced the reassignment of Lika to the authorities of the Military frontier in 1712.

In the historical studies published so far, the reconstruction of events in Lika and Krbava during the years before 1712 has been mainly based on archive material of the military bodies.³ The extensive collection of records of the civil administration has largely gone unnoticed.

The following depiction draws on the records of the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber for the period 1695 to 1745.⁴ It attempts to revise the general view presented by previous historical research and to call attention to new details that shaped the history of both regions.

First of all, it is essential to investigate the following questions: how important was the acquisition of Lika actually for the central government and how did its acquisition fit into some larger administrative concept? Was it really a “neo-aquisticum” to be exploited as best for economic ends as possible?⁵

To answer these questions we need to make a brief excursion into economic history. Until the late seventeenth century, the Habsburg Monarchy was essentially a landlocked territory, functioning as an interior market with respect to commercial matters. Therefore the financial, industrial, commercial and population policy had to be modified completely according to western models in order to realise the ideal of the state as a strong and self-supporting economic body with a homogeneous district of economic enterprise, of a state that should be recognised and accepted internationally as an equally matched economic partner.

Under Leopold I, several proposals were put forward, such as that of Johann Joachim Becher from 1668,⁶ which suggested applying the commercial system of mighty naval powers to Habsburg conditions. Cameralism, a German and Austrian variation of mercantilism that was first discussed during the second half of the seventeenth century, was to become the dominant economic policy

³ Records of the Viennese and Inner Austrian Court Council of War, see Kaser, 1997, 229–239, as well as Kaser-Grandits, 1998, 38–44.

⁴ The Steiermärkische Landesarchiv (Styrian Provincial Archive) was closed for several months when I was preparing this paper, therefore I could only use the notes I collected before that time. It should be pointed out that plenty more material concerning the Lika is still accessible. Its evaluation could contribute to a better understanding of the regions discussed here.

⁵ Kaser, 1997, 228 ff, as well as Grandits-Kaser, 1998, 38.

⁶ Johann Joachim Becher. *Politischer Discurs, Von den eigentlichen Ursachen deß Auff- und Abnehmens der Städt, Länder und Republicken*. Franckfurt, 1688. (Reprint Glashütten im Taunus, 1972).

in the Habsburg Lands during the eighteenth century⁷ The first steps were taken by the Emperor to the following plan, which was to be eagerly followed by all his successors throughout the eighteenth century: to create a homogeneous littoral zone along the Adriatic coast.⁸ Besides the local and, up to that time, unimportant ports of Trieste and Rijeka, the plan also encompassed the integration of the Gulf of Bakar, Senj and Karlobag as well as the newly conquered regions of Lika and Krbava into this economic district. From this point of view it becomes evident why the emperor and the central government insisted in putting Lika under the administrative control of the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber. After the peace of Karlowitz in 1699 Lika became particularly interesting as a commercial base from which to initiate and promote the economic opening of the Monarchy to the east and southeast. Therefore, the organisation of this economic region was assigned to the Inner-Austrian central administration in Graz rather than the financial authorities in Vienna. The first goal of the new administration was to devise a new and uniform system for all the custom duties, tolls and taxes resulting from the trade in salt and wood that was dominant in these regions. This standardization of hitherto completely inconsistent regulations was to serve two purposes. It aimed at providing more funds for the state treasury and saving the monarchy from the looming threat of a financial crisis, and at the same time was intended to be of benefit to the local population by promoting trade and commerce, which in turn would increase the prosperity of the people in the country. Furthermore, a homogeneous and centralised system had to be created. The Inner-Austrian Court Chamber made itself responsible and entered into a regular correspondence with all the officials in Trieste, Rijeka, Bakar, Senj, Karlobag and Lika. All rescripts of the emperor in this connection were addressed to the officials of tolls, taxes, salt and wood and other officials of the Chamber in all these localities, without giving preferential treatment to any of them at the disadvantage of another.⁹

The government tried repeatedly to proceed homogeneously and to even out all the geographic or historical peculiarities of the individual regions. This was the first tentative to create a homogeneous commercial administration,

⁷ Louise Sommer. *Die österreichischen Kameralisten in dogmengeschichtlicher Darstellung*. Wien, 1920–25. Heinrich v. Srbik. "Der staatliche Exporthandel Österreichs von Leopold I. bis Maria Theresia. Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte Österreichs im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus." in Eli F. Heckscher. *Mercantilism*. Wien–Leipzig, 1907, 44; Grete Klingenstein. "Between Mercantilism and Physiocracy: Stages, Modes and Functions of Economic Theory in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1748–1763." in Charles W. Ingrao (ed.). *State and Society in Early Modern Austria*. Purdue Univ. Press, West Lafayette, 1994, 181–214.

⁸ Arnold Luschin von Ebengreuth. "Österreichs Anfänge in der Adria." in *Separata*. Vol. 17. Wien, 1916; Heinrich von Srbik. "Adriapolitik unter Kaiser Leopold I." in: *MIÖG Erg.* Bd. 11. 1929, 610–40; Giulio Cervani. *Il Litorale Austriaco dal settecento alla "Costituzione di dicembre" del 1867*. Udine, 1979; Eva Faber. *Litorale Austriaco. Das österreichische und kroatische Küstenland 1700–1780*. Trondheim–Graz, 1995. (=Veröffentlichungen des Steiermärkischen Landesarchives 20 u. Schriftenreihe des Historischen Instituts Trondheim 5).

⁹ Faber, 1995, see Abschnitt I.: Das Litorale unter der innerösterreichischen Zentralverwaltung bis 1748, 15–37; Idem. "Il ruolo dell'Austria interiore nella politica commerciale di Carlo VI." in *Cheiron 21: Dilatar l'Impero in Italia*. 1995, 161–186; Idem, "Vorstufen zu einer Innerösterreichischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Innerösterreichs in den Jahren 1717–1730." in *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines für Steiermark*. Vol. 87. 1997, 123–188.

which in this early form, however, was not crowned with success. Only the far-reaching administrative reforms under Maria Theresia would start to realise this project in part.

Another reason for Leopold I to concentrate his attention on the south of the Habsburg monarchy more than ever was political in character. The need for a protective fleet became clear several times during the Spanish War of Succession, particularly when the French attacked the port of Trieste in 1703. The English – as allies of the Emperor – stressed the good qualities of the Gulf of Bakar from a military and strategic point of view when they turned their attention to the Adriatic during the Spanish War of Succession. In his report of 1703, the English Major Edmund Halley wrote especially favourably of the gulf and, on consultation with the emperor, was given all powers to improve and extend the gulf according to his ideas.¹⁰ Lika was also part of these plans to expand the gulf, since Halley had strongly advised against promoting only the harbours, suggesting instead the establishment of military and commercial centres in the hinterland. It is true that the English lost interest after driving out the French from the Adriatic, but the region had now got a good reputation in Vienna and the suggestions of Halley were repeatedly brought up. This was the case, for instance, when the central government discussed the problem of the “*commercii turcici*,”¹¹ that is, how to structure trade from the monarchy to the southeast. These plans first began taking shape when Charles VI ordered the creation of a proper economic commission in Graz in 1717, which was put under the charge of the economic commission in Vienna in 1719. Shortly afterwards, from 1726 onwards, Charles VI had the “*via Carolina*” constructed, the road from Bakar to Karlovac.¹²

All actions and proceedings of the Inner Austrian Court Chamber in Lika from 1695 onwards can be understood in this context.

1. WHAT WAS THE MODE OF OPERATION OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND WHAT WERE ITS AIMS?¹³

A statistical analysis of the administrative records concerning Lika shows that the administration of the territory was neither superficial nor half-hearted: I counted the annual number of entries into the directory (*Findbuch*) of the

¹⁰ Alan H. Cook. *An English Astronomer on the Adriatic. Edmond Halley's surveys of 1703 and the Imperial Administration.* in *MIÖG.* Vol. 38. 1985, 123–52.


¹¹ Adolf Beer. “Die österreichische Handelspolitik unter Maria Theresia und Joseph II.” in *AÖG.* Vol. 86. 1898, 1–204; Hans Halm. *Habsburgs Ostbandel im 18. Jahrhundert.* München, 1954; Marianne Hertzfeld. “Zur Orienthandelspolitik Österreichs unter Maria Theresia in der Zeit von 1770–1771.” in *AÖG.* Vol. 108. 1919, 215–344; Wilhelm Kaltenstadler. “Der österreichische Seehandel über Triest im 18. Jahrhundert.” in *VSWG.* Vol. 55/56. 1968/1969, 482–497/1–104; Andreas Helmedach. *Das Verkehrssystem als Modernisierungsfaktor. Straßen, Post, Fuhrwesen und Reisen nach Triest und Fiume vom Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zum Eisenbahnzeitalter.* PhD Dissertation. Leipzig, 1999.

¹² Helmedach, 1999, 121–129; Faber, 1997, 143–166.


¹³ In the following only those records in the Styrian Provincial Archive that have been investigated by the author of this paper are specified. The references are cited with the abbreviation: “HK”. However, there are numerous further records in the archive that are related to the subject.

Court Chamber concerning Lika during the years 1695 to 1747¹⁴ and – for purposes of comparison – those for Venice as well. The terms “Ottoman Empire” or “Turks” are only marginally mentioned. The peaks which occurred in 1703 and 1735 were not only caused by the Spanish War of Succession and the threat arising for the Habsburg monarchy from Bourbon Naples in the South,¹⁵ but was also due to the fact that the commission composed of the Court Chamber and the Court Council of War was sent to Lika.

**Citation Frequency in Court Chamber Directory (%)
(1695–1745)**



**Citation Frequency of Lika and Venice in Court Chamber Directory
(1695–1745)**



¹⁴ The years of 1700 to 1748 were selected at random; omissions may be filled in only after the reopening of the Styrian Provincial Archive.

¹⁵ See especially: HK 1703-III-1, III-76, IV-13, V-5, V-6, V-8, V-30, V-58, V-65, V-70, VI-47, VII-31, VII-49, VII-71-, VII-76, VII-84, VII-85, VIII-10, VIII-13, VIII-21, VIII-22, VIII-37, VIII-50, VIII-73, VIII-93, VIII-97, X-18, XI-14.

These statistics determine the emphasis of this paper: to investigate the concepts and proceedings of the Court Chamber concerning Lika and Krbava and to outline those areas of activity that were of special concern to the authority.

2. COMMISSIONS

In 1695 the territories of Lika and Krbava were put under the administrative control of the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber. This meant that these regions, which had been administrated by military authorities before, now had to be integrated into the civil administration. In practice both authorities delegated one or several commissioners to the area. These commissioners represented their authorities' interests and together had to lay down the guidelines for the handing over of the administration to the civil authorities. They formed in this case a "mixed" commission, consisting of members of both civil and military offices, and often designated in the records as Translocations Commission.¹⁶ The members of the commission surveyed the drawing up of the frontiers, they handed over the coffers as well as all buildings and equipment that had been used by the administration – an altogether more awkward and tricky task – and they tried to settle quarrels, etc. It was not easy for the commissioners to cope with these tasks. There were many inconsistencies and misunderstandings and the authorities had to be asked repeatedly to help solve problems that continuously arose. Therefore, it is not astonishing that the activities of these Translocations Commission lasted for several years, with officials being frequently replaced,¹⁷ and finally did not lead to a result that was acceptable for everyone involved.¹⁸

However, there was another important reason why commissioners were sent to Lika: After all, the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber had little or no information about the new and remote possessions. Dispatching commissioners therefore seemed the best way to compensate this disadvantage. The commissioners' practical experiences and elaborate reports should serve as the basis for the discussions and decision-making process taking place during the sessions of the Chamber afterwards. In this connection it becomes evident how seriously not only the authorities in Graz, but also in Vienna proceeded in incorporating the new acquisitions. The "instructions" to the commissioners consisted of numerous questions they had to investigate and report on during their trip. Some of the Inner-Austrian court chancellors who were appointed commissioners were even called to Vienna for detailed discussions of their tasks. Antonio Canduzzi, Johann Christian Carl Freiherr von Abele and Johann Joseph Count Webersberg were three of those commissioners. In Vienna, they participated in all the sessions concerning the plans for the drawing up of the new frontier, the construction of fortifications and the avoidance of misunderstandings and repression in Lika, and they received special, additional orders.¹⁹

¹⁶ HK 1696-VIII-20; 1698-II-2, VIII-33, IX-80, X-17, XI-5; 1701-V-18, V-31, III-41, 1702-I-71, I-116, VII-65, VIII-67 u.v.m.

¹⁷ HK 1700-VIII-64, 1701-V-18, 1702-V-67, 1702-IX-15, 1703-V-2, 1703-V-75, 1715-XII-51 and others.

¹⁹ HK 1703-II-12; 1704-VII-80; 1705-II-50, 1710-VI-70.

The commissions were ordered to send reports to Graz at regular intervals in order to stay in permanent contact with the Court Chamber. The Chamber presented these reports during the common sessions of the Inner Austrian Government concerning Lika. The protocols of these sessions were sent to Vienna where they were discussed again during the meetings of the central government. On the other hand, the Inner Austrian government also forwarded the reports of the sessions to the *Landeshauptmannschaft* (Provincial Capitaincy) in Gorice and Gradisca as well as to the captaincy in Flitsch/Bovec/Plezzo, Triest, Rijeka, Bakar and Senj. Thus, the chamber officials of these administrative institutions were kept informed about the current discussion. However, they were also asked to give their point of view on difficult questions and to make suggestions for solving particular problems, for most of them – particularly the officials of middle and lower rank – were from noble and bourgeois families on the littoral, they were locals who were also familiar with neighbouring regions because of their obligatory trips of inspection. Their detailed reports are evidence of their profound knowledge of the problematic situation arising from the particular political, economic, social and administrative structures in these areas, which are sometimes so difficult to understand for us today.²⁰ Therefore, there was a regular correspondence not only between Graz and Vienna, but also between Graz and the administrative bodies on the littoral.

Furthermore, the commissioners of the Court Chamber who were charged with the integration of Lika into the Inner Austrian States were entitled to examine all records and files of the local administrative bodies, all information had to be given to them without any limitation or restriction.²¹ This measure had several reasons: first, it was very expensive to dispatch commissioners and therefore they were given the additional task of inspecting the administrative practice of all offices along their route. All commissioners of the Court Chamber sent to Lika had to investigate conditions in Cragniola, Trieste, Rijeka, Bakar, Senj and Karlobag. They visited, for example, the salt departments in Trieste, Rijeka, Bakar, Senj and Karlobag, they discussed with the captain of Mitterburg/Pisino/Pazin the trade of salt, corn and wine in the country, for which no taxes were levied – a fact considered inadmissible by the Court Chamber. They also visited the stud farm of *Lippiza*, and, among numerous other things, they examined the proposal to buy a Maltese ship, landed in Bakar, in order to convert it into a man-of-war.²² Second, it was hoped that these inspections would render a reliable and detailed picture of the current practices of the cameral²³ administration in the local authorities and to learn about problems, misuses and abuses. Particularly during the first decade of the eighteenth century the call for a standardization of the cameral administration was taken into account in several practical approaches. This became evident in the policies concerning important matters like the trade with salt and wood, regulations for customs and duties, and action taken against smuggling.

²⁰ HK 1701-XII-13.

²¹ HK- 1702-V-25.

²² HK 1702-IX-75, 1703-V-47; 1703-VI-29, VI-68, VI-79, VII-11, X-27.

²³ In the following, all matters or individuals related to the Court Chamber will be referred to as: "cameral" matters or individuals.

The commissioners were also instructed to examine the entire system of defence in the Austrian and Croatian littoral and in Lika, as well as the size and condition of the armed forces, which in these regions were paid for by the Inner Austrian Court Chamber.²⁴ Furthermore, the commissioners were entrusted with the renovation of the fortress of Zvonigrad, which had been reconquered from the Venetians, and with putting it back into operation. The renovation and commencement of operation was entrusted to the commissioners. Up to 1702, the fortress was under the control of the captain of the Court Chamber, who bore the title of “Commander of Zvonigrad”; from 1702 onwards, military matters were controlled by the authorities of the military frontier, whereas cameral matters were without exception in the hands of the civil captain of Lika.²⁵ In military affairs the Court Chamber and Court Council of War should proceed together. The commissioners also investigated the proposals of the civil captain in Lika as to how to improve the situation in the country.²⁶

The numerous reports and memoirs of the Inner Austrian commissioners show how extensive their competencies were. They had powers to settle disputes and misunderstandings on the spot, without having to consult their authorities, but were instructed to write detailed reports justifying their actions and proceedings. They settled quarrels between local officials²⁷ and between the local people and the administration,²⁸ and they collected complaints of the local population, the so-called *gravamina*.²⁹ In this context it becomes obvious that the commissioners did not only pursue matters that were of immediate interest to the Court Chamber, but that they also gave time and attention to the demands and needs of the local population. They suggested, for example, that the authority pay for the erection of additional buildings serving local needs, such as brickworks, public wells, or baking-ovens, and mediated in individual concerns, such as asking the Court Chamber to let a local merchant have the wood he needed to build a ship at a better price.³⁰

As representatives of the Inner Austrian government, the commissioners also dismissed officials or carried out their ceremonious installation.³¹ They looked for suitable replacements if positions became vacant, and they administered justice on behalf of the Inner Austrian government. The latter happened, for instance, in the case of the “three ringleaders in Lika”, who had planned an uprising against the Inner Austrian administration: the two commissioners of the Court Chamber carried out the proceedings together with the vice-captain of Trieste, the officer for finances (*Fiskal*) of Gorice and, as the representative of the local population, the arch-priest of Brinje, Marko Mesić.³²

²⁴ HK 1703-XI-49.

²⁵ HK-1700-X-13, XI-6, XII-59, 1701-I-59, III-44, VI-6, VI-30, IX-59, XII-19, 1702-II-47, V-58, 1703-XII-8, 1704-I-10, III-37, 1706-IV-6, 1703-XII-8, 1704-III-37, 1705-X-41, 1706-XII-65, 1721-I-23.

²⁶ HK 1704-IX-65, 1705-VI-48, 1710-XI-77, 1712-II-10.

²⁷ HK 1703-XI-20.

²⁸ HK 1703-VII-86.

²⁹ HK 1703-XII-18, XII-42.

³⁰ HK 1703-VII-39, VIII-9, IX-85, 1721-V-10.

³¹ HK 1703-VI-24; 1706-V-25, V--66.

³² HK 1705-II-50, 1710-V-120. For Mesić, see Grandits-Kaser, 1998, 29 and the literature quoted by them.

This commissions could be composed of high officials, for example of the president or vice-president of the Inner Austrian Court Chamber or the Inner Austrian Court Council of War, who were sent to Lika in order to warrant smooth proceedings in important matters there and then, and to avoid friction in the course of the handing over of the administration, the drawing of the new border or in the settling of disputes and misunderstandings. However, in most cases the councilors of the Court Chamber who were ordered to the littoral and to Lika had already been there several times.³³ It is conspicuous in this context that since 1717/18 all those councilors sent to Lika were also members of a new commercial authority, founded in Graz in 1717, that aimed at the organisation of a new Inner Austrian "Commercial Community". One of their members, Johann Christian Carl Baron Abele von Lilienberg (?–1730), was responsible for all affairs concerning the bishopric of Senj and its grip on Lika. In 1702/3, he was a member of the Translocations Commission, in 1710 a member in the commission charged with setting up new defence systems in Lika. He had experienced unrest and uprisings in Lika. During his travels he had repeatedly examined the cameral offices in Trieste, Rijeka, Bakar, Senj and Karlobag.³⁴ In 1712 he organised the adoption of the administration in Lika, representing the interests of the Court Chamber. He acted as mediator between the bishop of Senj and the Court Chamber, examined all affairs in this respect, and was responsible for the salt trade and mining.³⁵ Johann André Enders/Endters (?–1726) and Johann Joseph v. Webersperg had often been at Abele's side. In addition, Enders was responsible for the cooperation with the military frontier, for the troops of the Chamber in Lika, for the transport of weapons and munitions, and was equally director of the cameral officials in Lika. He was also appointed to examine and judge defence concepts and he met Halley in Bakar.³⁶ He also took part in numerous trials against criminal offenders from Lika.³⁷ Webersperg, after numerous trips to Lika, headed the department concerned with Likan affairs in the sessions of the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber and the Court Council of War in Graz.³⁸ Franz Bernhard v. Zöhrrern, depute of the Inner-Austrian *Bankalkollegium*, an authority on finances, had also traveled to Lika as a commissioner.³⁹

This new body for commercial affairs had been created to collect information about all aspects of the Inner Austrian economy and its deplorable state of affairs, to remedy things going wrong, and to standardize and improve the different, backward and underdeveloped practices concerning trade in this region. All decisions and proceedings of the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber concerning Lika were therefore part of this important project and have to be seen in this context.

³³ HK 1700-VIII-64, 1701-V-18, 1702-V-58, VII-44, VII-53.

³⁴ HK 1700-IX-57, 1702-I-71, VII-58, VII-80, VIII-67, IX-29, 1703-II-12, III-34, V-47, V-75, 1710-XI-77.

³⁵ HK 1702-VII-58, VII-59, VII-73, X-65, 1707-III-7, 1711-IV-61, IX-26, 1712-II-10.

³⁶ HK 1703-IV-62, 1706-IV-45.

³⁷ HK 1703-IV-13, V-73, V-76, VI-46, VIII-73, VIII-97, 1704-VII-80, VII-98, 1705-II-50, 1706-III-28, III-79, V-25, V-27, V-66, VI-85, VI-101, VII-94, VIII-57, 1707-II-108, 1712-VII-72.

³⁸ HK 1705-II-50, IV-48, 1706-I-54, 1707-II-108, III-7, 1710-V-120, VI-70, XI-77, XII-33.

³⁹ HK 1710-XI-77, XII-33, 1712-II-10.

However, individuals who did not usually work for the Inner Austrian administration⁴⁰ were also asked for their help and advice. Baron Androcha, for example, offered to travel to Lika in order to appease the local population at a time of unrest, whereas Father Mesić was paid to be a commissioner working as a mediator between the local people and the authorities.

Commissioners, therefore, can be seen as mediators between the institutions and the realities and peculiarities of local life. It depended on their understanding of peoples' nature and of local conditions as well as on their tactical skills as to how they could "translate" to their superiors in Graz what they had seen and done and experienced. On their return, they attended the sessions in Graz, where the Inner Austrian government decided on a course of action in all matters and then tried to bring their position into accord with the emperor's will or to make new suggestions. A detailed report was sent to Vienna where it was discussed by the central government and afterwards submitted to the Emperor. After he had pronounced his will, the decision went back through all the proper channels of authorities, finally reaching the commissioners, who had to bring into force the new measures and regulations at the local level, regardless of whether they agreed with them or not. It is therefore not quite adequate to talk of a certain proceeding behind the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber and to simply disapprove of it. The Chamber, as well as their officials and commissioners, were a means to an end, they had to execute the "very highest" will, and their possibilities were limited to making suggestions and to putting forward the best possible arguments in favour of their proposals. What has been said about the commissioners also applied to the captains, the governors of Lika, who were appointed by the Court Chamber, as will be shown in the following.

3. RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS IN LIKA

During the years 1694 to 1712, three captains were installed in Lika: from 1694 to 1700 Anton Count Coronini, from 1700 to 1702 Jakob Friedrich Baron Ramschüssl, and from 1703 to 1712 Franz Andrée Baron Oberburg. They come off quite badly in the judgment of the locals and of historical research. Coronini and Ramschüssl were murdered in 1702, Oberburg allegedly chased away,⁴¹ which, however, could not be verified by investigating the records of the Court Chamber. It is true that Oberburg repeatedly reported about "reprisals" taken by the local population, but the captain repeatedly returned to Lika up to the end of his period of office.⁴²

To enter into details of the events during that time one would have to go through numerous reports and records, which is not possible in this context. Nevertheless one has to bear in mind that for a more objective and critical exam-

⁴⁰ Concerning the curriculum vitae of the councilors and secretaries of the Court Chamber, Webersperg, Endters, Abele, Denaro, Dapp, Zöhren, see Faber, 1997, 132–139.

⁴¹ Kaser, 1997, 231 and Grandits-Kaser, 1998, 40, refer in both cases to Radoslav Lopašić. *Dva Hrvatska Junaka*. Zagreb, 1888, 98 f. See also Bidermann. Abt. 1, 1867, note 63.

⁴² HK1711-VI-6, VII-3, 1710-XII-84, 1712-I-5, IX-82.

ination of these incidents around 1702, one should not only consider the harsh complaints brought forward by the population and by the administration of the military border against these officials of the Court Chamber, but one should also take into consideration the reports, stored in Styrian archives, written by the incriminated officials, defending and justifying their course of action. After all, Coronini was rehabilitated by the Emperor himself and was compensated for all the damages which had arisen from the accusations.⁴³ This is no proof of his innocence of course, but should only demonstrate the other face of the coin.

Between the captaincies of Ramschüssel and Oberburg there was an administrative *intermezzo*: in November 1702 the captain of Bakar was placed in charge of affairs in Lika temporarily, a task he passed on to the commissioner of the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber Johann André Endters in summer 1703.⁴⁴ The latter installed Oberburg, who was also captain of Karlobag, in November of the same year.⁴⁵ His functions as a captain ended in 1712, as the captaincy of the Court Chamber in Lika was abandoned and Oberburg was therefore released from his function as a captain. The new captain was installed by the administration of the Military Border. But all concerns related to the administration of the Chamber, for example the control and improvement of trade and commercial infrastructure and all revenues and expenditures concerning the fiscal and commercial administration, that is to say all civil affairs, continued to be handled by the Inner Austrian Court Chamber. Their officials in Lika, from 1712 to 1714, were termed *Kameral-Kommissär*, from 1714 to 1745 *Kameral- und Kriegskommissär* (commissioner of cameral and military matters), sometimes even *wirklicher Kriegskommissär* (real military commissioner), though one cannot detect any military concerns in his tasks. Without any exception, these officials were all members of the Court Chamber in Graz.⁴⁶ In 1712 Oberburg assisted the new cameral commissioner in learning the ropes of his new job, which can also be seen as a proof that Oberburg had not been chased away by the locals.⁴⁷

The diagram shows that the activity of these cameral officials was not significantly limited after the handing over of Lika to the Military district in military affairs. Political affairs had to be taken care of jointly.

Joseph Ernst von Lebenegg, the first commissioner of the Chamber in Lika, performed his function for about two years until 1714, when he was appointed captain and *Rentmeister*, a financial function, of Bakar. From March to October of this year the *Konzipist*, an official of the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber, Heinrich Franz von Bendl,⁴⁸ took over these functions. Finally the authority installed Johann Nicolai Neander, an officer of provisions in Gorice serving the Inner-Austrian Court Chamber, as the first commissioner of cameral and military matters. Neander stayed in office for over twenty years, until his death. He was suc-

⁴³ Concerning Coronini: HK 1700-II-13, III-2, VI-45, VI-96, XII-5, XII-112, 1702-III-41, V-84, VI-30, IX-52, 59, XII-19, 37, 1702-IV-38, VIII-31, VIII-50, 57. Zu Ramschüssel: 1700-VIII-27, VIII-66, X-13, 1701-XII-49, 1702-IV-38, V-58, VII-56, VII-56, VIII-50, 57.

⁴⁴ HK 1702-IX-12, 52, XI-9, XII-72, 1703-III-104, VIII-73

⁴⁵ HK 1703-IX-47, 1704-I-150.

⁴⁶ See for example HK 1712-VI-18, 72, 1713-II-44, 1715-I-16, 1739-I-17, I-76, I-78.

⁴⁷ HK 1712-I-5, IX-82.

⁴⁸ HK 1714-III-14, X-18.

ceeded in the years of 1734 to 1745 by Nicolo Xaverio di Marotti, a nobleman of Rijeka. Marotti was also responsible for the transport of militia and provisions between Italy and Hungary.⁴⁹ To execute this function he generally stayed in Rijeka, but he had orders to go to Lika for court-days, to supervise the circulation of currency and to help the customs officials collect taxes and duties, and to prevent smuggling. As he could not combine these latter functions, which required his personal presence *in loco*, with his tasks in Rijeka, he was appointed a “substitute commissioner” in 1737: Johann Bartholomée Samsa/Samson of Cragniola. In 1739 Samson was appointed “real commissioner for cameral and military matters”.⁵⁰

It was not before 1745 that this coexistence of administrative authorities was terminated by the handing over of all cameral concerns of Lika to the Prince of Sachsen Hildburghausen.⁵¹

THE RANGE OF CIVIL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBILITIES

The detailed working methods of the officials of the Chamber as well as the recruitment of the native or Croatian officials on the lower level, that is to say officials responsible for the salt duties and others, still remains to be illuminated by detailed studies of the sources. This would answer questions about their social origins, their identification with the new employers and about their relationship with the local population. That these relationships were often strained and marred by conflicts becomes evident from a look at the records, which repeatedly report misunderstandings and even violent reprisals.⁵²

The imperial captain of Lika was installed in the name of the monarch by Inner Austrian officials and was paid by the Inner Austrian Court Chamber. He was therefore the representative of imperial interests in the administered region. In his function of military captain he was head of the garrison. Furthermore, he was authorized to take precautions in military matters, which extended to the drafting of the local population in times of crisis. As a civil captain he supervised and controlled, as the highest official in Lika, all other offices. He was head of the civil and criminal court. He could enact orders of punishment and throw everybody who violated the law into prison.

These functions differed from those of captain or captain-in-chief within the administration of the military frontier. The latter were at the head of a captaincy, that is, in this context, a centre for defence within the range controlled by the military frontier. Along the Croatian frontier there was the head captaincy of Senj and some other captaincies as, for example, Ogulin and Szluin. Although they had exclusively military tasks, they became more and more influential in

⁴⁹ HK 1715-I-16, 1736-I-108; 1736-VII-8, 1737-II-86, 1745-I-120, 1746-II-17, III-8. Concerning the family of Marotti see Faber, 1995, 29, 118 f, 167, 180–182.

⁵⁰ HK 1737-II-86, 1738-I-50, I-102, 1739-XII-1. Marotti was addressed in the same manner in 1745. Obviously Samson stayed in the country, while Marotti showed up only intermittently.

⁵¹ Jean Nouzille. “Le duc de Saxe-Hildburghausen et l'évolution des confins militaires autrichiens au XVIIIe siècle.” in *Études Danubiennes*. Vol. 7/1. 1991, 49–61. Kaser, 1997, 153–162. Faber, 1995, 17, 30, 94; HK 1746-III-140 (very comprehensive file), 1746-V-54.

⁵² HK 1706-III-7, IV-51, 1710-VI-70, 1711-I-52, 1719-II-1.

shaping social and economic life, particularly in the ravaged regions. Further regions in the hinterland, such as Ottochaz, Brinje and, along the coastline, the cities of Bag and Starigrad also belonged to the captaincy of Senj. It should be pointed out that the military commanders increasingly considered themselves contributing elements in the everyday life of their territory.⁵³

The “captain of Lika” in the following context therefore refers to the captain entrusted with this function by the Inner Austrian Court Chamber in the period up to 1712. His civil functions were assumed by the cameral commissioners from 1712 to 1745.

The captains and cameral commissioners were obliged to reside in the province assigned them, they were allowed to leave only after applying for special permission. Often their wish to leave was not granted by the emperor.⁵⁴ Therefore they took their wives or families with them, invested in property and sometimes owned real estate. These immovables had to be sold after their term of office ended or after their death.⁵⁵ Only Oberburg, a native of Cragniola, who was captain of Lika and Karlobag at the same time, lived in the seaport of Karlobag and traveled to Lika regularly.⁵⁶

In case the captains were not murdered, they received a similar function on the littoral after their recall from Lika: Lebenegg advanced to the rank of captain and *Rentmeister* of Bakar, a port that especially in the period before 1720 was strongly favoured by the Habsburg monarchs and considered a possible future free port of the monarchy.⁵⁷ In 1754 Marotti received the captaincy of Senj, an authority that was under the control of the Intendance of Trieste and considered part of the newly planned Habsburg economic region that stretched along the Adriatic littoral.⁵⁸ Samson, in 1746, was called to the administration of salt in Rijeka.⁵⁹

These “capi”, who mainly came from Inner Austria, proposed subordinate cameral officials, who in turn were mostly locals or from Karlobag or Senj.⁶⁰

INFORMATION GATHERING, INFRASTRUCTURE AND JUSTICE

One important task of the officials in charge was to collect all the information necessary for the Court Chamber to form a clear picture of the local conditions and events. The Court Chamber needed information about the region and the people, about their needs, about abuses, misuses, or shortcomings of the offices, about peculiarities, and often the authorities pressed for news and reports urgently.⁶¹

⁵³ Kaser, 1997, 56–63.

⁵⁴ HK 1710-XII-46, 1712-III-20, 1713-III-89, V-64, 1715-I-128.

⁵⁵ HK 1714-V-85, 1738-II-146, IV-95, 1745-IX-31.

⁵⁶ It could not be determined how long Oberburg served as the captain of Karlobag.

⁵⁷ Faber, 1995, 19–25. See also all entries of the Repertory (directory) of the Court Chamber in the Styrian Provincial Archive. For this period they exceed by far those of Trieste and Rijeka.

⁵⁸ Faber, 1995, 117–122.

⁵⁹ HK 1745-I-119.

⁶⁰ HK 1706-IV-17, XII-67.

⁶¹ HK 1704-I-150, 1704-II-86.

The captain was responsible for the maintenance and the construction of the infrastructure in the country. He supervised the reconstruction of destroyed villages, buildings, fortresses and needed domestic technology such as baking ovens, meat-abbatoirs and washing places in the villages.⁶² An important factor was that of the jurisdiction. Up to 1712 the captain was responsible for jurisdiction in Lika. Since 1712 all quarrels between civil and military subjects were referred to a military commission. The cameral commissioner was responsible only for cameral jurisdiction.⁶³ He was ordered to help where poverty and neediness emerged, that is to say with widows of indebted husbands, orphans, and victims of fires.⁶⁴

TRADE, CUSTOM DUTIES AND TOLLS, SALT AND WOOD SMUGGLING

As a matter of fact, the history of the trade in Lika at that time is a history of smuggling. But also in this respect it would be wrong to turn one's attention only to local events and proceedings and to condemn the Inner Austrian Court Chamber for its "inhuman" proceedings, geared only to exploitation. On the contrary, all actions and decisions of the Inner Austrian Court Chamber only become plausible when viewed in relation to those concerning the Austrian and Croatian littoral.⁶⁵

As has already been mentioned, at the beginning of the eighteenth century the theory of mercantilism, which had already proved fashionable in western states for almost a century, increasingly became the cornerstone of economic debate in the Habsburg monarchy. The Inner Austrian government proceeded in this respect according to the guiding – and binding – principles laid down in Vienna. First of all, however, the Inner Austrian government did not follow them voluntarily and tried to resist the official instructions issued by the central government in Vienna, pointing out that they were not in accordance with local conditions. This resistance, however, was of no avail in the long run. Every single proposal of the Inner Austrian Court Chamber concerning the Inner Austrian trade, the salt, the cutting of wood, was therefore examined in Vienna, and decisions were more often than not based on the guidelines of a general concept rather than on local particularities or conditions in the most underdeveloped region. Warnings from the officers of the local authorities went mostly unheeded.⁶⁶ The captains in Lika were forced to execute ordinances from above.

From the local perspective, many of these measures therefore seemed absurd and unfair. There were manifold efforts of the population to escape making payments to the Court Chamber: smuggling was top of the list, but some also tried forging coins.⁶⁷

⁶² HK 1702-II-47, 1704-I-10-, III-47, 1706-XII-43, 1710-XI-77, XII-37, 1715-I-127, IV-17, 1721-I-23, 1725-VI-551738-I-99(od.91).

⁶³ HK 1712-VII-23, 1713-I-52, IV-90.

⁶⁴ HK 1739-I-78.

⁶⁵ HK 1720-II-45.

⁶⁶ Faber, 1997.

⁶⁷ HK 1738-II-30.

Most smuggling occurred in the salt trade. It is difficult to understand the enforced restrictions placed on this important and much sought-after commodity. They are only understandable in connection with the mercantilist discussion over the incompatibility of trade with stone and sea salt. The Inner Austrian authorities had always favoured stone salt in order to favour the important mining areas in Styria. The regulation of the extensive trade with sea salt on the Austrian and Croatian littoral, which existed nonetheless, was a priority project approached by the authorities in various ways. The central office for the control of the trade with sea salt was the *Rentamt* of Bakar, which employed a salt administrator, who was also responsible for Lika. In 1710 two so-called "salt directors of the Inner Austrian sea frontier" were installed to improve the incomes of the *Ärar* (public purse). The Court Chamber appointed as directors Johann Christoph Baron Abele and Johann André Enders, both of them already experienced commissioners in Likan affairs. They had to communicate primarily with the salt official in Bakar, whom they had to keep informed regularly and consult on important matters. The reports of all salt-officials of the littoral and of Lika were now addressed to the two directors, who presented them to the Court Chamber. Their responsibility concerned everything that had to do with the salt trade, for example salt storage rooms,⁶⁸ warehouses, prices, merchants, ships, and smuggling in Lika, Karlobag, Senj, Bakar, Rijeka, Trieste and Duino. Shortly afterwards, the administration of salt was changed and the administrator of Bakar was declared inspector of the salt trade. In 1733 the supervision and direction of the production of sea salt in Bakar and the Idrian mercury mining affairs were transferred to the official of the Inner Austrian Court Chamber, Johann Maximilian von Pelikan. The authority was well aware of the fact that the incomes of these two areas made up the bulk of total income of the Chamber and that they depended on good regulation as well as continual inspection and supervision. In 1736 the captain of Bakar also performed the competence of superintendent over sea salt.⁶⁹

In Lika the salt agenda played an important role in the work of the cameral officials. All decisions and proceedings in this regard were aligned to those of the Croatian littoral and were coordinated by the salt officials in Karlobag, Senj and Bakar.⁷⁰ With the handing over of Lika to Hildburghausen all incomes of the offices in Senj, Karlobag and Lika were taken over by the Inner Austrian *Kameralzablamt*.⁷¹

Another considerable area of work was forestry.⁷² This branch of industry was not only important to the Chamber but also for military matters and ship-building. Therefore there was a strict differentiation between military and cameral woodlands. Instruction for wood officials were laid down with great care and the forester had to report regularly about the condition of the wood-

⁶⁸ These are: places to store salt, store-rooms, depots.

⁶⁹ HK 1736-II-25.

⁷⁰ HK 1703-V-47, 1704-II-100, 1711-VII-34, 1712-VI-18, 1713-I-19, III-10, 1715-I-128, X-4, 1717-VII-8, 1719-II-1, XII-6, XII-26, 1720-I-3, II-45, V-16, VI-62, X-70, 1721-VI-75, VII-27, VIII-40, 1725-XII-29, 52, 1738-I-225, IV-95, VII-73, X-17, 1739-I-17.

⁷¹ HK 1747-II-85.

⁷² About forests see Kaser, 1997.

land as well as about wood-cutting. He had to report any abuse immediately. The trade with wood was wholly in the hands of the Chamber and was undertaken by the cameral officials.⁷³ In times of war this was of utmost importance since the provinces had to put wood at the troops' disposal, as otherwise the soldiers would have taken advantage of the woodlands directly without distinguishing between precious wood for construction and ordinary firewood. In order to coordinate activities on the littoral and in its immediate hinterland, which was also Lika, a director for the forestry affairs of the littoral had been nominated.⁷⁴ In Lika, access to the forests had to be also regulated thoroughly.⁷⁵

These examples demonstrate the endeavours of the Inner Austrian government and, via this authority, also of the central government in Vienna to standardize conditions. Such tendencies became apparent in almost every field, for example when brickyards had to be constructed and the leading officials of Goricia, Trieste and Rijeka, the *Rentmeister* of Gradisca and Bakar as well as the cameral commissioner in Lika were asked for their opinions and recollections as to whether such brickyards had existed at all in their regions previously and how such buildings could now be constructed.⁷⁶ In all this, the motivation of the administration was certainly not the exploitation of one Inner Austrian region to the favour of another, but the attempt to get rid of the manifold local practices and particularities. The adoption of a common and "modern" system was the goal of the authorities. The fact that in the long run the decisions taken in order to reach this goal favoured the richer and more developed regions, situated nearer to the center, while failing to demonstrate similar effects in the poorer and underdeveloped regions, only became obvious to the authorities with practice. Countermeasures taken were doomed to failure for other reasons that will be outlined below. At any rate, smuggling in Lika soon veered out of control and cameral soldiers had to be admonished so as to combat it better, though without going so far as to suspect a smuggler in every merchant and without bothering the honest ones.⁷⁷

Although there were attempts of the Inner Austrian Court Chamber to promote traffic from the Ottoman Empire through Lika to the Habsburg Lands, they remained insignificant. The records include only one inquiry of interest in this respect, which raises the question as to which goods from the Levant could be transported via Lika to Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia.⁷⁸ The main task of the captain or cameral commissioner in this context remained to coordinate the trade via Karlobag to the interior and vice versa, to avoid smuggling and obstructions and to collect taxes and duties according to the decisions taken by the Chamber.⁷⁹

⁷³ HK 1733-IX-86.

⁷⁴ HK 1734-XII-93.

⁷⁵ HK 1703-VI-46, VIII-5, 21, IX-42, 1712-III-38, VI-72, IX-80, 1713-III-47, III-114, 1715-VI-116, 1717-VII-8, 1719-I-112, II-53, 1721-X-4, 1725-VI-55, 1738-IV-12.

⁷⁶ HK 1721-VII-79.

⁷⁷ HK 1711-IV-19.

⁷⁸ HK 1721-III-11.

⁷⁹ HK 1713-X-18.

For this purpose, the Likan captain did not have his own cameral officials at his disposal, but had to rely on the officials for taxes and salt from Karlobag who were entitled to employ four cameral soldiers for their protection when traveling to Lika.⁸⁰ These officials were not only responsible for levying taxes and duties, but their tasks also included the thankless one of recovering debts and punishing smugglers.⁸¹ They were repeatedly admonished not to allow more time to the locals to pay the toll or the transport costs of their goods, as the charges were usually paid only partially or never or only much later.⁸² In another case the toll-officials were asked to punish a salt smuggler, Bucha Roxanich, only if this could be done "without causing public turmoil".⁸³

The treasury of the toll office was used to pay for the expenditures of the captains and commissioners, for the renovation of buildings, the monthly allowances for wood and light of the officials, and for the salaries of the military frontiersmen working for the Court Chamber and so on.⁸⁴

Important orders and decisions from the Inner Austrian Court Chamber concerning any particular place on the littoral with regard to matters of salt, wood or taxes were always addressed to each responsible toll or salt officials in Trieste, Rijeka, Bakar, Senj and Karlobag. Therefore these officials were informed about the proceedings in all neighbouring regions.⁸⁵ The captain or cameral commissioner was responsible for correct accounting and had to send the accounts to Graz regularly. Thus, the representative of the Court Chamber in Lika was often under pressure to pay the missing sums into the cameral treasury even if he, as has been shown, had not yet been able to collect them.⁸⁶

CIVIL TROOPS

In the period before 1712 the Court Chamber was also responsible for the fortresses and the defence of the region. In this respect the captains should act together with the responsible officials of the military frontier.⁸⁷ The records concerning the conscription and position of soldiers under the Court Chamber and fields of activity are fairly extensive. They show that the troops of the Chamber had to maintain law and order, to support and protect the salt and duties officials as well as the captain and to take criminal offenders into custody. The troops were responsible for the renovation and maintenance of the defence systems.⁸⁸ The representative of the Court Chamber in Lika was therefore responsible for the recruitment, the supply and the pay of his soldiers. In case of emergency he had to ask the military frontier for reinforcement.⁸⁹

⁸⁰ HK 1711-III-11, 1712-IX-98, VI-18.

⁸¹ HK 1719-II-53, 1721-VI-75, 1725-XII-52, 1738-X-17, 1739-I-18.

⁸² HK 1710-VI-30, 1711-IV-19, IX-1, XI-28, 1712-III-38, 1713-I-43, 1719-I-112.

⁸³ HK 1719-XII-6.

⁸⁴ HK 1711-IX-29, 1713-III-47, V-31, 1721-III-38, 1725-VI-9, XII-29.

⁸⁵ HK 1712-VI-72, 1713-III-92.

⁸⁶ HK 1713-III-10, 11, 1719-III-9, 1738-II-19, 1739-I-113, 1745-I-120.

⁸⁷ HK 1706-XII-43, 1710-XI-77, 1712-II-10.

⁸⁸ HK 1720-X-44, XII-57, 1738-I-99 od. 91, VIII-1, IX-22, X-3.

⁸⁹ HK 1701-II-51, 1703-VI-73, 1706-VI-1, VIII-69, 1707-II-42, 1711-IV-18, 1719-XI-5, 1721-V-39.

The Court Chamber also had to contribute financially to the transportation of troops across Lika, for example from the military frontier to the Adriatic, or from the Inner Austrian regions to the south-east, that is for their accommodation, their keep and the *Vorspann* (team) of these troops. The captain was responsible for avoiding any trouble during the march through the country. Besides that, there were further costs to be met: Every soldier, for instance, was traditionally entitled to be given free firewood, which constituted an enormous burden on the region. The Court Chamber asked several times for this traditional practice to be reconsidered. Whenever necessary, the authority also had to put ammunition and military equipment at the troops' disposal.⁹⁰

The captain repeatedly asked to spare the local population the compulsory quartering of soldiers.⁹¹ He always had to have ammunition, medicine and field medicine chests ready to hand. He supervised hospitals and *Kontumazhäuser* (quarantine).⁹² In the event that Likan soldiers or other local conscripts were needed in other places, the captain had to organise their transfer and provide them with ammunition, horses and provisions.⁹³

4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COURT CHAMBER AND THE MILITARY FRONTIER

When taking over the new territory the Court Chamber had to fight several interest groups, who did not intend to tolerate any further outside influence on Lika. The main administrative opposition came from the Court Council of War in general and the military administration in Karlovac in particular. Numerous reports, complaints and protests of the Court Chamber demonstrate that this conflict was too deeply rooted to be abolished by mere joint sessions or by ordinances. It penetrated all levels of administration and made a common proceeding impossible in the long run. The social and communal life of the people on both sides of the frontier was also affected by it.

The starting point of this conflict was the fact that the Court Council of War and therefore also the administration of the military frontier were not prepared to accept having "lost" Lika and the Croatian ports on the Adriatic from the authority of the cameral administration. Their protest was a fierce one and took on all conceivable forms of practical opposition. The conflict reached its first peak in 1696, when the Court Chamber started to install the cameral administration in Lika, Krbava und Karlobag. The officers of the military frontier boycotted this initiative from the beginning, were not willing to collaborate and tried to preserve their influence over the locals. The leading officer had convinced the inhabitants of Lika, according to reports of the Court Chamber to Vienna that the new officials would take away all their liberties and reduce them to the status of

⁹⁰ HK 1702-V-26, VI-9, 1703-II-49, 1712-II-19, 1721-X-4, 1738-I-102.

⁹¹ HK 1719-I-96, 1725-III-63, 1738-I-80.

⁹² HK 1702-V-26, VI-9, 1703-II-49, 1706-VIII-6, 26, 69, 1715-II-40, III-20, V-45, VIII-13, 1720-VIII-68, 1721-XI-48, 1725-VI-29, IX-38, 1738-I-8, 139.

⁹³ HK 1706-II-57, IV-45, VI-1, VI-85, 101, VII-8, 1738-I-102, 1745-VII-3.

unfree peasants. Owing to these accusations, the locals organised an uprising and chased away the members of the Court Chamber, without giving them any time to account for the misunderstanding. The captain-in-chief of Senj, Rudolph von Edling, and the *burgrave* Motschaz even published written instigation that the population should not acknowledge the new administration. The frontier officers had been warned and requested to assist the Court Chamber in every aspect but, as the Court Chamber complained, they had not followed these orders.⁹⁴

Problems arose on many levels: Officers had reserved for themselves a certain percentage of the proceeds of the fishing, the salt trade and wood cutting and retained part of the fines, and now they did not want to lose these incomes. It had even become a sort of tradition that military captains kept for themselves goods from incoming ships without paying the duties.⁹⁵ The compromise found was to grant these incomes to the officers up to the end of their term of office, but not to their successors. Another problem was that the military administration had started to repair roads and paths and now required to be reimbursed for their expenses. The handing over of arsenals proved to be difficult, too.⁹⁶ Furthermore, there was the question of who now had the final say in quarrels between subjects of the civil and the military side? Should all persons who had been imprisoned by the military administration now be tried by the Chamber? How much should the Chamber pay for the equipment and effects belonging to the military administration? Finally, the handing over of the treasury and coffers also led to misunderstandings.⁹⁷

Officers were urged not to interfere any longer in matters regarding tolls, not to cut wood in cameral woodlands, to keep their hands off the salt trade and to support and protect the cameral officers in their lines of duty.⁹⁸ But the captain-in-chief Edling was not prepared to give up easily. He insisted on his project of establishing a free trade emporium for wood and salt trade and to hand over nothing to the treasury. The Chamber pointed out that he had won the community of Senj over to his side and simply refused to conduct the handing over as requested. He had to be menaced by the Court Chamber with being declared “a rebel” and being “treated accordingly”. Edling tried to prevent the influence of the Court Chamber by all possible means. So he explained to the officials of the Court Chamber that the deputies of Senj, who represented their community during the proceedings, had not been given sufficient powers and therefore all further decisions were null and void. Edling put all delays down to the unwillingness of the people of Senj to cooperate. He secretly carried on his private trading ventures. Some noblemen of Senj cooperated with him. Again and again, as the Chamber assured, Edling succeeded in spreading the rumour among the inhabitants that they only needed to offer resistance in order to maintain the status quo. Meanwhile, in view of the threat that the local population constituted to the officials of the Court Chamber, he promised the Court Chamber to be

⁹⁴ HK 1696-V-68, April 16. to June 13., 1767-VIII-2.

⁹⁵ HK 1712-IX-80, X-9. 1713-I-52, III-22, 1713-V-30. 1714-III-40, III-41, 1715-I-127, III-89. See especially 1717-VII-8, 1719-XI-7.

⁹⁶ HK 1715-IV-17, 1719-I-153.

⁹⁷ HK 1711-VII-22, 1712-VII-23, VIII-7, 1713-IV-90, 1717-IV-96, 1719-III-9 and so on.

⁹⁸ HK 1797-VIII-2.

willing to take action against the inhabitants, if only he were given the control of the dues (taxes) and forestry affairs. But to the Councilor of War Edling presented the view that the Court Chamber could not cope with the situation and therefore took inadequate decisions.⁹⁹

Many misunderstandings arose over the drawing up of the frontier. The Court Chamber repeatedly reproached the Court Council of War for lack of co-operation and spoke of "outrages against their officials". The Court Council of War in turn accused the Chamber of being incapable of dealing with the situation. On the highest level, too, negotiations escalated. The Court Chamber learned that the Court Council of War secretly intervened against the civil administration, in 1704 for example, when the Court Council of War planned a conference in Graz in order to release Lika from the Court Chamber's control. A similar project was undertaken by the general of Karlovac, Prince Portia, a fierce opponent of the civil administration. In 1711 the Chamber again learned about such attempts.¹⁰⁰

It soon became evident that it would be completely impossible to put the captain installed by the Chamber in charge of military superintendency in Lika. However, even after all military affairs had been re-assigned to the administration of the military frontier in 1712, the Court Council of War still continued its manifold efforts to take over the cameral administration and civil and criminal jurisdiction, too. Portia also tried to bring Karlobag and Senj back into the administration of the military frontier. Indeed the conflicts between military and civil officials in these two ports never seemed to stop.¹⁰¹

There were also quarrels at a local level. The communities of Bunić and Ubdina complained about the captain of Lika, Oberburg, at the *Generalat* of Karlovac and tried to be put under its administration. They were supported in this matter by the military captain of Bunić. Portia immediately took this as an opportunity to send troops, without any authorization from higher authorities, into the territory of Lika, which was administered by the Court Chamber. This action infuriated the latter who asked the Court Council of War to forestall such incidents.¹⁰² The reports of captain Oberburg induced the authorities to send a commission to Lika to settle all misunderstandings and quarrels between the Chamber and the Military authorities on the Military Frontier, some of which had even led to murder and slaughter. This commission consisted of councilors of the Court Chamber, a "Viennese military commission" and Father Marko Mesić.¹⁰³ The latter had been asked repeatedly by the Court Chamber to act as a mediator between the authority and the inhabitants and had been paid out of the cameral treasury.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ HK 1697-X-5, extensive.

¹⁰⁰ HK 1702-I-71, 1704-X-32, 1706-I-36, III-79, IV-119, VII-58, IX-1, 1710-VII-72, 1711-VII-22.

¹⁰¹ HK 1711-VI-6, 1713-III-7.

¹⁰² 1707-I-86, III-12, 1710-VI-70, threatening letter written by the Captain of Bunitsch Dobronojchnesevich, to the Captain of Lika, which was handed over to the Inner Austrian Councilor Johann Joseph Count Weberspert and to the Viennese military commission, with a request of investigation.

¹⁰³ HK 1710-V-120.

¹⁰⁴ HK 1700-XI-6, XII-112, 1701-I-59, II-29, III-44, VI-7, 1702-IX-12, IX-52, X-13, 1703-I-10, II-79, IV-62, VI-63, VI-73, 1704-III-34, V-98, VII-98, 1705-I-54, II-50, IV-88, 1706-I-48, 1707-II-108, 1710-V-120, VIII-65, IX-72, 1711-II-64, 1713-IV-7.

In the records one can find villages who wanted to become part of the Karlovac Generalate¹⁰⁵ as well as villages who wanted to stay under the control of the Court Chamber. Posarischa (Pazarište?) protested against the course of action taken by soldiers of the military frontier on its territory. All the quarrels over this matter, however, were quelled by the general of Karlovac – since 1711 this was (Johann Joseph) Count Rabatta – without officially informing the Court Chamber. The inhabitants of Karlobag protested against the “excesses and proceedings” of the military commander against them, which were not in accordance with their liberties. The village of Jablanac, too, which consisted of eight houses, protested against the installation of a commander by the Military authorities and insisted upon the retention of the status quo under the cameral administration.¹⁰⁶

Quarrels also arose within the Inner Austrian government in Graz as, for instance in 1714, when the councilor of the Inner Austrian Council of War Baron von Waidmannsdorf and the Inner Austrian councilor of the Court Chamber were at loggerheads concerning the question of who should have the presidency during the sessions concerning Likan affairs.¹⁰⁷

Misunderstandings and obstructive measures also spoiled the cooperation between the captains-in-chief of the military frontier and the representatives of the Chamber and their officials. In most cases, the Court Chamber reproached the Court Council of War for the lack of cooperation, obstruction in official duties, and seditious activities towards the population, and urged the Court Council of War (*Hofkriegsrat*) to induce its officers and subordinate its soldiers so as to facilitate cooperation with the Chamber.¹⁰⁸

One of the fiercest opponents of the cameral administration proved to be the *Oberhauptmann* (Senior captain) of the military frontier for Lika and Senj, Karl Raimund Count Attems. Cameral officials repeatedly complained that Attems ignored imperial resolutions demanding collaboration between the authorities and that he always tried to make the cameral administration appear in an unfavourable light.¹⁰⁹ Attems insisted on having the right to inspect ships in the harbour of Karlobag and none of the orders he received in this respect could induce him to stop doing so.¹¹⁰ He did not shrink from administering justice on cameral matters and from levying duties, taxes and issuing penalties and did not pay any attention to the protests of cameral officials or to the request of the Chamber to stop these actions. He also granted his subordinate officials great liberties in these respects. The Court Chamber complained, for instance, that the vice-captain of Senj had without authorization dismissed a judge who had been appointed by Oberburg.¹¹¹ The Chamber asserted that whenever the cameral officials defended themselves against these infringements, Attems and his subordinate officers reacted with insults and menaces. Meanwhile the Court

¹⁰⁵ HK 1710-I-125, 1713-III-10.

¹⁰⁶ HK 1715-IX-28, 1717-IV-96.

¹⁰⁷ HK 1714-IX-34.

¹⁰⁸ HK 1711-VIII-8, XI-29, XI-38, XII-23.

¹⁰⁹ HK 1713-II-43.

¹¹⁰ HK 1713-III-22, III-114, 1714-III-41, 1715-IV-15.

¹¹¹ HK 1710-XII-86.

Chamber advised their officials to keep calm, and not to give any reason for complaint. The affair culminated in dispatching a “commission for inquisition” against the “obstinate” and “unreasonable” captain.¹¹² But many locals had been encouraged by that time to refuse paying their duties to the Chamber.¹¹³

Soon the conflicts impinged upon all areas of everyday life. In case troops of the military frontier were provided with bread within the territory administered by the Court Chamber, who was to pay for it?¹¹⁴ If a *Syndicus* (syndic), paid by the Chamber, was arrested by the Court Council of War, what should happen to him? Who was allowed to punish a highwayman within the territory administered by both authorities and who was to determine the amount of the fine? All incomes from civil and criminal proceedings, which were still carried out by the Chamber, were to go to the Chamber and not, as was still common practice, be transferred to Karlovac.¹¹⁵ Particular problems arose when the Court Chamber called to account a Likan for smuggling that had relations serving in the administration of the military frontier who now stood up for him and did not refrain from violent actions.¹¹⁶

This last case shows that the boundaries between military and civil areas were blurred, for on both sides many of the serving soldiers or officers came from the region itself. The families of Vojnovich, natives of Senj, or of Attems/Attimis, based in Styria, Carinthia and Gorice/Gradisca, are but two examples. Members of both families were employed in civil and military offices on both sides of the military frontier. There are numerous similar examples to be found at all levels of administrative posts, from the lowest to the highest ranks. Lower-rank officials of this type, in particular, often wanted to do their service near their place of residence and tried, for example, to be coopted from the military into the civil administration or, as records show, did not even leave the military service while at the same time applying for positions with the Court Chamber. The Court Chamber then asked them to take a clear position for one of the two sides.¹¹⁷ The responsible officials of the military administration mostly refused to release these people from their service, which became another potential for conflicts between the authorities.¹¹⁸ Records even report on excesses of the military officials against reluctant locals or officials of the cameral administration.¹¹⁹

The Court Chamber's complaints in Graz and Vienna directed against the administration of the military frontier and vice versa continued to dominate the relationship between these authorities throughout the following 60 years. The Court Chamber in Graz repeatedly deplored infringements and chicaneries that reached from the lowest rank of the soldiery to the highest positions of the Court Council of War. The most serious accusation referred to the attempts of the soldiers and officers of the military frontier to malign and defame the Court

¹¹² HK 1713-IV-90, V-30, VI-39, VII-32, X-18, X-20, 1714-III-41, 715-IV-15.

¹¹³ HK 1710-IX-72.

¹¹⁴ HK 1715-I-96.

¹¹⁵ HK 1715-I-127, 1719-XI-7, 1719-XI-6, case Monteruga.

¹¹⁶ HK 1719-XII-6, case Roxanich.

¹¹⁷ 1707-II-72, 1711-VII-3, 1713-II-22, III-7, 1714-IX-34.

¹¹⁸ HK 1712-IX-80, 1713-II-43, 1717-IV-96.

¹¹⁹ HK 1717-IV-96, extensive file.

Chamber in the eyes of the population. These reports of the Court Chamber regarding the complete refusal of the Court Council of War to cooperate and its permanent intent to stir up animosity in the population against the “annoying competitor” of course contradict completely the many reports from the Military Frontier about the Court Chamber, which were sent to Graz and Vienna and can be found in the archives of the respective Court Council of War.

It should be noted, of course, that the soldiers of the military frontier had lived in the country for a much longer time. They had organised the reconquest of the country together with the inhabitants, they knew the people and the region fairly well and, in addition, by far outnumbered the officials of the Court Chamber, who were now sent to a country that was far away from their authority, arriving with completely different instructions, conceptions and ideas.

All these events made it evident for the first time that the civil and military administrations were completely incompatible, a circumstance that was to continue throughout the eighteenth century. When the Croatian ports of Senj, Karlobag and Bakar were placed under the control of the authority of Trieste in both political and commercial matters during the 1750s, the realms of conflict remained the same. Numerous analyses and reports concerning this matter can be found in the Viennese archives. They were compiled by officials of central and local governments, private correspondents, merchants, and adventurers who traveled through these regions of their own accord. Even the private secretary of Joseph II, a man named Giorgio, submitted a detailed and impressive report in 1775 about the complete boycott of the military frontier versus all efforts of the commercial authorities to promote the trade.¹²⁰ The first governor of Trieste, Karl Count Zinzendorf, described the languishing trade within the Karlovac Generalate in his diary of 1777.¹²¹

He depicted the startling poverty of the inhabitants as a consequence of inadequate infrastructure for agricultural and commercial activity and of the persistent refusal of the responsible officers among the military to find a basis of communication with the civil administration.¹²² Thus, the events in Lika at the beginning of the century do not appear as temporary and insignificant developments on the monarchy's periphery, but carry much more weight.

THE ACCUSATION OF THE “EXPLOITATION” OF THE “NEOAQUISTICUM” BY THE INNER AUSTRIAN COURT CHAMBER

This accusation seems no longer justified after consulting the extensive archive material. On the contrary, it becomes clear that the Court Chamber soon recognised that it was an illusion to gain profits from Lika. The captain, for instance, reported repeatedly that he could not take money from the locals be-

¹²⁰ Vienna. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv. Hofreisen 9. Report of the court secretary Adam Giorgio of September 15, 1774, about the “state and the real causes of the decay of the generalat of Karlovac”. Vienna, March 3rd, 1775. (Relation des Hofsekretärs Adam Giorgio vom 15.9.1774, über den Stand und wahre Ursachen des Verfalls des Karlstädter Generalats. Wien 16.3.1775.)

¹²¹ Vienna. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv. Nachlaß Zinzendorf, Tagebuch 1777.

¹²² Faber, 1995, see especially chapter IV/4, and VI/1.

cause they did not possess any. The valuables they offered instead, such as silver cutlery, proved to be of such bad quality that they were in no way sufficient to cover the administration's debts. Even clothes had to be taken as a consequence of criminal offences in default of valuables.¹²³

The travels of the commissions were very expensive and often dragged on for years. They were paid for directly by the Court Chamber and not from the profits made in Lika. The analysis of the records shows furthermore that hardly any money came out of the littoral because most of it was used on the spot to meet the expenses of the captain, to cover the pay of the subordinate officials and the costs for reconstruction as well as the maintenance of the infrastructure.¹²⁴ In this connection the Court Chamber repeatedly claimed that its expenses by far outweighed its income.¹²⁵

It seems that the accusation of exploitation was rather an invention of the Court Council of War in order to manipulate the local population and to bring the Court Chamber into disrepute. In the long run, this strategy was successful.

5. THE ROMAN-CATHOLIC CHURCH

One more interested party which was concerned to keep its influence in Lika was the Roman-Catholic Church. The diagram presented above shows the extent to which this institution was part of the events in Lika. The church feared that in the event of a strong presence of the Court Chamber in Lika it could lose its influence on the population and an important part of their income in the form of money or natural products.

The bishopric of Senj had already been installed in the fifth century, and from the sixteenth century onwards the bishop of Senj also administered the bishopric of Krbava, founded in the twelfth century and comprising Modruš and part of Lika. This power over both dioceses was called into question at the end of the seventeenth century. Johann von Abele, the official of the Court Chamber who led the investigation, proposed the separation of the two bishoprics, but did not succeed. He feared that the bishop of Senj would become too influential and independent in his ecclesiastical jurisdiction and in the collection of ecclesiastical tithes, which took the form of grain and cattle. Abele pointed out that the control of all parishes was too much for one man, which would impair the immediate control of the clergy. The clergy would therefore become more and more independent and extend the liberties they already enjoyed, liberties that were often not in accord with the church's interest. But Abele could not carry his point and the bishop of Senj remained also responsible for Lika.¹²⁶

¹²³ HK 1720-VI-62, 1725-XII-12, 1739-I-76.

¹²⁴ HK 1700-I-24, 58IV-25, VI-27; VIII-27, XII-57, 1701-XII-21, 1703-I-61, IV-104, V-9, II-63, XI-10, 1704-9, 1705-II-63, XI-10, 1706-V-25, VIII-76, 1710-VI-30, VI-37, IX-41, XII-111, 1711-III-11, IX-15, XI-28, 1712-II-19, III-38, IV-82, VI-18, VII-72, 1713-I-43, II-44, VI-16, 1725-III-6, 1737-II-86.

¹²⁵ HK 1701-VI-30, u. IX-59, XII-19, XII-21, 1703-I-61, IV-104, 1705-II-63, XI-10, 1706-I-109 usw., 1711-III-11, 1719-XI-5, 1720-XI-19, 1725-III-6, VI-9, 1736-VII-8, 1737-II-86, 1738-I-99(od.91), I-139, VI-44, 1746-II-17.

¹²⁶ HK 1700-IX-67 (extensive file).

The income of the church was not limited to tithes. In addition, the clergy could also demand from the parishes money from church collections, payments for duties performed by the clergy, and taxes for jurisdiction. Extraordinary payments, which originally had to be delivered by the population to the church during a state of emergency, were easily converted into permanent duties, particularly in the periphery.

In addition, when assuming office, every bishop was faced with considerable expenses. He had to pay up to thirty-five duties to the apostolic chamber in Rome in order to have his diploma confirmed by the pope. Since he could not or did not want to raise the money himself, he tried to cover his expenses through reimbursement taken from the population of his diocese. Indeed, the Court Chamber repeatedly accused the bishop of Senj of "extorting" money and goods from the locals.¹²⁷ It should be noted that within 65 years eight new bishops were installed at the bishopric of Senj: in 1681 Dimitri Hyacinthus, in 1690 Sebastianus Glavinich, in 1699 Martinus Braikovich, who in 1704 was appointed bishop of Zagreb/Agram, in 1704 Benedictus Bedekovich, in 1712 Adamus Ratkay, 1718 Nicolaus Pohmajevich, in 1730 Ioannes Antonius de Benzoni, born in 1693 in Rijeka, and in 1746 Georgius Wolfgangus Chiolich, born in Senj in 1722.¹²⁸ This remarkable number of new appointments in the periphery represented an additional burden on the people. The fight between the bishop and the Inner Austrian Court Chamber about the rights and the influence on the territory started anew with every new nomination of a bishop.¹²⁹

The bishops had to perform regular visitations or ordered their representatives to do so. They had to report about them to the Court Chamber which in turn tried to prevent infringements by the bishop, which occurred every now and then as, for example, in the jurisdiction or the collecting of contributions.¹³⁰ The installation of priests in the parishes was principally done by the Court Chamber, but the bishop had to be informed and asked for his consent. This procedure repeatedly provoked conflicts.¹³¹ The bishop had also the right to propose candidates to the post of archdeacon.¹³²

For the Court Chamber the bishop remained an important and competent partner whenever it needed information on the region or wanted to execute measures in Lika, as after all he resided there and then. The Court Chamber paid him to take part in the travels of the cameral commissions through the country.¹³³ The bishop was also asked for advice on how to proceed with the population during riots, for protests were frequent. The Court Chamber actually could not do without the clergy's familiarity with and influence on the locals and therefore always endeavoured to stay on as good terms as possible with them.¹³⁴

¹²⁷ HK 1714-III-13.

¹²⁸ *Hierarchia Catholica Medii et Recentioris Aevi*. Vol V/VI. 1952/1958.

¹²⁹ HK 1700-VIII-28, 1711-IV-61, 1719-IX-95.

¹³⁰ HK 1701-I-6, IV-2, 1702-VII-58, VII-73, X-13, 1704-XII-67, 1706-V-31, 1713-IV-26, 1720-III-133, 1721-IV-90, VI-59, X-15.

¹³¹ HK 1700-IX-57, 1702-VII-57, 1711-IV-50, 1712-IX-4, 1721-IV-21, 1721-VII-60.

¹³² HK 1713-VI-59, 1715-VII-55, 1720-IV-117.

¹³³ HK 102-X-65, 1703-V-47, 119-II-110.

¹³⁴ HK 1702-VIII-67, IX-12, XII-21, 1703-I-10.

There was also some friction between the bishop and the parish priests, that did not feel inclined to give up their traditional independence and liberties and, as the bishop complained, often led “scandalous” lives.¹³⁵ Therefore, with the consent of the pope, the Capuchin order was entrusted with the re-establishment of a pure Christian faith.¹³⁶ But in fact this mission was mainly used in the struggle against the Greek-Orthodox clergy and their adherents among the people. Between the Catholic Christians and the “schismatics”, as they were also called, constant frictions prevented a peaceful co-existence. The “schismatic” bishop was therefore constantly obstructed in the performance of his duties.¹³⁷ The Court Chamber was instructed to support the mission of the Capuchin order, which mainly rested on the support of “newly baptised Christians”, on re-establishing the Catholic faith across the country and on driving the schismatics out of Lika. The Court Chamber, together with the Capuchins, also had to examine the problem of emigration from Lika.¹³⁸

6. CROATIA, VENICE AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Despite assignment of Lika to the cameral, later on to the joint cameral and military administration, it stayed part of Croatia. Therefore it made contributions, supplied 1,200 soldiers, sent deputies to the Croatian Estates and supplied Croatian troops crossing Lika.¹³⁹

Another point raised by the sketch provided above concerns the relationship of the Court Chamber with Venice. In the records, there are frequent complaints about Venetian infringements against the population in Lika, such as the abuse of pastures and arable land and intruding Venetians.¹⁴⁰ Other entries concern maritime trade and smuggling.¹⁴¹ There is hardly any mention of the Ottoman Empire, only a few cases of encroachments of Likans against Ottoman subjects or the desertion of Likans into Ottoman territory.¹⁴²

7. THE LOCAL POPULATION

The correspondence of the Court Chamber in Graz shows that it was often annoyed that information about local people and conditions was coming in so

¹³⁵ HK 1701-IV-2, VI-7.

¹³⁶ HK 1700-VI-74, 1706-XII-82, 1707-III-7, 1710-V-104, VI-32, 1713-VI-59, 1720-VII-107, 1721-VI-67, 1745-I-2, III-14.

¹³⁷ HK 1700-VI-36, 1702-VII-59, XII-1, 1703-II-20, 106-XII-10, 1711-V-61, IX-26, 1713-II-49, IV-41, 1715-V-13, 1720-X-35, 1721-VI-65.

¹³⁸ HK 1700-XI-6, 1704-III-37, 1712-VII-24.

¹³⁹ HK 1696-IV-80, V-35, 1703-II-4, 1706-VII-85.

¹⁴⁰ HK 1700V-41, XII-59, 1701-IV-8, IX-68, 1703-VI-97, 1704-VII-98, 1706-I-44, II-42, 1715-I-1, 1719-XII-6.

¹⁴¹ HK 1700V-41, XII-59, 1701-IV-8, IX-68, 1703-VI-97, 1704-VII-98, 1706-I-44, II-42, 1715-I-1, 1719-XII-6.

¹⁴² HK 1704-VII-28, 1706-II-42, XII-43, 1711-V-61, 1711-VI-27.

slowly from their representatives, and that many of their questions were not answered in sufficient detail to be taken as a base for informed decisions. Therefore the authority repeatedly admonished their representatives to fulfill their duties, to send reports to Graz and to answer all questions which had been asked faithfully.¹⁴³ But the correspondence also reflects that the Court Chamber in Graz knew the situation in Lika. The authority was familiar with grievances, clearly realized the causes for the discontent of the locals, was informed about smuggling or imminent riots, and was working on solutions to these problems.¹⁴⁴ Proceedings, however, became difficult owing to insults and resistance on the part of the locals, and even more difficult when such obstructive behaviour was displayed by the Court Council of War.¹⁴⁵

To determine the exact composition of the population, in 1712 a project was started that was to be carried out jointly by the Court Chamber and the Court Council of War: carrying out a census in Lika, that is to say putting together an inventory of the population, of their real estates and of all men capable of bearing arms. In practice, this plan was carried out by a so called “delegated commission” under the direction of the Captain-in-Chief of Lika, Raimund Count Attems, and of the Commissioner of the Court Chamber in Lika, Joseph Ernst von Lebenegg.¹⁴⁶

Further entries deal with the proceedings concerning new settlers who had been converted to Catholicism, with smuggling, deserters into the “Turkish territory”, as they called it, but also with the allotment of land to new settlers, allowances granted in case of poverty, catastrophes or epidemics, and the construction of new structures such as brickyards, public baking ovens, wells, but also with the settlement of quarrels among the local people.¹⁴⁷ The Court Chamber also faced considerable difficulties in administering justice in the country, because their representatives could not always hold their own against the local population. During criminal proceedings the Chamber therefore liked to fall back upon the support of the “archpriest” of Brinje, Father Mesić.¹⁴⁸ From 1712 onwards criminal proceedings were presided over by the *Fiskal* (bursar) of Bakar.¹⁴⁹ Conflicts between cameral and military subjects were the order of a day and often concerned the right of pasture or of woodcutting in the woodlands of the region along the frontier.¹⁵⁰

It would be wrong to see the locals as a unified force. As has been pointed out, it was possible that members of one family served both in the cameral and the military administration and /or were clergymen. Furthermore, the rumours

¹⁴³ HK 1702-VIII-65, 1702-VIII-106, 1706-IX-3, 1710-V-104.

¹⁴⁴ HK 1702-VIII-50, VIII-57, 1703-IX-28, 1704-VII-80, 1706-VI-95, XII-67, 1707-I-74, 1710-I-91, I-125, XII-33, XII-39, 1711-I-82.

¹⁴⁵ HK 1710-IX-72.

¹⁴⁶ This census has been described in detail in Grandits-Kaser, 1998, 42.

¹⁴⁷ HK 1700-II-19, 1701-I-59, IV-9, IX-68, XII-45, 1707-I-95, II-15, 1710-V-106, 1711-I-17, I-52, 1713-III-114, 1719-IV-96, X-72, 1720-I-38, 1738-IX-3, 1745-I-7, I-118, VII-33.

¹⁴⁸ HK 1704-III-45, VI-71, VII-98, 1706-VIII-29, XII-31, 1710-IV-77, XI-57, X-72, 1711-I-82, II-51, XI-28, XI-38.

¹⁴⁹ HK 1712-IX-5, X-5, 1713-III-116, 1721-V-10.

¹⁵⁰ HK 1715-IV-116.

mentioned above, namely that the Inner Austrian Court Chamber would be eager to turn the free Likans into serfs, persisted and certainly could have induced many Likans to prefer living under the military administration. The military administration was based on simpler rules and a more clearly defined hierarchical system than the Court Chamber, which relied more strongly on a system of co-operation. The system of cameralism, the new economic ideas and the project of creating a uniform Inner Austrian economic community remained alien to the people of this barren land. The military administration was more favourably located than the Inner Austrian government in Graz, which was much farther away. Besides, a military officer could usually deal much better with the local population, as he was oriented towards defending the frontier, than a representative of the Court Chamber, whose background was familiarity with Inner Austrian. This is why the captain installed by the Court Chamber was faced with almost insurmountable problems: He had to fend for himself and on behalf of an authority which was far away, he was confronted with the often harsh resistance of the military, the church and the locals, and he could only rely on the support of a few, mostly local, subordinates, on the militia of the Court Chamber and, in case of crises, on reinforcements sent by the littoral. It depended very much on the personality, ability and tactical skills of the individual representative, but also on the pure chance, if he succeeded in building up a *clientèle* in the country, in finding allies and in pushing through his projects in spite of all adversity. In this connection it seems worth mentioning that the commissioner of the Chamber Johann Nicolai Neander performed his duties over a period of twenty years in Lika, without leaving the country for an extended period, and even died a natural death in Lika.

The correspondence and records of the Court Chamber therefore contribute greatly to an understanding of conditions in Lika. They contain plenty of sources of all types and origins. Their further evaluation could yield more new insights into the history of Lika during that time.

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**SPONTANEOUS POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE
HUNGARIAN KINGDOM DURING THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE CROATIAN
AND SERBIAN IMMIGRATION**

ABSTRACT

The author deals with the first phase of the resettling process following Turkish wars of the late 17th and early 18th century. The research focused on the Serb and Croat immigration into Southern Hungary. In the course of the analysis it turned out that this process was overwhelmingly spontaneous movement of a relatively large mass of immigrants who tried to find their residence in the border area between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. At the peak of the movement the line of Serbian settlements, shaping a triangle form, reached the heart of Hungary, the city of Pest-Buda. However at the end of the 18th century the majority of Serbian population concentrated mostly in Southern Hungary and even in this territory the population became a mixture of Germans, Hungarians, Slovaks and Serbians. The economic, cultural and political adaptation of the Balkan migrants was not really successful until the time of the enlightened absolutist regime and of the relatively developed agriculture of Hungary. The following periods witness relatively weak migration processes between Hungary and the Balkan until the 20th century.

1. INTRODUCTION

The research on the migration history of eighteenth-century Hungary concentrates mainly on the origin, ethnic structure and direction of population movements. There are several general beliefs both among specialists and amongst the public, for example:

a/ During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century the devastated territories of the Hungarian Kingdom were resettled mainly by foreign immigrants;

b/ If we disregard Transylvania and focus only on Hungary in the narrow sense, then it used to be supposed that the vast majority of foreign settlers were of German and Austrian origin, while the second largest group consisted of different Balkan ethnic groups;

c/ Of the Balkan migrants, the largest group was that of Greek Orthodox Serbians who moved into Hungary during the Great Trek (Velika Seoba) led by Patriarch Aršenije III Čarnojević in 1690;

d/ After the Turkish Wars in Hungary (1683–1699 and 1716–1718), the main direction of internal migration – the internal redistribution of the population – was the movement of upland people down to the plain areas. The latter territories were formerly occupied by the Turks and after the Hungarian “reconquista” they became extremely underpopulated, while the hilly regions untouched by the plagues and wars of the sixteenth-seventeenth century turned into overpopulated areas.

These beliefs – incorporating true, partly incorrect and false facts – were based on scattered evidence made by the clerks in tax conscriptions, individual settlement contracts, chronicles and contemporary descriptions as well as legal documents. What was common between them was that no large-scale quantitative evidence was produced which could provide a basis for such arguments. Although a lot of sources have already been published on the resettlement process (the recovering of the settlement and population structure) and the contemporary taxation, nevertheless, few quantitative analyses have been carried out. Our aim now is to replace this paucity in research and investigate both the literature and the available statistical [numerical] evidence through quantitative analysis from the viewpoint of a historical demographer.

2. MIGRATION MOVEMENTS AFTER THE TURKISH WARS

If we carefully read over the literature that deal with the population movements of eighteenth century Hungary, then three stages can be established in the migration process:

a/ Predominantly spontaneous migration movements until the 1720s covering nearly the whole country;

b/ Parallely existing spontaneous migration and organized settling actions toward the formerly Turkish territories including the newly liberated Banat region (1720s – 1770s);

c/ An almost exclusively planned and organized migration process aiming to fill the remnant gaps within the dispersion of settlements (1770s – 1820s).¹

In this paper, the first phase of the eighteenth century migration is going to be analyzed: that is to say, the spontaneous population movements of the turn of the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries. Regionally, we will concentrate on the southern part of the Hungarian kingdom as well as on the contacts between Hungarian and Balkanic peoples' and societies' migrations. Nevertheless, readers should always bear in mind that these migration movements were always just segments of a much larger process of resettling and redistribution of the population in the whole Carpathian Basin following the collapse of Turkish rule there.

¹ Of course the spontaneous immigration of relatives and neighbours to the already settled families and communities could be always observed throughout the whole century.

The main characteristics of the first stage in the history of migration to southern Hungary are the following:

a/ The migrants who were almost exclusively peasants moved first of all in a spontaneous way and the migrating groups were relatively small. They consisted of mainly single families or smaller family groups (relatives or neighbours), not masses of people;²

b/ The proportion of German/Austrian immigrants among the newcomers was extremely low. The latter usually did not move below the middle regions of the country; they reached beyond a line passing through lake Balaton, Fejér county and the twin city of Pest-Buda during this period;³

c/ A vast but unmeasurable number of Balkanic immigrants constantly moved in and out of southern Hungary – we have the impression that the majority of them never settled down in one single place for any length of time. Authors usually argue that this extreme mobility was a consequence of the nearly constant warfare between 1683 and 1718. It must be certainly true however, we believe it seems that this feature was not independent from other factors, namely that (in contrary to the immigrants coming from the West) an important proportion of the Balkanic immigrants could not adapt socially and economically to the local circumstances. The newcomers were more or less free peasants in their southern homelands and previously they never experienced such a rigid and relatively well organized feudal system. Due to this, they were not prepared to accept the contemporary social and administrative system of Hungary: the *corvée* (known as *Roboth*), regular taxation, the permanent county and state control over the villages and their inhabitants, an inferior position in the social hierarchy, and the spiritual dominance of the Roman Catholic Church. Last but not least their economic attitude and behavior favoring the pastoralism, animal husbandry, and subsistence economy did not fit well into the relatively well organized crop economy of the Hungarian and German peasants, not to mention the much more market and money-oriented mentality, a distinctly different family model, inheritance customs and value systems of the latter. Probably, these background factors resulted in the repeated – and often failed – settling efforts of the Balkanic migrant groups in rather different places of Hungary within the Dráva – Pest-Buda – Banat triangle.⁴

3. THE REGIONALITY OF MIGRATION

If one would like to see a comprehensive picture of the migration movements of the late seventeenth-early eighteenth century Hungarian kingdom, then it proves to be a hopeless exercise to find direct sources describing this process. Perhaps one of the best and most promising methods is an analysis of the state tax conscriptions (*conscriptioes regnicolaris*) of 1715 and 1720. The


² This statement is based upon our research on spontaneous migration movements in eighteenth century Hungary (work in progress).

³ Bezerédy, 1979; Vadász, 1976.

⁴ Based on Horváth, 1976; Jenei, 1976; Szakály, 1991; Sršan, 1991; Tobler, 1984; Vadász, 1976.

reason for this is relatively simple. It is related to the fact that after the Turkish Wars a fight started between the counties of former Royal Hungary (the western and northern border territories) and the municipalities of the regained lands a propos the redistribution of the state tax burden. Because of the controversial interests involved in the taxation process, the counties controlled each other relatively well in misreporting their taxpaying capacity. For this reason, the regional changes in scheduled taxes more or less produced an acceptable map regarding the growing taxpaying capacity – i.e the growing numbers of the taxable population – of the southern territories which was probably also in appropriate correlation with the resettling movement in Hungary.

Map 1. Investigated cities and counties




Looking at Map 2 we can see that the growth of the taxpaying capacity – that is the resettling movement – before 1723 was concentrated mainly on the south-eastern part of the Great Plain.⁵ During this period, the south transdanubian counties neighbouring Croatia and Slavonia did not extensively participate in this population movement and the Banat was omitted because it was still under Turkish rule until 1718.


It is interesting that Map 3 which presents the progress of the resettling movement between 1723–1780 reveals a slightly different picture. Here the riverside area (the counties on both sides of the Danube from Baranya to Pest

⁵ This year is famous about the act of the National Assembly which stimulated with temporary tax exemption the immigration of inhabitants from the Holy Roman Empire.

Map 2. Index of change in taxable units by county in Hungary between 1700 and 1723



Map 3. Index of change in taxable units by county in Hungary between 1723 and 1780



county) is joined to the newly populated regions and within the migration process the role of the Bács/Bačka is increasing.⁶

Another type of source which gives relatively comprehensive information about contemporary migration are the county name lists of fugitive serf peasants,⁷ In the course of the above mentioned dispute over tax-redistribution, a lot of municipalities prepared lists of their fugitive taxpayers using them as arguments trying to reduce the payable sum of tax levied by the central government. These lists often gave some details not only about the number of fugitives but also on their social status, family size, year of move, place of origin and arrival, so they provided a good insight into the motives, the size and the geographical direction of the spontaneous migration movements.

Looking at the numerical results of our collected data on fugitives, the detailed figures do not completely fit expectations. According to Table 1, the majority of the spontaneous migrants moved first of all to their neighborhood, usually within 40–60 kilometer radius from their birthplace (residence). The figures suggest that most of the migrating peasants never went to the devastated territories. Nevertheless, according to our data concerning the counties neighbouring the Great Hungarian Plain and of the western borders (Pozsony/Pressburg and Vas/Eisenburg counties) there also existed a moderately large, long-term movement toward the south-east.⁸

Table 1. The main directions of spontaneous migration according to the county reports

County	Year of report	Neighbouring county	Former Turkish territory	Other regions	Unknown	Total	N
Abaúj	1722	91,1	5,1	1,6	2,2	100,0	1186
Bars	1729	74,9		25,1		100,0	315
Békés	1725	56,9	15,9	1,1	26,1	100,0	364
Borsod	1738	58,7	31,5	3,6	6,2	100,0	501
Gömör	1720	69,5	14,7	11,7	4,1	100,0	632
Kraszna	1724	90,4	1,9	6,6	1,1	100,0	900
Máramaros	1724	64,1	2,9	29,8	3,2	100,0	1540
Nógrád	1723 ^{a)}	(52,0)	(28,0)	(8,0)	12,0	100,0	1075
Pozsony	1734 ^{b)}	47,2	39,3	7,4	6,1	100,0	229
Szabolcs	1735	86,6	11,0	2,4	–	100,0	1055
Vas	1735 ^{b)}	49,1	28,3	4,5	18,1	100,0	1530

^{a)} Estimated regional distribution.

^{b)} Uncomplete data.

Source: calculations of the author


⁶ Although during this period the Banat was already under Habsburg administration, and certainly participated in the settling movement, we could not illustrate that. The Hungarian state tax conscriptions were not covered this region until 1780.

⁷ During the investigated time period the, so called, hereditary serfs (at least two third of the landed peasantry) had no freedom in move. Every permanent emigration of them was bounded to the permission of their landlord and the creation of a substitute person who will pay further the state taxes after the house and the plot for the county administration.

⁸ Unfortunately we could not find such lists covering the counties of Southern Hungary until now. Maybe this type of lists (the conscriptions of fugitives) were made first of all by the resource counties, who lost their taxpayers, and not the host municipalities who gained.

Due to the slow pace of southward movement, even after a hundred years of immigration a relatively significant difference was preserved in the distribution of population between the former Habsburg and Turkish territories (Map 4). The county level population density figures of the first census of 1785–1787 clearly reveal this phenomenon: a more densely populated west and north (the former Royal Hungary) and a relatively less populated south and east.⁹ This inequality in population density was to disappear more or less by the mid-nineteenth century, although in some places it survived even until World War I.

Map 4. The population density of Hungary in 1787



If we check more thoroughly the available migration figures concerning border counties, then we can see that these movements were not only of short range but also bidirectional. There were not only waves of immigration but equally emigration (Table 2.). Nevertheless, the emigration was characteristically different from its late nineteenth century counterpart: the direction of these movements was much more strongly hampered toward the east and south (mainly Transylvania, Croatia and Galicia) than to the west, to the Austrian provinces.

⁹ Thirring, 1938.

Table 2. Peasant emigration of border counties by political-administrative units in the early eighteenth centuries

Host territory	Resource county			
	Pozsony	Vas	Kraszna	Máramaros
	in percentage			
Hungary	90,8	54,1	88,1	52,7
neighbouring counties	47,2	49,1	80,0	43,9
further territories	43,6 ^{a)}	5,0	8,1	8,8
Foreign territories	3,1	27,8	10,8	44,1
Austrian lands	–	2,0	–	–
Croatia	–	25,8	–	–
Transylvania	–	–	10,8	23,9
Poland	–	–	–	18,6
Other	3,1 ^{b)}	–	–	1,6 ^{c)}
Unknown	6,1	18,1	1,1	3,2
Total	103,1	100,0	100,0	100,0
N	229	1530	900	1540

^{a)} More than three quarters of them moved to the Uplands, the rest to the Great Plain.

^{b)} Not specified.

^{c)} Moldavia.

Source: See Table 1.

4. THE MIGRATION AND THE MIGRANTS IN THE LIGHT OF FIGURES

The spontaneous migrants were widely dispersed by origin. According to the county reports (which usually summed up a five to ten year migration history) few villages existed where the number of movers exceeded 10 people (Table 3) which means that their disappearance did not really influence the local population development of the resource territories. (The latter was the major argument of both the contemporary municipalities and some present day historians.)

Table 3. Proportion of emigrants by settlement in the resource counties

County	Year of report	Number of emigrants by settlement (person)				Number of all settlements	Settlements with registered emigrants (%)	Number of all emigrants	Average number of emigrants by settlement
		0	1–4	5–9	10–X				
Abaúj	1722	54	85	51	30	220	75	1186	7,1
Bars	1729	136	200 ^{a)}	32	315	4,9
Békés	1725	–	–	2	11	13	100	364	28,0
Borsod	1738	101	11	23	14	150	33	501	10,4
Borsod	1764	30	44	35	47	156	81	1278 ^{b)}	10,1
Gömör	1720	83	100	31	15	229	64	632	4,3
Nógrád	1723	69	75	53	51	248	72	1075	4,9

^{a)} 64 villages reported emigrants but the exact numbers are not published.

^{b)} Together with those who became soldiers, related to the period 1751–1764.

Source: See Table 1.

The migration was not performed in only one single move from one place to another (Table 4). The migrants often tried to settle down more than once until their efforts finally became successful. At the end of the seventeenth and during the first decades of eighteenth century, there was a relatively large constantly moving unstable mass of population wandering in and around southern Hungary.

Table 4. Migration history of persons moved from the Banat to county Bács/Bačka (1734)

The migration history	The distribution by number of moves					Total	Total number of moves	Average number of moves per person
	1	2	3	4	5 or more			
	per person							
Known	3	10	14	8	10	45 ^{b)}	156	3,5
Uncertain ^{a)}	11	2	3	–	–	16	24	1,5
Unknown	18
Total	(14)	(12)	(17)	(8)	(10)	79

^{a)} Uncomplete migration history.

^{b)} 24 persons moved first time in their childhood.

Source: Calculations after a conscription, deposited in National Archive, A23, No. 175/1734.

There were several causes behind these migration movements. Of course the main motive was the available free land and the temporary tax exemption (usually three years, but if the migrant moved further he could have an additional three). Another important cause was the already mentioned problem of unsuccessful social, cultural and economic adaptation or, better to say, of the attempts of Serbian and Croat settlers to avoid it. Last but not least political violence, the long-term recurrent warfare was a further and still often overlooked factor behind the migration and instability. Before the different waves of Serbian and Croat immigrants there was usually a Turkish campaign and a lost war from the late fifteenth century onward. At the same time, a significant proportion of Serbians settled down in Hungary as auxiliaries of the Turkish army (*martalots*) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹⁰

The situation had not improved much at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During the Rákóczi uprising, first the Hungarian Kurutz army expelled the Serbian settlers as pro-Austrians, an accusation part true, since a part of them – but not all – were again auxiliaries, now on the Austrian side. In return for this, one or two years later Serbian border guards burnt down several dozens of Hungarian villages and killed and expelled thousands of people (also some hundred newly arrived German settlers) as enemies on account of their different culture and denomination.¹¹ If we check the years and events mentioned in the personal migration histories of the Banat peasants (Table 4), than it turns out that around half of their move was connected either to the Rákóczi uprising or to the following Turkish War which ended with the liberation of the Banat in 1716–1718.

¹⁰ Hegyi, 1997.

¹¹ Kollareck, 1973; Szita, 1974.

It is probable that the majority of the migrants moved together with their families, but little data is available about their demographic and family characteristics. We have detailed lists of immigrants containing their demographic data only in the case of organized settling actions which were much more important for the period following the 1720s. Otherwise, in these lists we can find usually German immigrants – few list survived on eighteenth century Balkan and Hungarian settlers in Hungarian Archives.

Most of the migrants were not ancient inhabitants even in their resource territories. Let us witness an example. In a Baranya estate, nearly half of the migrants born in Hungary were ethnically Serbian or Croatian (Table 5/Figure 1). Probably they were the offspring of those settlers who came to Hungary in the course of the seventeenth century. The figures also show that the strongest immigration to this estate was not from Serbia but from Bosnia and Croatia. (The sources used the term “Ratziani” but their denomination was divided between Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy).


Table 5. The distribution of immigrants by place of origin and ethnicity in the Batthyany estate (Baranya county, 1701)

Ethnicity and denomination	The origin of inhabitants							Total
	indigenous	immigrants from						
	Baranya county	other Hungarian regions	Croatia	Serbia	Bosnia	Unknown region		
Hungarian ^{a)}	20	22	–	–	–	–	42	
Serbian orthodox	15	8	6	13	1	81	129	
Serbian catholic	–	–	–	–	–	5	5	
Croat ^{b)}	–	2	–	8	–	15	25	
Total	35	32	6	21	1	101	201	

^{a)} Denomination unknown, the majority is probably Calvinist.

^{b)} Probably Roman Catholics.

Fig. 1. The distribution of household heads by place of origin and ethnicity in the Batthyany estate (Baranya County, 1701)



A similar picture can be drawn regarding the Balkan immigrants living in the cities of Buda and Pest in the early years of the eighteenth century. They consisted of an important proportion of the contemporary population, especially in the case of Buda. However, their origin was rather heterogenous: in Pest one quarter of them were Roman Catholic, while in Buda the figure was about one third (Table 6). According to their family names, the largest group came from Bosnia and still there were also names which witnessed Croat, Greek, Macedonian, Bulgarian and Armenian origin.¹²

Table 6. Ethnic structure of taxpaying inhabitants^{a)} in the twin city of Pest-Buda at the turn of seventeenth-eighteenth century

	Buda 1714	Pest 1696
	percent	
German	52	32
Rascian	40	13
Hungarian	5	38
Other	3	17 ^{b)}
Total	100	100
Estimated proportion of Roman Catholics between "Rasciani":		
	Buda	one-third
	Pest	one-quarter

^{a)} The structure of the non taxpayers is unknown – probably they are dominantly non-Germans.

^{b)} Slovaks, Czechs, Spaniards, Italians etc.

Source: Nagy 1975: 150–152.

In the case of the city of Pécs, nearly half of the population was of Balkan origin in 1698¹³ and more than one third of them settled here before 1688, i.e. before the period when the great war of reoccupation reached the region. The structure of the Balkan population of the city by ethnocultural groups was Croats 35%, Bosnians 26%, Serbians 24% but Dalmatians, Turks, Greeks were also scattered amongst them.

If we inquiring as to the impact of the migration of Balkan peoples during the sixteenth and seventeenth century on the population and ethnic structure of Hungary, then the first comprehensive picture can be drawn only after the Rákóczi uprising. Previously, we have only scattered information indicating an approximate 40–50% preponderance of Southern Slav population even in the middle of Hungary (Fejér and Tolna counties) but this data is not reliable enough. It was compiled under difficult conditions when the regions were really underpopulated and the population was rather unstable.¹⁴

¹² Nagy, 1959, 70; Maybe that it was partly an older heritage – in the city of Buda about 15 percentage point of the taxpaying non-Muslim population was Greek Orthodox (Fekete – Nagy, 1975, 385) in the mid sixteenth century. A hundred years later, in the 1660ies according to the observations of Evlia Cselebi the majority of non-Muslim Buda population was already of Bosnian origin (Evlia, 1985, 287–288).

¹³ Móró, 1995, 28.

¹⁴ Dávid, 1982; Jenei, 1976; Vadász, 1976.

According to the royal tax conscriptions of 1715 and 1720 (Table 7), we can see that in the Southern Transdanubian counties 18–26 percent of taxable population belonged to the different Southern Slav ethnic groups, while this proportion in Bács/Bačka county reached 95 percent. (The Western part of the Banat – the later Temes and Torontál counties – probably was between the above two values.) The newly formed cities of Bács/Bačka county (Szabadka/Subotica, Újvidék/Novi Sad, Zombor/Sombor) were comprised nearly entirely of Southern Slav population. Besides the important Balkan minorities of Buda and Pécs already mentioned, smaller groups of Serbs, Croats and Bosnians inhabited the cities of Pest, Székesfehérvár, Szeged and several southern market towns (Szentendre, Kaposvár, Nagykanizsa, Mohács, Baja, Gyula).¹⁵

Table 7. Changes in the proportion of Croat and Serbian population with respect to allegiance to the Greek Orthodox church in southern Hungary between 1720 and 1890

Counties	Croats and Serbs		Serbs	Proportion of Greek Orthodox	
	1720	1890		1782	1890
Zala	19,3	19,7	–	0,0	0,0
Somogy	17,6	3,3	–	0,3	0,0
Baranya	26,2	6,9	5,6	8,5	4,6
Bács	95,0	0,1	23,7	36,4	18,9
Temes	...	–	14,4	86,0	53,4
Torontál	...	0,8	31,1	75,1	46,1
Krassó	...	1,2	3,0	94,6	75,1
Royal free cities					
Buda	37,6	0,2	0,4	6,1	0,5
Pest	9,0			4,0	
Székesfehérvár	8,5	–	0,1	1,9	0,5
Pécs	39,7	1,2	0,1	–	0,2
Szeged	4,7	–	0,4	4,8	0,7
Szabadka	100,0	–	43,8	9,4	3,4
Újvidék	85,7	1,3	37,6	52,1	36,0
Zombor	100,0	0,1	65,8	64,6	42,6
Temesvár	...	0,1	3,9	...	12,2

Sources: Acsády 1896: 46x 197

Darkó 1987:160–161

Darkó 1989: 207

Dányi 1993: 186–187, 267–269

Census 1900: 22x–23x, 28x–29x.

¹⁵ The data and proportion was calculated after Ignac Acsády's source publication (1896). The author and his colleagues separated the different ethnic groups according to their family names. Usually this is not a very reliable method, especially not reliable for single families and for those groups who settled down several generations ago. But in the case of Southern Slavs (and also in the case of Germans) their names were very different from Hungarian ones and the settlers bearing those names were mostly newcomers so we believe the basic proportions to be acceptable in their case.

Unfortunately, at the moment we have no detailed statistics about the distribution and proportion of the different ethnic groups within the umbrella term "Southern Slav". If we try to establish very carefully the chain of events in backward order from the later results then we can suppose that in Zala and Somogy county the overwhelming majority of the Southern Slav population was Croat while in Baranya there was a great mixture of Croats, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic Serbs (sokac). The Southern Slav population of Bács/Bačka county was dominantly Serbian but a minor part of them followed the Roman Catholic faith while the Banat Serbs nearly exclusively belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church (Table 7). The Serbian population of the city of Zombor/Sombor was also a mixture of Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox, while Újvidék/Novi Sad was dominantly Greek Orthodox, and Szabadka/Subotica was Roman Catholic Serbian.

5. THE OUTLOOK: THE RESULTS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IMMIGRATION MOVEMENTS

If we turn back to the historiographical commonplaces mentioned in our introduction, then we have to revise most of them. The first one about the role of the foreign immigrants looks true with a complementary remark: an important part of the resettling process was based on spontaneous migrations.¹⁶ However, the role of the German and Austrian settlers is currently thought to be less than historians considered it previously.

Coming to the question of Balkan immigration, we have to reformulate its main thrust. First a significant part of the Balkan population groups settled in the Hungarian Kingdom already much before the eighteenth century. As a consequence of the first Turkish campaigns in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, the former ethnic Hungarian population of Szerém/Srijem perished or moved to the other side of the Dráva. During the "fifteen years war" (1592–1606) the medieval settlement structure of Hungary collapsed entirely. From the early seventeenth century on, an important Croat and Serbian settler population emerged in the form of a triangle with its points marked by southern Transdanubia – city of Pest-Buda – the Banat. According to latest estimations, the size of the immigrant Southern Slav people was about 300,000, which was about one third of the population living in the region occupied by the Turks.¹⁷

Only the second large wave (consisting mostly of Serbians) could be observed at the end of the century following the expulsion of the Turkish administration from Hungary. Nevertheless, the size of this wave was much less than research thought it previously. Aršenije III. Čarnojević arrived here not together with 30,000 families but persons and only a minority of them settled in the internal parts of Hungary, the majority stayed in the south, near to the borders and became at an early date professional border guards.¹⁸

¹⁶ Faragó, 1998.

¹⁷ Dávid, 1997, 169.

¹⁸ Kačanski, 1997; Koroknai, 1974; Nagy, 1959.

During the Rákóczi uprising (1704–1711), the majority of Serbian settlers living in Southern Hungary were expelled or ran away. Although following the fights the fugitives partly returned, or were partly replaced by new settlers, the proportion of Serbians in Southern Hungary never again reached the dimension which had been characteristic of the seventeenth century settlement structure. The more intensive internal migration of Hungarians as well as the organized settlement of German peasants from the 1720s on blocked the range of Serbian settlers and pushed back them toward the south. In the middle of the century, the majority of the Serbian population concentrated on the Military Border, not in Hungary.

The Croatian migrants had a much more stable migration history. Their immigration was much more organized, slower and they were better accustomed to the Hungarian county administration as well as to their neighbours. We can not find such oscillations in the history of the Croatian settlements in the counties of western and southern Hungary as we find in the case of Serbian migrants.

Looking at the migration between the Hungarian Kingdom, Croatia and the Balkan as a whole we can see two borderlines. One was an invisible geographic border between the Serbian and Croatian immigration into Hungary: the latter was predominant in Transdanubia, while the Serbians settled in the Banat, Bačka and along the Danube. These two populations were only substantially intermingled in Baranya county. The other borderline is chronological. The Balkan participation in the resettling movements of Southern Hungary was predominant before 1700 and began to decline definitively from the 1720s. The Serbians of mid-Hungary moved down to the Bačka and to the Banat or to the Military Border during the first decades of the eighteenth century. During the course of that century the Croatian population of Transdanubia was also diminished except for the county of Baranya and the western border region (present day Burgenland). The small, singular, fragmented groups of both ethnocultural groups became assimilated by the end of the nineteenth century. (Some of them, especially Roman Catholics, already changed their identity much earlier, even during the eighteenth century.)

The Serbian settlers of Hungary were pushed out mostly by German immigrants pouring into the territory from the 1720s. The latter were better organized – a substantial part of them arrived within the frame of organized settlement actions – and they were more willing to accept the rules of the state and county administration just so as to pay their taxes regularly. So we can say that in the course of eighteenth century Balkan immigration finished partly with failure – primarily, the settlement of Serbians in Hungary on a greater scale became unsuccessful. The later events of population history prove the fact that the central Balkan regions stayed a closed world at least toward Hungary. The realities illustrate this statement well enough:

a/ The Serbians played a smaller role in the cities than the settlers arriving from lands farther afield (the German states, Austrian lands). Although the latter were less aware of local circumstances and Hungarian customs, they knew much more about the urban way of life;

b/ The area covered by the Serbian settlements, which reached the heart of the country and the city of Pest-Buda at the end of the seventeenth century,

shrank some decades later to the southern border territories of the Hungarian Kingdom (Table 7.);

c/ The migration between the mostly Serbian settled Military Border region and Hungary stayed at a very very low level until the abolition of the border system over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The same is true for the Hungarian contacts with Bosnia and Serbia until the First World War.

In our view, this situation was the consequence of the distance between common customs, culture, religion, family patterns, ways of life as well as the difference in farming, animal husbandry and industrial activities of the Greek Orthodox Balkan population and the other old and new inhabitants of the Carpathian Basin.

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CARTOGRAPHIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE TRIPLEX CONFINIUM AND STATE POWER INTERESTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 18th CENTURY

ABSTRACT

On the basis of an analysis of available cartographic records in Zagreb originating from the period 1700–1750, the paper present perceptions of the Triplex Confinium in different Habsburg, Venetian and Ottoman cartographic traditions and the question of interdependencies between cartographic presentations in particular traditions and the dominant interests of particular state authorities in the Triplex Confinium region. Attention is also paid to contributors of Croatian origins in the mapping of the Triplex Confinium, when comparing to those three imperial traditions.

INTRODUCTION

In the history of mapping the Croatian territory, notably the Triplex Confinium area, the very beginning of the 18th century constitutes a real turning point. The development of cartography and the progress of cartographic knowledge of Croatian lands are directly connected with military operations, more precisely with the Ottoman retreat and the peace treaty of Sremski Karlovci in 1699. This is the period when cartography developed into the so-called “military cartography” practised in military institutions. Professional military engineers were the creators of new maps. Because of the secrecy surrounding war operations many of those maps are little more than drawings.¹ But this is also the beginning of the creation of the first topographic sketches and genuine topographic maps of Croatian territory. After a long period of descriptive cartography based on travel accounts and compilations, the beginning of the 18th century marked the beginning of a more sophisticated mapping based on measurements in situ, field measurements, and of the use of available measuring instruments, if still combined with compilations. According to Sančević² this period from 1700

¹ Ankica Pandžić. *Pet stoljeća zemljopisnih karata Hrvatske*. Zagreb, 1988, 16.

² Zdravko Sančević. “Povijesne granice Hrvatske i Bosne prema kartografima od 16. do 18. stoljeća.” in *Hrvatska revija*. Vol. 1/2. Zagreb, 1991, 17–46.

–1850 is called “pregeodesian” period. The development of geodesic techniques and the increasing use of maps for state and military purposes led to a real revival of cartography. Maps begun to be produced according to the requirements of the clients, and most of them were made on the basis of military topographic maps.³

A considerable progress in the knowledge of Croatian countries, especially those along the new border and the triple frontier area itself, took place after 1699 on the occasion of the peace treaty of Sremski Karlovci. After the peace treaty, a delimitation commission was appointed in order to establish the new boundaries and the first detailed maps of this region were made.

On the Austrian side, the commission was led by Count Fernando Luigi Marsigli. His team consisted of a number of military engineers and cartographers. This great task and project of mapping the border, which had never been surveyed before, was assigned to Johann Christoph Müller, the young and best royal military engineer of the time. Müller made many topographic sketches along the rivers Sava and Una up to the Triplex Confinium. These sketches were the foundation of the first topographic map of Croatian territory in 24 sections, on a 1 : 34 700 approximate scale.⁴ An active member of Marsigli's commission, working together with Müller was Pavao Ritter Vitezović. He joined the Commission as the representative of the Parliament with the aim of representing Croatian interests. He made by himself several topographic maps and sketches of the wider triple frontier area that have remained in a manuscript form.

The demarcation of the new Ottoman – Venetian border after the peace treaties of 1699 and 1718 was carried out by Venetian representatives Francesco Grimani and Alviso Mocenigo.⁵ Mapping was assigned to the team of Venetian cartographers led by military engineer Giusto Emilio Alberghetti. Alberghetti's maps represent a turning point in Venetian cartography as well as in the cartographic knowledge of the Dalmatian hinterland. In comparison to earlier cartographic works, based on written documents and accounts, his maps were mainly based on field surveys that were enabled by the new circumstances. But, although they represent a great advancement when compared to Müller's or even to Austrian maps generally, they are far less detailed. Still, they were repeatedly used as a basis and copied for numerous various purposes.

The cartographic presentation of the Ottoman side of the Triplex Confinium at the beginning of the 18th century remained in the hands of Austrian cartographers. They made the first steps towards the execution of a complete state topographical map founded on surveys throughout the Empire.⁶ The Ottoman geographic as well as the cartographic knowledge of its lands was reduced to the translations and compilations of western European geographic works mainly from 17th century. One of the most significant compilations written dur-

³ Mirko Marković. *Descriptio Croatiae*. Zagreb, 1993.

⁴ Zoltán Fallenbüchl. “Zur Geschichte der Ungarnkarte J. Ch. Müllers (1709).” in *Különlenyomat, A Magyar Könyvszemle*. Vol. 1969/2. Számából, 1969, 141–147.

⁵ The borderlines resulted from those peace treaties (S. Karlovci, 1699; Požarevac, 1718) are called “Linea Grimani” and “Linea Mocenigo.”

⁶ Marković, 1993.

ing this century was that composed by Bartinli Ibrahim Hamdi. This work, completed in 1750, was called an "Atlas."⁷ It should be pointed out that an Atlas, in the Ottoman terminology of the time, signified a general work of geography. Thus, it is a synonym for the word geography, and not, as usually, for the collection of maps. The most valuable aspect of Ottoman geography at the beginning of 18th century lies in the field of the historical geography of Rumelia,⁸ both human and physical, and not in cartography. So, Austrian military authorities, in order to be informed as completely as possible, kept secretly gathering relevant topographic material from the Ottoman side of the border. The activities took place mostly in the regions of western Bosnia, and consequently most of the information dealt with the region then called "Turkish Croatia", while much less data existed concerning the eastern regions towards the Dalmatian coast.⁹

CARTOGRAPHIC SOURCES

Generally, the beginning of the 18th century was a very fruitful period concerning map production, notably on the Austrian side. There exist a huge number of dominantly military maps, topographic sketches, drafts and drawings made by Austrian officers. Accordingly, those cartographic sources are mainly kept outside Croatia in Austrian institutions, precisely in the War Archives in Vienna and some of them in the National Library in Vienna. Still, the greater part of the Venetian maps of demarcation are kept in the cartographic collection of the State Archives in Venice.

The present cartographic analysis is based on cartographic originals in Zagreb, Croatia.¹⁰ It includes map collections from the cartographic collections of the Croatian State Archives, the National University Library and the Museum of Croatian History.

Maps dating from 1700–1750, representing the Triplex Confinium area in various senses and scales, are not numerous at all among Zagreb's cartographic holdings. Anyway, the choice of eight maps, two Austrian, two Venetian and four maps by the Croatian representative¹¹ in the Austrian delimitation commission from 1699, could be considered as a rather good sample for analysing the perceptions of the triple frontier from different, imperial as well as cartographic, traditions. In addition, such a choice of Coronelli's, Alberghetti's, Müller's, Weigl's and Vitezović's¹² maps enable an insight into the different approaches to

⁷ Cengiz Orhonlu. "Geographical Knowledge Amongst the Ottomans and the Balkans in the Eighteen Century According to Bartinli Ibrahim Hamdi's Atlas." in Carter, W. Carter (ed.). *An Historical Geography of the Balkans*. London, 1977, 271–292.

⁸ The Ottoman Turks used the term Rumelia for the Balkan Peninsula. They took it from the Byzantine "Romei" (lands of Eastern Roman Empire). Orhonlu, 1977, 281.

⁹ Marković, 1993.

¹⁰ Out of Zagreb institutions, a number of maps representing the area of Triplex Confinium is kept in the Cartographic collection of State Archives in Zadar, and in the National Library in Split.

¹¹ Pavao Ritter Vitezović.

¹² The sources will be cited together with their corresponding numbers from the list of sources at the end of the text.

cartographic representations even within the framework of a single, overarching tradition. The maps equally reveal a turning point in cartography which took place at the turn of the century.

LEVELS OF PERCEPTIONS AND INTERESTS

By analyzing the available cartographic sources which represent the Triplex Confinium area from 1700–1750, it is possible to define two levels of perceptions. The first one is related to the specific relation of the state authorities to the triple frontier region, their particular interests and understanding of its importance. The other one reveals spontaneous perceptions of the area that are perhaps the most common at the time.

The perceptions that are imprinted on the maps are of different age and state of their development. Some of them could be traced back to the 16th century, while others are rather new. Anyway, the fact is that they all vanished by the end of 18th century or with a certain delay, by the beginning of 19th century. Born in the distinct and complex border circumstances of the 16th–18th century, they disappear from the maps with the change of circumstances that created them.¹³

At the first level of perception, the maps are regarded as a source that reveal individual state power interests in the entire triple frontier region as well as in their own territory as opposed to the others. The maps do not only reflect the real condition, but also the inclination of the system hiding behind them, even the personal views of certain cartographers.¹⁴ From this point of view and on the basis of our available sources, it is possible to put into relation two rather different approaches within the Venetian tradition, specifically Austrian cartographic interest in the frontier region as a reflection of state power interests and, on the third count, the personal approach of the Croatian cartographer P. Ritter Vitezović.


CARTOGRAPHY AND STATE POWER INTERESTS IN THE TRIPLEX CONFINIUM

Venetian cartographic policy was primarily subordinated to the republic's political and administrative purposes. So, generally, the Venetian maps have more information about political or administrative divisions and contain much less of a geographical inventory. The choice of Coronelli's great map of Dalmatia from 1700 (1), and supplemented Alberghetti's map of Dalmatia from 1732 (2), enables us to distinguish two different stages for approaching the Venetian territory as part of the triple frontier region.

¹³ Borna Fürst-Bjeliš. "Toponimija i percepcija u prostoru Triplex Confiniuma." Conference report presented at the scientific colloquium *Cartographic Sources for the History of the Triplex Confinium* in Zagreb on October 29, 1999. In print.

¹⁴ Mirela Slukan. *Kartografski izvori za povijest Triplex Confiniuma*. Zagreb, 1999, 16.

Vincenzo Maria Coronelli, Jean Baptiste Nolin: Le ROYAUME DE /DALMACIE/ Divisé en ses COMTEZ, TERRITOIRES et c(etera) La MORLAQUIE, et la BOSNIE. 1 : 1 250 000. – 1700. – Copperplate, coloured; 58,7 × 44 cm. PMH/KZ, 3802.



Enjoying the exceptional support of the Venetian Senate, the official Venetian cartographer Vincenzo Maria Coronelli was the most prominent figure in promoting Venetian politics regarding the territorial pretensions on his maps. His maps were an important instrument for emphasising the Venetian conquest over the Ottomans. Coronelli regularly depicted conditions prior to the Ottoman conquest and did not acknowledge their possessions in Dalmatia.¹⁵ This can be clearly seen on his great map of Dalmatia (1) from the very beginning of the 18th century (presumably around 1700)¹⁶ This is a general regional map on a rather small scale. The map charts Venetian Dalmatia, the territory of the Republic of Dubrovnik, parts of Croatia and Bosnia and surrounding lands. The whole inland area between the river Sava and the Adriatic is compressed along its north-south axis. Even the Adriatic coast is incorrect and deformed. But, on the other hand, the territory of Venetian Dalmatia is unproportionally vast, especially concerning its inland part. The northern Dalmatian border depicted on this map does not correspond to the frontier between the Venetian and Ottoman territories. It goes too far to the north, even incorporating the whole territory of the Hercegovina region into Venetian Dalmatia. This map is still based on compilations, and not on a land-based survey. In spite of all the various errors and deformations, it provides good evidence of not only Venetian knowledge about its lands in Dalmatia, but maybe more a testimony to the expression of state power interests and an approach to the frontier areas.

A new stage in presenting Venice's frontier regions is marked by Emilio Giusto Alberghetti. As a member of the demarcation commission, he led the team of military cartographers in order to make a map of demarcation of the newly established border after the peace treaty of Sremski Karlovci, signed between the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire in the year 1700.¹⁷ Those maps were based mainly on the field survey. The beginning of the 18th century was a time of relatively numerous changes of border,¹⁸ and consequently a time of intensive cartographic work. Demarcation maps from that time present the very first topographic presentation of the Dalmatian hinterland. Alberghetti's supplemented map of Dalmatia from 1732 (2) presents three borderlines; the old one from 1671 (Linea Nani), the one from 1700 (Linea Grimani) and the newest one from 1720 and 1721 (Linea Mocenigo). The map contains the administrative division of the territory that most Venetian maps have. The topography is very detailed and rather correct except orography and communications, that might be, perhaps, surprising. There is an obvious lack of interest in the islands. Their presentation contains only some of the coastal settlements. Beyond the border, there is no presentation whatsoever, except for some very general textual notions of what may be found: "Parte della Licca", "Parte della Bossina", "Erceguina".

¹⁵ Ibid, 19.

¹⁶ Pandžić, 1988, 89.

¹⁷ Ešref Kovačević. *Granice bosanskog pašaluka prema Austriji i Mletačkoj republici po odredbama Karlovačkog mira*. Sarajevo, 1973, 63.

¹⁸ 1699 (1700) (Peace Treaty of S. Karlovci), 1718 (1720, 1721) (Peace Treaty of Požarevac), 1729 (corrections of the border at the mouth of the river Neretva).

In spite of significant differences in technical sense as well as of some differences in the cartographic policy, there are some constant elements that unify and characterise the Venetian cartography of the Triplex Confinium. These are the primary interest in the political and administrative units and divisions of the territory and the subsequent use of maps for the various purposes of the state administration. The maps were not considered an important instrument in warfare. From that point of view, the lack of data about orography and communications and the lack of information i.e. interest regarding the territory immediately over the border can be explained.

Unlike Venetian state power interest in mapping the triple frontier area, Habsburg cartography was guided completely by military and strategic interests and needs. Highly aware of the extreme importance of knowing the frontier area in the strategy of warfare, they already surveyed and mapped the territory long before the 18th century. Of course, the occasion of the peace treaty from 1699 and the need to fix the new border between Habsburg Monarchy and Ottoman Empire was the direct cause of the first topographical survey and the appearance of the first genuine topographical maps of the territory along the border.

The central interest in the new border is shown on Christoph Weigl's map of the Imperial – Turkish Border after the peace treaty (3), made presumably around 1702.¹⁹ The only theme of the map is the border, which is the only coloured element of the map as well. There is not much content outside the borderline except a rich inventory of military fortifications. The interest in the military aspect of cartography particularly on such thematic maps is obvious.

Johann Christoph Müller, the official royal military engineer, worked on the great project of surveying and mapping the border area according to the peace treaty of Sremski Karlovci in the years of 1699 and 1700. This map represents a real technical achievement of the time. Shortly after that, a great new project of mapping Hungary with surrounding lands was assigned to Müller once again. Working on the map of Hungary (4), dated 1709, Müller used all the material, knowledge, skills and techniques acquired in his work in the delimitation commission. The map was made on four copper plates, employing varying scales from 1 : 500 000 to 1 : 890 000²⁰ in its different parts. The whole map contains 4,456 names,²¹ and generally shows a considerable richness of cartographic content and an extensive inventory. It is, of course, understandable that just the territory along the new border was the most accurate part of the map.²² Austrian state power interest and the awareness of the outstanding strategic importance of the frontier region were thus the reasons that the Triplex Confinium area was one of the best known parts of Croatia evidenced on maps produced at that time.

Unsatisfied with the newly established borders accorded by the peace treaty of Sremski Karlovci, the Croatian representative and cartographer Pavao Ritter Vitezović tried to present to the Austrian court his view of the “real historical”


¹⁹ Pandžić, 1988, 99.

²⁰ Fallenbüchl, 1969, 146.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Although one of the best achievements on this map as well as one of its main values is the correction of the Danube flow from Vienna to Belgrade, with respect to that presented on the maps from Mercator. This error was until then constantly repeated by compilations. Fallenbüchl, 1969.

Johann Christoph Müller: augustissimo romanor(um) imperatori /iosepho i/ hungariae regi invictissimo/ mappam hanc/ regni hungariae/ propittis elementis fertilissimi/cum adiacentibus regnis et provinciis/nova et accuratori forma ex optimis schedis collectam/ d(at) d(onat) d(edicat)/ eiusdem s(acrae) maiestatis camera regia hungarica.
**1 : 500 000 – 1 : 890 000. – 1709. – Copperplate, coloured;
 160 × 118 cm. NSK/KZ S-U-XVIII-14.**



borders and territory of Croatia.²³ Apart from the number of topographical maps and sketches of the triple frontier area made in 1699 during his work in the delimitation commission he made a map of the Croatian territory that has no direct connection with the Triplex Confinium itself. On his map of the kingdom of Croatia (7) from 1699, he depicted the entire kingdom of Croatia in its ancient, historical limits as confirmed by the Hungarian king Ludovic from the 16th century. Along with the 1699 demarcation, he drew in the former borders. The eastern border follows the line of the Vrbas river, and the Cetina river marks its southern border. The map is followed by a written document named "Croatia Rediviva" and dated 1700. It represents an attempt by the author to establish the fact that the historical borders of Croatia were considerably larger than those established in his own time. Beside the far-reaching consequences of the future annexation of Dalmatia to Croatia, Vitezović in fact formulated with this work a political programme that would have an important influence on the members of Illyrian Movement.²⁴

CARTOGRAPHIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE TRIPLEX CONFINIUM

At the second level of perception, maps reveal the most common spontaneous perceptions of the area of Triplex Confinium. Unlike cartographic expressions of different state power interests, spontaneous perceptions are found to be common to all imperial, as well as cartographic traditions.

There are three expressive perceptions of the Triplex Confinium area that are printed on maps mainly through toponyms, or through some specific descriptions. The first one presents the area as the land of the Morlacchi, while the second one is related to its depopulation and state of devastation. It is, furthermore, possible to establish a specific relation between the two. The third one refers to the border territory between two borderlines, the old one prior to Ottoman conquest and the new one from 1699, still considered (Turkish) Croatia.

The toponyms Morlacha or Morlacchia²⁵ appear on the maps as oronyms, denoting the mountain Velebit, as well as horonyms, denoting the frontier region. Toponymy and perception of space are very closely related. Those toponyms come from the term Morlacchi, the Venetian name for the Vlach population. They can be found on such maps from as early as the 16th century. Cartographic analysis shows that this term, although originating in the Venetian tradition, spread and became a common name not just for the population group, but also for the area along and across the Venetian border in the triple frontier region. Thus, the term has got a spatial notion and corresponding form.

On his map of Dalmatia (1), Vincenzo Maria Coronelli used the form "La Morlaquie". He also named the Velebit channel "Canal de Morlaquie". Further-

²³ Mirko Marković. "Prilog poznavanju djela objavljenih u zagrebačkoj tiskari Pavla Rittera Vitezovića." in *Starine*. Vol. 60. Zagreb, 1987, 71–99.

²⁴ Zrinka Perković. "Croatia Rediviva Pavla Rittera Vitezovića." in *Senjski zbornik*. Vol. 22. Senj, 1995, 225–236.

²⁵ With a number of some other corresponding forms: Morlacca, Murlacha, Morlakia.

more, the expression “Morlacca detta Podgorie” could be found on supplemented Alberghetti’s map of Dalmatia (2) for the area of the southern Velebit. Coronelli, on his map, presented the region. As there is not any presentation of relief, the toponym certainly does not correspond to the mountain. One more reason for the presumption that La Morlaque is used as a horonym is the title of the map.²⁶ This is the map of several regions of different, but rather high range: Dalmatia, Morlacchia and Bosnia.

Although in Croatian as well as in the German language there exists the term Vlach for such a population group, the toponym with the Venetian base is not unknown to Croatian cartography at all. Pavao Ritter Vitezović used some forms of the toponym on his maps. On the topographic sketch of the Triplex Confinium (5) made in Drežnik in 1699, he used the term “Morlakischen Canal” in the description of the Austrian – Venetian border. On the map of Lika and Krbava (8) made in Rijeka in 1702, the same inscription “Canale Morlaci” can be found. As Vitezović, in the same period and on the same maps and sketches named particularly the Velebit mountain range as “Velebich mons”, it seems that he had distinguished the mountain and its name from the concept of the Morlacchian region.

His maps reveal the relation between Morlacchia and Vlachs as well. On his map of the whole kingdom of Croatia (7) he stated, by the map inscription,²⁷ that there was a Vlach population inhabiting the deserted border area along the river Kupa. He obviously made a difference between the general name of the population group (Vlachs) and the spatial concept of the Venetian part of the triple frontier (Morlaci, Morlakischen). Additionally, there was a consciousness of a clear relation between those devastated and depopulated border land and the Vlach population. In fact, he saw almost the whole area along the triple frontier as deserted and devastated. The same map bears the inscription “terra deserta” twice; in the border region along the river Kupa to the north, as well as in the area of Podgorje on the Venetian side to the south. The statement that the “depopulated land” was inhabited by a Vlach population expresses a very common perception of the Vlachs as a different and distinct population group.

Originating from the Venetian term, the derived toponymic forms became the common name for the border region for more than three hundred years in circumstances where three different imperial forces met. Although the cartographic sample does not enable the comparison, current extended investigations²⁸ clearly prove that the term was used equally by all relevant European cartographic traditions that normally do not used the term Morlacchi but Vlach as a base. This toponym and its several distinct forms has got a spatial sense and became a precise spatial concept. At the end of its development, it acquired a prevailing sense of a border region. With the disappearance of the specific border circumstances in the 18th century, the spatial concept disappeared from maps as well.

²⁶ “Le ROYAUME DE /DALMACIE/ Divisé en ses COMTEZ, TERRITOIRES et c(etera) La MORLAQUIE, et la BOSNIE”.

²⁷ “Terra deserta olim nunc a Valachis habitata”.

²⁸ Fürst – Bjeliš, 1999.

Although Croatia regained a large part of its territories by the peace treaty of Sremski Karlovci, it failed to get back some of its lands. That, specifically, was the area between the Una and Vrbas rivers (the area between the new and the old border), that the 18th century cartographers usually denoted "Turkish Croatia". This fact reveals the perception of the area as an integral part of Croatian historical territory in spite of the newly established borders.²⁹ It also reveals the consciousness of its difference. There are several relationships that are expressed here. The old and the new border as the real, historical border opposed to the new (temporary?) border; Christian Croatia opposed to Moslem Croatia. The perception, therefore, includes an awareness of religious identity and distinction as well.

In the spirit of European monarchical legalism, cartographers and map-makers of the time bestowed precedence to historical boundaries and have only attached a secondary importance to the variable and ever changing boundaries of war, based on "ius conquistae."³⁰ Some of the cartographers, along with the new boundary, drew in the old one as well. That is the case on Müller's map of Hungary (4) and of course on Vitezović's map of the whole kingdom of Croatia (7). There are cases where perception is expressed by an inscription, either a general one like Croatia, or a more specific one like Turkish Croatia, over the interfluvium between the Una and Vrbas rivers. On Weigl's map of the Habsburg-Turkish border (3) the inscription "Croatia", regardless of the actual borderline, is written across the Una river, while Vitezović additionally distinguishes, on the same map (7), Turkish Croatia ("Croatia Turcica") as the interfluvial area between the Una and Vrbas rivers. On Coronelli's map of Dalmatia (1), the whole hydrographic network is deformed and far from correct. Consequently the situation of the border area is uncertain. According to Pandžić (1993), Croatia's eastern frontier lies between the Una and Vrbas rivers. By analyzing and comparing some basic elements on the map, their relation and position, it seems more likely that the word refers to the new border on the river Una. But, he also marked a border territory of a certain width that differs in color from the rest of the Bosnia, as well as from the rest of Croatia, lying under the inscription "Croacie". That could be an indication that, despite having recorded the new borderline, he perceived this condition as temporary.

IN PLACE OF A CONCLUSION

An analysis of available cartographic originals from Zagreb representing the Triplex Confinium area at the beginning of the 18th century reveals two basic trends. The first one is related to the specific attitude of the state authorities towards the triple frontier region, their particular interests and an appreciation of its importance. The second reveals spontaneous perceptions of the area that are most common at the time.

²⁹ Sančević (1991) stated that even some of the sanjaks (Bihać, Lika, Klis) were called **Vilajet Hrvati**.

³⁰ Sančević, 1991, 25.

At the first level, it is possible to establish connections between different approaches of each imperial and cartographic tradition as well as the personal approaches of certain cartographers. Opposed to that, the second level reveals spontaneous perceptions common to all sides. As they were born in distinct border circumstances, so they disappear from the maps with the change of circumstances that created them.

SOURCES

ABBREVIATIONS

PMH/KZ	Museum of Croatian History / Cartographic Collection
HDA/KZ	Croatian State Archives / Cartographic Collection
NSK/KZ	National University Library / Cartographic Collection

1. Vincenzo Maria Coronelli, Jean Baptiste Nolin: Le ROYAUME DE /DALMACIE/ Divisé en ses COMTEZ, TERRITOIRES et c(etera) La MORLAQUIE, et la BOSNIE. 1 : 1 250 000. – 1700. – Copperplate, coloured; 58,7 × 44 cm. PMH/KZ, 3802.
2. Anonim. Alberghetti's supplemented map of Dalmatia. Descrizione Topographica della Dalmazia. ca. 1 : 200 000. – 1732. – Manuscript in colour; 140 × 53 cm. HDA/KZ, E I 90.
3. Johann Christoph Weigl: Mappa der zu Carlovitz geschlossenen und hernach durch zwei gevollmächtige/Comissarios vollzogenen Kaiserlich – Türkischen Grantz – Scheidung, in dem früh jahr 1699. angefangen und nach verfliesung 26. Monaten volendet worden. 1 : 11 300 000. – 1702. – Copperplate in colour; 290 × 365 cm. HDA/KZ A I 12; PMH/KZ 3844; NSK/KZ S-JZ-XVIII-14.
4. Johann Christoph Müller: augustissimo romanor(um) imperatori /iosepho i/ hungariae regi invictissimo/ mappam hanc/ regni hungariae/ propittis elementis fertilissimi/cum adiacentibus regnis et provinciis/nova et accuratori forma ex optimis schedis collectam/ d(at) d(onat) d(edicat)/ eiusdem s(acrae) maiestatis camera regia hungarica. 1 : 500 000 – 1 : 890 000. – 1709. – Copperplate, coloured; 160 × 118 cm. NSK/KZ S-U-XVIII-14.
5. Pavao Ritter Vitezović. MAPPA GEOGRAPHICA. /Particularis/ Varias Limitim circa triplic(is) Confi-/nii concursum. 1 : 200 000. – 1699. – Drawing; 44,5 × 30,7 cm. HDA/KZ B I 17.
6. Pavao Ritter Vitezović. MAPPA GEOGRAPHICA, /CROATIAE. PARTEM ILLAM, /per quam/ LIMITES/ CAESAREUM inter et OTTOMANNICUM/ IMPERIA. 1 : 200 000. – 1699. – Drawing in colour; 103,4 × 97 cm. HDA/KZ D I 64.
7. Pavao Ritter Vitezović. MAPPA GENERALIS/ REGNI CROATIAE TOTIUS; / LIMITIBUS SUIS ANTIQUIS,/ videlicet, a Ludovici, Regis Hungariae, Diplomatus, / comprobatis, determinati. 1 : 550 000. – 1699. – Drawing in colour; 69,4 × 46,4 cm. HDA/KZ D I 60.
8. Pavao Ritter Vitezović. TABULA GEOGRAPHICA /LIKENSEM et CORBAVIENSEM /Comitatus/ una cum partibus circum vicinis Regni Cro/atiae Exhibens. 1 : 750 000. – 1701. – Drawing; 47 × 65 cm. HDA/KZ B III 1.

Note: The maps have been reproduced by the courtesy of the Museum of Croatian History, the Croatian State Archives and the National University Library in Zagreb, Croatia.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Coronelli's map of Dalmatia, 1700 (1)
2. Müller's map of Hungary, 1709 (4)
3. Weigl's map of the Imperial – Turkish Border, 1702 (3)
4. Vitezović's sketch of the Triplex Confinium, 1699 (5)
5. Vitezović's map of the whole kingdom of Croatia, 1699 (7)

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CROATIA ON THE TRIPLEX CONFINIUM: TWO APPROACHES

ABSTRACT

Having won the war with the Ottoman Empire, a number of political, economic and military projects concerning the future organisation of the Habsburg “Neoquisita” started to appear, in the Viennese centres of political power and the periphery alike. In this paper the author seeks to explore the features of the perception of Croatia from “below” and from “above,” using the examples of the “Responsio ad postulata comiti Marsiglio” by Pavao Ritter Vitezović, the Croatian Estates’ commissioner in the boundary commission, and the “Relazione di tutta la Croazia” by the Habsburg plenipotentiary boundary commissioner, Count Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli. On the basis of the results yielded by the hermeneutical strategies undertaken, a marked difference between these texts can be noted, both at the level of expression and at the level of content, so that two significantly discordant discursive visions of Croatia emerge. However, to the extent that they are determined by a shared context, the texts also exhibit certain similarities, not only in terms of strategies of meaning production but as regards the ideologies of their authors as well.

For the Habsburg monarchy, the dawn of the 18th century seemed to herald its ancient dream coming true – it would finally become a *Grossmacht* on a world scale and a contender worthy of Louis' France.¹ Since peace finally ruled – according to the mercantilist teaching, the essential prerequisite for any reform aiming at creating a *societas civilis*² – the spirit of optimism and enthusiasm, evi-

¹ After the signing of the Carlowitz peace treaty in 1699, both the domestic and the foreign political situation seemed promising indeed: Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia to the river Una and south of the Velebit massif, and Slavonia were all liberated. Germany in the West and Hungary in the East were for the first time after almost a century and a half unanimously backed the dynasty, Italy was protected by the Spanish Habsburgs, and Poland was ruled by Leopold's liege Friedrich August. Moreover, according to the so-called “Second Partition Treaty” of Spain, signed in July 1699, after the death of the last Spanish Habsburg, Charles II, Leopold's son, the archduke Charles, was to receive the Spanish empire (except for Spanish Italy which was ceded to France).

² This phrase was introduced by J.J. Becher (1635–1682) in his work *Politische discours*. Frankfurt, 1668. What he meant by it transpires from the subtitle: Politische discours, von den eigentlichen Ursachen / des Auff- und Abnehmens der Stadt / Länder und Republiken / in specie, wie ein Land Volkreich und Nahrhafft zu machen / und in eine rechte Societatem civilem zu bringen: Auch wird

dent in an avalanche of plans and projects³ for the future organisation of the Habsburg *Neoaquisita*, permeated the intellectual and political atmosphere of the Monarchy.⁴

It is worth the trouble inquiring what was the role of Croatia within these *Einrichtungswerke* and how it was perceived from above/outside and from below/inside by some of the creators of such projects. I have chosen two short texts on Croatia as examples, one by the Croatian polyhistor and patriot Pavao Ritter Vitezović (Senj, 1652 – Vienna, 1713), the other by the Italian virtuoso and diplomat, Count Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli (Bologna, 1658–1730). The texts are the *Responsio ad postulata comiti Marsigli*⁵ [*Response to the Inquiries of Count Marsigli*] (dated September 25, 1699), written by Vitezović in his capacity as the Croatian Estates' commissioner in the boundary commission and at Marsigli's request, and Marsigli's report entitled *Relazione di tutta la Croazia, considerata per il geografico, politico e economico e militare*⁶ [*Relation of the whole of Croatia, considered in terms geographic, political, economic and military*] (dated December 29, 1699), which he, as the plenipotentiary boundary commissioner, sent to Emperor Leopold.⁷ The choice of these two texts was motivated by an unexpected paradox: although the former work was to be the basis of the latter, a cursory glance reveals that the two discursive images of Croatia, i.e. the two “worlds of the work”⁸ presented to the reader's interpretative endeavour hardly agree in any significant respect. This is all the more surprising when we consider the social, intellectual and cultural background of the two au-

von dem Bauern Handwercks- und Kauffmanns-Stand / derer Handel und Wandel / item, Von dem Monopolio, Polypolio und Propolio, von allgemeinen Land-Magazinen, Niederlagen / Kauf-Häusern / Montibus Pietatis, Zucht- und Werck-Häusern / Wechselbäncken und dergleichen ausführlich gehandelt. Cf. also Gherardi, 1980, 137–48.

³ For example, in the Vienna *Hofkammerarchiv*, in the holdings entitled *Vorschiende Vorschläge*, 514 folders are kept containing various suggestions for reform, dating from the mid-17th to the mid-18th century, most of them conceived precisely at the time of the Carlowitz peace treaty. Gherardi, 1980, 292, n. 42.



⁴ Cf. Gherardi, 1980, 306–308.

⁵ Vitezović's autograph is kept in the Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna in Count Marsigli's collection, manuscript volume 103, entitled *Documenta rerum Croaticarum et Transylvanicarum in Commissione limitanea collecta* (4°, 34 × 22, 493 fol.), fol. 27r–34r. The Latin original facing the Croatian translation by Z. Pleše was published by Golden Marketing: Pavao Ritter Vitezović. *Ožujela Hrvatska*. Zagreb, 1997, 188–215.

⁶ Marsigli's reports from the time he worked on the boundary commission are kept in the Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna in the manuscript volumes 59 (*Relazioni dei confini cisdanubiali spedite a S.M. Cesarea fra l'anno 1699 e parte del 1700*, vol. IX, 4°, 35 × 24, 648 fol.) and 60 (*Relazione de' confini transdanubiali, spedite a S.M. Cesarea negli anni 1700 e 1701*, vol. X, 4°, 35 × 25, 209 fol.) *Relazione di tutta la Croazia, considerata per il geografico, politico, economico e militare* is in the volume 59, 378r.–409r. All 34 of Marsigli's reports during his work on the boundary commission (1699–1701) were published by Raffaella Gherardi. *Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, Relazioni dei confini della Croazia e della Transilvania a Sua Maestà Cesarea (1699–1701)*. Modena, 1986.

⁷ For a more detailed account of the Commission see Stoye, 1994, 164–215; Klaić, 1914, 129–38.

⁸ By this Ricoeur means the work's denotative aspect. According to him, “to interpret a work means to reveal the world the work refers to due to its design, its form and its style.” Ricoeur, 1981, 249.



thors.⁹ For all we know, they should have belonged to the same discursive community.¹⁰

Both Pavao Ritter Vitezović and Count Marsigli belong to the intellectual and political elite of the period. Neither had a formal education, but both were typical baroque polyhistorians in the range of their intellectual interests and work. Both took part in the war against the Ottomans, Marsigli as a colonel and Vitezović as a captain, living up to the supreme baroque ideal on which the aristocratic code of the early modern age was based – *vir utriusque Palladis*. After youthful *Wanderjahre*, they both embarked on a political career. But while the Italian Marsigli entered the service of the Emperor Leopold as a mercenary, the Croat Vitezović served in various offices of “national” interest entrusted him by

⁹ For a detailed bio-bibliography of both authors see Stoye, 1994 and Klaić, 1914.

¹⁰ The term discursive community is taken here in the sense given to it by Linda Hutcheon: “The notion of discursive community [...] acknowledges those strangely enabling constraints of discursive contexts and foregrounds and the particularities not only of space and time but of class, race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual choice – not to mention nationality, religion, age, profession and all the other micropolitical groupings in which we place ourselves or are placed by our society.” Hutcheon, 1994, 92.

the Croatian Estates. Perhaps this is the clue to solving the riddle of coexistence of two so divergent perceptions of Croatia, Marsigli's and Vitezović's.

I am inclined to contend that their links with various structures of political power conditioned the marked difference of their ideological perspectives, and which in turn so strongly influenced the semantic level of their discourses. Nevertheless, they did belong to similar discursive communities, as will soon become apparent when we start to read the meaning of their discourses.¹¹

Let us turn to the texts themselves. How are we to explain the paradox that according to their formal properties both works can safely be classified as privileged strong histories,¹² by definition explicative and representing historical facts, and yet manifesting differences in such high degree? I shall start from the premise which is still considered as heretical by traditional historiography that all narrative texts, including so-called historical sources, come about through discursive activities, and strategies of mystification and fictionalisation,¹³ which means bringing into the foreground their specific rhetorical rather than cognitive value. I therefore rely on some tenets of contemporary intellectual history which, in search of new hermeneutical procedures, fearlessly ventures into phenomenology, semiotics and discourse analysis.¹⁴ I shall first establish the ground for comparing Vitezović's and Marsigli's texts by describing their generic, compositional and stylistic features, and then embark on a semantic analysis, in search of the features of their meaning production strategies.

As regards genre, both works could be considered *memoranda*, a highly popular and widespread genre of the so-called pragmatic historiography.¹⁵ A distinctive feature of the works in this genre is the existence of a real addressee, since such works are generally written on the request and demand of authority of some sort. This fact on the one hand determines the type of discourse the features of which enable reconstruction of the author-addressee relationship, thereby making the writer's intentions and their involvement in the discourse more apparent, while on the other hand, granted the existence of a response of course, facilitating the examination of the peculiarities of the addressee's reception of the work. Generic conventions demand, among other things, a limited scope of exposition, separation and systematic ordering of topics discussed, the rendering absolute of the authorial position and an attempt at objectivity of expression.


¹¹ I rely here on the dichotomy meaning (semantic value yielded by the semantic potential of a given work) – significance (created semantic unit which in such a discourse, as well as in the discourse on discourse, marks the appearance of the world and shows the interpreter's point of view with respect to the text and the historical world), introduced by phenomenological criticism. Cf. Peleš, 1989.

¹² The distinction between "strong" and "weak" histories is Paul Vayne's concept. The former include political histories and various forms of encyclopaedic knowledge (erudition), while biographies and similar anecdotal stories belong to the latter group. Vayne. *Comment on écrit l'histoire, Essai d'épistémologie, du Seuil*. Paris, 1978, 22–3, as Quoted in Velčić, 1991, 116.

¹³ I use these terms in a more positive sense than they are traditionally given. According to Richard H. Brown (Brown, 1990, 261), mystification would mean presenting a given meaning as the only possible. I derive my interpretation of fiction from Mirna Velčić's understanding of every textual transposition as a process of fictionalisation. Cf. Velčić, 1991, 105, 119.

¹⁴ Cf. LaCapra – Kaplan, 1982.

¹⁵ Cf. Krieger, 1975, 72–75.



Let us now inspect how each of the texts is realised within the indicated thematic and generic framework. Both Vitezović's and Marsigli's texts include a reference to the addressee already in the title,¹⁶ but Marsigli's work, based on Leopold's comprehensive *Instruction*,¹⁷ is four times longer than Vitezović's.¹⁸ This, naturally, bears upon the treatment and distribution of material in the *memoranda*. In his *Responsio*, Vitezović confines himself to presenting a concise geographical, historico-administrative and ecclesiastical division of Croatia, while Marsigli not only performs an extensive analysis of discrete parts of Croatia in geographic, political, economic and military respects, but also works out a detailed plan of how it should be re-organised within the framework of his *buon ordine*.

Judging by their formal properties, both texts are completely legitimised so as to present a trustworthy image of "reality." This might indirectly confirm the view that historical texts are inherently mystifying and fictionalising, and of the performativity of the historical discourse in general.¹⁹ On the level of signifiers, nothing indicates the legerdemain for in no way do they make their making codes visible.²⁰ But let us consider the Croatia presented by Vitezović, and that presented by Marsigli, at the semantic level.

If we open the first page of Vitezović's memorandum, we will find the title *In Response to the Inquiries Concerning the Kingdom of Croatia and Dalmatia*. One would be right to put the scholarly competence of the author of this article, who mentions only Croatia, instantly in doubt. However, in the first part of the memorandum,²¹ by no means accidentally entitled *First, of Dalmatia*, Vitezović attempts to convince the reader that Dalmatia, a *resentiment* of the Roman era, does not really exist, being but a titular kingdom in the royal title of Hungarian kings. In the manner of a true baroque erudite, he explains the genesis and territorial scope of the Roman toponym of Dalmatia, on the evidence of five historico-geographical maps made by Ivan Lučić,²² only to conclude, by means of

¹⁶ The title of Vitezović's memorandum in full is: *Responsio ad postulata illustrissimo ac excellentissimo Domino, Domino Aloysio Ferdinando comiti Marsilio, Sacrae Caesareae Regiae Maiestatis Camerario, Peditatus Colonello, et ad limites totius Croatiae Commissario Plenipotentiario*, etc. Marsigli's report on Croatia is included in *Decima sesta umilissima relazione a Sua Maestà Cesarea, dal campo di Bielovaz a' 29 dicembre 1699*.

¹⁷ The document in question is Leopold's instruction, consisting of 25 articles specifying Marsigli's duties as the plenipotentiary commissioner. Apart from gathering information on border regions and documents justifying the Emperor's right to economically and strategically vital areas still held by the Turks or by Venice, Marsigli was to regularly send reports and geographical maps to the court. Cf. Gherardi, 1980, 328–329.

¹⁸ See notes 5 and 6.

¹⁹ M. Velčić considers historical discourse to be performative "because it pretends to have its source in reality, while actually producing it." Velčić, 1991, 110. R. Barthes makes a similar claim in his essay "Discourse of History": "We could say that historical discourse is a fudged up performative, which what appears as statement (and description) is in fact no more than the signifier of the speech act as an act of authority." Barthes, 1981, 17.

²⁰ De Certau, quoted in Velčić, 1991, 121.

²¹ Vitezović, 1997b, 190–4.

²² Ivan Lučić (Trogir, 1604 – Rome, 1679), doctor of law and historian, traditionally considered the founder of Croatian scientific historiography. His most important work is entitled *De Regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae libri sex*, which includes many sources presented with a critical apparatus. The appendix also contains a collection of narrative sources, genealogical tables and the historico-geographical maps referred to above.

a virtuoso logical deduction, by triumphantly pointing out contradictions in Lučić's account to the effect that Dalmatia was, in effect, an integral part of Croatia:

"In the work itself (ch. 13, bk. 2), however, he includes Zadar, Split and Trogir under Dalmatia, under the pretext that those towns had retained their Roman names, although these very towns, and all the islands, since they were paying tribute to the Croats, were by Porphyrogenitus and Archdeacon recorded as particularly Croatian (ch. 5 and 13, bk. 2; ch. 9, bk. 3). And that Croatian, and later Hungarian, kings also used the royal title of Dalmatia, which was but an honorific title inherited from the Romans."²³

"What, then, once were Liburnia and Illyricum proper, Pannonia to the rivers Mura, Drava and Danube, was today called Croatia. No one spoke of Dalmatia, for neither at the time of the Illyrians and Liburnians, nor later at the time of Croats, did it exist, not even according to Virgil."²⁴

Having thus done away with Dalmatia, Vitezović moves on to *Second, of the borders of Croatia*. Basing his arguments on the works of the authors who to this day are generally taken to be leading authorities on ancient Croatian history (Thomas the Archdeacon, Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Priest Dukljanin), which, by the way, he came to know through Lučić's *De Regno*, as regards Croatian borders, he concludes:

"What, then, once were Liburnia and Illyricum proper, Pannonia to the rivers Mura, Drava and Danube, is today called Croatia."²⁵

Having thus delineated the outer borders of Croatia, Vitezović presents the following division:

"This Croatia, which Lučić divides into three provinces, we rightly divide into five: that is, Lučić's just mentioned Maritime (*Maritima*), Middle (*Mediterranea*), Interamnian or Sava (*Interamnensis sive Savia*), and two more, Citerior (*Citerior*) and Ulterior (*Ulterior*). These are further divided into *zupaniae* and *comitatus*, or provinces and iudicial districts."²⁶

Following Vitezović's words, the reader instantly looks at Lučić's map to locate the said provinces. On the fourth map, entitled *Dalmatia post Imperii declinationem in Croatiam, Serviam et Dalmatiam ipsam distincta* [*Dalmatia after the fall of the Empire divided into Croatia, Serbia and Dalmatia proper*], he clearly makes out the borders of the three Croatian provinces: the Maritime encompasses the maritime area between Rasa and Cetina, in the South, the mountains Kapela, Velebit and Dinara, in the North, and the sea. The Middle occupies the area from these mountain ranges to the river Sava, and the Interamnian that between the rivers Sava and Drava. Should he continue to read

²³ Vitezović, 1997b, 193. This example is illustrative of Vitezović's citational relationship with his illustrious predecessor. Although Lučić's work is his main point of reference, due to his croatocentric point of view, Vitezović uses every opportunity to accuse Lučić of dalmatocentric, pro-Venetian attitude, a subject to which he would devote a whole work (*Offuciae Ioannis Lucii de Regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae Refutatae*, 1706)

²⁴ Vitezović, 1997b, 195.

²⁵ Vitezović, 1997b, 195.

²⁶ Vitezović, 1997b, 195.

Vitezović's account, where he Vitezović systematically lists all districts within each of these parts of Croatia, the reader will instantly see that Vitezović has given Lučić's toponyms a much more comprehensive meaning.²⁷ The area between Cetina and Neretva, as well as all Adriatic islands are Vitezović's addition. A similar fate befell Lučić's Middle Croatia – to it Vitezović has, on his own initiative, added Bosnia. Only as regards Interamnian Croatia do Vitezović's and Lučić's accounts agree.

However, Vitezović does not give an equally detailed description of each of his five parts of Croatia. Statistically speaking, 54% of the complete textual material of the memorandum is given to discussing Maritime Croatia, only 8% to the Middle, 4% to the *Interamnian*, while the *Citerior*²⁸ and the *Ulterior*²⁹ are only referred to in passing. Also, not all the areas within these five provinces merit equal treatment. Most textual space within the discussion of Maritime Croatia is given to Zahumlje and Rama, areas not included in Lučić's Maritime Croatia. Somewhat less space is given to the districts Maritime (Split and Trogir) and Biograd (between Nin, Sidraga and the sea), while about other districts within Maritime Croatia he writes in more or less equal detail. As regards Middle Croatia, which he divides into Proper (*propria*) and Bosnia, no less than two-thirds of the discussion are devoted to the latter, again not included in Lučić's province of the same name. The privileged textual position of these provinces goes beyond mere quantity, Vitezović putting more effort into the narrative devices used in the corresponding parts of the text. This is most apparent in the more frequent use of argumentation and citation as mechanisms for producing the "reality effect" (Barthes).

It is not all that difficult to guess the reason for such discursive treatment of these provinces. The regions in question remained outside the borders of Croatia and the Monarchy after the Carlowitz peace treaty, so that they were the object not only of Vitezović's croatocentric, but also *in spe* of Habsburg imperial desires.

On the thematic level, three *topoi* stand out:

a) the local public law traditions of the respective provinces, manifest in the existence of autochthonous institutions of government or incumbents of administrative functions;³⁰

b) a historico-legal legitimacy, manifest in the claims of the crown of St. Stephen;³¹

²⁷ Vitezović's Maritime Croatia includes Zahumlje (from Drina to Neretva), Rama (between Neretva and Cetina), Cetina (between Rama and Knin), Livanjska (between Danube and Knin), Maritime (Split and Trogir), Sidraga (Skradin), Bribir (from Sidraga to Krka), Tenena or Knin, Vrljka, Biograd (between Nin, Sidraga and the sea), Nin, Pag, Veka (between Zrmanja and Senj), Lika and Krbava, Senj, Rapska, Krčka, Osorska and Kastav. Cf. Vitezović, 1997b, 197–209.

²⁸ "Croatia Citerior is Istria and Kranjska; of these dukedoms speak their authors. Others rightly add the Slovenian Marches to Middle Croatia." Vitezović, 1997b, 211.

²⁹ "Croatia Ulterior is Serbia; this is further divided into Serbia proper and Raška."

³⁰ E.g. re Zahumlje: "Here is the town of Skadar, of yore the seat of Illyrian kings and of the province. [...] Zahumlje has had its dukes, descendants of the royal line of the Nemanjićs." Vitezović, 1997b, 197.

³¹ E.g. re Biograd: "In Belgrad was in 1102 Koloman, king of Hungary, crowned." Vitezović, 1997b, 205. Re Bosnia: "First came to be considered kingdom from the viceroy Tvrtko, proclaimed by the Hungarian king Ludovicus in 1376 as the king of Raška." Vitezović, 1997b, 211.

c) the Croatian/Illyrian form of the name³² as the most reliable champion of the essence of national character.³³

These are the key elements of Vitezović's ideological conception.³⁴ I would cite Vitezović's description of Klis, stylistically markedly different from the rest of the text, not only as an example of a discursive construction which, due to its mythologising function,³⁵ assumes a poetic character, but also to illustrate the principle of legitimisation, which, rooted in the heroic national ethos, transcends every public law reality originating in *ius victoris*.

"The fort of Klis, built by Diocletian above Salona, had its own dukes, who were for a time the Subics, and then again others. Klis was taken from the royal Croats, after a year long siege, by the Turks in the year 1537, and was won back by the people of Senj in 1592; but in the same year its heroic defenders together with their fellow townsfolk, who came to help them, and with the clergy and the bishop were wiped out by the sheer force of the barbarians, thus in their own blood confirming their patriotic and royal rights [emphasis Z. B.]."³⁶

In conclusion, Vitezović summarily presents the ecclesiastical administrative and hierarchical division of the provinces. Judging from the position and the treatment this thematic unit receives in the text, especially by its stylistic features (shorthand listing of data in paratactic, often elliptical, sentences), Vitezović personally did not give them much attention and was merely obliging his superior, Marsigli.³⁷

From the foregoing, the contours of a metahistorical³⁸ Croatia as glimpsed by the reader of Vitezović's memorandum can be made. Although Vitezović's Croatia could hardly be made to fit the geographic boundaries of its contemporary toponym, nowhere in the text do we find any indication of so high a degree of fictionalisation. The credibility of his statements results primarily from the rhetorical features of his historiographic discourse. Thematic units corresponding to respective geographical ones are composed using the following template: territorial situation (present tense used) + historical description (past tense used).³⁹ I intentionally emphasise the use of the present tense in descriptions of territorial scope of given regions because Vitezović's districts mostly correspond to mediaeval administrative divisions (e.g. most of those in Maritime Croatia correspond to the list of Porphyrogenitus of Croatian *zupaniae* in his *De admini-*

³² E.g. re Knin: "Tenena or Tininij, Slavic [name] Knin [...]." Re Zadar: "Jadra, by the Illyrians called Zadar [...]." Re Rijeka: "*Flumen Sancti Viti*, demotic [name] Rijeka." Vitezović, 1997b, 203 and 209.

³³ Cf. Simpson, 1991, 94.

³⁴ Cf. Vitezović, 1997a, 39–55.

³⁵ Vitezović in fact refers to the symbolic and mobilising role Klis had for the ideology of the Uskoci. Cf. Bracewell, 1997, 161.

³⁶ Vitezović, 1997b, 202–3.

³⁷ Vitezović's world view is prominently secular. When he deals with religious subjects, the motivation is usually instrumentalisation for national and political purposes (e.g. the praise of the cult of national saints in the work *Indigetes Illyricani sive Vitae Sanctorum Illyrici*, 1706).

³⁸ The term metahistory is defined by M. Velčić as "temporalised narrative space" produced by historical discourse. Velčić, 1991, 111.

³⁹ It should be pointed out that the second part is often omitted, usually when dealing with indisputably Croatian territorial units.

stratio Imperio, from the tenth century), which in his day did not in fact exist. Vitezović's historiographic discourse is characterised by precision and explicitness, exhibiting no stylistic markers of distancing or relativisation, he mostly uses relative and copulative connectors,⁴⁰ which have the highest factive potential, and only a single use of the first person plural pronoun (in the function of *pluralis modestatis*), in the course of outlining the parts of Croatia, discreetly hints at the author's arbitrary role.

Concluding our remarks on Vitezović's discourse we could single out intertemporality and transtemporality as its structural underpinnings: the past and the present are juxtaposed and intertwined in a manner that renders any disentanglement impossible, and both function as argumentative axes around which the fictional and transtemporal Croatia as a discursive articulation of Vitezović's world view is being built.

And what is the metahistorical Croatia presented in Marsigli's *Relazione di tutta la Croazia* like? As I have already mentioned, upon entering the office of the plenipotentiary boundary commissioner, Marsigli was presented with an *Instruction*, wherein his tasks were listed in detail. On the basis of this he composed a *Formolario*⁴¹ of eight articles, where he stated the principles for writing his reports, enclosing it with his first report, dated April 14, 1699. The compositional scheme of the *Relazione di tutta la Croazia* follows this template, but due to the need for knowing the specifics of the Croatian historical situation as a prerequisite for disentangling "queste annodate confusioni", at the beginning of his report Marsigli outlines the organisation and borders of Croatia during three periods:

- a) the situation at the time before the Ottoman conquests, more precisely under the Hungarian kings;
- b) the situation during Ottoman rule and before the Vienna War;
- c) the situation after the signing of the Carlowitz peace treaty.⁴²

In order to ensure adequate reception of this complex problem, he encloses a graphic representation on two maps and an accompanying "synoptic table."⁴³

Still, Croatia within the borders defined by the Carlowitz peace treaty is the focus of Marsigli's interest. This contemporary historical reality is the basis of his

⁴⁰ On the function of connectors as organising elements of the text, see Velčić, 1987.

⁴¹ The title of the document in full is: *Formolario stabilito per ordinare il protocollo dello stato dell'intera limitanea linea dell'Imperio de Cesare con quello dell'Ottomano, secondo il fondamento della pace de Carlovitz, ad uso de'presenti e futuri tempi*. BUB, Mss Marsili, no. 59, l 17r–18v. He states that he intends to give a detailed description of the borderline, then the orthographic features of the area, including characteristics of the soil, system of communications, mineral resources and administrative organisation. He will then give a detailed ethnographic description of the populace, including data on ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Finally, he will give a detailed description of the actual state of fortifications, with suggestions for improvement with respect to "[their] usefulness for defending current conquests and making new ones in future times."

⁴² Gherardi, 1986, 249–51.

⁴³ The maps in question include that showing the borderline from the Una to the *Triplex Confinium*, with "military villages" indicated, and a historico-geographical map *Mappa generalis Regni Croatiae totius limitibus suis antiquis, videlicet, a Ludovici, Regis Hungariae, diplomatus, comprobatis determinati*, made by Pavao Ritter Vitezović, with an accompanying explicative *tabula synoptica*.

descriptive analysis, as well as of the utopian projection of establishing a Croatian *buon ordine*. This is the organising principle governing the structure of Marsigli's report. After a detailed description of the Croatian frontier after the Carlowitz peace treaty, with a brief discussion of its military and strategic features,⁴⁴ Marsigli presents a "natural" division of the country into Maritime (*Maritima*), Intermontane (*Intermontana*), and Interamnenian (*Intramnense*) Croatia.⁴⁵ Obviously, Marsigli's terminology is derived from the Lučić-Vitezović tradition (*Maritima* and *Intramnense*), but the semantic scope of the terms used is restricted by the Carlowitz peace treaty borderline, i.e. referring only to the areas then currently under the jurisdiction of Emperor Leopold. The case of Marsigli's and Vitezović's Croatia could, therefore, be characterised as an instance of the semantic variability of toponyms as determined by different ideological contexts.

Marsigli then describes the geographic, demographic, economic and military-strategic features of Croatia. He is using a strategy we might term oppositional, since it is based on the *disordine-ordine* opposition, thus simultaneously creating an ideal vision of the future mercantilist-absolutist Croatia as a counterpoint to his description of the contemporary situation in Croatia, which he generally characterised as one of "disorder, crime, confusion," stating that the country had "no laws of government, nor military defence,"⁴⁶ At the same time, however, he insisted on pointing out Croatia's economic, demographic and military potential, which would, once the mercantilist and military reforms were implemented, enable it to become, realising the main mercantilist principle, a paradise for its subjects and a gold mine for the emperor.

The situation, that is, the disorder encountered in Croatia, Marsigli describes thus:

"The land is naturally mountainous, consisting of hills, mountains, pastures and woods; these having only spread primarily due to the fact that for over a century the land has not been worked [...]"⁴⁷ The quality of the soil is inferior to that in Hungary, since, due to the interchange with living rock and natural barrenness, manure needs constantly to be put down in profusion in order to produce.⁴⁸

"The Croats are by nature freedom loving and avid for privileges, whence springs disorder and opposition to the executing of the commands of Your Majesty, showing little or no industriousness, and born for comfort rather than hard work."⁴⁹ The maritime Croats are by nature and physical constitution very fierce.

⁴⁴ Gherardi, 1986, 251–252.

⁴⁵ "That part of Croatia which is under Your Majesty's jurisdiction I therefore divide into maritime, intermontane and intramnenian. The maritime is that stretch of land between the mountain of Velebit and the sea, divided into Podgoria and Vinodol; the intramontane is Lika and Krbava, between the ranges of Velebit and Plješivica; the intramnenian is between the rivers Kupa and Una, the Kupa and Korana, the Korana and Glina, and between the Una, Kupa and Sava." Gherardi, 1986, 253.

⁴⁶ Gherardi, 1986, 264.

⁴⁷ Gherardi, 1986, 253.

⁴⁸ Gherardi, 1986, 253.

⁴⁹ Gherardi, 1986, 254.

[...] This people are vindictive and quarrelsome, and even when at rest not adverse to pillage. [...] The Vlachs are by nature indomitable, of fiery temper and vile [...], naturally inclined to work the land, which they do extremely well. [...]”⁵⁰

“On the whole frontier no priests or churches are to be found, nor even private chapels, and hardly are there any in garrison towns and forts [...]”⁵¹ There are no villages comparable in size or administrative organisation at least to those of Hungary, and my statement will not seem repugnant of huge numbers of new population, should we remember that occasionally they refused obedience, with great damage to discipline and order, in accordance with the laws and economy of the land [...].⁵² Advantageous to successful defence are well fortified places, and from the confluence of the Una to the triple border point there are none such [...].⁵³”

However, Croatia has important resources which, in Marsigli's view, might ensure “not only the happiness of the subjects, but even the increase of the public income of the Empire.”⁵⁴ These included cereals, wines, cattle and the royal regalia – iron and silver mines, woods and salt.⁵⁵ To make Marsigli's mercantilist dream come true the following needed to be done:

a) the securing of the Croatian frontier with fortified garrison towns of German troops;⁵⁶

b) the creation of so-called military villages (*villaggi militari*)⁵⁷ with their own jurisdiction, in civil matters subordinated to the official responsible for the implementation of the laws of the kingdom of Hungary and, in military affairs, to German officers;⁵⁸

c) the apportionment of the land to the population;⁵⁹

d) the organisation of continental, fluvial and maritime communications⁶⁰ and storehouses for “merchandise reserves;”⁶¹

e) the frugal use of the royal regalia;⁶²

f) reform of ecclesiastical structures.⁶³

⁵⁰ Gherardi, 1986, 255.

⁵¹ Gherardi, 1986, 254.

⁵² Gherardi, 1986, 256.

⁵³ Gherardi, 1986, 258.

⁵⁴ Gherardi, 1986, 255.

⁵⁵ Cf. Gherardi, 1986, 256–257.

⁵⁶ Cf. Gherardi, 1986, 262.

⁵⁷ The importance accorded these villages by Marsigli is best seen from the part of the report discussing military issues, where he lists no less than 17 sites between Zrmanja and the confluence of the Una and the Sava, indicated graphically on the map enclosed with the report. Cf. Gherardi, 1986, 261–262.

⁵⁸ Cf. Gherardi, 1986, 256.

⁵⁹ Cf. Gherardi, 1986, 256.

⁶⁰ Cf. Gherardi, 1986, 255, 260.

⁶¹ Cf. Gherardi, 1986, 256, 258.

⁶² Cf. Gherardi, 1986, 257.

⁶³ Cf. Gherardi, 1986, 254.

With the establishment of *buon ordine* in Croatia, a golden age would begin, idealistically envisioned by the enraptured Marsigli:

“As for the good disposition of the people, it suffices to know that they cultivate the land, produce goods, pay tithes and taxes the prince might justly decree, and it is therefore needless to expound the matter further.⁶⁴ [...] Whenever the Vlachs are well governed, believing their land property secure, and are confined within the limits guarded by the Germans, benefiting from commerce and trade routes, Your Majesty would be able to gather large sums of money, even when demanding but a small tribute of a single gold ducat per capita, which would amount to a fourth of what they have been paying to the Ottoman empire.⁶⁵ [...] These two latter nations [the maritime Croats and the Vlachs, Z.B.], should they be assisted by the regular concourse of maritime traffic, on the scale enjoyed on Your Majesty's shores, would in all probability, should they grow accustomed to trade, give up marauding, pledge their fortunes, and become Your Majesty's loyal servants. [...]”⁶⁶ In this fashion, Your Majesty would begin to be recognised the king of Croatia and venerated by the subjects as such, and there will be no more opportunity to spend money but to gather it from that Kingdom.”⁶⁷

Marsigli's report, and his scholarly strategy on the whole, is methodologically structured using an antithetical model. Marsigli perceives history as a cyclic alternation between the antithetic ages of *ordine* and *disordine*,⁶⁸ which is also the crucial distinguishing feature of his discourse with respect to Vitezović's. Marsigli sharply distinguishes the present from the past, which is but a basis for comparison, while for Vitezović the value of the past is equal to that of the present, and he occasionally even subordinates the present to the past in the light of his national and political ideals,⁶⁹ which is why in Vitezović's historiographic discourse there is no clear distinction between the past and the present.

Another important feature of Marsigli's ideologico-political framework underscoring his discourse is the future, which in Vitezović is not to be found in such an explicit form. While Marsigli presents his Croatia according to the dialectical and teleological model which includes not only the past and the present, but also the future as a medium for establishing the ultimate, ideal goal – the

⁶⁴ Gherardi, 1986, 257.

⁶⁵ Gherardi, 1986, 257–258.

⁶⁶ Gherardi, 1986, 255.

⁶⁷ Gherardi, 1986, 258.

⁶⁸ This is well illustrated by Marsigli's statements in the first part of the report where he gives a short historical survey. “Croatia fell from the confusion of its kings and princes to the Hungarian crown, under Coloman. [...] The Kingdom of Croatia initially flourished under the Hungarian kings, predecessors of Your Majesty, one might almost say restorers of the ancient Roman order in Illyria. [...] Now, as this lineage falls in a Kingdom, which has for over a century been reverting to its ancient manners and divisions, furthermore against its own interest and those of its true lords, predecessors of Your Majesty, I allow myself to beseech Your Majesty permission to depict it in its true order and state, with explicatory data gathered from public histories, as well as from ancient manuscripts and relations of living savants, which things might serve to further understanding of the extent of the Ottoman repression, the true cause of all disorder [...]” Gherardi, 1986, 249–250.

⁶⁹ Cf. Simpson, 1991, 94–107.

mercantilist Arcadia, Vitezović's *transtemporal* Croatia includes the future only implicitly and only to the extent it is immanent to the utopian.

This can also be noticed at the level of the syntactical organisation of Marsigli's text, where, in contrast to Vitezović, who never uses a verb in the future tense, we find all three tenses: past, present and future, with the latter two being more frequent. The relation between the present (*disordine*) and the future (*ordine*), the basic feature of Marsigli's ideological conception, is reflected at the level of expression as well, in the use of real and potential conditional clauses, which on the one hand emphasise conditionality in the sense of the need to "reform this frontier in military and economic respect," while on the other reveal the author's prophetic strain, thereby rendering Marsigli's vision of the Croatia of the future similar to utopia as defined by Paul Ricoeur.⁷⁰

In Marsigli's discourse, which we might call personalised, the authorial position, mediated primarily by the use of the first person singular pronoun, is strongly emphasised. The ultimate purpose in employing this writing strategy, however, is to stress the author's exceptional competence in the subject he is discussing, rather than to alert the reader to the subjective prism through which the subject the texts deals with is refracted, for there are no signals that the author's "knowledge" is unreliable in any degree. At the level of discourse, the so-called organisation shifters⁷¹ also perform the function of establishing and confirming the authority of the author. When we add the author's direct addressing of the addressee, the reader's impression of the author's absolute "knowledge" and authority is further enhanced.⁷² Marsigli's own words illustrate this point:

"From this information I have submitted on the uses of His own treasure, Your Majesty will see the rationale for fortifying the frontier, as such situations demand, that is, as stated in the section devoted to military affairs, and will see the advantage of having funds in cash for paying the German militia and the Croatian cavalry Your Majesty might want to keep on the said frontier, instead of taking annually from the Carniola and Carinthia the money until now used to this end."⁷³

Should we compare this to Vitezović's – let us call it apersonalised (excepting the single use of the first person plural pronoun) – discourse, structured in a

⁷⁰ "A Utopia is always in the process of being realised [...] The best function of the utopia is the exploration of the possible, what Ruyer calls 'the lateral possibilities of reality.'" Ricoeur, 1986, 273, 311.

⁷¹ In his famous essay "Discourse of History", R. Barthes explores the conditions under which the historian is led or authorised to mark the very act of utterance in his discourse. He introduces two types of shifters, those of "hearing" and those of "organisation." Of the latter he says: "The second type of shifters comprises all the explicit signs whereby the utterer – in this case, the historian – organises his own discourse, taking up the thread of modifying his approach in some way in the course of narration: that is to say, where he provides explicit points of reference in the text. [...] Thus we can cite as cases where the shifters affect the flow of utterances: the effect of immobility, that of returning to an earlier stage, that of coming back again, that of stopping dead and that of announcing." Barthes, 1981, 8.

⁷² That Marsigli saw himself in this light is pointed out by J. Stoye, who claims that he cherished "an image of himself as someone with a gift for dealing with urgent matters in high places." Stoye, 1994, 29.

⁷³ Gherardi, 1986, 258.

much simpler manner and having no autoreferential marks, we shall notice the similarity of intentions of both authors, even though the effect of objectivity is in each text achieved by using different modes of expression.

Are there perhaps more links between Marsigli and Vitezović? Apart from the aforementioned, resemblance can be detected on three other levels. The most prominent, although not the most important, is the similarity at the factual level. As has already been pointed out, in the part of his report dealing with the historical situation of Croatia, Marsigli refers to two appendices supplementing his report, which present synoptically the natural and historico-administrative borders of Croatia in all three periods he discusses. The first is a map entitled *A General Map of the Whole Croatian Kingdom in its Ancient Borders as Defined by the Authorised Documents of the Hungarian King Ludovicus*,⁷⁴ and the other a synoptic survey entitled *Tavola sinoptica*.⁷⁵ The author of both these works is Pavao Ritter Vitezović.⁷⁶ Even though Marsigli usually used the services of his learned cartographer Müller, he entrusted the delicate task of disentangling “this confusing labyrinth of Croatia”⁷⁷ to Vitezović. This, then, could be an extrinsic indicator that Marsigli deemed Vitezović competent in things Croatian. As for Vitezović's acceptance of the task, which ostensibly meant rejecting his pan-croatian programme, his pragmatic interests can account for it fairly easily. What better way of attracting the attention of the court, which during the period represented a promised land for intellectuals and artists,⁷⁸ and if they, like Vitezović, happened to be patriots, it further offered the opportunity of exercising *amor in patriam*.⁷⁹

The second, and I dare say much more significant, similarity occurs at the textual level, in denying the legal existence of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, which is also the most palpable example of Marsigli's reception of Vitezović's memorandum. Marsigli's arguments on that issue follow Vitezović's point by point.⁸⁰ Should we pose the question of motivation of both authors, the answer is to be

⁷⁴ One copy in the BUB, Mss 49, 21, another in Arhiv Hrvatske, sg. D.I.60, and a third one in Vienna.

⁷⁵ BUB, Mss. 49, 20.

⁷⁶ The authorship remains spurious, however. J. Stoye, for example, attributes the map to Müller (Stoye, 1994, 197), while in Croatia it is filed under Vitezović's name. Judging by the handwriting, it seems to be Vitezović's work, although Müller's collaboration is not to be discounted.

⁷⁷ Gherardi, 1986, 265.

⁷⁸ On the role of Vienna as symbol and instrument of integration in the time of Leopold's rule, cf. Ingrao, 1994, 98.

⁷⁹ Already in late 1700, after the publication of his manifesto work, *Croatia rediviva*, Vitezović received the imperial invitation to Vienna, with the following explanation: “Since certain and important reasons make your presence in order to provide some information urgently required, also bring all letters and documents delineating and defining borderlines and demarcations of our said Kingdom of Croatia you have on your person [...]” Klaić, 1914, 105.

⁸⁰ Of Dalmatia, Marsigli writes this: “Having assigned such extent of the territory to the Kingdom of Croatia, the question of where is the Kingdom of Dalmatia situated arises, and it will hence not be futile, as is my explicit obligation, to inform Your Majesty that the said Kingdom of Dalmatia in the times of ancient Hungarian kings, predecessors of Your Majesty, was so called for no other reason but in the memory of the Romans who alone gave it that name [...]. It remains to be concluded that Dalmatia indeed constituted a part of Croatia and was so called, as I said above, to retain the Roman appellation of these parts, whence, as the identity of the Dalmatian crown can in no other way be established, the Venetian hope that they might profit thereby.” Gherardi, 1986, 249–250.

found in the ideological climate dominating the Viennese centres of power as well as in the contemporary political context. In accordance with the postulates of the instrumental character of history, formulated, under the influence of French political thought, by G. W. Leibnitz (1646–1716),⁸¹ the aim of Viennese politics after the Carlowitz peace treaty was, as Leopold put it in his rescript to Marsigli, dated September 26, 1699: “behauptung unserer praetensiones und extendierung derselben gegen denen Venetianischen Gränizen.”⁸² Apart from clearly testifying to the instrumentalist use of public law, this also points to the revival of mercantilist political tendencies towards the “maritime orientation” of the Habsburgs, which would start to be put into practice only after Leopold's death, the most serious impediment to which was the Venetian Republic's expansionist assault on the Croatian coast, the area to which the Holy Roman Emperor and Hungarian King Leopold had a hereditary claim.

The most important resemblance between the two contemporaries and associates that can be perceived in the structure not only of their texts but also of their historical, intellectual and cultural contexts lies, however, in their shared idealist-utopian outlook – and this might sound paradoxical – of pragmatic bent. Vitezović's Croatia, the semantic and geographic content of which far outpasses the real, historical Croatia, is in fact a projection of Habsburg expansionist dreams from the time of their initial successes in the Viennese War, the dreams which, it was believed, only needed to be enhanced by historical law to be made real. In early 1689, at the time of the initial negotiations between Vienna and the Porte, Habsburg diplomatic representatives steadfastly persisted in demanding that the eastern frontier of the Monarchy should follow the river Morava, that is that Bosnia, Herzegovina and Serbia had unconditionally to be a part of the Monarchy.⁸³

Marsigli's mercantilist Croatia, on the other hand, is also a projection of Habsburg dreams, but of those of an economic nature. These Habsburg dreams, which were a consequence of the fascination with the French political and the Dutch economic miracle and the wish to see the *Reich* as their rival, were articulated ideologically in the works of Leibnitz, Becher, Hörnigk and Schröder, and worked out in practice in the numerous reports, projects and memorandums dispatched to the court from every corner of the Empire. Marsigli was himself an eminent member of the mercantilist group around Chancellors Strattman, Kinsky, and later Stahremberg, who were through their projects for reform and modernisation investing great efforts into transforming the Monarchy into a central European state respectable in economic terms.⁸⁴ There is, nevertheless, an

⁸¹ Of the use of history Leibnitz writes: “[...] since I know that in all state affairs, private and public law (I was forced to study it in great detail by years of service), the greatest use is to be had of history, and of charters (on which histories mostly rely) which will have to be found in archives, or other manuscripts.” Leibnitz to the Emperor (Vienna, January [?]1689), in G.W.Leibnitz: *Samtliche Schriften und Briefe*, edition of the Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Allgemeine Politischer und Historischer Briefwechsel, Berlin, 1954, vol. V, no. 222, 389–390. On the influence of Leibnitz's ideas of political use of history, cf. Gherardi, 1980, 391–398.

⁸² BUB, Mss, Marsili, n. 62, *Recritto imperiale del 26 settembre 1699*, fol. 205r, quoted in Gherardi, 1980, 374.

⁸³ Cf. Stoye, 1994, 71–72.

⁸⁴ Cf. Gherardi, 1980, 293–315.

irreconcilable contradiction at the core of Marsigli's and Vitezović's world views: Marsigli sees Croatia in an anational perspective as a means for making the absolutist mercantilist ideals⁸⁵ of the court come true, while Vitezović in a national perspective sees the absolutist mercantilist ideals as a means for reviving Croatia.

Finally, it remains to be seen how the ideas of the two baroque *virtuosi* were received. The best indicator of that reception, as well as of the fate Marsigli's Croatian project suffered at the grindstone of inert administrative bodies entrusted with realising it, is the letter of his friend, the imperial councillor and reporter of the War Council, Giovanni Tiell, of May 27, 1700:

"I shall not tell Your Illustrious Lordship of the state of other public affairs here, taking it that You are sufficiently informed through Your other correspondents. I shall but complain that things of such momentum as borders and demarcations are being considered with such slackness and frigidity, which would suffice for the sagacity of Your Illustrious Lordship. Your Illustrious Lordship's fine projects as regards the populace of the conquered regions, winning the Vlachs and the Serbs over, providing the necessary communications, introducing commerce, establishing military villages, and many another salutary project, are generally met with *admiration and applause* [emphasis Z. B.] of the whole ministry, as being profitable and necessary for the public good, but as this public good does not reach individuals, it is looked upon differently, where everybody is after everybody else's position in order thus to promote the public good. And it frequently happens that when it comes to execution, there is no one to perform it. The same goes for these projects, everybody admires them as long as they do not have to be involved in their execution...⁸⁶

Should we compare the description of the reception of Marsigli's project with Vitezović's self-assured estimate of the reaction to his work *Croatia redi-viva* in Vienna that same year, the resemblance is striking. In his letter to Marsigli of March 4, 1700, Vitezović claims:

"The Viennese are applauding my *Prodromus in Croatiam Redivivam* I have sent them: if only they would like the work it pre-heralds, and donate for it so that it should not be nipped in the bud, as the author is too poor for such an undertaking.⁸⁷"

Indeed it was a time of great plans and even greater illusions, an era truthfully incarnated in Marsigli and Vitezović. The two of them, polyhistor and soldiers endowed with both of Pallas' gifts, were devoted actors on the sumptuous baroque stage, who in the end earned nothing but applause. The harsh reality – the forthcoming War of the Spanish Succession and Rakoczy's uprising in Hungary, the diarchic⁸⁸ structure of government, institutional and administrative polycentricity, the incongruence of central and local levels of authority, the chronic deficit – all this contributed to postponing even a partial realisation of Vitezović's and Marsigli's visions until deep into the eighteenth century.

⁸⁵ On this see Gherardi, 1980, 129–167, 275–315, 387–419.

⁸⁶ BUB, Mss. Marsili, no. 115, letter no. 33, quoted in Gherardi, 1980, 97–98.

⁸⁷ BUB, Fondo Marsili, vol. 709, XIX. *Lettere del Cavaliere Ritter*, letter no. 2.

⁸⁸ J. Berenger in his work *Finances et absolutisme autrichien* calls the joint rule of the monarch and the estates diarchy. Quoted in Gherardi, 1980, 83.

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**STOJAN JANKOVIĆ IN THE MOREAN WAR,
OR
OF USKOKS, SLAVES AND SUBJECTS**

ABSTRACT

The content of this article is mainly concerned with the discussion at the international conference on the project "The Triplex Confinium" at the University of Graz (9–12. 12. 1998) Plan and Practice: How to Construct a border society. The Triplex Confinium (cca. 1700–1750). This article also contains summaries of many longer discussions, especially from the regular meetings of the project team at the Institute for Croatian History at the Arts' Faculty in Zagreb, numerous exchanges of opinion at the History Department of the Central European University in Budapest, and editorial work, together with Nataša Štefanec, M.A., on three volumes on the project. I feel grateful to all those who have encouraged me in any way at all. Incidentally the article finally took shape in Rovinj, in the summer of 2000, thanks to the rich library there, which has many volumes on the subject and the very pleasant working environment of the Centro di ricerche storiche. I would like to express my gratitude in this manner also to Prof. Giovanni Radossi and his colleagues for their help.

"ZAKON KRAJČKI" AND THE "VIRA KRAJIŠKA"

The Venetian Captain Ivan Marušić, on becoming a slave in Sinj, probably in 1685, as the property of *Shain-aga* Mandić, expresses his anger towards the *Aga* in a letter addressed to his "bosom-friend" Stipan Garković, as the *Aga* would not allow him the usual conditional release to enable him to try to collect on the Venetian side "*tešk(u) cin(u) iladu i dvista groša z darovi,*" which was the amount the *Aga* was demanding for his release. His anger was well-founded although the *Shain-aga*, in denying him this right, was doing something which was actually very unusual throughout the entire borderlands in the 16th and 17th centuries: "...ovo me ne kti dati na viru ničnū, **da bi nosio moe dugovane kako i ostali sužni po Kraini** (emphasized – D.R.), *nego se nađe jedan redovnik iz provincije poličke don pavao žuljević imeno(m), koi mi izide dokle progovorim z gospodinom generalom i on se kutemta priat svargo na gvozdija, koja su na me mečali...*"¹

¹ Desnica, 2, 119. This letter was actually written in Croatian cyrillic script.

Thus according to Captain Marušić, the “*Krajina*” (borderlands), represented a shared space and expressed an idea which transcended imperial borders. The borderlands were the scene of direct conflicts over a multitude of borders, fixed in European traditions, often day after day, and frequently at the limits of what humans can endure (thirst, hunger, a long-term threat to human life etc.). But it was also the place where that never-ending war, fought on the borders of faith and imperial civilizations, had its own autohtonic rules and regulations of behaviour. As in the borderlands one lived constantly with the feeling of danger to one’s life, there was an even greater need for fixed codes of conduct and systems of values which would bind everyone, especially the enemy, therefore to that which is termed in sources “*vira krajiška*.”²

At the same time as the Captain Ivan Marušić was complaining about *Sbain-aga* Madić, *Osman-aga* Beširević, the captain of Oštrožac (1690–1727) complained about Karl Gušić in the Ogulin captaincy: “as a hero in the honest borderlands” for not keeping to the customs for the redemption of slaves (the author’s emphasis). In his complaint he refers to the “*zakon krajički*” (law of the borderlands) expecting that Gušić, as his equal, “would do nothing illegal in the borderlands as no such gentleman had ever done, nor had you, sir.” (the author’s emphasis).³

This way of regulating relationships in the Borderlands between “fierce” opponents, did not at times exclude sincere and even very close relationships between people on opposite sides, of course in accord with the measure of authority and power they had available and above all with the interests which led them to each other. The captive Venetian Captain Ivan Marušić had every right to be angry with *Sbain-aga* Madić for breaking the borderland custom in this case, as his entire future depended on it, just as *Osman-aga* Beširević also had good reason to be angry with Karl Gušić for bringing into question one of the customs which formed the basis of power for border commanders to a large extent on all sides of the triple border.

“*CONFINIA ...KRAINE, MEJASTVA, KOTARENJA*”

Numerous sources in archives of Habsburg, Venetian and Ottoman origin lead to the same conclusion of a recognisable unified *Krajina*, independent of imperial borders, which, amongst other things, may be seen in the use of this word or others like it. Moreover, in linguistic terms the very idea of a triple border (*triplex confinium*) is more an indication of what brings the region together than what divides it. The same is true of the concept of “dry boundary” (*suba međa*), which defines above all the Habsburg and Ottoman borderland region on the left bank of the River Una following the treaty of Karlovac (1699). In other parts of the Una valley the boundary is formed by the river and therefore “wet.”

In order to avoid entering into more exhaustive use of archive material, it will be sufficient here to point out the use of the concept in dictionaries produced by Croatian lexicographers in the 17th and 18th centuries, and some other more recent linguistic research. Of the older dictionaries, the most exhaustive is by Belostenec, which we will quote here.

² In peace time (the captains up to the end of the 17th century D.R) kept up close contact with their equals on the other side of the border and paid one another visits. They always kept the “*vira krajiška*” (*krajina* faith). Kreševljaković, 1980, 69.

³ The letter has an interesting title: “From me Osman-aga Beširević, to the noble and exalted, worthy of all gentlemanly praise and honour, Mr. Karl Gušić, vice-Captain of Ogulin, respect and great and dear greetings, as hero of the honest Borderlands” and also end: “And may you be healthy in those Borderlands. Amen.” See also Lopašić, 1890, 242; quoting: Kreševljaković, 1980, 111–112.

Hamdija Kreševljaković is one of the few historians who clearly recognises the contemporary understanding of the entire area of the Borderlands, and especially on its triple border. See especially his work *Kapetanije u Bosni and Hercegovini*. The book was first printed in Sarajevo in 1953 and the second edition with an afterword by Avdo Sućeska came out in Sarajevo in 1980.

According to it, the Latin "*Confinis, ...Mejaski, megyaski*" and "*Confinia, orum. plur.*" also as frequent in archival sources of the time "*Kraïne, mejastva, kotarenja.*"⁴

Thence "*Confinium, ij...*" Is simply "*Konecz zemlye, gdesze z-drugum zesztaje. Mejas, kotar*".⁵ It is noticeable that the concept of "border" is not linguistically given at all here in this interpretation of "*krajište*" as an area which is relative to the boundary.⁶

For us in this study it is more important to note that in Belostenec the word "*kotar*" may also be used to signify "*krajina*" since in Northern Dalmatia it is precisely the "*Ravni Kotari*," the borderlands in the immediate vicinity of Zadar from the 16th to the 18th century, which we deal with the most. In the 16th and to a lesser extent the 17th centuries "*Gorski Kotar*" was important as a border area in Habsburg Croatia.⁷

It is important to notice that the word "*granica*", like "*krajina*," was not unknown to Belostenec (e.g. "*Kotarszki, Granicbni, kraïnszki. Limitaneus*") but the main sense of the word "*granica*" was demarcation, a difference. This is also true of the word "*meda*" as a border, a demarcation ("*Meja ili megya na polyu, vinogradu etc. Limes, tis, terminus, fines, ium, lapis finalis, meta, ae...confinium, ij v. Pogon*").⁸

Thus in contrast to "*krajina*" which is complex in meaning, with a definite spacial sense, in the case of "*granica*" the emphasis is on what it divides, separates, confronts etc. In this sense it is possible to talk about "*krajiškim granicama*". It is no wonder that the word "*granica*" is much more frequently used after the treaty of Karlovac in 1699, that is after the drawing of boundaries by international agreement. At the same time the word "*krajina*" began to mean the same as "*granica*." This process went on throughout the 18th century.⁹

⁴ Belostenec, 1, 1740, 339.

⁵ Ibid, 339-340.

⁶ In that sense it is not strange that in both the Croatian and Serbian language tradition the root of the concept is "*tromeda*" (triple frontier) and not "*trograničje*" (triple border), when dealing with a region. We could even go so far as to say that it would be useful to introduce a distinction between the concept of "*tromeda*" as an area and the concept "*trograničje*" as the meeting place of border points, as for instance on Medveđa Glavica on Debelo Brdo (Triplex Confinium).

⁷ This interpretation of the word "*kotar*" is pre-*krajina* since Belostenec defines "*confines agri*" as "*zemlye kesze szkup kotare*" and "*confinis meus*" as "*kotarnik, mejasnik moy, megyas moy*". As is well known in the experience of critical historiography, philological arguments cannot be used as proof, but only as indications. Therefore in the case of "*kotar*" the word "*krajina*" is not always used in the same sense as today, and this is even true in Belostenec:

"*Kotar, Hatar, darsava. Rustice. Supa. Territorium ij. Districtus, us, Universitas ererum inter fines cujusque Civitatis, Regni. Fines, ium, Limites, um Kotare polasem, Fines pono, Terminos constituom terminis circumscribo, v. Meja*" (Belostenec 2, 1740: 181) The same is true of the word "*meda*": "*Meja ili megya na polyu, vinogradu etc., Limes, tis, terminus, fines, ium, lapis finalis, meta, ae...confinium, ij v. Popgon*". Belostenec, 2, 1740, 214.

The Croatian philologist Petar Skok also pointed out this dichotomy when discussing the word "*kot*," "*kotac*": "*Zatim kotar (1423) u vrlo starom značenju "territorium, meda, kraj, srez" kao administrativni termin Upor. Lat. Fines... Denominal na -iti kotariti se (1586) graničiti.*" (Skok 2, 1972: 176). The same is true of the word "*meda*": "*Meda f. meja, meža: "1. Granze, sinor, kunfin, mrgin 2. (since primitive boundaries were marked by paths, bushes, trees, the meaning broadened to include džbun, česta, gušta, fruticetum, 3. In feudal speech it transfer to the territory of a town and in combination with the adjective gradski means župa, županija...".*" Skok, 2, 1972, 398.

⁸ Belostenec, 2, 1740, 214. It seems that the word "*krajina*" in its basic sense is older than the related terms given, judging by Skok: "*Kraj... the old derivative with -ina (krajina (1110) is important with the adjective krajinski (1597) as a territorial term 1. Land on borders (Bosnia, Montenegro) 2. Wars in that land, from whence the verbs "krajiniti " (Serbia, Vuk), to wage war...".*" Skok, 2, 1972, 176-177. Otherwise for Skok the word "*grana*" from which derives the word "*granica*" is also very old: "*The oldest confirmed meaning "margo" is found in the Germanic archaic term "Grenze". In that sense it has the Slavic and Old Slavonic diminutive ending -ica: granica (1499) synonyms: međa krajina, krajište, Vojna krajina.*" Skok, 1, 1971, 608.

⁹ In the 19th century the terms "*Vojna krajina*" and "*Vojna granica*" (Military Border) took on practically the same meaning.

THE TRIPLE-FRONTIER AS *KRAJINA*

The Morean and Viennese war between (1683–1699 and 1684–1699) was still being fought in the *Krajina*, on the triple frontier as a united region at the meeting place of two Empires, where everyday life was to a large extent the same. Whilst the *Krajina* was already at that time deeply rooted as a notion on the Habsburg and Ottoman sides, at the beginning of the 16th century, the Venetian side already limited to land along parts of the coastline of the Adriatic and its islands, the word “*krajina*” or more precisely “*krajine*” (plural) became commonly used only after the Cretan war, that is from the time when the Venetian borders also began to move inland, towards the regions where the “*krajiška*” (borderland) way of life – meaning of course warfare – was already deeply rooted.¹⁰

Regardless of all their differences, the late Medieval Hungarian, Slavonian and Croatian captaincies, right up to the fundamental changes in the Habsburg Croatia-Slavonian military borderlands in the first half of the 18th century, formed the heart of the military borderland system both on the Croatian and the Bosnian side in the Ottoman Empire. Kreševljaković points out that there were no captaincies, apart from in Bosnia, anywhere else in the Ottoman Empire. On the borders with Croatia the Ottoman rulers founded them, often with the same headquarters, usually after they had conquered an area or in situations where some need arose. The Gradiška captaincy was founded in 1537, in Krupa in 1565 and in Bihać in 1592. “When their conquests reached the banks of the Sava and the Una, the Turks encountered the captaincies which had been founded on the Croatia-Hungarian side to defend against further advances by the Turks. They began to make use of them themselves in the towns they had conquered, where they already existed, keeping them going by appointing their own Captains and sending armed forces there.”¹¹

No one except Kreševljaković has to date made a detailed comparison of the Croatian and Bosnian or rather the Habsburg and Ottoman captaincies, and even he does not do it systematically. Although it is possible to accept his opinion that the “captaincies in Bosnia are a copy (...) of the military borderlands in Croatia when these were in their formation,” it is hard to overlook the fact that their environment in the hierarchy of power in Bosnia was very different from that of the captaincies in the Croatian military borderlands and in Slavonia. From both sides the central military power was a professional army, infantry and cavalry, in both cases there was, in time, an increasing proportion of unpaid soldiers, usually from the Vlach or Morlach (Northern Dalmatian) population, and furthermore for both sides the regional aspect of the organization of the captaincy was important. A major difference was that service in the captaincy on the Bosnian side was hereditary.¹²

Kreševljaković is partially right when he says that the Bosnian captaincies did not make up a “separate territory like the military borderlands” as the process of territorial separation of the military borderlands was very slow on the Croatian-Slavonian side, and was not completed until the middle of the 18th century.¹³ However whilst in the middle of the 18th century the captaincies were disappearing from the Habsburg military borderlands, on the Ottoman side, in Bosnia, their number was increasing and the territory covered by the captaincy system was growing, albeit “reformed” in a particular fashion, so that on the eve of their dissolution in the Bosnian *eyalet*, there were thirty-nine of them.¹⁴

There are other important differences. The strongest military borderland urban strongholds on the Habsburg side were first of all Senj and later Karlovac, both of which were relatively far from the border, in the sense of the dividing line, whilst on the Ottoman side, the urban, fortress nature of the *krajina* area was much more obvious. Bihać, as by far

¹⁰ Peričić, 1989, 184.

¹¹ Kreševljaković, 1980, 5, 7.

¹² *Ibid*, 11.

¹³ *Ibid*, 73.

¹⁴ “... in the entire Bosnian *eyalet* there were 39 captancies in 1829.” *Ibid*, 15.

the most important Bosnian *krajina* centre, and captaincy, was always relatively close to the border. In time (1699), as the border changed, it was even closer to the border, and even then the Habsburgs did not succeed in conquering it: "The Turks took Bihać or Bišće on 19th June 1592, and immediately made it the centre of the Bihać *sanjak*, *cadiluk* and captaincy. At the end of the 18th and in the first years of the 19th centuries other towns were also part of this captaincy: Bihać, Sokolac, Ripač, Brekovic, Izačić, Mutnik, Trzac, and Jasenica. Since all these towns were occupied at the same time as Bihać, they were certainly part of the same system from the first years of the existence of that captaincy. The *Agas* of the Bihać captaincy had their seats in these towns. Bihać, Ripač and Brekovic had their own *dizdaras*. As Bihać was the seat of a captaincy before 1592, it continued as such under the Turks. In place of Josip Lamberg, the last Croatian captain, the Turks appointed their own captain and troops. Since Bihać was from that time the main Bosnian fortress, so the Bihać captain was considered to be the head of all the captains in the Bosnian *eyalet*. He sat on the *eyalet* council in the first seat on the captains' side.¹⁵

Thus on the triple frontier there was a "structural" similarity in the way they were organized as military borderlands, which without doubt went a long way to form the basis of a united borderland region, independent of imperial boundaries, and they made possible all forms of communication between the leaders of the region. However these leaders were not the only ones who maintained communication over the borders of these "worlds." Their subjects, farmers in more peaceful times, even at risk to their lives, frequently worked the land on both sides of the border, sometimes even giving their tithes to two masters. The movements of herdsmen were more constant and deeper rooted, since the borders at the triple frontier were for them the most controversial, as they frequently limited movement along paths that had been used for thousands of years leading to summer and winter pastures in both the Adriatic and Dinaric regions. Despite the frequent contradictory measures introduced by the authorities, they always managed to obtain what they wanted in the end. The entire region of the triple boundary was criss-crossed by numerous legal and illegal trade routes. In such an area trade is never merely local, and was frequently quite extensive, when it was a matter of salt or livestock. If trade could not be legal, smuggling could achieve similar if not greater results, with the complicity of people from two or even all three sides of the boundaries. The best example of this is the constant and truly massive, and lucrative, smuggling of salt. Incidentally, it is in any case difficult to differentiate trade from contraband on the triple boundary. In the end, only rarely were there no travellers from all corners of the world, who in their own way would also contribute to integration on this boundary. Thus, people moved over the boundary in the widest variety of directions and for the widest variety of reasons.¹⁶

¹⁵ Ibid, 101. During the time when the treaty of Požarevac was being negotiated (1718), when the Ottoman Empire was in a very unequal position in decisions over the Bosnian borders, the very determined attempts by the Habsburgs to gain control of Bihać were unsuccessful. For the Ottomans Bihać was "the key to the Bosnian *eyalet*" and they would not give it up, the more so since they had succeeded in defending it in the war: "The talks about Bihać were much more complex. In the name of Austria the negotiators said this important fortress and city with its surroundings should be surrendered to them in return for part of the territory of the Belgrade pashaluk. The Ottoman diplomats reacted energetically. Their response was that Bihać was the key to the Bosnia *eyalet* and that if they were to give it up, it would bring the entire province into question. They also said that definitely not even the Sultan, nor the great vezir and the then Bosnian representative Numa-pashy Čuprilić (who had succeeded in defending it in the war) would agree to this." Pelidija, 1989, 246. This way of seeing things was expressed in Ottoman sources in many situations. Pelidija writes that "still in 1700 in a chronogram on the fortress wall, the following was written: "The key to Bosnia is Bihać." Ibid, 105. See Mehmed Mujezinović. *Islamska epigrafika Bosne I Hercegovine. Vol. III. Bosanska krajina, zapadna Bosna i Hercegovina*. Sarajevo. 1982, 410.

See also the map *Military-administrative Organisation of Bosnian Eyalet, 1699–1718*. Drawn by Dr. Mirela Slukan.

¹⁶ All these forms of integration of communications on the area of the triple frontier have been discussed recently by Bernard Stulli in his research of the Sinj border regions. See the discussion

Finally the greatest role in maintaining the “unity” of the borderland region fell to the *uskoks* and the *hajduks* (fugitives and outlaws). Although they were on all sides at best on the edge of the law, of course with the proviso that they could be used against one side of the triple frontier or the other – usually in wars, they were such an endemic phenomenon in this region that it is impossible to consider any kind of history of the region without them. This paper will pay them particular attention.¹⁷

**FROM BORDERLANDS TO MILITARY BORDERLANDS
AND IMPERIAL BORDERS:
BASIC ISSUES OF THE WARS OF 1683–1699 AND 1684–1699
ON THE TRIPLEX CONFINIUM**

The border fixed by international agreement in the treaty of Karlovac in 1699, and the complete organisation of the borders which were fixed over the years that followed, were carried out in accord with the developmental needs of modern states and the appropriate inter-state relationships in Europe. This *de facto* ruled out the existence of the *krajina* in the singular.¹⁸

Thus the foundations were secured for the development of the military borderland systems and societies in the Habsburg Monarchy, the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire, with their differing regimes, which were primarily regulated from above from the centre of the state’s authority.¹⁹

However the basic question arises whether in the Viennese and Morean war (1683–1699 and 1684–1699), there were any visible changes which would show any distinctive direction taken by the military borderlands institutions, the constitution of complex interests from “below” upwards, in the *krajina* region, in a social and hierarchical sense, which would have important consequences for post-war events and changes. This paper is based on the assumption that this war – more precisely these two wars – in the very area of the Triplex Confinium established social and state interests which would largely be in conflict, on all three sides, with the later needs for development (in some sense modernization) of each of these three empires faced with the challenge of building a modern state. Every modern war is primarily a redistribution of power, authority and wealth, and European states of the early Modern era are an extremely important example of how and to what extent war and the emergence of modern European states are indistinguishable from each other.²⁰

Kroz historiju Sinjske krajine and gospodarsko-društvene i političke prilike u Cetinskoj krajini sredinom 18. stoljeća, published in his collection “*Iz povijest Dalmacije*.” Split, 1992, 25–128; 129–208. Precisely the pasture lands in the Sinj borderlands were vital to the local people: on one side the pastures mentioned on the Dinar mountains, and those over the border within Cetina county; on the other hand to the south, parts of Klis county were used for winter pasture as well as the out-lying districts of central Dalmatian towns such as Split, Trogir and Šibenik. The latter were also important for salt, which was one of the main conditions, along with pasture and water, for the development of stock-breeding. Since they could only obtain salt in those towns, this resulted in the long-term and firm dependence of the stock-rearing hinterland on the coastal towns. Stulli, 1992, 26.

¹⁷ An excellent original account of the life of hajduks in the region is *Život Stanislava Sočivice* by Ivan Lovrić, first published in 1776. See too the Croatian translation: Ivan Lovrić. *Bilješke o Putu po Dalmaciji opata Alberta Fortisa i Život Stanislava Sočivice*. Zagreb, 1948, 183–216.

¹⁸ See a selection from basic literature: Braunstein – Delort, 1971; Lane, 1987 (1973); De-lumeau, 1991 (1974).; Kann, 1974; Diehl, 1985; Kitsikis, 1994 (1985); Bérenger, 1990; Matuz, 1992; Duggan, 1998 (1994); Inalcik – Quataert, 1996 (1994); Ingrao, 1994; Faroqhi, 2000.

¹⁹ Peričić, 1989, 169–215; Kaser, Kreševljaković, 1980.

²⁰ Turk Christensen, 1990.

Once established, these interests were to remain at least until the middle of the 18th century and often significantly longer. They are more visible in the Venetian Republic than in the Habsburg Monarchy but most clear of all in the Ottoman Empire.²¹

This paper should answer the question what kind of war was the Viennese and Morean war in the triple-borderlands, why it was fought in this region, who was involved and how it was fought and what were the interests which were being visibly established in the triple-borderlands. The issue therefore goes beyond the bounds of an article for a collection of scientific papers, and the main theme of the research will be the events on the Venetian side of the frontier, in Dalmatia, with occasional references to events on the other two sides.

In accord with the main point of focus of this discussion on the creation of a borderland society after the Vienna war, we will attempt to examine to what extent and how this society grew up during the war, in a complex network of related interests between the Venetian authorities and the people on the various sides of the borders, faced with the challenge of an alliance with Venice and/or citizenship. Stated in this way, this issue would not have much weight in research terms if the strategy of the Venetian war in Dalmatia, on the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy was not primarily based on the assumption of the possibility of a strategical alliance with the local population, above all on the Ottoman side. At this point it is not important whether this assumption was realistic, when the moods of the population were involved, since its reality was so effective that it had a decisive and basic effect on the behaviour and actions of the Venetian authorities on various levels of their hierarchy of power and authority.

From the beginning of the 16th century, when the triple-frontier first came into being, until the end of the 17th century, when with the Viennese-Morean war the region was reshaped, for the first time the Habsburg and Venetian sides spread their campaigns deeper and deeper into Ottoman, Bosnian and Herzegovinian territory.²²

At that time in the border regions of the Ottoman Empire, on both the Habsburg and the Venetian sides, anti-Ottoman activities by Ottoman subjects, with cross-border connections spread over a wide area, began regularly before operations by the Habsburg and Venetian armies.

Since at the beginning of 1682 the news spread far and wide of the Ottomans' preparations to wage war in the west along the Ottoman-Venetian border in Dalmatia and Bosnia, tension mounted considerably with many incursions by outlawed Venetian and Habsburg subjects (*uskoks*) into the Bosnian side, but also by Ottoman subjects in the opposite direction. The activities of *bajduks* across all the borders also increased, with the main focus being on attacks in Bosnia. In September 1682, following the slaughter of Ottoman subjects by the Morlachs (Northern Dalmatian herdsmen) in Zemunik, a severe crisis broke out in international relationships, which at that moment did not suit either the Venetians or the Ottoman authorities: "Hostilities followed on the border already in

²¹ When dealing with the Venetian borderlands in Dalmatia an important source from the period leading up to the fall of the Venetian Republic "*Priručnik o vojnim krajinama u Dalmaciji iz 1783*" drawn up under the orders of the *general provveditore* Bollduo, in its very introduction gives the following basic assessment: "The Dalmatian people were thought to be only capable of war, and on the basis of this inexact assessment they were left to themselves."

An unsuitable legal system, complex distribution of land, a lack of measures to prevent the fall in the population figures and orders by which people would become more civilised by their faith, no encouragement for farmers, enormous burdens resulting from poverty, unjustly distributed, were what brought unhappiness and poverty to the people. Regulations for Dalmatia were only a temporary help, which would have been more effective if there had been a good basic legal foundation." Rokсандić, 1999, 16. Trans. Olga Diklić.

See also the map *Military-administrative organisation of Dalmatia 1699–1797*. Drawn by Dr. Mirela Slukan.

²² See the map *Changes of Borders in the Wider Triple Frontier Area (1606–1791)*. Drawn by Dr. Mirela Slukan.

1682. Namely in September of that year the Venetian subjects in Zemunik killed more than a hundred Turks over disputes about limitations on the renting of land (...). This caused a severe diplomatic conflict which was smoothed over by bribes to officials of the sultan. The following year, the Turks, in revenge, attacked the Zadar inland area, killed twelve people and took a large quantity of cattle; The *uskoks* then pursued the Turks and killed about a hundred of the attackers (...). This incident did not have the same consequences as that in Zemunik.”²³

The riots, conflicts and contention were barely subsiding and after the news arrived in September 1683 of the breaking of the Ottoman siege of Vienna, it was impossible to contain the Morlach uprising on the Venetian-Ottoman border: “The movement began in Kotari. Under the leadership of Ilija Janković a number of people from Kotari and several *uskoks* from Senj attacked Vrana... All the villages were deserted collectively, meaning that the action had been well organized” (Raukar et al. 1987: 364). Calming the uprising was not helped by extremely risky measures such as official intervention by influential Morlach leaders Zaviša and Stojan Janković in Venice. Namely the Venetian Republic had for a long time endeavoured to keep out of the war, even after the Ottoman defeat at Vienna, and when it did decide to enter the war in 1684, the Dalmatian and Bosnian battle fields were not its priority. As a result throughout the war the Venetians had relatively humble forces available.²⁴

On the other hand, the anti-Ottoman sentiment amongst the new Venetian subjects, from the time of the Cretan war, and the numerous Ottoman subjects in the Venetians’ neighbourhood, was so great that the hardest thing for the Venetian authorities was to discover how to make best use of it, in accord with the current needs of the state’s poilitics. The Habsburg and Venetian military authorities, taken by surprise themselves by the defeat of the Ottoman military might in the siege of Vienna, could, at best, encourage the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, the Roman Catholics and the Orthodox, that is the Croats and the Serbs, to rebel against the Ottoman authorities. Here the interests of the Habsburgs and the Venetians were very different, as were their capacities for action in the triple frontier area. Since the defeat of the *uskoks* of Senj at the beginning of the 17th century, the activities of Habsburg subjects over the Ottoman and Venetian borders in the region of the triple frontier were limited and were in fact restricted to a “small war.” The situation was different with the Venetians. In the Cretan war (1645–1669), the conflicts between the Venetians and the Ottomans reached their climax, meaning that the Venetians were investing their greatest efforts in ensuring the greatest number of Ottoman subjects as their allies in the war, men who under various circumstances, would be willing to cooperate with the Venetians and accept their authority. The Venetians were not particularly discriminating in choosing their allies. As result in various ways and under various conditions many outlaws, especially *bajduks* and *uskoks*, were entering the service of Venice, those who had in many cases, been pursued by the same authorities up to the beginning of the war. With them were many, often more restrained secular and spiritual leaders along the Eastern Adriatic coast, as well as in the offshore area, and increasingly in the nearer inland regions. Since the Venetians themselves had very limited military power in the provinces of Dalmatia and Albania at the beginning of the war against the Ottoman Empire in 1684, they had no alternative but to rely on the inventiveness and power of these mainly unwanted allies, primarily *uskoks* and *bajduks*.²⁵

This choice of allies made it much easier for the Venetians to succeed in their direct aims in the war in their inland Eastern Adriatic territory, which was mainly limited to

²³ Raukar et al., 1987, 364.

²⁴ See: Desnica, 1, 230 ff; Stanojević, 1958; Stanojević, 1962.

²⁵ Milošević, 1988: is an excellent collection of material on the role of the *bajduks* in the Venetian wars in Boka and neighbouring countries, also important for research in to the history of Dalmatia of that time. The Desnica collection, because of its basic conception, makes it possible to gain a partial insight into this issue in Northern Dalmatia.

parts of the coastline and islands. It only spread partially inland after the Cretan war. If these were not deep incursions, they were important for the fact that they made up for the loss of Crete and were moreover in Dalmatia, which formed the most effective protection of long-term Venetian geo-strategic interests in both economic and military senses. At a time when the Habsburgs were finding it much more difficult to find their bearings in the region of the triple borderland from Lika to Krbava further southwards, the Venetians, militarily much weaker, were in the throes of a major offensive. Anyone who could succeed in a war of that kind in principle gained the possibility of entering the service of the Habsburgs or the Venetians. Once more the numbers of *uskoks*, *hajduks* and a wide variety of outlaws increased, for whom the ideal was to become a mercenary with any kind of status, in armies upon which both the Habsburg and the Venetian sides relied heavily at the beginning of the war.²⁶

It could be said that in the early Modern era the Republic adapted very easily to local circumstances in its search for a way to ensure the greatest possible success in a military sense, where its land forces were relatively weak. Moreover, the Republic had a long tradition of paying mercenaries, both on the Apennine peninsular and throughout Europe and the Mediterranean, dating back to the Middle Ages. In a series of wars the "fate" of the Venetian Republic depended precisely on the trustworthiness, skill and sincerity of people linked to the Republic by a business contract: *"si la guerre était l'affaire du Sénat, les délégués vénitiens sur les champs de bataille – les provveditorii generali d'armata – étaient à côté des condottières, des fonctionnaires sans lustre. (...) Dans les guerres terrestres, ..., la République alignait comme ses rivaux des armées de mercenaires, conduites par les professionnels. (...) Quant aux troupes qui combattirent pour Venise, elles étaient en partie composées de "sujets" ou d 'alliés."*²⁷

Here it is very difficult to differentiate mercenaries in a pure sense from the many kinds of subjects who were in the army, since being a subject and loyalty to the Venetian Republic often directly depended on its ability to fulfill the expectations, or in other words, the demands of the soldiers who, if adequate remuneration was not forthcoming, were always willing, given the opportunity, to transfer to the service of another power. This was frequently the case in the triple-borderland area at the time we are dealing with here. However it would be historically inaccurate to overlook the deep-rooted tradition of service in the Venetian army amongst Greeks ("stradioti"), Croats ("*...comme ce baron qui en 1538 propose ses services avec 200 cavaliers*"), and other southern Slavs (Slavs, Dalmatians, Morlachs, those from Boka, Montenegro, Herzegovina), Albanians ("*...les meilleurs combattants contre les Uscoques, puisque par profession et par nature, ils sont ennemies;...*")²⁸ This kind of warfare would not have been possible without the "umbrella" of a mighty navy, readily available finances, unquestionably great diplomatic skill etc.: *"Elle doit à l'organisation même du commerce qui la nourrit, à l'ancienneté de ses positions (115) stratégiques, à la qualité d'un personnel dirigeant étroit, une tradition de diplomatie fondée sur la nouvelle, l'échange et la secret."* (118)²⁹.

However the way Venetian military affairs were run was to a large extent the result of Venetian constitutionalism, which permitted the Republic's position on the Mediterra-

²⁶ Unfortunately it is still almost impossible to speak with confidence about how great a part was played by these men in the forces of any of the warring sides on the triple frontier. Although partial data are available now in large quantities, it is still impossible to gain a complete insight. In the case of the Venetian Republic it is not even easy to do research in this field, bearing in mind the way they waged war on land, by recruiting military manpower, their widely varying status, pay etc.

²⁷ Braunstein-Delort, 1971, 114–115.

²⁸ Braunstein-Delort, *ibid.* There is still no thorough work published on Venetian military history of the early Modern era, as far as I have been able to find, in accord with the standards of world historiography, such as the monography by Hale, 1990.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 115,118.

nean to be established in a multitude of ways and with a high level of flexibility. This was particularly true of the Eastern Adriatic coast.³⁰

The way war was waged, which the later Middle Ages in South East Europe already knew as *akindžijski* or *martološki*, where the main aim was to expel and murder, or to take captive the population and destroy their material culture and economic resources, existed in the triple-borderland area for two full centuries, and was mainly known as *mali rat* ("small war").³¹

In the Viennese or Morean war the relationships in the triple borderlands were changed radically precisely as a result of this form of warfare as a type of planned strategy on both the Habsburg and the Venetian sides. Although the Ottoman side also attempted to make use of it again, the effect was much more limited since they were in any case either fighting defensively or in retreat.³²

³⁰ "De l'affirmation solennelle des droits acquis et de la juridiction sur l'Adriatique découle un système habile de souveraineté sur la côte et l'arrière-pays slaves: gouvernements direct, par occupation effective ou dédition provoquée, suzeraineté de type féodal, alliances militaires ..., traité de buona vicinia." Ibid, 93.

True experts in the early Modern era—especially followers of the tradition of Roman law and its appropriation into the legal heritage of the Holy Roman Empire, and later many expert followers of the theory of natural law – frequently criticise the "synthetic" nature of Venetian constitutionalism, its relationship to common law etc. More recently, in the historiography of the Venetian Republic there is a growing interest in these questions. For a very reliable interpretation of the issues involved see Cozzi, 1980 (1985). In this book Cozzi cites exhaustively an English critic of the 17th century, Sir Arthur Duck. *De usu et auctoritate Juris Civilis Romanorum in Dominiis Principum Christianorum*. London, 1653, who says on page 142 of his work, according to Cozzi's quotation: "Veneti vero ex omnibus aliis Italiae populis minime Romanas leges admiserunt" egli scriveva "et ut libertatem suam primaeuam contra Imperatorum Romanorum vim et potestatem conseruarunt, ita et legibus semper suis usi sunt; cum hoc summum in omnibus gentibus libertatis sit testimonium, legibus et moribus suis uti." This passage gave the writer cause to make the following comment: "Sir Artbur non ignorava che celebri giuristi avevano criticato il sistema die Venetiani, in quanto fondato sull'arbitrium," e che era stato attribuito a "superbia" il loro rifiuto di ottemperare alle leggi imperiali. Non era d'accordo: e riteneva anzi che a Venezia si fosse realizzata una soddisfacente integrazione tra il diritto proprio, die Veneziani, e il diritto romano, o comune, o imperiale, come si preferiva chiamarlo." Cozzi, 1980 (1985), 17–18.

See one of the latest works linking legal and military issues with full bibliographic notes on recent literature, Ivetic, 2000, 77–102.

³¹ Contrary to common opinion, *martolozzi* (mercenaries) were included in the military forces in the borderlands on the Habsburg side, especially in the early period of the history of the military borderlands. There is more about this by Lopašić, 1884, 1885 and 1889. Hamdija Kreševljaković also wrote about it: "However the *martolozzi* also crossed the borders and entered Christian service. There they were trained and equipped for battle against the Turkish *martolozzi*. The Austrian military authorities endeavored to pay their *martolozzi* better than the other soldiers." Kreševljaković, 1980, 27. However the mentality of *martološki* warfare was deeply embedded in the population on all three sides of the triple frontier. The Viennese war was to be the best testimony to this, and this testimony was not to be limited to the frontier territory alone.

³² In Italian historiography of the history of the Venetian Republic, as in other world languages, there is very little material on the military service of Venetian subjects and mercenaries in South Eastern Europe and from the Levant. In the case of the Morean war, in synthetic histories of the Venetian Republic, in interpretations from the 18th century to the present day, the fighting in Dalmatia is always overshadowed by the Levant battlefields. If there is some mention of it however, the Morean side is either absent or is totally marginalised. See for instance: Laugier, 1769; Le comte de Daru, 1838; Lane, 1973, 198; Diehl, 1985; Cozzi-Knapton-Scaraballo, 1992; Donati, 1996. A clear exception is Giuseppe Praga who in his *History of Dalmatia* (English translation of the Italian original (Pisa, 1993) gives assessments which are unusual for the mainstream of Italian historiography of the Venetian Republic: "For the first time in the history of Turco-Venetian relations the breaking off of diplomatic relations, the exchange of ambassadors, and the declaration of war took place according to international law. But as early as 1682 incidents that were so serious as to be incompatible with a normal state of peace had already taken place in Dalmatia. In September Hassan bey, a brother of the sanjack bey of Lica, had expelled from Zemonico a few Venetian Morlachs who had rental agreements. The infu-

Whilst in the “small war” in the triple borderlands, it was usually individuals or small groups who were captured, in the Viennese or Morean war the target of the war was the entire dependent community, primarily Christian (Catholic or Orthodox, Croatian or Serbian). The mass of the Islamic population had either been eliminated or taken captive. Amongst the captives there were often many Christians – more often Orthodox than Catholic – usually those who could not be persuaded to transfer to Habsburg or Venetian rule. In terms of the Middle Ages, the cycles of rises and falls in the movement of the number of slaves and the slave trade are relatively well-known.³³

For the Venetians this was a good source of income even from the earliest days of their Republic. The, at the very least, ambiguous attitude of the Church to the question had a significant influence: *“Neither slaves nor serfs ever formed a substantial part of the Venetian population, but in the ninth century slaves ranked almost with salt and fish as a mainstay of Venetian commerce. Christianity had not abolished slavery, and Church leaders approved the enslavement of pagans and “infidels.” They did so on the grounds that the enslavement of their bodies might lead to the salvation of their souls.”*³⁴

Reports of Venetian slaves in the early Modern era are much less reliable, although there is much more evidence in source material available from that time. As the entire history of the Venetians is the history of survival on the frontiers of faith, culture and civilisation, regardless of whether slavery was important in the Venetian reality in any sense, there will never be any lack of the possibility of excusing slavery, the trade in human beings: *“Among the “infidels” were counted not only the Moslems but those Christians were considered heretics. During some centuries, the Orthodoxy of the Greeks was considered heresy by Catholics, who adhered to Rome as did the Venetians.”* (Ibid.). There were plenty of wars. If the Venetians were not waging them themselves, they were being supplied with slaves by the others who were fighting in the period of peace in Venice. Almost all the wars in the region around Venice had some kind of religious connotation even in the early Modern era. The only exceptions were wars in the immediate vicinity of Italy. *“Wars against pagans, Moslems, and heretics helped supply the slave markets; indeed, wars and slave raids seemed in some cases indistinguishable. But citizens of the Italian cities did not enslave each other; captives were held for ransom or freed by the terms of a treaty.”*³⁵

To understand events on the Eastern coast of the Adriatic in the early Modern era, one must always bear in mind that at that time the Venetian need for slaves increased once more, especially in the 17th century, more precisely following the battle of Lepanto, and primarily in the navy: *“Increasingly, the crews on Venetian galleys were of mixed nationality. The thirty to forty soldier guards needed on each galley were largely Albanian refugees. Dalmatians and Greeks were numerous among the sailors of all ranks and among the free oarsmen. Convict oarsmen could not be had in sufficient number from Venetian prisons and were obtained from neighbouring states, even as far away as Bavaria. As the Cretan war dragged on, Venice’s oarsmen came to resemble more and more the galley slaves whom their opponents and allies obtained from raids or from the slave markets in Leghorn and various Moslem ports. Ever since Lepanto, captured Turks had been used. Gradually, more and more reliance was placed on recruiting in the Aegean Islands by methods which may include slave raids, purchase in slave markets, impressment, and the paying of bonuses.”*³⁶

riated Morlachs attacked Hassan and his clan and tore them to pieces. An atmosphere of muted hostility developed between the two sides, and when in September, 1683, the news of great Christian victory under the walls of Vienna spread, the Morlachs and cernide rose up irrepressibly.” Praga, 1993, 192. However in Praga’s case the only people mentioned by name in his history of the Morean war are Italians. The Morlachs are mentioned only en masse, with a collective noun.

³³ Budak, 1985, 115–130; Margetić, 1997, 385–436 (“O dalmatinskim servima”).

³⁴ Lane, 1987, 7.

³⁵ Ibid, 75.

³⁶ Ibid, 415.

What made war and warfare different in the triple borderland region from warfare in South West Europe, from Italy to England in the early Modern Era? When one reads more reliable literature on war history, concentrating on war as an act of the destruction of human life and possessions, it is hard to see any difference. However, if we assess wars and warfare in the light of the historical shaping of modern states, the differences are more than obvious. In South Eastern Europe war and warfare were factors in the shaping of modern states and societies, but in the triple borderland region they were a factor in the destruction of any prerequisites for that kind of development. On the one hand war was indistinguishable from the forming of modern “*civiltà*,” whilst on the other it continued to marginalise and “barbarise” these people in Europe etc.

To be more precise, to give an example, whilst in the 17th century wars on the Apennine peninsular rarely involved huge movements in the population, in Central Southern and South Eastern Europe this was the rule rather than the exception. The history of early Modern era imperial heritage in the area on the boundaries of today’s Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, is the history of changing borders and populations on the move. Many will argue with this and say that this kind of approach comes into conflict with the completely opposite view, showing which parts of the Habsburg monarchy, the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire did not change their imperial status from the beginning of the 16th to the end of the 18th centuries. This is irrefutable. The broad and unchanging cores of imperial power are not in question. However, there is hardly one of those mentioned where the regions were any less spacious which at various times in the new Modern era did not change their status. If it is a question of the population, their mobility during that same period, precisely in those peripheral, borderland regions was far greater. Namely, changes of borders are indistinguishable from the changes in population, not only of the disputed border areas, but also many areas deep within the empires. Moreover, the consequences of the changes of the borders in any instance are in various ways indistinguishable from the social and historical changes within the empires over a long period of time. Frequently the imperial power is unable to assimilate the consequences of these changes in any other way than to enter into a new imperial war for more border changes, for a new distribution of the population etc. It is possible to draw many other comparisons.

Historical cartography of wars and warfare in early Modern age Europe would reveal that there are regions where war was an endemic phenomenon, where conflicts were concentrated, influencing changes in civilisations way beyond the boundaries or the actual site of the war itself, and meaning that those regions remained on a very low level of development by contemporary European criteria. This is the case with the triple frontier region. The geographical and strategic importance of the triple frontier for each of the imperial powers meant it was constantly of great importance to all of them (the attitude of the Ottomans towards Bihać, the Venetians towards Zadar and the Habsburgs to Senj in a symbolic sense!), but also limited over the long term in terms of its chances for development as a civilisation.³⁷

It is therefore difficult to say what, for any of the imperial traditions of that period, what were the real and what the virtual borders and what was the border area or frontier. In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire from 1500–1800, each of these imperial powers was differently constituted, developed in different ways through history, and moreover, had a different relationship towards its borders and the borderlands and the people living in them.

This is probably clearest in the case of the Habsburg Monarchy. In fact that very term has only been commonly in use since the beginning of the 20th century, when the empire had already fallen. During its existence in the early Modern era this term never adequately expressed its dynastic or legal identity as a state. This is not the case with any

³⁷ See again the map, *Changes of Borders in the Wider Triple Frontier Area (1606–1791)*. Drawn by Dr. Mirela Slukan.

other term such as *Monarchia Austriaca*, *Imperium Austriacum* etc. The Habsburg Monarchy as a personal union, as an absolute monarchy as an Austrian Empire etc. however it was defined, was always questionable in some part of its constitutional tradition, which regularly meant that the idea of its real or virtual borders was also questionable, and therefore the borderland society was too. Namely, from the perspective of Vienna, or lower Austria, the borders were not the same as they were from the Croatian or Polish perspective. From the perspective of the Habsburg court, whatever in relation to borders could be legitimately considered to be the subject of diplomatic or military discussion, from the Croatian point of view, from any angle, could be a question of survival.

In contrast to the Habsburg Monarchy, spread out over a large part of the European continent and thus with a very fluid understanding of borders, the Venetian Republic was its own form of state boundary over its entire territory, from the Northern Italian *Terraferma* to its scattered lands in the Levant. In fact the most constant of the Venetian possessions was the sea, most of the Adriatic and a lesser part of the Mediterranean. Although the Venetians in various ways shared it with others, up to the beginning of the 18th century on many sides of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean seas, their domination was unquestionably hegemonic. Therefore, because of the very nature of maritime travel in the new Modern era, their first priority was to control the coastlines, which would enable them to maintain their domination of the seas, or to have such relationships with the powers who controlled the coasts that their, that is the Venetian hegemony, would remain unchallenged. Thus in the regions of the triple borderlands they were unequally matched in power in terms of trading interests, which, metaphorically speaking, are without borders, and geo-strategic interests, which presumed the weakness of the Habsburgs and the Ottomans on the Adriatic and in principle – as few as possible common interests between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. Combining trading, naval and financial power, in the many changes that took place over the three centuries of the early Modern era, the Venetian Republic showed itself to be very concerned about its borders on the triple frontier in a different way from the Habsburg Monarchy and especially the Ottoman Empire.

From its establishment in the Eastern Mediterranean area, with the integration of a great deal of the Byzantine heritage, in the middle of the 15th century, and as it expanded over three continents in South East and Central Eastern Europe, the Levant and Northern Africa throughout most of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire, founded on the principle of unceasing holy war (*gaza*), was in its entirety a “borderland empire.” Although at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries, following massive defeats and loss of territory, its status in South Eastern Europe was to come into question for the Ottomans themselves, the borderland nature of the empire in the triple frontier region became only the more obvious. Hence the question: *How to construct a Border Society?* with the given restrictions of space and time, includes at least two assumptions: first that following the treaty of Karlovac in 1699 each of the imperial powers had changed its social and historical situation in the borderland region in various ways, and secondly that these changes are incomprehensible if we do not take into account the fact that the actions of the imperial powers in their own borderland regions were fully intentional.

However from the beginning of the 16th century when the region of the triple-frontier emerged, its social and historical situation was in a constant state of flux, and each of the three imperial powers in different ways was forming its own interests in the region, or, in other words, the social and historical reality of the triple-frontier region was being shaped by the distinctive interests of the three empires. In this sense a more appropriate question would seem to be: what was changing in the triple-frontier region in a new social and historical sense at the end of the 17th and in the first half of the 18th centuries? When the question is formulated in this way, it demands a much more complex answer as it includes changes in both the macro-historic and the micro-historic sense, that is both from an imperial perspective and, with a great deal of interventions, from the perspective from within the triple borderland itself.

For all three empires the wars of 1683–1699 and 1684–1699 did not happen “by chance.” Maybe this was truer than for any other war in that triangle since the beginning

of the 16th century. First the Habsburgs and the Ottomans had barely succeeded in ending a war (1663–1664) and, following many major changes from within, this was accepted by both sides merely as a cease fire. Secondly: the Cretan war (1645–1669) caused such far-reaching changes in Venetian-Ottoman relations, that in that case, both sides felt to a large extent that a continuation of the war was unavoidable. On all three sides the war was to do with the internal balance of power and authority, albeit with differing emphases. The Habsburgs, with all their titles as rulers, were in fact torn between their empirical ambitions in the Holy Roman Empire and the challenge of founding their own state based on absolute power. They could only do this in the countries they had inherited, the Czech lands, bearing in mind the changes brought by the Thirty Years' War and the crown of St. Stephen in many countries, where they had founded their *de facto* unlimited authority, following the collapse of Hungarian and Croatian rule in the 1670's. The Venetians, losing in the Levant, were gaining more and more territory closer to their centre, but without the ability to constitute a modern state. The last war between the Venetians and the Ottomans (1714–1718) is clear evidence of that. The Venetians had never had so much influence in the triple-frontier region, but at the same time the extent of their power was never so unclear as then. After 1718 it seemed that the Venetian Republic turned in on itself – we could say *post factum* – dying a long painful death. The Ottomans, who from the beginning of the 16th century had been constituted as a tri-continental Mediterranean State, by that time had exhausted the potential for expansion of its state machinery, based on religion. The entire history of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century is marked by the challenge of the Habsburgs (and not to forget the Russians). The wars of 1716–1718, 1736–1739 and 1789–1791 revealed the complete anachronism of their imperial challenges which had no hope of any lasting supremacy, challenges which were also determined by the triple-frontier region as a relative geo-strategic constant. Thus the triple-frontier became “exactly” recognisable precisely because all three imperial powers were in different ways losing their potential for expansion, which in all three cases decreased the space between the real and the virtually defined imperial boundaries.

Furthermore the triple-frontier region was mentally in a state of constant, long-term danger of war. The effects of the war itself would hardly have been what they were if the frustrations of war had not gone on for such a long time. The dilemmas of the triple-frontier area were increased by indecision in the centres of state power. None of the imperial powers saw the triple-frontier as a lasting solution, but none had the power to solve the ambiguity. This meant that none of them saw their policies towards the triple-frontier as a contribution to its stability, rather primarily as the starting point for further imperial advances, for which, with the perspective of time, they had ever decreasing power.³⁸

This meant that they saw the border areas, in an ideological sense, primarily as a region, which excluded the possibility of imperial retreat, and presented room for imperial advances. In a practical sense the triple-frontier, in contrast, was a region of an infinite number of tiny and apparently insoluble everyday conflicts, which in itself created the need for the redefinition of its status within a differently conceived state order.

At the end of this chapter, we need to attempt to summarise its basic content, which is also a summary of the content of this article. The subject of the conference in Graz, as given, starts with the assumption, first of all that the imperial powers in the triple-frontier region, at the latest after 1699, have definite goals for their policies, right up to the level of their practical applications, and secondly, that the fundamental issue for research is the relationship between imperial plans and their practical application. Here we must keep in mind the following, hypothetically expressed from the historical perspective of the 18th century:

³⁸ N.B. Maps of Venetian and Turkish Dalmatia, Habsburg and Turkish Croatia etc. Right up to the beginning of the 19th century the Bosnian part of this region is more usually to be found as “*Tuerkisch Kroatien*”, “*la Croatie turcque*” etc.

First, the military borderland systems of the Venetian Republic, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, each with its exemplary social order, were historically already deeply rooted by the time of the treaty of Karlovac. In the region of the triple-frontier they had a tradition almost two centuries long. War is a major test for each of those military borderland states and systems, so that during a war itself changes take place within the area, but many more occur as problems which remain to be solved after the end of the war. Changes in the first half of the 18th century, which include two new wars between the Habsburgs and the Turks, and one between the Turks and the Venetians, relativised but did not exclude the importance of the historical experience of 1683/4–1699 in explaining and understanding the half century of change in the triple-borderlands, that is the area where three military borderland systems and societies meet. The triple-frontier was regulated for the first time in international law precisely in 1699/1700 and despite a correction at the time of the Požarevo treaty (1718), it remained unchanged until the fall of the Venetian republic in 1797. Therefore, its physical constitution remained essentially unchanged. Secondly, historiographic insights make it possible to assume that events in the first half of the 18th century did not include demographic and social and economic changes in the triple-frontier region comparable with those of the time of the wars of 1683/4–1699. Thus, discussion of the subject of the title certainly includes the need to examine events in the triple-frontier region during the wars of 1683/4–1699, from all points of view important for any discussion about it in the first half of the 18th century. Naturally this would take into account the existence of the military borderlands and the changes on all three sides at least in the perspective of the 16th and 17th centuries!

Furthermore, in contrast to the relative stabilisation of frontiers within the triple-borderlands, the borders between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire and the Venetian Republic, as well as the borders of each of these powers with other countries, were at times to change considerably in the first half of the 18th century. In the middle of the 18th century, historical events and the balance of power between these three powers was to be significantly different than at the beginning of the century. Thus the triple-frontier region, from each of the three sides, was to have a different status in a social historic and cultural sense, within its own boundaries, just as the triple-borderlands as a whole was to be very different. This opens the questions of the difference in the changes within the triple-borderlands during the wars of 1683/4–1699 as historic fact, which we must keep in mind when researching the events over the following half-century in the same region. To put it more simply, changes in the triple-frontier region have different historical consequences for each of the imperial powers.

Thirdly, for every human community in modern Europe, war is always, to differing degrees, a redistribution of human potential, material wealth and civilisation as well as power and authority. The redistribution takes place during the war itself, but contemporaries frequently see its deeper effects only after the war. Where this redistribution is concerned, the question of who won the war is less important in a military and political sense or in international law. What is much more important are all the “other things” that take place in a certain human community from the point of view of the dominant values of the civilisation and culture. Since in the triple-borderlands, in terms of civilisation and culture, a variety of historical events meet, penetrate, and exclude, one of the hardest tasks for a researcher is to explain and understand the contemporary perception of these divisions and shifts, and their importance for the plans of the empires and their practice in the triple-borderlands during the war and following it. I start with the assumption that the most decisive changes from that point of view take place during the war itself.

CAVALIER STOJAN JANKOVIĆ: WHOSE HEAD WAS RULED BY HIS HEART.

Since I would like to present the issues mentioned as far as possible on the level of everyday life, with a historical and anthropological emphasis, the main thrust of this article will deal with one of the Morlach leaders in Venetian service, Stojan Janković (?–1687), and

Stojan Janković. Unknown Painter.



the events he was involved in in various ways. Namely, the basic problem of historiographic and related pieces dealing with the Morlachs, is that they almost entirely depersonalise the people involved, bringing the Morlachs down to a mere mass – or on the other hand, they create heroes, which is simply another form of depersonalisation where research is concerned. The choice of Stojan Janković, as one of the undoubtedly influential Morlach leaders of the time, whom his contemporaries had already immortalised in folk songs, was however primarily determined by the fact that a considerable amount of archive material, which has been preserved or published, has not yet been made use of appropriately in a scientific sense. By researching the subject of his life, as well as his behaviour and actions, I will endeavour to make a contribution to the interpretation of the social, economic and cultural changes in the triple-frontier regions “from the bottom up.”³⁹

One of the earliest known documents on the young Stojan Janković comes from the pen of the Dalmatian *general provveditore* Lunardo Foscolo, who up to 1st February 1650

³⁹ The fullest material on Stojan Janković, still poorly used in research terms, was published in two volumes “*Istoriya kotarskih uskoka*” by Boško Desnica (Vol. I. (1646–1684) and Vol. II. (1684–1749)) by the Serbian Academy of Science in Belgrade in 1950 and 1951. This article will therefore be based on this collection of material and on quite a large range of literature, of which a strict selection is given at the end of this article. Of particular note is: Milutinović, 1971, 221–246.

gave him a monthly salary of 4 ducats as "*figlio di barambassa Gianco Mitrouich, nominato Stoian, in età tenera esistente*" (Desnica 1, 54). Although this occurred during the Cretan war, in one of those uncertain war years, when the Venetians needed to further increase their military power, it seems that this salary was primarily given to the young, approved Stojan as he was the son of Janko Mitrović, who was already irreplaceable amongst the Morlachs (in some later sources after the battle of Zadvarje in 1652 we find: "*capo principale di Morlacchi*").⁴⁰

The Venetians at this time only did this kind of thing when they had complete justification. It would appear that this confidence did not change in the case of Stojan, for relatively quickly, on 1st August 1653, there followed a raise in pay to 6 ducats a month, which was approved by the *general provveditore* Lorenzo Dolfin, once more as to Janko's son. In the *provveditore's* explanation he also expresses the expectation that his investment in Stojan will pay off, since he had noticed in him a great deal of his father's virtues. (Desnica 1, 67). Indeed, the young Stojan, a little later as a *barambaša* (captain of a gang) in Posedarje, did not shrink from perilous exploits, and in one such case, during the march on Obrovac in Cetinje, he was captured by the Turks, probably at the beginning of April 1666. (Desnica 1, 123–127). As he succeeded in escaping from captivity in Istanbul, Stojan Janković was already a favourite of folk songs, and the "Captivity of Janković Stojan" was one of the more popular and not just in the triple-borderlands.⁴¹ All this testifies that the burden of the defeat at Obrovac did not fall on Stojan Janković. If this had been the case he would not have been given the Order of St. Mark, and he would not have been given a deputy with such express limitations. By following documents that have been preserved, we may conclude that his status in the Venetian army grew for he himself, in accord with the norms of the time, on 15th January 1670, that is after the end of the Cretan war, giving detailed accounts of his family's and his own part in the wars, sought from the Venetian doge the position of captain of the cavalry and public acknowledgement. (Desnica 1, 141–142). His request was relatively quickly granted by a decision of the Senate on 13th March 1670, where it says of him: "*sia fatto kavalier nel collegio nostro da sua serenità et dattagli in dono una colana d'oro con medaglia di San Marco per valore de ducati cento bona valuta, ...*"⁴²

The post-war good fortune of Stojan Janković continued, for on 10th august 1670 he was given houses and land belonging to Yusuf-aga Tunić in Greek Islam and 400 gonyals of land "*di terreni arativi, vignati, prativi et inculti nelli confini presenti*"⁴³

⁴⁰ The new *provveditore* Girolamo Foscari gave Janko Mitrović a Turk he had captured at the battle of Zadvarje and gave him a galley, as confirmation of his part in the wars in Lika and Krbavo, and later in Duvno and Grahovo, and gave him the title of chief of the Morlachs." Desnica, 1, 59, 60; Milutinović, 1971, 221.

⁴¹ Andreis in his *Storia della città di Traù* (History of the City of Trogir) writes about this: "The Venetian borderlands mourned the loss of almost 400 of its men, and Miljković and Janković were taken captive, and as respected people taken to Istanbul and held in the Sultan's court; but in the end, by the will of God, they escaped and returned to the territory of the Republic, which rewarded them, and moreover gave Janković gifts and the title of a Knight of St. Mark." Milutinović, 1971, 222. "During the captivity of Stojan Janković in Istanbul, the Morlachs chose his replacement (with the title "Vice Harambassa"), Pavao Unčević, who "would carry out his duties until the said Stojan was free," which may be seen in the document drawn up by the *general provveditore* Cornaro, dated in Zadar 6th May 1666." Milutinović, 1971, 222.

⁴² Desnica, 1, 143. For his exploits in the war, on 13th March 1670 Stojan Janković received written acknowledgement from the Venetian doge of the time, D. Contarinio, which stated: "The Mitrović family, leaving their homeland and Turkish lands, living by the old religion, persuaded many other families to move to live under the banner of Our Lordship, was often involved in many perilous deeds, even going to meet danger where they had to give their own lives... (...) The said Stojan Mitrović for his successfully completed task, has been knighted by our Senate and given by us a gold chain with a medallion of St. Mark worth 100 ducats in good currency..." Milutinović, 1971, 222–223.

⁴³ Desnica, 1, 144–145. According to Desnica, "gonyal" is a measure of area of about 2593 m², that is "a little more than "a day's ploughing."

He thus received good land, on the new borders with the Ottoman Empire, which testifies to the expectations of the Venetians rulers that he would defend them with the greatest possible skill and determination. His abilities in service on the border itself were once again affirmed by another decision by the *general provveditore* Antonio Barbaro on 22nd January 1671, which set him up as the commander of the very important fort at Oštrović, one of the newly acquired and key Venetian strongholds on their border with the Turks (Desnica 1, 155). However his role was not limited to service in the army in the military borderlands, for from sources we see he was also very reliable in his leadership of work on colonisation, subjection of *bajduks*, solving disputes between old landowners and those who inherited their land and solving disputes with the Ottoman authorities.

The *general provveditore* Pietro Civran, at the end of his service in Dalmatia (in 1675), whilst giving a wide-ranging report, particularly emphasised that with the support of "*kavalier Gianco*" (as Stojan Janković was to be more and more frequently called in Venetian official documents) and Smoljan Smoljanić he had "*riuscito tranquillare e divertire molte altre fastidiose emergenze del confine.*" (Desnica 1, 182). At that time, on 16th August 1676, Stojan Janković got married to Antonija Rezzi from Zadar, a Greek of the Greek Orthodox faith. (Desnica 1, 187–188). However it was then that evidence of complaints against him began to emerge for illegal appropriation of goods (Desnica 1, 186–187, 189). These cases however did not threaten his status and prestige, which may best be seen in the fact that the Venetian doge Aluis Contarini issued an edict on 22nd September 1678 ordering the Dalmatian *provveditore* Pietro Valier to enrol on full pay Stojan and one of his sons in one of the cavalry units in service in Dalmatia (Desnica 1, 207). The following year his son Konstantin was made captain of a troop of 50 foot soldiers to be chosen by Stojan (Desnica 1, 211). Pietro Valier, while reporting on his period as *general provveditore* in Dalmatia in 1680, in his assessment of the Morlach leaders, which on the whole was not flattering, makes special mention of Stojan Janković with comments showing his respect, but emphasising the fact that his head was ruled by his heart.⁴⁴

His rise continued in the following year, 1681, when the Venetian doge Contarini, in his edict of 26th July, named Stojan Janković as leader of the Morlachs with a monthly salary of 25 ducats. Janković took over the role of the deceased Count Juraj Posedarski.

With the rapid deterioration in the situation on the Venetian-Ottoman border in Dalmatia in 1682, he was expected to catch Venetian citizens in the border area, who along with *bajduks*, were going over to the Ottoman side. He and Frane Posedarski were also expected to tour the border and report on what was going on. At the same time, the authorities engaged him to gather in the tithes the Venetian subjects owed for the land they were working on the Ottoman side. Namely, after the massacre in Zemunik and the events which followed, the Venetian authorities gave Stojan Janković the authority to hand over the tithes collected from Venetian subjects to the Ottoman owners of the land they were working (Desnica 1, 236–239, 241). At the end of 1682, at the time when a special commission of the Ottoman authorities was monitoring events in Zemunik, Janković was the one who in Gornji Kotari was to ensure as full supervision as possible of the movements and behaviour of the Venetian subjects. In the months that followed, he was given many more such tasks with authority, frequently involving great danger to himself, as along the Venetian-Ottoman border in Dalmatia there was a state of open rebellion on both sides (Desnica 1, 244–245, 249–251 etc.).

One of the people who played a large part in leading the undeclared war against the Turks was Stojan's brother Ilija Janković. For this reason in 1680, by decree of the *provveditore* Pietro Valier, he was condemned to death, which however did not stop him fighting. Although it seems that the Venetian authorities did know the difference between

⁴⁴ "*Gianco ha piu concetto e valore; la mente però non si proporziona con il cuore; ad ogni modo il suo nome è formidabile ai Turchi ed il più accetto ai cristiani, massime del vecchio rito.*" Desnica, 1, 216.

Stojan and Ilija, the *general provveditore* Lorenzo Dona decided on 17th September 1683 to send both Stojan and his brother Zaviša to internment in Venice.⁴⁵

In his report to the Senate on 12th October 1683, Dona justified his decision to intern Stojan and Zaviša by Ilija's crimes, not picking his words when talking of him ("*bandito Elia*"). At the same time, when the fall of the Ottoman forces at Vienna was becoming inevitable, the Turks withdrew *en masse* from settlements and fortresses on the Bosnian-Dalmatian border where they did not feel safe, and many of their Morlach subjects sought permission to transfer to Venetian citizenship (Desnica 1, 257–258). Ilija Mitrović was one of those who had the largest role in breaking the Ottoman forces in various parts of Northern Dalmatia. There the rebellion involved the vast majority of the population in the October and November of 1683. Frano Posedarski, in an attempt to prevent the uprising by the Morlachs of Kotari, found only empty houses there since everyone had gone with the rebels (Desnica 1, 255–256, 258–265, 268–269). The Morlachs, convinced that the Turks would never return, began to loot on a large scale. This drove the Venetian authorities to despair as it was clear that it would be impossible to gather up what had been stolen and return it to those to whom it belonged on the Ottoman side.

Angry as they were for what had happened after the breakdown of the siege of Vienna, and especially because of the behaviour of their Morlach subjects, some of the Ottomans in the triple-frontier region were of the opinion that the Venetian and Ottoman authorities would have to jointly slaughter all Morlachs (Desnica 1, 274–275). For the Venetian authorities the situation was increasingly untenable as the impatient Morlachs threatened to turn to the Habsburg authorities, and the people of Senj in any case were constantly inciting the Ottoman and Venetian Morlachs to rebellion and included them in their own activities.⁴⁶

The breakdown of the Venetian policy of avoidance of conflicts with the Turks in Dalmatia was complete. The authorities were forced to find a way to negotiate with Ilija Janković and his comrades. In these circumstances the return of Stojan Janković to Dalmatia became vital and the Senate decided to release the brothers, reinstall the "cavalier Stojan Mitrović" and to start with, compensate him for the pay he had lost while he was in internment.⁴⁷

At that time there were no Turks in Northern Dalmatia right down to Obrovac, Knin and Drniš. As soon as he returned to Dalmatia, the very same day, Stojan Janković tried to exert his influence to calm the anti-Ottoman movement. Although his first attempt was unsuccessful in trying to stop one of these movements against Morlachs from Žegar, who were Turkish subjects and led by Jovan Baljak and his brother Ilija Mitrović, he did succeed in persuading his own people in Kotari to return some of the spoils they had taken after the looting of Žegar. In his attempt to persuade his own people not to take part in anti-Ottoman activities, he received the reply that they would fight against the Turks in the service of other rulers, i.e. the Habsburgs, if the doge did not want them to (Desnica 1, 291–292, 294–295). Indeed the large number of several thousand Ottoman Morlachs

⁴⁵ Desnica, 1, 253, 254; Milutinović, 1971, 224.

⁴⁶ Desnica, 1, 272–273, 277–278. "The *provveditore* from Zadar informed the Senate (8. XI. 1683) that "the Venetian cavalry was not able to prevent the movements of Morlachs, who have agreed that all the villages should join together." The movement became increasingly widespread and spread further towards Split and Makarska. The Morlachs openly stated that they would not have allowed the Turks into Kotari, if they had known that so many people would die." The *provveditore* sent Colonel Ivan Radoš to the Morlachs, and he met with Bajo Pivljanin and others, and through them he invited Ilija Janković and Jovan Baljak to come to see him to try to get them to end their hostilities towards the Turks. However they did not want to come to Zadar at the invitation of the *provveditore*..." Milutinović, 1971, 222–224–225.

⁴⁷ Desnica, 1, 284–285. "...it seems that Stojan Janković was imprisoned from 17. IX ...until 20. XI. 1683 when the Venetian Senate sent Janković with his three companions from Venice to Zadar, with a directive for the *provveditore* of Dalmatia that he should use them to help calm the rebels;..." Milutinović, 1971, 225.

from the Bihać region who crossed over to the Habsburg side, was a cause of great concern to the Venetian authorities, since their chosen aim was to ensure the loyalty of Bosnian Morlachs to the Venetian Republic (Desnica 1, 297–299). Finally on 15th December 1683, the *general provveditore* Lorenzo Dona sent Stojan Janković to Kotari with the task of gathering together the leaders and ensuring that the Kotari Morlachs would restrain from any violence to Turks and their subjects, Christian Morlachs (Desnica 1, 300). In carrying out these orders Janković renewed his relationship with the Morlachs of Lika, who expected him to come to their aid (Desnica 1, 303–304).

In January 1684 Stojan was given the task of pacifying his brother Ilija, after Ilija had reached the deserted Obrovac, asking the Venetians authorities to secure him a salary if they did not want Obrovac to be handed over to the Habsburgs! Stojan succeeded "*con non poca difficoltà*" (Desnica 1, 317–318). He had less success in convincing the Morlach rebels that they should not persecute and rob their Turkish neighbours (Desnica 1, 319–320). However, his loyalty to the Venetian Republic was truly tested in every sense, and as the Venetian authorities were of the opinion that he withstood the test with honour, on 8th February 1684 *dodge Giustiniani* raised his monthly salary to forty ducats (Desnica 1, 322). The Republic was still faced with the direct possibility of war with the Ottoman Empire. Stojan Janković received another responsibility – to bring out the people of Kotari with their livestock to safer regions and to prepare Gornji Kotari for defence against possible attack (Desnica 1, 328). At that time Stojan Janković, Smoljan Smiljanić, Count Frano Posedarski and Šimun Bortulačić, as the Morlach leaders of Northern Dalmatia, were given new authority to make decisions on both military and civilian issues. Count Ivan Radoš, with his experience of the Cretan war, at that time was given the position of "*sopraintendente*" over all Morlachs in Dalmatia (Desnica 1, 336–337, 346). Thus Janković was at the very peak of the Venetian Morlach hierarchy. Yesterday's prisoner became one of the mainstays of Venetian politics in Dalmatia.

VENETIAN DALMATIA, TURKISH DALMATIA, HERZGOVINA OR...? PERCEPTIONS OF THE TRIPLE-FRONTIER AND THE AIMS OF THE MOREAN WAR.

The triple-frontier rarely caused such intellectual attention as during the Viennese and Morean war, as also in the period immediately before and immediately after it. The European public, and primarily those immediately affected by events in that region, took sides first of all mentally, identifying itself with cartographic representations of the triple-borderlands in its broader surroundings. Cartography was the height of fashion in all European cultural centres.⁴⁸

Of course cartographic representations are very complex sources and in the final analysis testify to both the cultural and the political experience of the location where they were made or who ordered them. This includes their aspirations, illusions etc. as well as their biased "realism." If we keep this in mind, all those sources with origins in the triple-frontier region itself are of special importance, from whichever side they come. These are actually more a collection of lists than maps, which were drawn up on various occasions and sent to a wide variety of people, most often beyond the boundaries of the region itself. Whilst the perspective of the state law of the time re-discovered Turkish Croatia or Turkish Dalmatia by means of cartography, which by comparing various maps could be frequently seen to coincide with one another to a large extent, I would point out a little known Franciscan document, originating from the Franciscan province of Bosnia Argentina, which suggests a conception of the triple-frontier region which differs somewhat from the traditional view.

⁴⁸ See Slukan, 1999.

O. fra. Mijo Radnić (*"custode e commissario visitatore di Bossina Argentina"*) in his letter to the Archbishop of Split from Makarska dated 20th May 1684, writes about the state of Herzegovina (*"dello stato d'Herzegovina"*). In his opinion Herzegovina in the Ilyrian language (*"in lingua illirica"*) means the grand duchy (*"il gran ducate"*). St. Sava is the patron saint of its *bercegs* (dukes), people of the same nationality (*"della propria nazione"*). Radnić says that Herzegovina stretches down the Adriatic Sea, obviously mostly inland, for 300 miles and for a breadth of 150 miles. In a Herzegovina thus conceived we would find Gračac, Obrovac, Vrana, Sidraga, Ostrovica, Skradin, Drniš, Knin, Vrlika, Sinj, Glamoč, Livno, Prozor, Rama ("Ranza"?), Konjic, Mostar, Blagaj, Počitelj, Gabela, Ljubuški, Vrgorac, Imotski, Zadarje, Stolac, Novi, Nevesinje, and Gacko! How far is this Radnić's historical imagination, or how far his erudite experience of the "golden age" of Herzegovina? How far is this the expression of the interests of the Franciscan province of Bosnia Argentina, which on the one hand would like to exchange its Ottoman citizenship for Venetian, but also keep what the Franciscans had gained under Ottoman rule, including the jurisdiction over scattered believers? How far is the change in awareness of the borders of Herzegovina the results of migration, that is the conviction that countries consist of the people, since the population really did move, metaphorically speaking between Gacko and Gračac, and between the Adriatic coast and Rama? In any case, Herzegovina is a special country (*"Il stato è ricco e dotato di tutte le gratie naturali"*) therefore worthy of Venetian attention and the effort needed to bring it under the Republic's authority.⁴⁹

The fascination with Herzegovina on the other hand, is also clear in the discussions of September 1684 in Zadar on the most favourable course of the main offensive of the Venetian army. Whilst the Kotari Morlach leaders wanted to move towards Knin and Lika, the Venetian military commanders assumed the attack would be towards Sinj and Livno, clearly with long term ambitions towards Bosnia, or rather "Herzegovina"⁵⁰

The Morlach leaders of Kotari, with their rich experience of life and warfare in the triple-frontier region, clearly assumed that the Venetian authorities would need to first of all secure an area which they could consolidate both in relation to the Ottomans and to the Habsburgs. In contrast to the largely imaginary "Herzegovina" (read: Bosnia) they were faced with the challenge of the tried reality of the triple-frontier. They were in a position to dispute any map or list of secret information about that region, as their experience was something living, and frequently had been on the edges of life and death.

VENETIAN GOALS FOR WAR IN THE TRIPLE-FRONTIER REGION: FIRST: "SCORCHED EARTH" JUST BEYOND ITS OWN BORDERS.

When we read Venetian sources of the 17th and much more frequently of the 18th century, especially the works of travelling writers, folk writers and natural historians, we may often have the impression that Dalmatia was *terra incognita* in Venice. However we have to be careful when reading this kind of text as a source. The frequent intellectual egocentricism of the writer should not be over-estimated. Although the Venetian Republic finally took root on the Eastern Adriatic coast only at the beginning of the 15th century (naturally from the point of view of its political experience of the end of the 17th century), its roots in that region were actually much deeper and went back to the time of the foundation of the Republic itself.⁵¹

⁴⁹ *Copia di lettera scritta dal padre Fra Michiel Radnich custode e commissario visitatore di Bossina Argentina a monsignor arcivescovo di Spalato. Breve descrizione dello stato d'Herzegovina. Macarsca 20 maggio 1684.* Desnica, 2, 9–10.

⁵⁰ Mocenigo to the Senate, Zadar, 16. 9. 1684. Desnica, 2, 42–44.

⁵¹ See the synthesis of Croatian historic experience in Raukar, 1997, Sources and Literature, 535–590.

The movement of people of all stations, for a variety of reasons, from one coast to the other, as well as further on into the inland area is always significant and never ceases. It is impossible to claim that Dalmatia was unknown in Venetia at any time in Venetian history. Moreover, there were always a large number of subjects in the service of the Republic, people whose origins were on the Eastern Adriatic coast. Thus even in the very heart of the Republic there was no lack of reliable information about their overseas, over the Adriatic, territories, or knowledge of the people who lived there. Another issue entirely is how and when these things were seen, assessed etc. in terms of the Venetian attitude towards Dalmatia. In the 17th century, after the advances made in the Cretan war, Venice's attitude towards Dalmatia changed considerably. It regained its inland "depth," unquestioned from the time of Humanism or even earlier. The 18th century was in that sense different from those before, but it was not beyond the bounds of the deeply rooted cultural tradition of the Venetian "*Stato da Mar.*"

As it entered the war in 1684 the Venetian Republic faced a conflict with its own long-term aims for the Eastern Adriatic coast. In the early Modern era, as it withdrew from its coastal territories on the Mediterranean, so it increased its hold on *terraferma* on the Apennine peninsula. The Morean war brought awareness of the possibility of extending *terraferma* on the Balkan peninsula and to close off the Adriatic waterway more deeply. Geographic maps of Venetian origin from this time showing Venetian and Turkish Dalmatia are at the same time some of the most important witnesses to the Venetian state's program. However this would be in the long-term a policy of confrontation with both the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy, the policy of creating an "Adriatic Empire." No one at that time felt this as well as the people of Dubrovnik, who were in any case very suspicious of everything the Venetians did in the Adriatic. The fact was that the Venetian Republic was going to war with the Holy Alliance against the Ottoman Empire, without any precise agreement with the Habsburgs on the goals of the war in regions where their interests were directly intertwined. Since they were interlinked throughout the broader Eastern Adriatic hinterland, the consequences of the way they fought the war were far-reaching for both sides.⁵²

They are nowhere so obvious as in Lika and Krbava, in the area immediately inland from Zadar, the centre of Venetian Dalmatia. Although the internationally weakened Republic was still ambiguous about its goals in these areas, there was no doubt that the Senate was sure that they needed as much influence and security there as possible. Moreover as Lika and Krbava, on the other hand, were key areas in the securing of the ever broadening path of the Habsburgs to the Adriatic sea, these two areas became the site of military exploits on both sides. As these activities had not been coordinated militarily, both the Habsburgs and the Venetians endeavoured as far as possible to weaken the Ottoman defenses where one or the other had the most interest, but at the same time as far as possible to limit the chances of their ally becoming securely settled in Lika and Krbava.⁵³

⁵² There is a great deal of literature on this, but monographs, based on thorough archival research – such as *Dalmacija u doba kandijskog rata* by Gligor Stanojević – are still few. His other book *Srbija u vreme bečkog rata 1683–1699* is a very useful testimony as to how widespread, in terms of territory, were the Habsburg-Venetian conflicts over their war aims and interests.

⁵³ There is still not a single study giving a comparative micro-historic interpretation of how the Venetians and the Habsburgs fought in Lika and Krbava in the Morean war. Before the Venetians entered the war, the people of Senj exerted their very strong influence, as they had most experience on the triple-frontier, in encouraging the rebellion of Venetian Morlachs in Northern Dalmatia against the Ottoman authorities, but they also sought to weaken the influence of the Venetian Republic in the entire region of the triple-frontier. There is a great deal of data on this in Desnica's collection, but in this sense the collections of material in Zagreb, Graz, Vienna on the triple-frontier are still completely unexploited in any suitable way. Amongst the relatively large collection of historiographic literature the most obvious works are those which approach events in these two areas from either the Habsburg or the Venetian point of view, and in fact do not deal with the complex nature of events in the triple-frontier region at that time!

WAR IN THE TRIPLE-FRONTIER REGION: WAR FOR PEOPLE AND LIVESTOCK

Thus for both sides of the alliance the most important and immediate goal of the war was to lay Lika and Krbava as much as possible to waste, making use of the originally Turkish “scorched earth” (*akindžinski* or *martološki*) policy in the triple-frontier area.

At the same time, their aim was to bring as much as possible of the population, who were actually mostly Morlachs, onto their own side, naturally with all their moveable property, especially their large quantities of large and small livestock.⁵⁴

Where the strategic security of the coastal area (*Primorje*) under Velebit was concerned, where the strategic interests of all three imperial powers met, it was not merely a matter of military interests, related to control of access to the inland of the triple-frontier region, but also the completely “prosaic” and effective protection of the Pag salt works and the trade routes vital for the sale of salt from Pag, as well as other forms of trade. In order to succeed here, it was necessary to hold Karlobag, for which the Venetians and the Habsburgs were struggling. On the Venetian side, their interest was completely clear. According to Vallier’s letter to the Senate of 9th November 1685, Karlobag “è il luoco già contenzioso con vostra serenità posto a dirimpetto di Pago e che apre la strada alla Licca, ne tempi antichi praticata dalle mercantie, che s’introducevano con molto proffitto nell’isole del Quarner, nella Bossina e nel Ungheria.” (Desnica 2, 116). To establish their influence in that region, the Venetian authorities endeavoured to move some of the Lika Morlachs to Karlobag permanently, which obviously did not meet with much response, as Karlobag was at that point completely devastated, as well as very dangerous for any form of lasting settlement.

This kind of warfare was the best way to weaken the Ottoman military power, but it also prevented the other, allied, side from having any possibility of becoming militarily established in Lika and Krbava. On the other hand, in a direct, military and tactical sense, without influence in Lika and Krbava, the Venetian Republic was much more vulnerable to attack from Bosnia along the entire length of their common border, right down to Venetian Albania. This further increased the importance of control of Obrovac and the river Zrmanja.⁵⁵

It was very difficult for any army from the Apennine peninsula to be successful in this kind of warfare. However, since from the time of the Cretan war the Venetian Republic had firm relationships with the Morlach communities within their own borders, but also beyond them, in the Ottoman Empire, and especially with their leaders, at the beginning of the war the outlook for the Venetians in Lika and Krbava was better than for the Habsburgs.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Since there has still been no thorough monographic research into the early Modern era Morlachs in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, who in terms of migration were still very closely tied within the borders of the Ottoman Empire and “poured over” into neighbouring countries under Habsburg and Venetian rule, this researcher is still today powerfully impressed by data from scattered source material about how much livestock even a relatively small number of Vlach or Morlach communities could have in the time from 1650–1750. There is also a great deal of information about this in the collections of Desnica and Lopašić, as well as in many other contemporary sources. What these herdsmen, frequently with rich experience in caravan trade and warfare, were capable of doing may be seen from Difnik’s description from the Cretan war, dated 1647: “After the people of Posedarje had run amok and set fire to it (*Obrovac* – note by D. R.) fear grew in the surrounding area /so for that reason/ eight hundred Vlachs from Đenovica with their families **together with thirty thousand head of cattle, which they had taken for safety to the island of Pag** (underlined D. R.), voluntarily submitted to the *general*.” Difnik, 1986, 127–128.

⁵⁵ Mocenigo – to the Senate, 15th March 1685, Desnica 2, 63–64. In contemporary sources the river Zrmanja is frequently also known as “*Obrovazzo*.”

⁵⁶ For Venetian experiences in the Cretan war, see a full contemporary source in Croatian translation in Difnik, 1986.

Their chances would have been greater if the determined efforts in 1682 and 1683 by the Venetians to prevent a deterioration of relations with the Ottoman Empire did not cause many Morlachs to leave the Republic in the Ottoman part of the triple-borderlands, the more so since the *uskoks* of Senj were willing to give their all to incite the entire region in an anti-Ottoman rebellion, naturally under their leadership. However, those on the coast on the Habsburg side, and especially those from Senj, who had for 150 years been “burning and torching” throughout Lika and Krbava, had an extremely bad relationship with the vast majority of the people of Lika and Krbava, both Bosnjak Moslems and Serbian Vlachs.⁵⁷

The Venetian authorities, in whose service there were incidentally a long line of prominent Morlach chiefs, with many connections in Lika, Krbava, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the case of these two westernmost regions, undoubtedly had far more successes after 1684 when they fought the war in this way.

Of course the Venetian Republic could not, nor would not enter into any form of fiercer confrontation with the Habsburg Monarchy because of their different interests in Lika and Krbava. It was not merely a question of the appropriate nature of such conflicts at the beginning of a war which was under the Pope’s patronage, but also the uncertainty about how long it would last. For this reason it was additionally much more important to first of all secure the maximum transfer of people and livestock from the area where they would come into conflict with the Habsburgs on their own territory in Dalmatia and secondly to prevent in the long-term any use of the land which would be unacceptable to the Venetians (such as burning etc.). To enable them to succeed in this, no one could be so effective or useful as the Morlachs, and their people, as well as those from the other sides of the triple-frontier: “The goal of the Venetians was through incursions by *uskoks* into Turkish territory to force the Christian population to join them, or to become the victims of the *uskoks*’ weapons. (...)” Or, by the same writer: “Wherever *uskok* battalions pass by, they leave behind a wasteland, ashes and death. Their haul of bounty in livestock and other things is increasing. *Uskok* incursions move people to migrate and exacerbate the relationship of the Turks with their suppressed Christian population. This is the goal and intention of the *uskoks*’ warfare.”⁵⁸

In the 15th and 16th centuries in the period of the rise of the Ottoman Empire in South East Europe, the military successes of the Turks would not have been so complete without the ability of the Empire to integrate the rural, agrarian majority into its own socio-economic system, frequently with more favourable conditions than those who were forced to live as peasants knew in their “own” countries before they fell to the Ottoman forces.⁵⁹

From the end of the 16th to the end of the 17th centuries the agrarian crisis in the Ottoman social and economic system became steadily worse, not only in comparison with the previous situation in the Empire itself, but also in comparison with some of its neighbouring countries.⁶⁰

This meant that it was no longer possible to expect the loyalty which for a long time the Ottomans had succeeded in securing from their Balkan subjects, both by their agrarian policies and their policy of repressive religious tolerance of Moslems towards Christians.⁶¹

On the contrary, already from the first half of the 16th century after the fall of Belgrade and Budim, with the lessening of the Vlachs’ privileges, the Vlachs began to migrate westwards, to regions under Venetian and Habsburg rule (the *uskoks* of Žumberak). On the other hand, along the borders of the empires there were broad stretches of uninhabited land, or where there were only a few scattered inhabitants, or in most cases privi-

⁵⁷ See C. W. Bracewell, 1997. Information in a series of places listed as “*Lika: uskočki prepadi.*”

⁵⁸ Stanojević, 1970, 313.

⁵⁹ See the chapter: “*Opadanje Osmanskog Carstva*” in Inaldžik, 1974, 59–75.

⁶⁰ For Josef Matuz the entire period from the beginning of the 17th century to the 1770’s was the “Failure of the Ottoman Empire.” Matuz, 1992, 105–125.

⁶¹ See Roksanđić, 1997, 49–82.

leged communities, of Vlachs or of some other origin. In these “*terrae desertae*” or rather on their edges, life was not simple and was always on the edge of survival, but the people of the time felt themselves to be “free.” (Although this idea, in view of its roots in the Modern era, is today not appropriate for research into the history of the military borderland Vlach communities, it is frequently used in the early Modern era, but any more detailed research into its connotations still remains to be done.) Precisely because of the conditions on the borders of human survival, which included not only the very high risk of loss of life, slavery, total impoverishment, constant hunger, often thirst and every other form of want, and above all the constant “little war”, imperial loyalty was always questionable in the triple-borderlands. This was the more so because until the Viennese and Morean war the triple-borderland was primarily a region. This made the “*vira krajiška*” (the faith of the *krajina*) as cited by Kreševljaković the more vital, as an open system of values and framework for behaviour, which was clearly determined by the situation. It did not only regulate individual cases during the “small war,” but also situations of vital importance in imperial confrontations, the more so since any form of imperial protection was suspect. It is an irony of history that for the regulation of these borderline situations in life, on all three sides of the military borderlands, the idea of “privilege” was already well established in a variety of senses.

ABSOLUTE POVERTY AND CONSTANT LOYALTY

A basic issue for Morlach loyalty was the possibility of basic survival. All three rulers in the triple-borderlands knew this well and counted on it whenever they needed to make any important decision. Battista Contarini, the *provveditore* of Šibenik spoke of their “miserable poverty” (“*la povertà miserabile de quelle genti agguerrite*”). For them to become Venetian subjects, they had to be provided with food, a basic existence (“*per haverli soggetti, è forza haverli da nutrire*”). If necessary, in a time of need they would return to the Ottoman Empire, “*sotto il giogo turchesco*.” Naturally as “*Morlacchi cristiani*” they would rather remain Venetian subjects, faithful in their “*vassallaggio*” if the Republic ensured they had what they needed for their basic existence.⁶²

Thus the *general provveditore* Valier frequently spoke of “*l’instabilità e la non molta disciplina de’ Morlacchi, difficili alla soggezione et all’ obediienza*,” but would not overlook the interests of the Republic itself in ensuring that they had what they needed for a basic life, to enable them to continue as their subjects.⁶³

Marin Michielo “*provveditor straordinario commissario*” also spoke at that time of: “*una estrema penuria di viveri*” amongst the Morlachs under his command.⁶⁴

After the experience of the march on Knin in the winter of 1685, his impressions of Morlachs changed, and became much more favourable than the usual assessment of Venetian officers. It would have been possible to obtain much more from them as soldiers, where the interests of the Republic were concerned if their elementary needs had been acknowledged.⁶⁵

This motive would arise more frequently as the war advanced. It was once again a question of the principle of need in their relationship with the Morlachs, except that Michielo expressed it his own way since he was not in a position to influence any

⁶² Battista Contarini to Pietro Valier, Šibenik, 21. 2. 1685. Desnica, 2, 55–56

⁶³ Pietro Valier to the Senate, Šibenik, 23. 2. 1685. Desnica, 2, 56–57.

⁶⁴ Marin Michielo to the Senate, Šibenik, 25. 2. 1685. Desnica, 2, 61.

⁶⁵ “*Li Morlacchi sono bellissima gente assuefata alle fatiche, che sa maneggiare le armi, che chi li velesse per servirsene, non v’ è bisogno di darli donativo; si hano sopra il luoco, insoma per fare un corpo in momenti di 6 e 7 mille, altro non vi vorebbe che il pane e qualche poca paga al mese. Con queste gente io credo che si potrebbe fare qualsisia tentativo.*” Ibid.

long-term solution in relations between the Venetians and the Morlachs. The reality of war, with its short-term demands, can create the illusion of something that is aimed at in the longer term.

In the uncertainties of the war in the triple-frontier region there were several Morlach communities who found it very hard, when the time came, to decide whether to change their allegiance, since any choice they made included long-term consequences, and at the same time was full of many unanswered questions. The mainly bad experience of Morlachs in the past in similar situations was an added burden when making a choice in a new situation. This indecision sometimes lasted quite a long time. The *general provveditore* Pietro Valier reported on precisely one such case in Cetina. At a time when the Venetian side was making large scale, but insufficiently successful, preparations to capture Sinj, many Morlachs from Cetina, with the *sirdar* Ilija Peraic at their head, debated through the entire winter whether or not to join the Venetians. It was only under pressure from 3,000 Venetian Morlachs, commanded by Stojan Janković and the captain of Šibenik, Mihovil Zavorović, that they crossed over into Venetian territory. There were six hundred of them capable of taking up arms, and they had about 30,000 head of small livestock and about 10,000 oxen! Carrying the full weight of mutual distrust, they were settled in the Trogir area by decision of the Venetian authorities, so they would be as far as possible from the devastated border area, although this form of accommodation, however temporary, was completely unsuitable for a community with such a large quantity of livestock.⁶⁶

Thus the battle for subjects in the Morean war in Dalmatia was primarily a battle for entire communities, in an effort to persuade them to cross over to the Venetian side at as little cost as possible. To that end there was hardly any means that was not thought permissible if it would succeed in persuading them to cross over from one side to the other. The Morlach community mentioned, led by Peraic on the Venetian side and with about 1,600 souls could remain in the immediate vicinity of Trogir because the authorities gave them abandoned Ottoman land to use. Naturally Peraic himself was then given a permanent monthly income – in his case ten ducats.⁶⁷

The *sirdar* Ilija Peraic, sometime in the September of the same year, was to die at sea not far from Rogoznica, in a battle with a pirate galley, and on the same occasion most of his family were taken prisoner amongst 175 others!⁶⁸

The principle of loyalty in service or as a subject is fundamental in settling relationships between the military powers and the people on the triple-frontier. Loyalty may be voluntary or forced, related to a situation or “permanent,” according to an agreement or imposed. Its importance is emphasised only because in the reality of the triple-frontier it was more than uncertain. Namely, loyalty includes certain commitments from both sides. The uncertainty of the triple-frontier made that kind of concept anything but certain. Anything that is debatable in human life, becomes more so in the hierarchy of power. For Stojan Janković, as one of the four most influential Morlach chiefs in Ravni Kotari in the second half of the 17th century, what was declared to be most important was “*di ben servire e far bonore al prencipe*.” However, following the major failures in the Venetian attacks on Sinj in October 1684, Janković did not enter into what was, in fact, necessary criticism of the leadership for the badly prepared attack from the Venetian side. Instead he endeavoured, once again, to concentrate on the military worth of his Morlachs in Venetian service, who were otherwise ritually accused for the failure of the attack on Sinj, as for all other failures whenever it was necessary to publicly identify the guilty party. In the Morean war this all went on as though the Morlachs really did not have the crucial role in the Venetian military successes in the triple-frontier region. It would be hard to imagine that any influential Morlach leader of the time, such as Stojan Janković, would be unaware of this, but

⁶⁶ Pietro Valier to the Senate, Split, 22. 3. 1687. Desnica, 2, 68–70.

⁶⁷ Pietro Valier's *terminazione*, Split, 30. 4. 1685. Desnica, 2, 81–82.

⁶⁸ Pietro Valier's *terminazione*, Split, 1. 10. 1685. Desnica, 2, 113–114; Hasan-aga Mandić to Šain-aga Mandić, Desnica, 2, 120.

since he had no opportunity to influence any change in that regard, he sought a way to commend them again to the Venetian authorities, and himself along with them.⁶⁹

Moreover, when comparing their price with that of other mercenaries, Janković claimed that they did not ask for more than *“un poco di pane”* or *“il biscotto in ragion di libre dieci per testa”* for taking part in such demanding battles. Also, knowing that Stojan Janković was anything but a calculating tradesman with the fate of the Morlachs, since he was himself the one who regularly took the greatest risks in battles that frequently went on day and night, it is impossible to ignore the persistence with which he recommended “his” Morlachs, and how, even in situations where they caused the greatest outcry, he continued to seek solutions to secure their basic human needs as a basic condition for their effective service. Stojan Janković was one of those Morlach leaders who did not see his service for the Venetian Republic as temporary or related to a specific situation. This set him apart, along with many other Morlach leaders in Venetian service in the Cretan and the Morean wars, from numerous mercenaries of various origins, of whom there were always many in the Venetian army. Thus he could agree with the Venetian authorities that loyalty to the Republic did not involve only faithfulness, submission but also steadfastness (*“costanza”*). In that time of war, in many cases, it would be difficult to talk of steadfastness in the case of Morlach groups in the triple-frontier region. War, hunger and disease, and many other motives arising from the situation, could time and again be the motivation for a change in point of view. The Venetian Republic, in many cases, could do nothing to make life more bearable for the Morlachs and therefore relied on the Morlach chiefs as their most reliable guarantee of some kind of supervision of their dependent population. By showing them a variety of honours in public, giving them awards, salaries and regular meals and the like, the Venetian authorities endeavoured to create an upper class in the Morlach community, who, because of their personal interests, would without question identify themselves with their Venetian citizenship, and especially their status in the Venetian administrative and military service in Dalmatia. Bearing in mind their influence in the traditionally founded Morlach communities, and the power over the members of those communities that they had at their command, the Venetian authorities, particularly during the early phase of the war, had no need to question that authority. Frequently their immediate need was to strengthen it further. This relationship inevitably created a great deal of tension amongst the Morlach leaders and conflicts between them. This was often a serious problem for the Venetian authorities, however much it suited them in principle that the leaders were vying with each other. However, in the war situation, the most important thing for the Venetians was still the need to maintain at least the appearance of the unquestionable nature of the oligarchy of chiefs amongst the Morlachs, and bring their personal needs into harmony (*“buona intelligenza tra loro capi”*).⁷⁰

The establishment of the oligarchy of Morlach chiefs in Northern Dalmatia could not however ensure the internal harmony of the Morlach communities. In any case the Venetians' interest was to secure the influence of people close to themselves amongst the Morlachs themselves, which was vital from the point of view of the Venetian authorities, who in those broad stretches of land, inhabited by new, scattered communities, could have no direct authority at all. Thus the necessary components were created for the creation of a dependent network of mainly village Morlach leaders, whose status would be partially based on traditional Venetian methods of regulating Morlach self-rule, and partially new needs which arose out of the Morean war. In that war itself, the Venetian authorities did not seek to secure any direct influence over them, contenting themselves

⁶⁹ *“...che correndo concetto sopra i Morlacchi di non esser atti, che di andar a rubar nel paese turcbesco con superchieria e correndo buona opportunità, per non esserci al confine molti Turchi, di cogliere qualche vantaggio sopra alcuno de loro luochi più considerati per acquistar riputazione...”* The transcript of the hearing of Stojan Janković, Zadar, 30. 10. 1684. Desnica, 2, 50–51.

⁷⁰ Valier to the Senate, Zadar, 9. 2. 1685. Desnica, 2, 54.

with the mediation of the oligarchy of chiefs. Thus Domenico Mocenigo, "*provveditore general dell'armi*," in his report to the Senate on the measures he was taking amongst the Morlachs having taken on his position in the spring of 1684, wrote of his meeting with their leaders ("*capi de Morlacchi*") – sirdar Smiljan Smiljanić, Count ("*conte*") Franjo Posedarski, cavalier ("*il cavallier*") Stojan Janković and governor Šimun Bortulačić – where the central issue was how to ensure public order and obedience ("*obbedienza*"). By his own account, Mocenigo shared their opinion that the only way was to appoint a chief in every Morlach village of their choice ("*...che unico ripiego fosse l'instituir in cadauna villa un capo de Morlacchi che sia persona di loro sodisfazione...*") whose job would be to monitor their movements and to answer to the appointed leader ("*...subordinato però sempre ai principali capi...*"). To ensure that the village chiefs would be looked upon as those with power given to them by the state, it was necessary to give them dolmans (special jackets), medals and rings (... "*veste, medaglie o anelli.*") or salaries if they proved to be diligent in their work. On the other hand, "new Morlachs" were to be given the deserted "Turkish" land which they had to cultivate and which was to make them more attached to the land.⁷¹

REWARDS FOR THE OBEDIENT AND HARSH PUNISHMENTS FOR THE DISOBEDIENT

The creation of a class of chiefs – whose authority in the Venetian service would not be questioned – took time, and they simply did not have time. For the Venetian authorities the most difficult question was how to secure their own direct presence amongst the Morlachs. At that time almost day and night new Morlachs were crossing over to the Venetian side, and there were more and more conflicts between the old and the new Morlachs where the influence of the chief was often the major issue. This was more of a problem since the chiefs themselves were often involved in the disputes. Moreover, as the Republic entered the war, it suited the Venetian authorities for new Morlachs to keep coming over from the Bosnian side, but it did not suit them at all for Morlachs, their subjects, to attack Bosnian Morlachs, Christians, which continued to occur on a regular basis. In this situation in principle the only public authority was that of the Venetian Republic, that is the *provveditore*, but the basic question was how to enforce their authority. Since the *provveditore* did not have sufficient power to protect his own authority in such chaotic circumstances, and could only to a limited extent rely on the Morlach chiefs, the *provveditore* would occasionally need to address the Morlachs themselves directly at their council (*liga*) "*che è un antica e solenne unione delle ville tutte per tutte.*" In those circumstances no more was expected of the council than for it to be an instrument of the *provveditore's* will ("*per far universalmente intendere la risoluta mia volontà*"). His will, naturally, included "*premio agl'obbedienti e pena severa a transgressori,*" that is a "carrot and a stick" as we would say today.⁷²

If at the time he came to Dalmatia, Mocenigo still believed that the four chiefs in the Zara region ("*territorio di Zara*") would be sufficient to maintain effective control of the Morlachs, a few months later, in the middle of July, 1684, he divided that entire region into eight groups of settlements, where along with Posedarski, Bortulačić, Janković, and Smiljanić he gave command to four more men who were not Morlachs: Giulio Soppe, Giovan Battista Soppe, Francesco Ventura and Zuanne Alberti.⁷³

The Morlach leaders immediately reacted, together, all four of them, with a complaint to the doge against the *provveditore* on 28th July. Referring to the commendations

⁷¹ Domenico Mocenigo to the Senate, Zadar, 6. 5. 1684. Desnica, 2, 4.

⁷² Domenico Mocenigo to the Senate, Zadar, 20. 5. 1684. Desnica, 2, 6–8.

⁷³ Mocenigo's *terminazione* from Zadar, 13. 7. 1684. Desnica, 2, 24–26.

they had already received from the doge for their services in the previous (Cretan) war, which guaranteed their authority over the region and the population (“...il governo di questo territorio e genti...”) as well as their services in the latest war, they protested that what they had gained had been taken away from them (“...il frutti di nostre fatiche, sudoir e pericoli”) even before the war, in which so much was expected of them, was over. They asked for the contested nominations to be withdrawn and suggested, if that was not possible, that these men should be sent to fight in the Levant.⁷⁴

The Morlach leaders actually succeeded in abolishing the *terminazione* even before their appeal could have reached Venice, and Mocenigo received a direct order to behave with a great deal more courtesy to the Morlachs and their chiefs (“questa nazione benemerita”) and not to forget “l’interesse della patria.”⁷⁵

It would seem that this success of the Kotari chiefs encouraged the Morlachs of the coastal area to ask that they should not be ruled by people from Zadar, but, as before, by people from their own region.⁷⁶

The people of Vrana (“i Morlacchi di Vrana”) began to rebel in the same way, but their demands were aimed at Šimun Bortulačić. In seeking the privileges they had had before under Turkish rule (“...conservazione del privilegio, che godevano sotto all’ottomano dominio”) they unanimously asked for *sirdar* Smiljanić as their chief, and for their captain, Count Ilija Radašinović. They wrote their request “in idioma illirico.”⁷⁷

The success of the four North Dalmatian chiefs in saving themselves from an attempt to limit their power and authority amongst the Morlachs, resulted in similar attempts throughout the hierarchy of Morlach officials, even amongst the old Morlachs. The demand by the people of Vrana for the renewal of their privileges from their time in the Ottoman Empire was the climax of these endeavours, the more so as it was expressed in the middle of a war against the Turks. Thus the concern of the Venetian authorities in Dalmatia as to how they were to secure the greatest possible loyalty to the Republic from the Morlachs became even greater. The first reaction was symbolic since nothing more effective could be done. There was an overriding conviction that the expression of appreciation could play an important role in calming this new wave of dissatisfaction, which unexpectedly included both old and new Morlachs. In severe cases, they could distribute salaries and financial rewards, which was something the Venetian authorities were usually extremely reluctant to do. Thus the *provveditore* Mocenigo, on 12th May 1684, awarded the Morlach standard bearer (“alfiere”) Kojadin Žepina a ducat a month “per atto di pubblica generosa gratitudine” for the loss of his hand in the battle at the tower of Durak Begović in Plavno, but also so that he would be an example to others both for his deed and his reward (“...esempio agli altri d’imitarlo...”).⁷⁸

Otherwise at that time the Venetians had available some five to six thousand old and new Morlachs, capable of bearing arms. However, in their opinion, they were unused to discipline and obedience, prone to robbery and flight from the battlefield if they experienced resistance. For them to be useful soldiers, they had to be used in combination with the paid army (“militia pagata”).⁷⁹

This was clearly too Mocenigo’s indirect assessment of the capitulation (“capitoli”) of the Morlach chiefs Franjo Posedarski, Šimun Bortulačić, Stojan Janković and Smiljan Smiljanić, sent together with this same message to the Senate, where they suggest the creation of four Morlach light cavalry troops, naturally under his command.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ Desnica, 2, 28–30.

⁷⁵ Edict of the Venetian Senate to Domenico Mocenigo, Venice, 28. 7. 1684. Desnica, 2, 30–32.

⁷⁶ Domenico Mocenigo to the Senate, Zadar, 14. 8. 1684. Desnica, 2, 33; Appeal by the people of Biograd to Domenico Mocenigo, Desnica, 2, 34.

⁷⁷ Desnica, 2, 42–44, 44–45, 45–46.

⁷⁸ Desnica, 2, 4–5.

⁷⁹ Domenico Mocenigo to the Senate, Zadar, 17.5.1684. Desnica, 2, 5–6.

⁸⁰ “Secondo – Cbe dette compagnie dovranno esser sempre dirette da suddetti capi e loro officiali per poter meglio servire ove saranno comandate.” Ibid.

UNWANTED BUT UNAVOIDABLE: SUBJECTS OR ALLIES?

However much the Venetians authorities counted on the chiefs, they had no illusions about the limits of their possible influence on the Morlach masses. On the other hand, it is questionable how far they really cared about separating out from that, in any long term sense, an upper class, who would simultaneously have the support of the Morlachs and the rulers. Mocenigo went on to display his mistrust towards the Morlach chiefs again, for example in his letter to the Senate of 24th June 1684, and even more clearly he expressed his doubt in their military capabilities, repeating his similar restrained assessment: "*Sono in somma i Morlacchi suddeti avidi et insatiabili di rapine, inconstanti et inquieti; atti al rubar e fuggire, non al combatarne resistere.*" Such as these could not be trusted with: "*la riputatione del publico riverito nome.*"⁸¹

Facing the great problems involved in carrying out state business amongst the Morlachs, and burdened by the feeling of responsibility for success in the war against the Ottomans, which he was supposed to achieve primarily by relying on the most numerous Morlach forces, Mocenigo was first of all concerned to convince the Senate of the need for the largest possible reliable Venetian army. The Senate could not agree to this, obviously for a variety of reasons.

The reality of the war would soon make necessary a different relationship towards the Morlachs, as the most numerous military force, especially in situations where the Venetians failed, such as the failed attack on Sinj in April 1685. The counter-offensive by the Bosnian *pasha* in June, aimed at Zadvarje and very dangerous in terms of its possible consequences, as a first trial, demanded the rapid gathering together of a force which would as far as possible equal the Ottomans. That was impossible without the Morlachs. The need was the more urgent since the Bosnian *pasha* also had many Morlachs available to him on the Bosnian side. These Morlachs would need to be paid, and thus the need arose to rely primarily on Stojan Janković and his men as some of the most reliable.⁸²

Thus on 25th September 1685, Marin Michiel reported to the Senate on parades of Morlach cavalry, the first having been in Split, and he gave notice of more to come.⁸³

The dependence on the success of the Morlach chiefs in their military service continued to grow. Marin Michiel "*provveditor straordinario commissario,*" in his report to the Senate of 1st January 1686 could not hide his surprise at a letter from the *general provveditore* to Stojan Janković, where Valier asks Michiel to grant Janković any request he made for bread or munitions. In this way Janković took what was needed for 2,000 men, without even informing Michiel about the aim of the undertaking: "*...ma dove sij andato non lo so, perche ne lui me l'a detto, ne io l'ho ricercato.*"⁸⁴

When Janković returned to Lapac from his march on Lika after ten days, with 1,200 new settlers, 3,000 head of livestock, including 500 head of large animals, and a great haul of bounty, that bounty was divided up amongst the Morlachs themselves, leaving the state as its tithe, just one useless slave, as Michiel reported in extreme bitterness.⁸⁵

The army of the Bosnian *pasha* was routed at Zadvarje and the *general provveditore* Valier reported to the Senate that the Morlachs brought the cut-off heads of their opponents for their ransom. This was a custom introduced and encouraged by the Venetian authorities to ensure that the Morlachs would be as thorough as possible in their pursuit

⁸¹ Domenico Mocenigo to the Senate, Zadar, 24. 6. 1684. Desnica, 2, 19–20.

⁸² Pietro Valier to the Senate, Omiš, 17. 6. 1685; The same to the same, Vrulje, 19. 6. 1685. Desnica, 2, 87–89.

⁸³ Marin Michiel to the Senate, Split, 26. 9. 1685. Desnica, 2, 112.

⁸⁴ The same to the same, Zadar, 4. 1. 1686. Desnica, 2, 124–125.

⁸⁵ Marin Michiel, Zadar, 17. 1. 1686. Desnica, 2, 126–128.

of their enemies, which in this battle had not just been “*Turchi*” but also “*cristiani greci*” who at Zadvarje proved to be ... “*piu fieri nemici de Turchi medesimi.*”⁸⁶

It was precisely this incursion by the Bosnian *pasha* which enforced the need for constant monitoring of the mountain passes, which were the main paths from Bosnia into Dalmatia. The main aim was to separate the Turks of Lika and Krbava, including those in Knin, from others in Bosnia, and thus weaken their military striking power considerably. The only ones who could be trusted with this task were the tried Morlachs from various parts of Dalmatia. Under the command of Stojan Janković the selected men from Kaštel, Klis, Poljič and Makarska went up into the mountains and this time they were better paid than usual: “*...ma è impossibile che si continui lungo tempo in campagna con il solo biscotto, e qualche barila di vino.*” Valier warned, in justifying the extra cost to the Senate: “*necessità di non perdere per poco danaro molti vantaggi, che si possono conseguire...*”. On the other hand, the governor general continued to express his fear of the possible consequences of entrusting “*la pubblica fortuna nelle mani vacillanti e dubbie de' Morlacchi.*”⁸⁷

Since the other two sides, both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, had to use their own Morlach forces at the same time, for each side it was vital for the authorities to know how these forces were being rewarded for their services, and especially how they were being paid in money.⁸⁸

SLAVES, SLAVES...

Regardless of all the possible traditional values which could make a war of this kind more bearable, it was still above all a war without mercy for the weaker party in any situation. The war was the more brutal since it was frequently a war between the Morlachs from one of the three sides, who were under three different rulers, and often in close, if not the closest of relationships.

Following the criticism he received for his relationship towards the Morlach chiefs and the Morlachs in general, in his *terminazione* of 31st August 1684, Mocenigo awarded Stojan Janković a monthly salary of 10 ducats for the duration of the war. Our attention is also caught by his expression of his acknowledgment of Stojan Janković, as well of his men, for their exceptional bravery in battles with the Turks at Knin, Glamoč and Grahovo, as well as their success in devastating Lika and bringing back slaves (“*schiavi*”). Smiljan Smiljanić and Šimun Bortulačić were also to receive the same salary.⁸⁹

Jovan Sinobad (Zuanne Sinobad) was also rewarded with a salary of 2 ducats a month for his courage shown at the battle at Grahovo.⁹⁰

The *general provveditore* Pietro Valier presented Jovan Sinobad a life-long salary of the same amount on 15th March 1686, emphasising his service in settling Poličnik and Nadin with new subjects, but also “*bavenda fatta moltissimi schiavi tra quali Mebrem Comania Turco di considerazione, come ce lo dimostrano moltissimi attestati de'pubblici eccellentissimi rapresentanti.*”⁹¹

⁸⁶ “*...Molte teste sono state condotte e particolarmente quella del Bugliubassà, e ui è l'uso di comperare le teste morte col danaro viuo; et ho creduto in quest occasione animare quest' interessate nazione con la ricognizione del merito di cascbeduno, perchè prendino animo e si proseguisca con la buona fortuna, e con qualche decena de cebini e qualche agnello, non solo la persecuzione de Turchi, ma de cristiani greci, che ci sono in quest occasione dimostrati piu fieri nemici de Turchi medesimi.*” Pietro Valier to the Senate, Vrulje, 19. 6. 1685. Desnica, 2, 89.

⁸⁷ The same to the same, Omiš, 25. 6. 1685. Desnica, 2, 90–91.

⁸⁸ Transcript of the hearing of Vukosav Kosić, Zadar, 8. 8. 1685. Desnica, 2, 101–102.

⁸⁹ Desnica, 2, 37–38, 39–40.

⁹⁰ *Terminazione* of Domenico Mocenigo, Zadar, 5. 9. 1684. Desnica, 2, 38.

⁹¹ *Terminazione* Pietro Valier, Zadar, 15. 3. 1686. Desnica, 2, 138–139.

The motives of the new citizens and slaves were repeated on similar occasions with almost unbroken regularity. At that time Zavis Janković, the captain of Obrovac, was also very successful, for when attacked at Krbava he succeeded in taking captive the *dizdar* of Udbina, Ibrahim-aga who was overseeing the ploughing of his land, as well as “*Aga Cumalich et altri dieci, restandone otto morti nella difesa che pretendevano di fare.*”⁹²

It was then vital for the Venetian authorities to receive reliable information about those taken captive, and of course the possibility of receiving as much ransom as possible.⁹³

In the war in the triple-borderlands, the most important aims were to take as much booty as possible, meaning human slaves, with their possessions, especially livestock. In fact there was no difference between the warriors and their commanders on all three sides of the frontier in terms of these aims. The greatest profits could be made by buying and selling or using human slaves. These interests were regulated by the highest state authorities. Thus in an edict of 18th November 1684, it was determined that one tenth of male slaves should be given to the state in kind, that is as people, as they were more than necessary for maintaining Venetian naval power. Where children, women and old people were concerned, one tenth should be given as money, that is one tenth of the sale price. The highest state authorities in Dalmatia were responsible for overseeing the number and quality of the slaves (“*il numero, la qualita de’ schiavi*”).⁹⁴

Although at first sight it may seem that the influence of the state on slavery in the triple-frontier region was limited and small, without a doubt a certain measure of state policy could have a great influence on the activities of “slave hunters.” As there has still been no thorough research carried out into Venetian slaves coming from the Ottoman side at this time, all that is certain is that they came from all three religious backgrounds. The most lucrative were those from a Muslim background, followed by the Orthodox believers, although they brought in much less profit, and the most risky were the Catholics, as trade in Catholic slaves from Bosnia, which was known to occur on both the Venetian side and with Dubrovnik, could be the source of a variety of problems, even with the Holy See. Since in the areas on the Bosnian-Dalmatian border, some of the Orthodox population was certainly directly serving the Ottoman Empire, but at the same time were the most protected population compared with the Venetian citizens, it would seem that the numbers of Orthodox Bosnian slaves were very high, regardless of the modest price that be be obtained for them. There is no need to point out how slavery affected the relationship of the Orthodox population in Bosnia with the Venetians, especially towards the very possibility of crossing over to the Venetian side. In the war of 1684–1699, transfers of population of this nature became one of the strategic aims of Venetian politics. In order to encourage as many Orthodox believers to transfer to the Venetian side, the government had to exert influence to decrease the trade in Orthodox slaves in Bosnia, and even encourage the purchase of captives to enable them to be released. The *general provveditore* Valier officially demanded the compulsory registering of Orthodox slaves and a state ransom of 200 liras, where the prisoner was not able to redeem himself.⁹⁵

Since the number of people taken captive, slaves, despite all these changes, was still on the increase, in 1685 the Venetian authorities resorted to the introduction of a state title on slaves. This assumed that it was possible to have a reliable insight into the slaves’ situation, who was holding them, in what conditions etc. Valier’s *terminazione* from Split of 5th October 1685 regulated all these issues.⁹⁶ It also regulated the question of the state title on slaves. Judging by Michiel’s letter to the Senate of 26th September 1685, these slaves were being delivered by the Morlach chiefs, specifically Janković and Bortulačić.⁹⁷

⁹² Antonio Teno to the Senate, Zadar, 18. 6. 1687. Desnica, 2, 140–141.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Desnica, 2, 52.

⁹⁵ Declaration by Pietro Valier, Split, 26. 5. 1685. Desnica, 2, 83.

⁹⁶ Desnica, 2, 114–115.

⁹⁷ Marin Michiel to the Senate, Split, 26. 9. 1685. Desnica, 2, 112.

The free trade in slaves amongst the Morlachs was limited in one more way at this time. Since there had been a number of cases where Venetian Morlachs had been taken captive by the Turks and sold as slaves, arranging their release, even without official involvement, was still a great burden for the authorities. Namely, the case of Sinj in 1685 testifies to the fact that captive Venetian Morlachs were being redeemed for arms which the Republic had given them for their military service. In his *terminazione* of 30th September 1685, Valier decided, in agreement with the Morlach chiefs, that following every successful campaign against the Turks when the spoils were being shared, the slaves should be separated out along with valuables which could be used to redeem captive Morlachs.⁹⁸

During their attacks on Sinj in April 1685, the Morlachs devastated the surrounding area, looting and taking people captive into slavery: "*Scorrendo la costa del fiume Cettina i Morlacchi hanno devastato il paese, e passato il fiume in qualche numero d'essi hanno abrughiata la tore d'Obrovaz vicino al ponte con morte di sopra 30 persone, altrettanti schiavi fra figlioli, huomini e femine, asporto di moltissimi animali e qualche cosa altro.*"⁹⁹

Every Venetian report of that campaign regularly gave data on the captives and their status, whenever it was possible. There was hardly any difference between the attitude to slavery of the Morlach leaders and the ordinary people in any military campaign that was undertaken specifically with that aim. The triple-frontier during the Morean war was one of the most profitable regions for the wartime slave trade.

SCORCHED EARTH, SLAVES, CAPTURED LIVESTOCK... AND THE FAME OF STOJAN JANKOVIĆ

In situations where it is necessary to co-ordinate military exploits with the Habsburg army in Lika and Krbava, which was particularly necessary at the beginning of the war in campaigns with more far reaching aims, the Venetian authorities once again had to rely on the Morlachs. For Venetians, to allow the Habsburgs to run the war in Lika was far more dangerous precisely because of Venetian strategic interests, but for larger joint campaigns in Lika and Krbava to rely primarily on Morlach forces was just as risky because their reactions were so difficult to predict. In June 1685 the commanding officer of the Karlovac military district Count Herberstein, invited the *general provveditore* Valier to take part in a joint campaign in the two most distant Ottoman provinces at a time when he was completely occupied with campaigns in Western Herzegovina. Of course he had no choice but to promise the cooperation of the Kotari Morlach leaders, specifically Stanko Janković, whenever it was possible.¹⁰⁰

However Valier was clearly concerned that Herberstein may himself be more successful in the war, so both Colonel Posedarski and cavalier Janković went off to Lika along with *sirdar* Smiljanić and governor Bortulačić. Making use of the Ottomans' surprise at an attack from two sides, which forced them to abandon a large number of settlements, the Morlach gangs looted and burned on all sides, beginning in the village of Rebac, where as well as looting and arsen, there was also: "*quaranta schiavi.*" It was the same in the town of Lovinac which was actually fortified: "*...havessimo fortuna di incendiar Lovinaz primo luocbo in Licca verso la nostra frontiera, in quella notte da*

⁹⁸ "...onde con l'assenso de' sardari, capi de Morlacchi e karambasse, con l'autorità del generalato nostro ordiniamo che in avvenire ogni qual volta, che succedesse nella marcia, combattimento o ritirata, che occorresse farsi d'ordine die capi, che alcuno die nostri restasse schiavo, che iddio non permetti, sia prima di divider il bottino, estratto dallo stesso tanti schiavi o effetti, quanti fossero bastanti per liberare li nostri;" Desnica, 2, 112–113.

⁹⁹ Desnica, 2, 73.

¹⁰⁰ Pietro Valier to Joseph Herberstein, Split, 14. 6. 1685. Desnica, 2, 94–95.

Turchi abandonato." (Posedarski), which is not sufficient if we do not add: "*trentasette schiavi fra huomini, donne e ragazzi...*" (Janković).¹⁰¹

Three hundred and sixteen Morlach households in that area crossed over to the Venetian side, that is 2,561 souls crossed over to the left bank of the River Zrmanja where they were supposed to settle. At the beginning of August 1685, commesar Marin Michel advised their leaders, gathered in Zadar: "*di lasciar un paese barbaro, et il dominio del prencipe tirano, per riccovrarsi soto quello del più giusto del mondo.*" They were granted "*200 stara di formento in circa*" for the time being to help them settle, which was to be delivered when they had all crossed on to the Venetian side.¹⁰²

Otherwise in that campaign there was no direct cooperation with the Habsburg forces, aimed at Krbava, although early that summer, men from the Karlovac area had made strong and forceful incursions into the area. During August and at the beginning of September 1685 several thousand of Janković's Kotari and Tartaglino's Kaštel Morlachs, with some mercenary troops, marched into Bilaj in Bosnia, then Vakuf na Uni and finished up in Srb. The Ottomans, having no confidence in their poorly built *palanke* and *čardake* and having received prior warning of the attack, left their villages and gathered in those with the best fortifications. In the case of Bilaj this was disastrous. However, the greatest gain for the Venetians was the transferral of Orthodox Morlachs, Serbs, to the Venetian side, where Stojan Janković played a key role.¹⁰³

Following Herbertstein's successful campaigns in Lika, in September 1685, when Valier avoided taking part, at the beginning of November of the same year, the *sirdars* of Zadar, their forces united, marched into its deepest interior, as well as Krbava, destroying, as well as many, many villages, about thirty towers belonging to the Ottoman leaders. Since the Turks were retreating before this overwhelming force, this kind of success did not demand any enormous effort or imagination: "*...così che abbandonato il paese poterono distruggere et incendiare molte ville, alcune terre e 30 torri de principali Turchi...*"¹⁰⁴

It is clear from the same report by Valier to the Senate that the success would have been greater if the Morlachs had been more disciplined and if their military training and equipment had been better.

In the winter of 1686, the Venetians were once again concerned about the planned campaigns on the Habsburg and Ottoman sides. It seems that at that time it was more and more difficult to obtain reliable information. Once again a great deal depended on what the Morlach chiefs could find out from their own trusted men or their own scouts on the other two sides of the triple-frontier. According to published material, it seems that at that time Stojan Janković was the most successful in this regard. It seems that he had people all over the triple-borderlands who kept him informed about what was going on. Of these many were newly settled Morlachs. Thus Vučić Olujčić: "*Morlacco nuovo habitante a Bellissane sopra Obrovazzo,*" in January also reported on the successful campaign of the Croatian Viceroy into Bosnia.¹⁰⁵

At that same time there were more often reports of preparations by the Bosnian *pašba* for a military campaign against Venetian Dalmatia, which would partially indicate that the *pašba* was going to head for Knin, and partially for Sinj.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ Desnica, 2, 94–99.

¹⁰² Marin Michiel to the Senate, Zadar, 4. 8. 1685. Desnica, 2, 99–100.

¹⁰³ "*...arrivati ad un luoco chiamato Sarp, habitato da greci, che vi erano scampati, ma poi andorono volontariamente all'ubidienza del signor kavalier Gianco, a vi saranno più di cinquecento huomini d'armi sendo in gran quantita di famiglie e condussero seco le loro robbe et animali, che non so in che quantità. Siamo poi venuti verso queste parti, et arrivati in un luoco chiamato Zermagnia, ridotto ivi tutto il bottino, ne è stata fatta la divisione;...*" Francesco Manzecchi to Pietro Valier, Skradin (?), 8. 9. 1685. Desnica, 2, 108–109.

¹⁰⁴ Pietro Valier to the Senate, Split, 9. 11. 1685. Desnica, 2, 116.

¹⁰⁵ Transcript of the hearing of Stojan Janković, Zadar, 28. 1. 1686. Desnica, 2, 130–131.

¹⁰⁶ According to Michiel's report of 1. 2. 1686, harambasha Nakić reports: "*che il passia medesimo di Bosna sij partito da Bagnalucca con il convoglio, e che si va fermando di luogo in luogo*

At that moment, Michiel could only rely on Bortulačić and Janković as Smiljanić was ill and the other leader was not well.¹⁰⁷

However in the middle of January, Michiel was to receive word that the *pasha* was not moving out of Banja Luka. Nevertheless, the Morlach chiefs and the *barambašas* were on the borders in full force. (Desnica 2, 136–137). By the spring it was clearer that the true goal of the Ottomans was to break the siege of Sinj, and Janković's 1,600 men from Kotari were sent an order, together with a paid cavalry, that they should be in constant readiness.¹⁰⁸

At that time Janković's fame was at its peak. According to one report from Paštrović, in Venetian Albania, it was sufficient to mention his name, or to announce his arrival to help a besieged fortress for the Ottoman siege to be deserted!¹⁰⁹

Following many Venetian successes in battles with the Bosnian Turks, amongst the people of Dubrovnik too there was a great deal of concern over the possible consequences. They were afraid that the spreading of Venetian rule to Boka might lead to them finding themselves totally surrounded. For this reason the people were the most active in as far as possible trying to limit the effect of the Venetian campaigns and to weaken them as far as they could, wherever that was possible. To prevent the Dubrovnik hinterland remaining under Ottoman control, the people of the city determinedly sought the right of the Habsburgs to control those lands, as well as of the Hungarian kings. With this aim in mind, they endeavoured to direct some of their efforts towards the Morlachs and their leaders. Stojan Janković was one who attracted their attention. Although it is impossible to conclude directly, it is assumed that a truly unusual letter signed and dated in Vienna, 30th June 1686, "*conte Matimir Matthias Nicolaus Illynova Illyriae et Dalmatiae haeredis duca Culmiae*," addressed to Stojan Janković as "*il signor cavaliere generale...*" and "*amico mio charissimo*" originated from Dubrovnik with a Habsburg scenario, for Ilijanović is presented as the heir to the title "*conti di Gabella e di tutta Illyria Culmia ducato*," or "*e per conseguenza signori di tutti questi contorni anco sotto Zara*." In a tone which was also threatening, Ilijanović reproaches Janković because "*sua soldatescha*" was mistreating the people in the region of Zadar!¹¹⁰

Of course the *general provveditore* Cornaro was of the opinion that messages of this kind deserved the attention of the Venetian inquisition.¹¹¹

The inquisition investigated the letter and discovered Ilijanović's identity, but did not pay him too much attention except that the Senate gave the *general provveditore* the responsibility of watching for any further correspondence between Janković and Ilijanović.¹¹²

At the same time the Venetians began to deal with the long-standing issue of the organisation of their regiments of overseas infantry. The first unit was given to Stojan Janković which included his right to choose soldiers and officers, with the final approval of the governor general. Stojan's son Nikola was to command the regiment. Permission was also given for a mounted division under the command of Stojan's other son

due o tre giorni alla volta, per dare ristoro a cavalli; che giungerà a Cliumo, dove ritrovarà nuovo seguito per incorporare a' suoi, e che capo di mezzo mese arriverà al luogo destinato" that is to Knin. Marin Michiel, Zadar, 1. 2. 1686. Desnica, 2, 132–133.

¹⁰⁷ "*Gl'altri due Smiglianich e Possidaria, il primo sta guardando il letto aggravato da podagra, che giuntagli al collo, lo rende in sommo pericolo della vita, l'altro dice d'haver male e non si vede.*" Desnica, 2, 133, 136.

¹⁰⁸ Antonio Zeno to the Senate, Zadar, 12. 4. 1686. Desnica, 2, 139–140.

¹⁰⁹ Transcript of the hearing of Nikola Koproneža, Zadar, 6. 3. 1686. Desnica, 2, 137–138.

¹¹⁰ Matija Ilijanović to Stojan Janković, Vienna, 30. 6. 1686, Desnica 2, 144–145.

¹¹¹ Gerolamo Cornaro to the State Inquisitor, Split, 30. 10. 1686. Desnica, 2, 154–155.

¹¹² The state inquisitor to Gerolamo Cornaro, Venice, 22. 1. 1687 and Gerolamo Cornaro to the State Inquisitor, Split, 14. 2. 1687. Desnica, 2, 179–181.

Konstantin. The Venetian doge, signed as Marcus Antonius Iustinianus, issued an edict to this effect in Venice on 7th November 1686.¹¹³

Clearly on all sides, in Venice, Vienna, Dubrovnik, and also amongst the Bosnian Turks, the conviction was growing that further success in the war deeper inland would depend on winning the support of the most influential Morlach leaders, or on how the people behaved. During the Ottoman counter-attacks on Northern Dalmatia in the second half of November 1686, Janković already had at his command 300 men recruited into his regiment.¹¹⁴

He also had already appointed the first captains of his regiment (Zuanne Bossich and Nicolo Blagoevich of Šibenik) (Ibid.). The decision of the Venetian Senate to entrust Janković with the formation of infantry regiments and cavalry troops had an extremely positive effect on the Venetian aims. The extraordinary *provveditore* of Kotor, Antonio Zeno stated on 6th December 1686 that the Patriarch of the patriarchy of Peć (Arsenije III Čarnojević) was preparing to move from Peć to Cetinje to enable him to be more effective in encouraging the people to rebel together with the Venetians, and that he was ready to equip and send 100 riders for Janković's regiment.¹¹⁵

Janković's men gathered in Zadar. As there were more and more of them, Cornaro urged the Senate to supply the necessary equipment as soon as possible, so that they could be moved out of the city as it was dangerous to keep them there in "*il lungo e numeroso soggiorno della gente di tal natura*" (Ibid.). The gathering of infantry regiments and cavalry troops roused a variety of questions and opposition. The recruiting of such a large number of people who could be sent to other battlefields, especially in the Levant, aroused fear in many because of the possible weakening of their defensive power in Dalmatia, where the Venetians in any case did not have very strong forces. On the other hand, other Morlach chiefs, due to their own interests and envy were making the recruiting more difficult. However, the Venetian authorities placed so much faith in Janković for his abilities and loyalty, that any complaints however they were expressed, had no effect on the official relationship towards him.¹¹⁶

At the same time, making use of his prestige in the Venetian service, Stojan Janković did not hesitate to make the greatest possible use of it in areas where, without him, it would be hard to imagine that the Venetians could have any success in the war. At the beginning of February 1686, in a full complaint, giving many details, new settlers in Kožulovo Polje complained about him and Bortulačić, for theft of 500 reals in valuables (silver plate, needles etc.), violence, even murder, because of an agreement with the Turks on the conditions of migration from the Lapac area. They particularly complained about the duty imposed on them that each village had to work a piece of Janković's land in Kožulovo Polje. As the complaint was written by a friar, closing with the words: "*semo christiani, a questo savè certo che tuto il populo fa scriver sta letera da un religioso, e a fato un'altra copia per mandar a Venetia al prencipe perchè veda qua non podemo parlar ne aver ragion....*," it is possible to imagine that there was quite a different aim behind these accusations against Janković, for well-founded reasons (Desnica 2, 133–135, 137).

However Janković was far too important to the Venetian authorities for them to stand against him at a time when he was the most successful on the battlefields which were so important to them, where they otherwise had no other possibility to use their own forces to any significant extent. It appears that they began to count even more on him in the Spring and Summer of 1686 in the attacks on Knin, Lika and Krbava, on one side and Sinj and Livno on the other. In June, the leaders from Kotar devastated the area around Knin, destroying, amongst other things, 25 mills.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Edict from Marcantonio Giustiniano, Venice, 7. 11. 1686. Desnica, 2, 155–157.

¹¹⁴ Desnica, 2, 169.

¹¹⁵ Antonio Zeno, Kotor, 6. 12. 1686. Desnica, 2, 170–171.

¹¹⁶ Antonio Zano to the Senate, Zadar, 25. 2. 1687. Desnica, 2, 181–182.

¹¹⁷ "*La partita de Morlacchi condotta dal kavalier Gianco et altri capi nelle campagne di Knin, ha devastato grandemente le biave, incendiati circa venticinque molini e distrutta una torre*

Somewhat later, in July, the governor general, Gerolamo Cornaro, was barely able to hide his euphoria as he informed the Senate of the very successful campaign of 5,000 Morlach foot soldiers and 1,500 horsemen, under the command of the four Kotar sirdars in their march on Livno, "*sede ordinaria die passà di Bossina, frontiera stimabile del confine, fontico abbondantissimo di biade, deposito principale de munitioni da guerra e d'ogn'altra sorte de viveri.*" This time the Morlachs in the attack were "*gente tutta scielta e valorosa,*" with which they succeeded in killing more than 400 of the enemy, "*diversi fatti schiavi,*" releasing more than thirty Christians from slavery, burning down a large number of houses in Livno and a wide variety of supplies, starting with straw, stealing huge quantities of goods, military equipment etc. Naturally Corner did not think twice about demanding the division of most of the spoils between those who had taken part in the campaign, and of the Senate he asked: "*di provedermi di qualche numero di medaglie et anelli,*" to be able to show the most deserving his appreciation.¹¹⁸ The Senate too, on this occasion had no hesitation in talking of the deserving Morlachs and their leaders, allowing the Morlachs to take the spoils from Livno, and granting the medals and rings that had been asked for as rewards for the most deserving.¹¹⁹

At the end of the summer, Janković and Smiljanić once again set out on a major campaign in the Livno region following confirmation of the news of the approach of a large Ottoman army, led by the *pasha* of Zvornik, Bastić and the Bosnian *Alay-beg* Filipović. Their aim was to help with the rebuilding of the region and especially the military fortifications. Once again in the attacks by the Morlach chiefs a large number of people suffered, many houses and possessions went up in flames, and huge amounts of valuables and useful items were taken as loot. Janković and Smiljanić emphasised that the entire area around Livno, over an area of about 50 miles, was completely laid waste.¹²⁰

PUSHED ASIDE IN THE CELEBRATIONS AFTER THE FALL OF SINJ, IN FEAR OF OTTOMAN REVENGE.

This weakening of Livno encouraged the Venetian authorities in Dalmatia to begin again preparations to take Sinj. The Venetian army prepared for this new march on Sinj incomparably more seriously than on the previous occasion in 1684 which had ended in disaster. This meant that it was necessary to ensure the best possible tactical preparations for the attack, but also the best possible army. This could no longer consist merely of Morlachs, and those chosen had to be the most reliable and the ones with the most experience. There was no doubt that the Turks of Sinj would defend the city bitterly and to their best ability. Indeed, when the *general provveditore* Cornaro was finally able to send a report to the Senate that Sinj had been captured on 30th September 1686, at the very beginning he had to say how Sinj had fallen: "*doppo una disperata resistenza die diffensori al tormento continuo dell'artiglieria, agl'incomodi essentialissimi delle bombe et al fuoco mai intermesso die moschetti.*"¹²¹

In contrast to some earlier reports of successful battles against the Turks, in this instance the central theme was praise for the Venetian officers and the men under their command. Only later may we read: "*et i Morlachi pure con i sardari hanno contribuito l'impiego con la solita natural brava,*" and it continues, "*alcuni de quali essndo stati da me riconosciuti a misura delle proprie attioni con agnelli e medaglie son in obbligo di*

forta, che sopra il fiume Cherca diffendava la maggior parte delli molini stessi, con la prigionia delle garde che v'esistevano." Polo Michiel to the Senate, Bribir, 26. 6. 1686. Desnica, 2, 141–142.

¹¹⁸ Gerolamo Cornaro to the Senate, Split, 19. 7. 1686. Desnica, 2, 142–143.

¹¹⁹ The Senate to Gerolamo Cornaro, Venice, 27. 7. 1686. Desnica, 2, 143–144.

¹²⁰ Transcript of the hearing of Stojan Janković and Smoljan Smiljanić, Zadar, 7. 9. 1686. Desnica, 2, 146–147.

¹²¹ Gerolamo Cornaro to the Senate, in the camp at Sinj, 30. 9. 1686. Desnica, 2, 151–153.

supplicarne qualche nuova provisione e masime degl'annelli stessi per haver modo di premiare in ogn'altra occasione i più benemeriti et animarli a continuare il loro fruttuoso servitio."

With the fall of Sinj a new border with Bosnia was set up on the Prolog mountain above the city on the road to Livno, in naturally bleak surroundings where the *bura* wind frequently blew ("*al vento di borra furioso*") and where it was also difficult to supply the army with many things, including even hay. This was therefore just one more position which would be difficult to hold without the Morlachs' involvement. When reading Cornaro's report, it is noticeable that this time there is no mention of dividing the rich spoils amongst the Morlachs. They would mostly be distributed in quite other directions, as was also to be the case with the division of land and other property whose new owners were to be more often from Split or the other side of the "old territory," that is from Italy. Incidentally, 30 Christian slaves were released in Sinj ("*et 30 schiavi cristiani restituiti alla liberta*") (Ibid.).

The attack on Sinj and of course its fall caused great excitement amongst the Bosnian Turks, leading to a counter-attack in the form of a major Bosnian offensive towards Northern Dalmatia. The Venetians found out about it in time, and immediately endeavoured to prepare themselves as best they could for the conflict. Bearing in mind the great vulnerability of the Morlach population and their property in these attacks by the Turks, one of the first measures they took was to order the population to withdraw from the most endangered places (Ostrovica, Bribir etc.), along with their livestock.¹²²

However, commesar Antonio Molin was only slightly more successful in encouraging Janković and Bortulačić, but otherwise the Venetian orders met with a poor response. There were various reasons for this, but at first Molin pointed out the need for a different organisation of the Morlach army, more appropriate to their needs.¹²³

Ill equipped for better defense, the Venetians were once again mainly dependent on the strength of the Morlach resistance in their defense of Northern Dalmatia. The Ottomans then had sufficient strength to break through almost to the coast and the area around Zadar. In a special missive of 14th November 1686, the *general provveditore* Cornaro put his trust in Janković's courage and skill.¹²⁴

At that moment this support was very important for Janković as he was defending Bribir alone with the core of his gang, but many of his men were scattered on all sides. There was no hope of any kind of agreement of cooperation with other Morlach leaders. It was as if the Venetian military support of Stojan Janković in those days had the opposite effect amongst the Kotar and other Morlach chiefs who considered themselves his equal, but they did not have the privilege of recruiting an infantry regiment and a cavalry troop! However that was probably the less important reason for the lack of any stronger support for Janković in establishing his position in Bribir, facing the advancing Bosnian Turks. It was more likely to be the news of the incursions of a large Bosnian army, with 16,000 men, under the command of the Bosnian *pasha*, with four other *pasbas*, from the direction of Knin, which aroused terror amongst the Morlachs, and every one else right up to the coast, for they had no doubt that the Turks were hungry for revenge after such a humiliating defeat in the triple-borderlands. Seeing that no Venetian army was being raised in Kotar, like the one that captured Sinj, in a situation where the Venetian authorities themselves were recommending that the Morlach population should leave their homes and property, taking the best cover they could find, most of the ordinary Morlach people would first of all take care of their households and their property before being

¹²² Antonio Molin to the village chiefs, Zadar, 7. 10. 1686. Desnica, 2, 154.

¹²³ "*Queste emergenze mi hanno avvertito di molte cose, così della cavalleria come de paesani hanno materia da riflettere opportunamente alla somma virtù di vostra eccellenza, ...*" Antonio Molin to Gerolamo Cornaro, Zadar, 10. 11. 1686. Desnica, 2, 157–158.

¹²⁴ Gerolamo Cornaro to Stojan Janković, Šibenik, 12. 11. 1686, and again the same day and 13. 11. 1686. Desnica, 2, 158–160.

willing to go somewhere where they could very easily be killed having gained absolutely nothing. Moreover, as both Janković and the *general provveditore* Cornaro repeated several times, at that time there was a very strong *bura* wind which blow ceaselessly day and night (“...il vento furioso di bora che spirava da molti giorni non gli aveva permesso d'avvazarli...” /Desnica 2, 162/), which could only serve to further “cool” the fighting mood in those late Autumn days. At the moment when they expected an attack from the Bosnian side at any moment, Janković had very few men left in Bribir, and despite his attempts not to withdraw, he had no choice but to pull back to Skradin.¹²⁵

Some Bosnian troops broke through to Vrana and Perušić, but they barely took any spoils and captured hardly any slaves – it was as though the entire borderland was deserted before them. All they did was to burn down a large number of *potleusice*, the hovels which the Morlachs at that time tended to inhabit. After this, to everyone’s surprise, the Bosnian army withdrew. It soon became known that the main reason for this was the conviction that the gathering of Venetian forces, in preparation for an attack from two sides (Zadar and Skradin) would make them capable of surrounding the main body of the Bosnian army and destroying it. Venetian rumours clearly played their part at this juncture. However, this counter-offensive actually was being prepared, although it was going to take more time.

The *bura* was blowing a few days later over the sea too, causing another great headache for the *general provveditore* Cornaro on his way from Šibenik to Skradin, along with the other problems he was having due to the collapse of the defense of Bribir. The Morlachs had not lived up to expectations, neither the *sirdars* nor the ordinary people, and this forced him to use stronger language in his report to the Senate. Janković was the only exception here, although the collapse of the defense of Bribir indirectly was his responsibility. Naturally this was not held against him. It was considered a great success that the Turks had not succeeded in taking human slaves nor any of their possessions as loot.¹²⁶

THE MARCH ON DUVNO “*PER PRATICAR LA DESTRUTTIONE*” AND THE DEATH OF STOJAN JANKOVIĆ

The Venetian authorities usually thought of the Morlach forces as a major element in the depopulation and destruction of material culture of the Ottoman side. In the marches on Duvno, Livno and Glamoč in August 1687, they were included in the Venetian army precisely for this purpose.¹²⁷

The foray into Duvno, “*novanta miglia circa discosto dalle marine,*” that is deep into the Bosnian interior, and at the same time as a conquering attack on Novi in Boka, was proof of the effectiveness of Morlach warfare from the beginning of hostilities in the Morean war in the triple-borderlands. However, campaigns where robbery and taking prisoners are the main tasks, may easily turn into disasters for the attackers, if they meet with any unexpected resistance from well-prepared and motivated opponents. This is what happened to Janković’s Morlachs at Duvno. In a critical moment, accompanied only by a handful of warriors, he entered into an extremely dangerous conflict with far more numerous, and fortified Ottoman forces. He died as though alone: “*Rende amareggiata la felicità del successo la disgratia incontrata dal cavalier Gianco, quale da una schioppettata colpito, e traversata li poi una sablata sopra la schena, rese’ poche dopo*

¹²⁵ Transcript of the hearing of Stojan Janković, Skradin, 16. 11. 1686. Desnica, 2, 161–163.

¹²⁶ Gerollamo Cornaro to the Senate, Skradin, 21. 11. 1686. Desnica, 2, 165–169.

¹²⁷ “...per coglier con essi qualche vantaggio nel paese nemico, così a divertimento del concorso alla parte menacciata, come per praticar la destruttione (emphesised by D. R.) specialmente di biade e fieni, erano radunati per il svernar del bassa* di Bosna a questi confini, conservati in Duvno, Clivuno, Glamoz, Scopie, et altri luochi circonvicini.” Antonio Zeno to the Senate, Sinj, 26. 8. 1687. Desnica, 2, 189.

l'anima al creatore."¹²⁸ His death had a powerful effect. Zeno was himself still experiencing strong, emotional feelings in his official letter to the Senate of 26th August 1687.¹²⁹

The campaign into the Bosnian interior fulfilled its aims both in a tactical sense, in relation to the campaign to capture Novi in Boka, and from the point of view of the long-term goals of Venetian warfare in the triple-borderlands – the expulsion and material and cultural destruction of the opposing side. Of course, "*(m)olte famiglie cristiane che sospiravano sottrarsi dalla barbara schiavitù, e farsi suddite della serenità vostra, sono state da me caritatevolmente assistite e scortate al numero di trecento cinquanta sei anime, così per la sicurezza loro, come degl'animali, che sono han condotto.*" (Desnica 2, 192).

Zeno decreed that Stojan Janković was to be replaced by another Morlach leader, "*del maggior credito*" Božo Milković ("Milchovich"), who was recommended for his constant show of "*molto valore e corraggio...*" (Desnica 2, 194). Thus the new choice was no longer made by the Morlachs themselves, as was frequently the case by tradition, although Milković's prestige was not in doubt amongst them. Stojan Janković, at the moment of his death was so much a Venetian official that Zeno's move did not create any opposition amongst the Morlachs themselves. Although Stojan Janković had up to that point recruited a large number of people for his infantry regiment and his cavalry troop, and although the positions of commanders were reserved for his sons, they were at that time too young and above all inexperienced to be able to take on this responsibility. Incidentally in this way the Venetian authorities freed themselves of a duty to install them, which they did not care for over much. It is more than certain that they had no interest in establishing any kind of Morlach "dynasty" in the triple-borderlands, especially before the war was over.

The death of Stojan Janković was avenged by his brothers and their Morlach men in various places. Zaviša Janković, *sirdar* Matija Nakić and *harambaša* Božo Milković attacked Varcar Vakuf: "*...riuscirono mirabilmente con l'acquisto di quattro milla e più de minuti, doicento tra cavalli e bovini,*" "*nel lungo giro di dodeci giornate, hanno tutto il paese saccheggiato et incendiato; la quantita di biade ritrovate, così nelle case, come in monti per la campagne, ancora nelle spighe, non possono descriverla...*" etc. etc. (Desnica 2, 196–197). Zeno concludes in his report to the Senate: "*...mentro Turchi si lusingavano, che la morte del cavalier Gianco potesse haver diminuito il corraggio della nazione, e tanto più sono stati fortunati li successi, quanto che non sono periti, che due soli tra nostri, ed uno lievemente ferito.*" (Desnica 2, 197).


In the midst of all this Novi in Boka also fell. The Turks were forced from their most important exit to the Adriatic sea, which was vital for Bosnian interests. Of the more important fortified cities south of the Dinar mountains, only Knin remained in their possession. And Knin was to fall in September 1688, soon after the death of Stojan Janković. Although he died some time before the end of this war in 1699, his death coincided with the time when the Morlachs' way of fighting for the most part began to lose its purpose for the Venetian republic. Moreover, the Habsburgs would finally come out on top in Lika and Krbava in 1689, and on the other battlefields in Dalmatia and Boka, the Venetian Republic fought very cautiously. Stojan Janković died at the right time, when the need for people like him "whose head was ruled by his heart" was becoming less and less.


¹²⁸ Ibid; Desnica, 2, 190.

¹²⁹ "*La passione che io ne provo per la perdita di così degno e valoroso soggetto, può ben esser compressa dall' eccellentissimo senato, havendolo sperimentato di tanta devotione e fede verso la serenità vostra.*"

E' morto certo, come ha vissuto, da gran soldato, ma pu' dirsi haverla volontariamente incontrata, mentre con troppo disuguaglianza e contro gl'ordini repplicati ha voluto perire; tuttochè si bavasse espresso fosse l'oggetto suo di riddur alla campagna li Turchi, e facilitare quell'intento che seco havevo comunicato.

Anco seguita la di lui morte, mi portai in persona nel corpo de' Morlachi stessi per eccitarli alla vendetta del suo capo; ma niente ha giovato; anzi li trovai rissoluti di partire senza di me, e con difficoltà trattenuti segui la marcia regolata a scanso de' discapiti." Ibid; Desnica, 2, 190.





INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

This article was written with one main aim, and that was to make a contribution to the scientific discussion of the basic issues of the history of Croats and Serbs in the triple-borderlands, that is about the Morlachs in discussions about the Triplex Confinium. I would not claim to be the first to do this. Without many articles by my predecessors from the 18th century on, those who have taken part in a debate which frequently involves the whole of Europe, I would not have been able to do anything at all. Nevertheless, there are few issues in Croatian and Serbian history which are so burdened by mythology as this is. I would not like to claim that this article has “solved” any of the open questions, but I am sure that it poses many new questions about these Eastern Adriatic “barbarians,” which indicate the need for a different approach in research to many controversial points. Without the Morlachs it would hardly be possible to write even one chapter of the history of the Eastern Adriatic, as well as of all those imperial powers who ruled there in the early Modern era, in any kind of consistent critical appraisal of their heritage. However it is still an open question, how to do any research at all into the historical concept identified by the Mediterranean “*la civiltà*.” As far as this is a cause for critical reflection, which it has been on many occasions from the 18th century to the present, it is too often approached as a research issue outside or opposed to “*la societe englobante*” without which it is, in the final analysis, merely fiction. The Morlachs were not early Modern era fiction, although they have been portrayed as such in both Croatian and Serbian national ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries, as well as in historical services devoted to them, right up to the recent, truly tragic misunderstanding of their heritage. They represent – depending on one’s point of view – both sides of the coin of the Eastern Adriatic historical experience in the early Modern era, where war constitutes just one episode demanding research.

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